THE 
PROBLEMS  AND  LESSONS 

OF 

THE  WAR 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY  ADDRESSES 

DECEMBER  16,  17,  AND  18,  1915 


EDITED   BY 

GEORGE    H.    BLAKESLEE 

PROFESSOR    OF    HISTORY    AND    INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 
CLARK    UNIVERSITY 


WITH  A  FOREWORD  BY 

G.  STANLEY  HALL 


PRESIDENT   OF   CLARK   UNIVERSITY 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
•Rnfcfcetbocfter  press 
1916 


COPYRIGHT,  1916 

BY 
CLARK   UNIVERSITY 


Ctx  ttnicfctrbocccr  frees,  Hew  Cork 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

FOREWORD  :  WITH  A  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR         .         .         .         .  ix 

G.  Stanley  Hall,  LL.D.,  President  of  Clark  University. 


INTRODUCTION:  THE   WAR  PROBLEM  AND  ITS  PRO- 
POSED SOLUTIONS        ......    xxv 

George  H.  Blakeslee 

PREPAREDNESS 

II 

AMERICA'S  NEED  FOR  PREPAREDNESS  IN  POLICY.     .         i 

Norman  Angell,  Author  of  The  Great  Illusion,  Arms  and 
Industry  and  America — The  New  World  State. 

Ill 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  AND  THE  MAINTE- 
NANCE OF  OUR  NATIONAL  OBLIGATIONS       .         .       22 

George  Haven  Putnam,  Litt.  D.,  Late  Major  I76th  New 
York  Volunteers,  Prest.  of  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons;  Author 
of  Abraham  Lincoln,  A  Prisoner  of  War  in  Virginia, 
Memories  of  a  Publisher,  etc. 

IV 

THE  NAVAL  LESSONS  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE 
PRESENT  WAR  .         .         .  .         .         -45 

Ira  N.  Hollis,  Sc.D.,  L.H.D. ;  President,  Worcester  Polytech- 
nic Institute ;  Graduate  United  States  Naval  Academy,  for 
Nineteen  Years  an  Officer  in  United  States  Navy;  Author 
of  Numerous  Papers  on  the  Navy  and  Engirieering. 
iii 


IV 


Contents 


PAGE 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  NAVAL  CONSULTING  BOARD 

OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 83 

Arthur  Gordon  Webster,  Sc.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Physics 
in  Clark  University,  Member  of  the  Naval  Consulting 
Board ;  Delegate  of  United  States  Government  to  Inter- 
national Radio-Telegraphic  Congress,  1912. 

VI 

THE  POISON  OF  PREPAREDNESS  .      93 

Hon.  Warren  Worth  Bailey,  Member  of  Congress  from 
Pennsylvania. 

VII 
PREPAREDNESS:  THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAM  .     103 

William  I.  Hull,  Ph.D.,  Author  of  The  Two  Hague  Conferences, 
The  New  Peace  Movement,  and  The  Monroe  Doctrine: 
National  or  International? 

ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 
VIII 

ECONOMIC  POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AT  THE 
CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR 121 

Hon.  George  E.  Roberts,  Assistant  to  the  President,  The 
National  City  Bank  of  New  York;  Formerly  Director 
•   of  the  United  States  Mint. 

IX 

THE  ECONOMIC  ROAD  TO  PERMANENT  PEACE    .         .     138 

William  English  Walling,  author  of  The  Socialists  and  the 
War  and  Socialism  as  It  Is. 

X 

ELIMINATING  THE  ECONOMIC  CAUSES  OF  WAR  .     155 

Roger  W.  Babson,  President,  Babson's  Statistical  Organiza- 
tion; Author  of  The  Future  of  World  Peace. 


Contents  v 

XI 

PAGE 

THE  WORLD-WIDE  EXTENSION  BY  INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT  OF  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  MONROE 
DOCTRINE,  AS  NECESSARY  TO  PEACE  .  .  .163 

F.  E.  Chad  wick,  Rear  Admiral,  United  States  Navy;  For- 
merly President  of  the  Naval  War  College;  Author  of 
Causes  of  the  Civil  War,  Relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  and  The  United  States  Navy. 

PROPOSALS  FOR  RESTRICTING   OR   ELIMI- 
NATING WAR 

XII 
DOES  NATIONALISM  ANSWER  PRESENT- DAY  NEEDS?     179 

Edward  Krehbiel,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Modern  History, 
Leland  Stanford  Jr.  University;  Author  (with  David  Starr 
Jordan)  of  a  Syllabus  of  Lectures  on  International  Con- 
ciliation. 

XIII 

FEDERATION  OR  INTER-STATE  ANARCHY  :  THE  WORLD 
CRISIS  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  AMERICAN  HISTORY, 
1783-9  •  •  193 

George  W.  Nasmyth,  Ph.D.,  Director  of  the  World  Peace 
Foundation,  President  of  the  Eighth  International  Congress 
of  Students;  Author  of  Social  Progress  and  the  Darwinian 
Theory:  A  Study  of  Force  as  a  Factor  in  Human  Relations. 


XIV 

THE  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE    .         .         .         .214 

Hon.  Samuel  J.  Elder,  LL.D.,  President  of  the  Boston  Bar 
Association;  One  of  Senior  Counsel  for  United  States  before 
The  Hague  Tribunal  in  the  North  Atlantic  Fisheries 
Arbitration  with  Great  Britain,  1910;  Memberof  Executive 
Committee  of  the  American  Branch  of  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace. 


vi  Contents 

xv 

PAGE 

THE  BRITISH  UNION  OF  DEMOCRATIC  CONTROL         .    223 
Hon.  Francis  Neilson,  Member  of  the  British  House  of 
Commons. 

XVI 

THE   "WISCONSIN   PLAN":    A   CONFERENCE      OF 
NEUTRALS  FOR  CONTINUOUS  MEDIATION     .         .     244 

Emily  G.  Balch,  Professor  of  Economics  and  Sociology, 
WellesleyColiege;  a  Delegate  to  the  International  Congress 
of  Women  at  The  Hague. 

THE  TEST  OF  THE  WAR 

XVII 

THE  WAR— A  TEST  OF  THE  GERMAN  THEORY  OF 
MILITARISM 265 

Morton  Prince,  M.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  Emeritus,  Tufts 
College  Medical  School;  Author  of  From  Webster  to  Wilson: 
The  Disintegration  of  an  Ideal  and  The  Psychology  of  the 
Kaiser. 

XVIII 

THE  WAR— A  TEST  OF  THE  GERMAN  THEORY  OF 
STATE 279 

Kuno  Francke,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  the  History  of  German 
Culture,  Harvard  University;  Author  of  Glimpses  of 
Modern  German  Culture  and  German  Ideals  of  To-day. 

NATURALIZED  AMERICANS 

XIX 

SOME  OF  THE  RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS  OF  AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP ,291 

Hon.  George  W.  Anderson,  United  States  Attorney  for  the 
District  of  Massachusetts. 


Contents  vii 

xx 

PAGE 

To  WHAT  EXTENT  is  AMERICA  SERVED  BY  SUPPRESS- 
ING THE  RACIAL  TRADITIONS  OF  ITS  HYPHENATED 
CITIZENS?  .......  307 

Camillo  Von  Klenze,  Ph.D.,  Head  of  the  Department  of 
Germanic  Languages  and  Literatures,  Brown  University. 

BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  VIEWPOINTS 
XXI 

THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  WAR  UPON  EUROPE         .         .314 

Stanton  Coit,  Ph.D.,  of  London,  England.  Founder  of  the 
Moral  Education  League  of  England ;  author  of  The  Soul  of 
America. 

XXII 

WHAT  A  GERMAN  VICTORY  WOULD  MEAN  TO  THE 
WORLD  .  .  343 

John  A.  Walz,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  the  German  Language  and 
Literature,  Harvard  University. 

PAN-AMERICANISM 
XXIII 

THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  UPON  PAN-AMERICAN 
CO-OPERATION  .......  357 

Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima, Ph.D.,  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary from  Brazil,  Professor  of  Lathi- American  History  and 
Economics  (1915-16)  at  Harvard  University;  Member  of 
the  Brazilian  Academy  and  Academy  of  Lisbon;  Author  of 
Pan-Americanism:  Bolivar- Monroe-Roosevelt  and  Impres- 
sions of  a  Diplomat. 

THE    RED    CROSS 

XXIV 
THE  INFLUENCE  FOR  PEACE  IN  THE  RED-CROSS  WORK    369 

Mabel  T.  Boardman,  LL.D.,  Chairman  of  the  American 
Red-Cross  Relief  Board. 


FOREWORD 

WITH   A   DISCUSSION   OF  THE   PSYCHOLOGY   OF   THE 
PRESENT  WAR 

IT  was  not  without  some  natural  hesitation  that  the 
authorities  of  the  university  approved  the  bold  and 
brilliant  plan  of  my  colleague,  Professor  Blakeslee, 
to  hold  a  conference  here,  at  Clark  University,  upon  a 
topic  that  has  aroused  throughout  the  world  an  intensity 
of  feeling  and  a  diversity  of  opinion  which  is  without 
precedent  in  history.  It  should  be  clearly  understood 
at  the  outset  that  the  university  has  simply  offered  a 
free  platform,  and  invited  the  frankest  expression  of 
opinion,  but  has  assumed  responsibility  for  no  man's 
views.  All  of  the  speakers  on  the  program  whose  ad- 
dresses follow  in  this  volume,  were  here  as  our  guests ; 
they  came  not  without  effort  and  even  expense,  on 
their  part,  to  contribute  to  the  symposium,  and  entered 
heartily  into  its  spirit ;  each  is  a  widely  recognized  au- 
thority on  the  topic  on  which  he  speaks. 

To  my  mind  there  is  no  more  splendid  illustration 
of  the  spirit  of  fair  play,  of  toleration,  of  true  neutral- 
ity, in  a  word,  of  Americanism,  than  the  spectacle,  all 
over  the  country,  of  our  schools  coolly  utilizing  this 
war  to  teach  its  geography,  history,  economics,  on  a 
basis  of  facts  that  all  admit  but  without  bias  toward 
or  offense  to  any  class  of  our  citizens  of  whatever 
nationality;  and  also  of  our  college  youth  debating 


x  Foreword 

everywhere  with  fervor  and  conviction  the  merits  of 
both  sides  of  this  conflict,  singing  alternately  Die  Wacht 
am  Rhein,  Rule  Britannia,  Heil  Dir  im  Siegerkranz, 
and  the  Marseillaise,  and  in  the  end  all  joining  hands 
and  voices  in  The  Star  Spangled  Banner  as  a  Doxology. 
Such  spectacles  are  possible  only  in  a  land  measurably 
free  from  the  awful  handicap  of  ancient  racial  animosi- 
ties and  national  antagonisms,  some  of  them  in  Europe 
as  old  as  the  crusades.  The  spirit  that  hears  all  sides 
with  malice  toward  none  and  charity  for  all  is  not  only 
American,  but  it  is  peculiarly  academic,  for  that  culture 
is  a  very  spurious  one  that  does  not  make  man  more 
tolerant  toward  honest  views  the  opposite  of  his  own. 
We  not  only  permit  but  wish  all  who  come  to  our  shores 
from  different  lands  to  remain  loyal  to  the  spirit,  tradi- 
tions and  ideals  of  their  fatherland,  whatever  it  is. 
We  not  only  wish  but  help  them  to  perpetuate  and 
study  its  language,  its  literature,  and  to  maintain  its 
customs.  We  believe  that  such  variety  enriches  our 
national  life  and  prevents  stagnation  and  uniformity. 
We  insist  only  that  they  must  be  Americans  first  and 
not  disloyal  to  the  spirit  or  interests  of  the  country 
in  which  they  have  elected  to  live  and  by  which  their 
interests  and  their  citizenship  are  protected.  Every 
white  citizen  of  this  country  is  an  immigrant  or  de- 
scended from  immigrants,  and  our  people  are  made  up 
of  representatives  of  every  race,  creed,  and  nation  of 
the  earth.  All  we  require  is  a  gentleman's  agreement 
that  although  they  may  differ  ever  so  widely,  they 
must  differ  amicably,  or  at  least  without  open  strife. 
This  is  the  very  corner-stone  of  such  a  republic.  A 
nation  so  unprecedentedly  composite  as  ours  must 
regard  a  true  impartial  neutrality  that  hears  and  weighs 
all  sides  as  part  of  its  manifest  destiny,  and  this  gives  us 


Foreword  xi 

in  some  sense  a  judicial  position  above  that  of  the 
warring  nations  of  Europe,  so  that  the  verdict  of  this 
country  about  the  war,  if  it  ever  reaches  any  degree 
of  unanimity,  ought  to  be  the  verdict  of  history.  This, 
then,  is  the  spirit  with  which  this  conference  was 
planned  and  with  which  it  has  been  carried  out. 

As  one  of  the  thousands  of  American  teachers  who 
have  been  more  or  less  "made  in  Germany,"  I  will 
venture  to  illustrate  the  above  academic  freedom  by  a 
few  opinions  of  my  own.  Like  so  many  of  my  class, 
I  have  felt  my  soul  almost  torn  in  two  between  a  sense 
of  loyalty  to  and  admiration  of  civic  and  cultural 
Germany,  from  whom  we  have  yet  so  much  to  learn, 
and  German  militarism.  Not  only  by  colonization 
and  trade,  but  by  the  fact  that  Germany  has  set  the 
world  its  highest  standards  in  education,  she  was  ad- 
vancing her  influence  in  peaceful  ways  by  leaps  and 
bounds  in  almost  every  civilized  country.  Her  school 
system,  from  the  kindergarten  to  the  university,  her 
marvelous  illustrations  of  efficiency  in  business  and 
municipal  organization,  her  great  thinkers  and  writers, 
were  silently  leavening  the  world ;  but  now  that  she  has 
elected  to  grasp  the  sword  to  enlarge  her  borders  and 
increase  her  influence  by  force,  she  seems  in  a  sense 
turning  her  back  upon  the  spiritual  kingdom  and 
reversing  the  great  choice  that  Jesus  made  between 
material  and  political  rule,  and  that  of  the  spirit  of 
truth,  for  it  must  be  that  the  pervasion  of  much  of  the 
rest  of  the  world  by  her  philosophy,  culture,  and  science 
generally  will  be  checked.  Our  library  has  collected 
some  two  thousand  books  and  pamphlets  and  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  cartoons  on  the  present  war,  and  we 
know  not  how  many  more  are  to  come,  to  which  the  at- 
tention of  those  interested  is  invited.  It  will  take  years 


Xll 


Foreword 


and  perhaps  generations  before  we  obtain  a  competent 
consensus  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  causes  and  effects 
of  this  war,  and,  for  one,  I  believe  that  the  key  to 
understanding  it  is  to  be  found  in  Germany,  which  is 
far  too  little  understood  by  any  of  its  enemies.     The 
Teutons  have  had  an  almost  unbroken  development 
since  the  days  of  Tacitus.     They  were  strong,  frugal, 
simple  in  life,  as  valiant  warriors  as  the  world  has  ever 
seen  from  the  Viking  days  of  the  furor  Teutonicus.     It 
is  very  significant  that  they  never  had  a  political  revo- 
lution like  that  of  France  or  our  own,  so  that  the  feudal 
spirit  and  autocracy  have  persisted  unbroken.     They 
were  not  converted  till  the  thirteenth  century,  and  in  a 
few  generations  thereafter  Luther  began  to  throw  off 
the  yoke  of  the  Church  so  that  Christianity  has  never 
effaced  the  indigenous  culture,  as  it  has  done  among  the 
Latin  races.  Their  language  has  isolated  them,  and  there 
has  been  and  still  is  a  strange  ignorance  of  both  the  best 
and  the  worst  things  in  Germany  by  her  enemies,  especi- 
ally by  the  English.  When  for  the  first  time  Germany  felt 
a  foreign  heel  upon  her  neck,  in  the  days  of  Napoleon, 
Fichte  began  the  work  of  giving  Germany  a  new  soul 
by  his  famous  addresses  in  which  he  said:  "We  have 
little  left  but  strong  bodies,  an  indigenous  language  of 
our  own,  not  composed  of  the  debris  of  other  tongues, 
an  independence  that  has  achieved  the  Reformation. 
Although  our  history  is  more  marked  by  strife  than 
unity,  we  have  an  inflexible  will  and  there  is  only  one 
possibility,  which  should  be  our  destiny,  and  that  is 
to  recreate  ourselves  by  education."     So  the  military, 
financial,  and  educational  system  was  radically  recon- 
structed, and  Germany  began  the  regeneration  which 
surprised  the  world  in   1870.     No  other  country  in 
Europe,  also,  has  succeeded  in  uniting  the  old  landed 


Foreword  xiii 

aristocracy  with  its  strong  conservative  and  military 
spirit  and  the  new  rich,  and  to  these  the  professors  and 
the  intellectuals  generally  have  been  added  since  1870, 
so  that  all  these  support  the  Crown.  Society  was  never 
so  stratified  into  many  classes,  each  domineering  over 
that  below  and  a  little  inclined  to  servility  toward  that 
above,  these  classes  being  practically  all  measured  in 
army  rank  as  by  a  yardstick.  Hegel  made  the  State 
the  supreme  embodiment  of  the  absolute  reason,  and 
the  theologian  Richard  Rothe  declared  that  it  should 
take  the  place  of  the  Church  and  be  the  object  of  the 
same  reverence  and  devotion  that  had  hitherto  been 
paid  to  it.  There  is  therefore  great  centralization  of 
power.  The  Prussian  Diet,  essentially  the  creature  of 
the  Kaiser,  controls  about  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  the 
population  of  the  empire,  and  the  Bundesrat,  which  re- 
presents the  seventeen  states  that  compose  the  empire, 
can  alone  declare  war. 

The  keynote  of  Prussianized  Germany  is,  discipline, 
organization,  system,  method.  Everything  must  be 
done  in  the  sharpest  focus  of  consciousness.  Attention 
must  revise  and  improve  upon  everything  in  the  social, 
financial,  educational  system.  The  school  is  primarily 
a  creator  of  loyal  German  subjects,  and  in  the  last  data 
available  to  me  illiteracy  had  been  reduced  to  sixteen 
hundredths  of  one  per  cent.  Bergson  comments  upon 
this  by  dubbing  Germany  a  machine,  which  in  his  phi- 
losophy means  a  soulless  and  lifeless,  made  thing  or  a 
Frankenstein,  and  says  that  new  Germany  is  without  a 
soul. 

But  if  she  has  lately  been  turning  her  back  upon  the 
old  German  spirit  and  been  remaking  herself,  hardly 
less  radically  than  Japan  has  done,  so  that  instead  of 
being  a  land  of  dreamers  she  is  now  a  land  in  which 


XIV 


Foreword 


efficiency  celebrates  its  highest  triumphs,  she  has  one 
psychic  element,  the  extraordinary  development  of 
which  I  do  not  believe  is  realized,  and  that  is  will 
power.  Kant  made  will  the  very  ap>ex  of  the  human 
soul.  According  to  his  pragmatism,  reason  can  never 
prove  or  disprove  even  such  things  as  God,  soul,  free- 
dom, or  immortality.  Nevertheless,  they  are  truer 
than  anything  else  because  as  postulates  they  work 
best.  Man  attains  his  highest  end  by  acting  as  if  they 
were  true.1  Duty  Kant  made  the  sublimest  word  in 
the  whole  vocabulary.  It  must  be  done  in  the  face 
of  every  natural  inclination,  in  order  to  be  pure,  so  that 
the  moral  rigorism  of  the  categorical  imperative  filtered 
down  through  Schiller  and  many  others  into  the  folk- 
consciousness  as  a  potent  influence  for  culture,  both 
expressing  and  moulding  the  national  consciousness. 
Fichte,  too,  fired  the  German  soul  with  the  idea  of 
duty,  while  Schopenhauer  even  identified  will  with  the 
force  and  energy  of  the  natural  world,  and  their  ideal- 
istic successors  might  almost  have  said  instead  of,  with 
Louis  XIV.,  "The  state  it  is  I,"  "The  universe  it  is 
I,  for  its  energy  has  its  supreme  expression  in  my  will." 
Thus  the  German  philosophy  was  focussing  down  to- 
ward the  point  which  is  well  expressed  in  the  cry  of  the 
German  soldiers,  "Immer  daratif  und  durch."  But  this 
focalization  on  will  went  much  further  in  Nietzsche. 
He  interpreted  Darwinism  and  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  in  the  most  literal  and  practical  way.  As  in 
nature  the  best  have  survived  and  the  worst  have 
perished,  and  as  evolution  is  going  on  without  end, 
we  must  regard  man  as  he  is  to-day  as  simply  a  link 
between  the  ape  from  which  he  descended  and  the 
superman  that  is  to  be.  Man  is  a  bridge.  Perhaps 

1  Vaihinger's  Philosophic  des  Als  Ob. 


Foreword  xv 

he  will  be  sometime  a  missing  link.  Therefore  our 
effort  must  focus  upon  the  highest  possible  develop- 
ment of  the  best  and  highest  men.  It  is  vicious  to 
serve  the  meanest,  the  humblest.  All  effort  must  be 
focussed  on  the  elite,  so  that  we  shall  in  the  end  develop 
a  species  as  much  superior  to  modern  man  as  he  is  to 
the  troglodytes.  Since  Christ  commended  the  poor 
and  the  weak  he  was  the  great  enemy  of  the  real  inter- 
ests of  man  and  made  for  degeneration.  What  is 
needed  is  to  develop  the  higher  individualities  to  their 
very  uttermost.  Strength,  energy,  ruthlessness,  are 
typical  of  the  great  man.  This  hypertrophied  egoism 
made  a  new  appeal  to  the  ambitions  of  youth  with  its 
horror  of  inferiority,  of  Minderwertigkeit,  and  its 
instinctive  excelsior  striving  to  the  summits.  Hence 
in  the  wake  of  Nietzsche  we  have  a  flood  of  literature 
developing  superhumanity  in  different  walks  of  life, 
and  dramas  and  novels  galore  are  inspired  by  this 
gospel.  One  writer  declares  that  the  supermen  in  the 
world  are  related  to  the  vulgar  masses  or  to  the  aver- 
age man,  whose  verdict  we  here  regard  as  the  voice  of 
God,  as  Prospero  was  to  Caliban.  Unfortunately, 
the  type  of  men  oftenest  selected  as  illustrating  super- 
humanity  are  men  like  Napoleon,  Borgia,  Stendhal, 
and  perhaps  Goethe  and  Faust.  Many  of  the  literary 
and  dramatic  supermen  are  almost  monsters  of  egoism, 
ruthlessness,  and  perhaps  self-indulgence.1  I  think 
we  might  say  that  for  many  German  authors  there  are 
two  opposite  ideals:  first,  on  one  hand,  that  of  Jesus, 

1  See  Wilbrandt's  The  New  Humanity  or  Easter  Island,  the  chief 
character  of  which,  Dr.  Adler,  is  Nietzsche;  Hoffmann's  Der 
eiserne  Rittmeister,  Widmann's  Jenseits  von  Gut  und  Base;  and  one 
hesitates  to  mention  Wedekind's  trilogy  on  the  superwoman,  Lulu, 
who  allows  herself  everything  and  storms  her  way  through  life  desiring 
to  have  every  possible  experience. 


XVI 


Foreword 


often  almost  parodied,  as  in  Hauptmann's  The  Fool  in 
Christ,  who  seems  to  me  meant  to  represent  a  kind  of 
generic,  totemized  man,  who  embodies  many  racial 
traits  but  has  evolved  no  or  a  contemptible  individual- 
ity; and  on  the  other,  the  ideal  of  an  almost  demonic 
being  who  lets  himself  go  with  abandon,  arid  has,  gets, 
and  makes  of  himself  the  very  most  possible,  regardless 
of  others.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  influence  of 
this  movement,  which  seems  to  have  gone  over  from 
philosophy  to  literature. 

Along  with  this  movement,  a  few  other  significant 
books  might  be  mentioned,  beginning  with  Gobineau's 
Die  Ungleichheit  der  Menschenrassen.  The  author  was 
a  Frenchman,  who,  as  Bergson  says,  has  always  been 
almost  unknown  in  France;  a  man  of  wealth,  who 
traveled  widely.  His  main  thesis  is  that  the  Aryan  race 
is  vastly  superior  to  all  others,  as  much  above  other 
white  races  as  the  latter  in  general  are  above  the  blacks, 
that  it  should  be  given  special  privileges  and  made 
responsible  for  the  rest  of  the  world.  As  he  was  unre- 
cognized, he  died  in  proud  seclusion,  as  a  critic  suggests, 
worshiping  himself  in  a  kind  of  ingrowing  religion. 
After  his  death  his  work,  however,  was  translated  into 
German  by  a  devoted  disciple,  Schemann,  and  made  a 
veritable  cult.  It  was  this  trend  that  Houston  Cham- 
berlain's book  developed  still  further,  urging  that  the 
Renaissance,  which  began  in  Northern  Italy,  was  mainly 
inspired  by  those  who  were  real  Teutons,  and  that  the 
Catholic  Church,  which  represented  the  Latin  races, 
by  its  persecutions  crushed  out  the  movement.  The 
best  things  in  Spain  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  before 
were  Teutonic,  and  the  old  Romans  must  have  had  in 
their  blood  Teutonic  ancestors  because  true  Teutons 
combine  the  intellect  of  the  ancient  Greeks,  the  organ- 


Foreword  xvii 

izing  power  of  the  Romans,  and  the  persistency  of  the 
Jews.  He  admits  that  this  fusion  cannot  yet  be  proven 
to  be  one  of  blood,  but  intimates  that  this  will  even- 
tually come.  For  him  all  history  so  far  is  prolegomena. 
True  history  will  begin  when  Germany  realizes  her  supe- 
riority as  she  does  not  now.  J.  S.  Reimers  and  even 
the  anthropologist  Ludwig  Volkmann  go  further  yet 
in  insisting  that  most  of  the  great  men  in  other  nations 
were  really  Teutons. 

A  very  significant  paragraph  from  Mommsen,  written 
in  1858,  has  lately  been  quoted  by  Charles  Francis 
Adams  to  the  effect  that  as  Germany  is  superior  to 
other  races,  she  has  responsibility  for  the  higher  de- 
velopment of  other  countries,  and  must  do  more 
than  apply  a  merely  negative  Monroe  Doctrine  to  them. 
Concentrating  the  good  traits  of  so  many  nations  in 
herself,  she  must  give  their  benefits  by  force,  if  neces- 
sary, to  others. 

The  official  head  of  this  great  race,  which  is  also  a 
nation,  with  all  these  new  strong  aspirations,  prospects, 
achievements, — the  Kaiser,  who  has  been  so  much 
discussed  of  late,  may  and  may  not  have  said  all  the 
things  ascribed  to  him,  but  we  should  not  forget  that 
he  is  not  only  probably  the  ablest  man  in  Europe  but 
has  by  far  the  most  exalted  place,  and  has  wielded  the 
greatest  influence.  Perhaps  he  did  compare  himself 
to  Joshua,  desiring  to  lead  his  people  out  into  a  larger 
promised  land ;  perhaps  he  did  say  that  there  was  only 
one  will  in  Germany  and  that  was  his.  He  is  really  not 
very  responsible  to  either  people  or  parliament,  and 
he  is  a  kind  of  human  deity  for  his  people.  It  is  hard 
for  us  to  understand  the  normal  state  of  mind  of  an 
able  man  in  his  position.  It  is  inevitable  that  he  should 
believe  in  his  destiny  and  perhaps  it  is  necessary  for 


xviii 


Foreword 


him  to  be  no  less  violently  antagonistic  to  the  social 
democrats,  who  seem  to  be  his  Mfe  noire-  Perhaps  he 
did  tell  the  Potsdam  recruits  in  1905,  that  they  might 
be  called  upon  to  shoot  even  their  parents  or  brothers, 
referring  to  the  social  democrats,  that  they  were  the 
only  foe  he  knew,  etc.  But  it  seems  to  me  our  function 
as  neutrals  is  to  try  to  understand  the  attitude  of  such 
a  man  in  such  a  position  before  we  pronounce  him 
insane  or  the  mad  dog  of  Europe,  etc.  We  really  have 
a  great  task  before  us  to  comprehend  a  type  of  race  and 
nationality  which  is  so  different  from  our  own,  and 
which  can  so  readily  be  made  to  seem  both  outrageous 

and  absurd. 

There  are  many  psychological  aspects  of  this  war 
that  are  interesting,  whatever  our  point  of  view,  and 
one  pertains  to  the  policy  of  frightfulness.  Clausewitz's 
three  volumes  long  ago  advocated  what  he  called  abso- 
lute war,  and  his  successor,  Hartmann,  both  heads  of 
the  great  military  training-school,  believed  that  mili- 
tary necessity  justified  everything,  long  before  Bern- 
hardi  advocated  a  Machiavellian  diplomacy.  War, 
these  men  tell  us,  must  not  be  limited  by  humanity. 
Every  passion  is  and  should  be  let  loose.  There  is 
no  such  thing  possible  as  civilized  warfare.  Military 
necessity  can  brook  no  opposing  right  or  duty,  and 
may  justify  every  means.  It  can  see  no  difference 
between  public  and  private  property.  Brutality,  even 
if  carried  to  the  very  uttermost,  may  be  on  the  whole 
the  best  policy  by  making  war  so  terrible  that  their 
enemies  will  supremely  shun  it.  Nothing  that  can 
help  the  enemy,  even  the  civic  population,  should  be 
left  behind  by  an  advancing  army.  One  general  de- 
clares that  the  army  snaps  its  fingers  at  all  critics  and 
defies  all  restraints  when  war  is  on.  It  cannot  be 


Foreword  xix 

limited  by  humanity.  I  think  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  Germany's  conception  of  war  differs  from  that  of 
France  and  England,  but  how  shall  we  reconcile  her 
terrorization  in  Belgium  with  her  regulations  as  to 
what  must  be  done  if  German  territory  is  invaded,  in 
which  case  even  the  Landsturm,  including  the  old  men, 
must  be  ruthless;  they  must  wear  no  uniform  and 
everybody  able  must  do  everything  to  kill  the  enemy, 
by  whatever  means.  One  German  general  is  reported 
to  have  said,  "We  are  not  barbarians  yet,"  intimating 
that  if  the  tide  of  war  went  against  them,  they  might 
become  so. 

As  to  the  religious  effects  of  the  war,  the  literature 
we  have  here  seems  to  indicate  that  as  war  tends  to 
bring  a  reversion  in  other  respects,  it  is  bringing  more 
or  less  in  all  the  countries  involved  a  reversion  toward 
the  religion  of  youth  or  childhood.  Baumann,  a  Ger- 
man professor,  tells  us  that  there  is  a  great  trend  among 
the  educated  soldiers  from  Nietzsche  to  the  New  Testa- 
ment, and  perhaps  quite  as  much  to  the  Old;  and 
Kahler  says  that  the  army  feels  it  has  four  fronts,  three 
toward  the  enemy  and  one  toward  heaven.  Another 
writer  describes  Jesus  as  standing  before  the  door  of  the 
heart  of  the  German  people  as  he  did  before  the  tomb 
of  Lazarus,  about  to  awaken  it.  We  are  told  of  the 
eagerness  of  soldiers  for  simple  religious  services  and 
their  consumption  of  religious  tracts  and  books.  In 
France  there  has  also  undoubtedly  been  a  movement 
in  the  same  direction,  to  instance  only  Psichari's  Le 
voyage  du  centurion,  which  seems  to  have  had  immense 
vogue  not  only  among  soldiers  but  among  civilians. 
France,  of  course,  since  the  end  of  the  Concordat,  has 
been  becoming  more  indifferent  to  religion ;  and  the 
state,  and  especially  the  educational  department,  had 


xx  Foreword 

made  prodigious  efforts  to  substitute  the  worship  of 
France  itself  for  loyalty  to  the  Church,  somewhat  as 
Japan  had  done ;  for  as  there  is  little  Protestantism  or  few 
half-way  stations  along  the  grammar  of  assent,  the 
problem  here  is  peculiar.  The  centurion  of  the  New 
Testament  was  a  military  man  having  soldiers  under 
him,  who  believed  Jesus  could  heal  his  servant  at  a 
distance.  This  he  did  with  evident  great  surprise  and 
hearty  commendation  that  a  soldier  and  a  Gentile 
should  have  such  faith.  So  Psichari's  assumption  is 
that  no  man  can  be  a  soldier  without  being  a  Christian, 
and  vice  versa,  because  the  Christian  must  be  ready 
to  lay  down  his  life  for  something  dearer  than  it.  As 
his  hero,  who  is  himself,  leaves  Paris,  he  feels  the  arti- 
ficiality of  civilization  there,  and  as  he  advances  through 
successive  degradations  into  Mauretania,  he  finds  him- 
self as  never  before,  because  he  has  found  something 
larger  than  self,  namely  the  love  and  service  of  Christ, 
which  he  identifies  as  the  love  and  service  of  man. 
The  final  moral  is  that  just  as  the  hero  was  really  con- 
verted in  his  campaign  against  the  disciples  of  Mahomet, 
so  French  soldiers  are  being  slowly  converted  to  a 
larger,  higher  life  in  their  advance  against  the  great 
anti-Christ  devotees  of  Thor,  the  Germans.  This  is 
the  work  that  has  made  its  appeal. 

Very  interesting  to  the  psychologist,  too,  are  the 
striking  illustrations  of  credulity,  as  instance  the  angels 
at  Mons,  who  were  said  by  so  many  to  have  actually 
appeared  and  turned  the  Germans  eastward  when  they 
had  their  enemy  in  their  power,  stories  which  the 
Psychical  Research  Society  has  rather  elaborately 
studied  and  which  Machen  has  embodied  in  The  Bow- 
men; the  false  story  of  the  Russian  bells,  of  which  U Il- 
lustration printed  a  full  account,  that  scores  if  not 


Foreword  xxi 

hundreds  of  them,  to  which  the  Russians  attach  an 
almost  superstitious  reverence,  were  taken  from  the 
churches  overrun  by  the  Germans  and  deposited  in  the 
public  square  of  Moscow;  the  credulity  with  regard  to 
the  Russian  army  going  from  Vladiv  ostock  through  Eng- 
land to  Flanders ;  the  persistent  myth  of  a  yellow  French 
auto  carrying  a  prodigious  sum  of  money  secretly  and  by 
night  through  Germany  to  Russia,  which  caused  watches 
to  be  set  in  many  cities  and  caused  the  deaths  of  a  num- 
ber of  men ;  the  rumor  that  the  Crown  Prince  had  com- 
mitted suicide ;  that  the  Kaiser  was  dying ;  that  a  great 
earthquake  had  overthrown  the  lions  in  Trafalgar  Square 
in  London;  the  Wolfe  Agency's  report  that  King  George 
had  been  captured;  that  England  had  sought  to  buy 
with  numberless  donkey-loads  of  gold  the  allegiance 
of  the  Sultan;  the  stories  of  spies,  fliers,  of  wounded 
soldiers  who  lived  supernaturally  with  their  limbs  and 
in  one  case  the  head  shot  away. 

Lahy  has  given  a  very  interesting  story  of  life  in  the 
cantonments  or  training  camps,  and  how,  despite  the 
hardships,  the  old  life  seems  to  be  more  or  less  forgot- 
ten and  left  behind ;  how  men  are  absorbed  in  the  present 
and  their  sphere  of  thought  limited ;  their  amusements, 
etc.  When  they  change  to  the  trenches  there  is  still 
more  narrowing  of  psychic  life,  to  almost  the  level  of 
sensuous  response  to  the  here  and  now,  with  the  prodi- 
gious din,  the  constant  danger,  the  very  difficult  con- 
ditions of  life ;  and  finally  the  third  stage  in  the  charge 
itself,  where  the  instinct  to  kill  is  prompted  solely  by 
the  impulse  of  self-preservation,  which  excludes  every- 
thing else  from  consciousness,  so  that  if  soldiers  are 
taken  right  from  the  charge  they  almost  forget  that 
they  have  home,  family,  and  all  the  other  relations  of 
their  life,  and  gradually  emerge  into  their  normal  con- 


XX11 


Foreword 


sciousness  almost  as  from  a  dream.  So,  too,  the  ac- 
counts of  Joly  and  Kurt  Dix  of  the  excitement  when 
the  declaration  of  war  was  made,  of  the  senseless  runs 
on  banks  and  on  markets,  that  sometimes  had  to  be 
closed;  the  tendency  of  all  citizens  to  get  acquainted 
on  the  street,  obliterating  all  class  distinctions;  the 
trend  to  bunch  in  the  open  as  if  the  herding  instinct 
reasserted  itself;  the  flocking  in  from  the  country  on 
the  first  of  August  of  those  who  for  every  reason  should 
have  stayed,  which  crowded  the  trains,  which  were 
soon  after  crowded  again  by  citizens  fleeing  to  the 
mountains  as  if  for  greater  security,  even  in  the  heart 
of  the  country  where  there  was  little  danger  of  attack, 
sometimes  because  they  wished  to  get  away  from  the 
war  and  hear  nothing  of  it;  the  general  nervous  tension 
and  anxiety  as  described  by  Weygert,  often  culminat- 
ing in  hysteria;  the  strange  mental  contagion,  so  char- 
acteristic of  crowds  and  mobs.  The  war  has  been 
very  hard  on  the  nerves  for  those  who  have  stayed  at 
home,  and  quite  often  those  thought  phlegmatic  before 
have  seemed  to  find  their  ideal  medium  for  efficient 
action  in  the  excitement  of  the  war.  Several  agencies 
have  been  developed  for  eliminating  the  unfit  because 
those  prone  to  panic  are  extremely  dangerous,  and  in 
Germany  three  stations  of  examination  for  incipient 
nervous  troubles  have  been  developed  at  home,  and  sup- 
plementary agencies  in  the  field.  Panics  of  horses  con- 
stitute another  rather  interesting  chapter.  So  does  the 
increase  of  the  population  of  asylums.  No  war  was  ever 
so  hard  on  the  nerves  of  those  who  participated  as 
this,  with  its  trench  life,  terrific  explosions,  and  so  on. 
It  is  in  a  semi-unconscious  state  and  purely  impulsively 
that  most  of  the  great  acts  of  heroism  are  performed, 
so  that  people  become  heroes  without  knowing  it. 


Foreword  xxiii 

Freud  and  many  others  have  shown  how  regressive 
war  is,  how  it  plunges  man  back  into  his  basal  nature, 
how  it  may  perhaps  in  a  sense  be  a  psychological  neces- 
sity occasionally,  because  it  relieves  both  the  tension 
of  progress,  which  is  hard,  and  the  monotony  and  spe- 
cialization of  life.  It  immerses  man  in  the  rank  primi- 
tive emotions.  Some  of  these  genetic  psychologists 
believe  that  it  is  almost  regenerative  of  energy,  and 
some  are  pessimistic,  holding  that  the  basal  instinct  of 
mankind  is  to  kill  in  the  sense  of  Hobbes,  that  the 
murder  lust  is  the  deepest  thing  in  man,  and  that  such 
a  war  as  this  shows  how  very  superficial  and  ineffective 
are  all  the  restraints  that  culture  has  imposed,  how  the 
hundreds  and  thousands,  perhaps  millions,  of  years  in 
which  man's  basal  nature  has  been  developed,  are  still 
incomparably  stronger  than  the  superficial  veneer  of 
culture  of  the  last  two  or  three  millennia.  Man  longs 
for  things  racially  old.  He  lives  on  an  evolutionary 
ladder.  Retrogression  is  a  means  of  regeneration. 

From  a  eugenic  point  of  view  the  war  is  unspeakably 
horrible.  We  have  various  estimates  as  to  the  number 
of  thousands  of  babies  per  month  that  would  have 
been  born  had  the  twenty  million  men  in  the  field  stayed 
at  home,  and  already  we  have  a  number  of  appalling 
statistics  as  to  the  unprecedented  drop  of  the  baby 
crop.  Now  heredity  is  the  most  ancient  and  precious 
wealth  and  worth,  and  if  it  is  impaired  in  quality  or 
quantity,  disaster  must  follow,  for  only  the  young,  the 
old,  and  the  feeble  are  left  at  home  to  propagate  the 
race.  Of  the  schemes  that  this  situation  has  suggested 
this  is  not  the  place  to  speak.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  a  war  involving  such  terrific  and  unprecedented 
strain  upon  the  nervous  system  will  vastly  impair  the 
quality  of  parenthood,  not  only  for  years  but  for  gene- 


Foreword 

rations,  because  we  now  know  something  of  the  very 
close  connection  between  the  nervous  and  the  repro- 
ductive system.  Again,  if  Europe  is  set  back,  does  it 
not  follow  that  the  fecund  east,  e.  g.,  China,  which 
has  already  begun  its  regeneration,  will  at  least  greatly 
lessen  the  culture  interval  that  separates  the  yellow 
from  the  white  race?  It  seems  to  me  that  the  main 
thing  in  view  of  all  these  stupendous  problems  in  this 
country  is  for  us  to  keep  our  poise  and  make  real  neu- 
trality our  religion;  to  insist  upon  a  judicial  attitude; 
to  always  hear  the  other  side;  to  be  ready  not  only  to 
learn  of  the  side  to  which  our  sympathies  run  counter, 
but  to  study,  to  appreciate  this  point  of  view.  The 
glory  of  this  country  is  that  those  who  come  here  do 
make  a  tabula  rasa  of  all  these  ghastly  inherited  preju- 
dices and  animosities  and  rancors,  and  that  toleration 
here  means  that  people  must  agree  to  differ.  That  we 
have  none  of  these  old  chimneys  to  burn  but  that  we 
can  develop  the  philosophic  temper  to  keep  questions 
on  which  men  differ  wide  open,  is  the  glory  of  the 
country  and  gives  us  cause  to  love  it  more  than  ever. 


G.  STANLEY  HALL. 


CLARK  UNIVERSITY,  WORCESTER,  MASS., 
April  24,  1916. 


THE  WAR  PROBLEM  AND  ITS  PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS 

BY  GEORGE  H.  BLAKESLEE 

IN  looking  back  over  the  past  thousand  years  of 
European  civilization,  we  must  often  be  struck  by 
the  fact  that  much  of  Europe's  most  intense  and  longest 
continued  suffering  has  been  caused  by  a  failure  not 
so  much  of  character  as  of  intellect,  not  so  much  by 
wrong-meaning  as  by  wrong- thinking.  The  centuries 
of  religious  wars  were  due  not  to  the  fact  that  the 
men  of  those  ages  were  worse  in  character  than 
those  of  the  present,  but  to  their  failure  to  see  that 
armed  force  is  not  the  appropriate  method  for  ex- 
tending spiritual  truth.  The  long-continued  religious 
persecution,  the  inquisition,  and  the  martyr's  stake 
existed  because  the  men  of  the  past  had  not  come  to 
the  belief  or  conviction  that  toleration  in  religious 
matters  is  correct  state  policy.  The  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  executions  for  witchcraft  were  not  due  to 
the  wickedness  of  past  generations.  In  fact,  the  court 
which  met  at  Salem  was  probably  composed  of  better 
men,  by  any  reasonable  standard  which  we  could  apply, 
than  any  court  which  has  been  held  anywhere  in  the 
United  States  within  recent  decades;  yet  it  condemned 
to  death  many  perfectly  innocent  men  and  women. 
The  failure  was  an  intellectual  one,  caused  by  the  belief 
that  witches  could  possess  and  control  human  beings. 


XXVI 


Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 


In  each  of  these  cases  what  was  needed,  above  every- 
thing else,  was  correct  judgment  and  accurate  thinking. 

In  the  world's  tragic  suffering  of  to-day  we  have  a 
similar  situation.  The  failure  to  find  some  means  of 
regulating  the  intercourse  of  states  without  recurring 
war  has  been  due,  in  the  recent  past,  not  so  much  to 
wrong-meaning  as  to  wrong-thinking.  The  vast  major- 
ity of  mankind  are  anxious  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  war ; 
but  the  best  thought  of  the  world  does  not  know  how 
this  may  be  done.  At  bottom  the  problem  is  primarily 
an  intellectual  one,  perhaps  the  greatest  civilization 
has  ever  had  to  solve.  It  deals,  to  be  sure,  with 
elements  now  charged  with  passion,  hate,  selfish 
idealism,  and  national  egoism,  but  it  is  nevertheless 
essentially  an  intellectual  problem. 

It  may  be  well,  in  the  first  place,  to  consider  the 
general  thought  of  the  world  in  regard  to  war,  the 
possibility  of  making  the  present  "the  last  war,"  and 
the  means  by  which  this  may  be  brought  about. 

It  must  be  admitted,  at  the  start,  that  there  are  some 
who  believe  in  occasional  war  as  a  good  national  tonic. 
We  all  remember  Von  Moltke's  famous  expression: 
"Permanent  peace  is  a  dream,  and  not  even  a  beau- 
tiful dream  at  that — no  nation  ever  yet  enjoyed  a  pro- 
tracted peace  without  sowing  the  seeds  of  ineradicable 
decline."  According  to  this  school  of  thought,  war 
is  needed  now  and  then  to  develop  national  hardihood 
and  self-sacrifice.  Closely  allied  to  this  extreme 
militaristic  view,  is  that  which  holds  that  the  state 
should  make  war,  cold-bloodedly,  as  a  matter  of  policy, 
whenever  it  may  secure  any  national  advantage  by  it. 
We  instinctively  turn  to  Bernhardi,  as  the  great 
exponent  of  this  creed.  But  Bernhardis  are  not 
limited  to  Germany,  although  they  exist  there  in  far  too 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxvii 

great  numbers.  They  are  found  in  Great  Britain,  as 
present-day  Teutonic  apologists  prove  by  quotations 
from  their  writings,  while  there  are  at  least  some  of 
them  here  in  our  own  midst.  Two  or  three  recent 
quotations  well  express  their  militaristic  philosophy: 
"Every  nation  to  be  respected  must  have  an  imperial 
ambition";  "world  empire  is  the  only  logical  and 
natural  aim  for  a  nation ' ' ;  and  "  it  is  the  absolute  right 
of  a  nation  to  live  to  its  full  intensity,  to  expand,  to 
found  colonies,  to  get  richer  and  richer  by  any  proper 
means  such  as  armed  conquest."  All  three  of  these 
statements  are  from  recent  issues  of  The  Seven  Seas,  the 
official  publication  of  the  Navy  League  of  the  United 
States.  The  last  quotation  continues,  "  Such  expansion 
as  an  aim  is  an  inalienable  right  and  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  it  is  a  particular  duty."  What  is  our 
"particular  duty"?  Expansion  by  armed  conquest — 
according  to  the  journal  of  our  Navy  League. 

Men  with  these  views  we  find  in  some  proportion 
in  every  country.  But  fortunately  they  are  in  the 
minority;  even  in  militaristic  Germany  they  are  in  the 
minority,  however  influential  we  may  regard  them. 
Bernhardi  himself  admits  that  he  wrote  his  famous 
book  in  order  to  turn  the  mass  of  the  German  nation 
from  peaceful  to  militaristic  ideals.  He  says:  "They 
[the  German  people]  have  to-day  become  a  peace- 
loving — an  almost  too  peace-loving  nation.  A  rude 
shock  is  needed  to  awaken  their  warlike  instincts"; 
and  farther  on  he  speaks  of  "the  aspirations  for  peace 
which  seem  to  dominate  our  age  and  threaten  to  poison 
the  soul  of  the  German  people."  This  idea,  that  the 
majority  of  the  Germans  are  peace-loving  and  not 
militaristic,  is  endorsed  by  the  British  writer,  Norman 
Angell,  who  says : 


xxviii  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

When  the  German  Government  desired  to  get  its  budgets 
voted  in  the  Reichstag,  it  was  obliged  to  disavow  any 
intention  of  aggression  and  to  base  its  appeal  on  the  danger 
that  Germany  was  exposed  to. 

From  a  French  source  evidence  of  the  non-aggressive 
character  of  the  mass  of  the  German  people  may  be 
found  in  the  secret  report  on  public  opinion  in  Germany, 
which  was  prepared  by  the  French  Embassy  in  Berlin 
in  1913,  and  recently  published  in  the  French  collection 
of  diplomatic  war  correspondence. 

The  great  majority  in  every  civilized  nation  do  not 
wish  war,  and  do  not  believe  in  it  either  as  a  good  in 
itself  or  as  a  policy  of  calculated  aggression ;  but  they  do 
propose  to  defend  their  country  as  well  as  its  policies, 
and  to  fulfill  their  national  obligations. 

A  large  proportion  of  those  who  hold  these  views 
believe  in  the  policy  of  adequate  national  preparedness. 
Their  motto  is:  "Peace  by  Preparedness."  This 
idea  that  international  peace  is  to  be  secured  by  na- 
tional preparedness  seems  to  be  the  popular  one  in 
each  great  country  to-day.  It  shows  the  loose  thinking 
so  characteristic  of  this  field.  Of  course,  if  there  is 
danger  of  war,  no  nation,  without  great  risk,  can  be 
without  reasonable  preparation  for  the  defense  of  its 
territory  and  its  national  policies.  It  is  obvious  that  a 
nation  which  can  probably  win  any  war  waged  against 
it,  is  reasonably,  although  not  certainly,  safe  from 
attack.  As  Winston  Churchill,  formerly  First  Lord 
of  the  British  Admiralty,  once  said:  "The  way  to 
secure  peace  is  to  be  so  strong  that  victory  in  the  event 
of  war  is  certain."  This  same  idea  was  recently 
expressed  by  one  of  our  own  Rear-Admirals,  A.  M. 
Knight,  when  testifying  before  the  House  Committee 
on  Naval  Affairs.  "Isn't  this  true,"  he  was  asked, 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxix 

"that  if  we  are  going  to  have  a  naval  defense  that  is  a 
sure  defense,  we  must  have  the  biggest  navy  afloat?" 
"It  is,  "  answered  the  Admiral. 

Let  us  cease,  however,  to  be  merely  nationalistic 
and  take  a  world  view.  Each  nation  cannot  be  stronger 
than  every  other,  but  only  on  such  a  basis  may  we 
have  world  peace  by  world  preparedness.  Each  nation 
cannot  maintain  the  two-power  standard  against  all 
the  others.  Each  international  alliance  cannot  be 
stronger  than  every  other.  One  may  sooner  raise  one's 
self  by  one's  boot  straps  than  maintain  world  peace 
by  world  preparedness.  A  similar  idea  that  money 
which  the  world  spends  on  armies  and  navies  is  an 
insurance  against  war,  is  also  due  to  a  lack  of  clear 
thinking.  The  world  as  a  whole  never  spent  so  much 
in  insurance  against  war  as  in  the  years  immediately 
before  1914.  This  supposed  insurance  not  only  did  not 
prevent  the  worst  war  in  history,  but  it  was  itself  a 
very  large  factor  in  causing  the  war. 

We  may  see  the  fallacy  of  world  peace  by  world 
preparedness  by  examining  the  doctrine  from  the  stand- 
point of  our  own  country.  We  need  to  be  better  pre- 
pared, it  is  claimed.  Agreed.  Under  present  conditions 
we  do  need  to  be  better  prepared.  But  what  is 
necessary  preparation?  The  Administration  urges  a 
certain  increase  in  our  army  and  navy  which  is  obviously 
a  compromise  proposal.  The  General  Board  of  the 
Navy,  however,  has  come  out  for  a  navy  equal  to 
the  strongest  in  the  world,  that  is,  equal  to  that  of 
Great  Britain.  But  even  should  we  have  such  a  navy, 
we  would  not  be  quite  secure;  for  if  we  had  war  with 
Great  Britain  we  would  very  probably  have  to  fight  the 
combined  navies  of  the  British  allies,  Japan,  France, 
Russia,  and  Italy.  Perhaps  it  is  in  view  of  this  possibil- 


XXX 


Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 


ity  that  the  organ  of  our  Navy  League,  in  three  recent 
articles,  demands  a  United  States  navy  twice  the 
size  of  the  British.  It  adds  that  the  necessary  initial 
expenditure  of  two  thousand  millions  of  dollars  should 
not  be  permitted  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  plan. 
Suppose  we  adopt  this  perfectly  logical  national  pro- 
gram and  attempt  to  build  a  navy  twice  that  of  the 
British.  The  British  will  then  say,  and,  as  a  fact  are 
already  saying,  that  the  United  States  has  no  real  need 
of  a  great  navy,  for  it  has  no  important  oversea 
possessions,  but  that  the  very  existence  of  their  empire 
depends  upon  their  keeping  control  of  the  ocean.  Great 
Britain  therefore  will  do  its  very  utmost  to  maintain  a 
navy  much  larger  than  that  of  the  United  States — 
Lord  Rosebery  so  stated  only  a  few  weeks  ago — and 
substantially  half  again  as  large  as  that  of  Germany. 
This  attitude  is  perfectly  correct  from  a  British  national 
viewpoint.  As  for  Germany,  it  believes  that  it  has 
failed  to  win  the  present  war  because  inadequately 
prepared  on  the  ocean.  Germany  will  then  also 
struggle  to  build  a  fleet  fully  equal  to  the  strongest  in 
the  world.  This  too  is  perfectly  logical  from  a  German 
national  point  of  view.  But  from  a  world  view — from 
the  view  of  those  who  wish  to  regulate  the  inter- 
national life  of  the  world  without  recourse  to  war — 
the  whole  thing  is  both  impossible  and  ridiculous. 
Each  navy  cannot  be  the  strongest. 

This  attempt  to  have  the  largest  navy  in  the  world 
or  one  equal  to  the  largest,  so  clearly  desirable  from 
each  national  viewpoint,  will,  from  a  world  view. 
simply  lead  to  a  wild  competitive  race  in  navy  building 
No  nation  can  have  any  absolute  standard  for  its  navy; 
it  aims  merely  to  be  stronger  on  the  water  than  any 
other  nation.  Our  Naval  Board  sometime  ago  recom- 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxxi 

mended  forty-eight  battleships;  but  there  is  nothing 
sacred  about  the  number  forty-eight,  nothing  in  the 
length  of  our  coastline,  the  provisions  of  our  Federal 
Constitution,  or  the  moral  nature  of  our  citizens  which 
makes  it  necessary  to  have  just  forty-eight  battleships. 
It  all  depends  on  how  many  battleships  the  other 
nation  has.  On  this  point  we  may  agree  with  the 
journal  of  our  Navy  League,  when  it  says: 

It  would  seem  that  anyone  who  has  the  least  notion 
of  international  or  foreign  affairs  must  perceive  at  once 
that  the  size  of  a  nation's  navy  or  army  is  not,  after  all, 
determined  by  the  will  of  its  citizens  or  even  by  its  own 
federal  government.  The  size  of  a  nation's  navy  is  deter- 
mined by  the  will  of  foreign  nations. 

Then  it  adds: 

If  a  foreign  nation  wills  to  have  a  100  navy,  it  wills  that 
we  should  have  a  200  navy. 

What  is  going  to  come  of  this  attempt  of  each 
nation  to  be  twice  as  well  prepared  as  any  other? 
Logically  it  will  lead  to  this:  when  each  nation  has 
spent  the  proverbial  "last  dollar,"  and  trained  the 
proverbial  "last  man,"  and  every  military  and  naval 
force  is  developed  to  the  last  degree  of  efficiency — then 
we  shall  have  no  insurance  against  war  at  all,  for  each 
nation  will  be  in  exactly  the  same  relative  position 
as  if  armies  and  navies  did  not  exist.  The  actual 
and  practical  result  of  competitive  preparedness  is 
well  illustrated  by  the  situation  in  Europe  to-day. 

There  is  then  no  such  thing  as  world  peace  by  world 
preparedness.  It  is  an  illogical  system  by  which  the 
world  uses  up  its  best  resources  in  trying  to  secure 
a  desirable  end  by  impossible  means. 


xxxii  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

An  idea  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  peace  by  pre- 
paredness is  expressed  by  the  slogan,  "Peace  by  Right- 
eousness." The  Godly  nations  are  to  be  ready  to 
fight,  at  the  drop  of  the  hat,  for  righteousness;  the  evil- 
doers in  the  family  of  nations  will  thus  be  terrified  into 
keeping  the  peace  and,  as  a  result,  the  world  will  enjoy 
the  double  blessing  of  righteousness  and  abiding  peace. 
But  the  whole  thing  simmers  down  to  the  question, 
who  is  to  determine  what  is  righteousness?  To  our 
administration,  a  few  years  ago,  it  was  righteousness  to 
insist  upon  building  the  Panama  Canal,  "for  the  benefit 
of  humanity."  But  to  Colombia  it  was  righteous 
to  take  no  step  toward  this  until  she  had  agreed  to  sell 
the  privilege  at  a  figure  which  she  regarded  as  satis- 
factory. Even  among  our  own  citizens  to-day  there  is 
a  marked  difference  of  opinion  as  to  which  of  these 
views  of  righteousness  was  correct.  Take  up  recent 
international  problems.  Japan  has  argued  with  our 
State  Department  that  the  Anti-Japanese  land  legisla- 
tion of  California  is  palpably  unrighteous.  Our  State 
Department  insists  that  it  is  quite  righteous,  but  leaves 
Japan's  last  emphatic  protest  unanswered.  We  state  to 
Great  Britain  that  its  so-called  blockade  is  unrighteous ; 
Great  Britain  answers  that  it  is  highly  righteous,  and 
that  she  is  going  to  maintain  it.  Righteousness,  used  in 
this  sense,  is  practically  synonymous  with  national 
policy.  We  all  regard  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  highly 
righteous;  but  this  view  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would 
amuse  an  intelligent  German,  if  it  did  not  make  him 
mad.  To  fight  for  our  national  policy  is  perfectly 
intelligible;  if  necessary,  in  most  cases,  we  all  intend  to 
do  it.  But  when  every  nation  fights  for  its  national 
policy,  this  will  hardly  lead  to  permanent  international 
peace.  In  fact,  this  world  war  is  largely  due  to  the 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxxiii 

fact  that  each  nation  is  fighting  for  its  own  national 
policy.  The  idea  that  permanent  international  peace 
may  be  secured  by  each  nation  fighting  for  ' '  righteous- 
ness,"  as  it  regards  "righteousness,"  is  a  curious 
specimen  of  intellectual  sophistry  and  intellectual 
humbug. 

If  the  world  can  find  little  hope  in  the  doctrine 
of  "peace  by  preparedness"  and  "peace  by  righteous- 
ness, ' '  possibly  it  may  have  better  success  if  it  turns  to 
the  recognized  peace  societies  and  their  leaders.  A 
difficulty  at  once  arises:  Who  is  a  peace  man?  A 
mollycoddle?  But  what  is  the  name  of  that  strenuous 
Ex- President  whom  the  judges  of  the  Nobel  Fund 
picked  out  as  the  prize  peace  man  of  all  America?  Is 
this  prize  peace  man  a  mollycoddle?  A  peace  man  is 
supposed  to  be  against  preparedness,  but,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  preparedness  is  not  at  all  an  issue  between 
peace  people,  as  a  whole,  and  militarists  as  a  whole. 
The  Massachusetts  Peace  Society  has  recently  finished 
a  referendum  vote  on  this  question,  and  finds  that  its 
members,  by  more  than  two  to  one,  definitely  favor  an 
increase  in  our  army  and  navy.  The  New  York  and 
Massachusetts  Peace  Societies,  the  World  Peace  Founda- 
tion, and  the  New  York  Federation  of  Churches  have 
officially  endorsed  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
which  necessarily  stands  for  an  efficient  army  and 
navy.  Further,  there  are  many  men  who  are  not 
only  members,  but  even  officers,  both  in  societies  for 
increasing  the  army  and  navy,  such  as  the  National 
Security  League,  and,  also,  at  the  same  time,  in  such 
peace  organizations  as  the  New  York  Peace  Society,  the 
International  Peace  Forum,  the  Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace,  and  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.  A  large  proportion,  if  not  a  majority  of  the 


xxxiv  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

officers  of  the  National  Security  League  are  either  mem- 
bers of,  or  endorse  the  principles  of,  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace. 

What  then  is  the  difference  between  a  militarist 
and  a  peace  man?  The  difference  is  fundamentally 
again  merely  a  question  of  thinking,  of  belief.  To  give 
a  working  definition,  leaving  the  dictionary  out  of 
account,  and  marking  the  actual  dividing  line  between 
them,  a  militarist  is  one  who  believes  that  there  is  no 
reasonable  hope  of  abolishing  the  war  system  within  any 
reasonable  time,  while  a  peace  man  is  one  who  believes 
that  there  is  a  reasonable  hope  of  abolishing  the  war 
system  within  some  reasonable  time.  A  militarist  may 
be  one  of  the  sweetest  dispositioned  men  in  the  world. 
As  a  most  kindly  friend  recently  wrote,  maintaining 
that  world  peace  can  never  be  secured,  ' '  The  world  is 
full  of  villains  and  victims.  It  ever  was;  is  now;  and 
ever  shall  be."  Such  a  person  is  a  militarist;  it  is 
impossible  for  him  to  work  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
present  war  system  since  he  is  convinced  that  it  is 
permanent.  His  influence  and  his  vote  must  count  for 
its  continuation  and  perpetuation.  A  peace  man,  on 
the  other  hand,  may  be  either  against  vigorous  pre- 
paredness, because  he  believes  that  it  leads  to  militarism, 
or  he  may  favor  it  because  he  considers  that  it  is  needed 
under  present,  and  he  trusts  temporary,  conditions. 

What  of  those  who  have  been  working  for  inter- 
national peace  or,  better,  for  the  regulation  of  inter- 
national life  by  other  means  than  that  by  war?  We 
find  that  they  too,  taking  them  as  a  class,  show  the 
same  lack  of  agreement  among  themselves,  the  same 
lack  of  clear-cut  ideas,  which  is  noticed  among  others. 
Before  the  war,  the  peace  campaign  was  a  many-sided 
one;  it  attempted  to  arouse  and  organize  public  senti- 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxxv 

ment  by  pointing  out  the  horror,  the  economic  waste, 
and  the  frequent  injustice  of  war;  to  bring  about  a 
better  understanding  among  the  nations;  to  prevent 
excessive  expenditures  for  military  purposes,  and  to 
develop  international  law  and  extend  the  jurisdiction 
of  international  courts  of  justice.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  at  no  time  in  the  world's  history  were  there  so  many 
diverse  agencies  working  for  international  peace  as  in 
the  couple  of  years  just  before  the  war.  Increased 
efforts  for  permanent  international  peace  and  increased 
rivalry  in  competitive  preparedness  went  on  at  the 
same  time.  Then  the  war  came.  It  proved  one  thing 
clearly — that  "peace  by  preparedness"  is  a  complete 
failure.  A  great  world  trumpet  blast  from  the  peace 
forces  should  then  have  rallied  all  peace  organizations 
to  united  action.  But  there  was  no  trumpet  blast — 
merely  a  chorus  of  cracked  and  discordant  peace 
bugles.  The  peace  forces  as  a  whole  had  not  thought 
through  the  war  problem;  they  had  no  general  plan 
on  which  they  could  unite.  Three  of  the  most  prominent 
of  the  American  peace  organizations  refused  for  a  year 
to  issue  any  statement  or  declaration  of  principles 
of  any  kind.  The  peace  forces  simply  did  not  know 
how  they  should  go  to  work  to  attack  the  war  system. 
This  fact  shows  once  more,  even  on  the  part  of  those 
who  are  supposed  to  have  studied  the  problem  most 
seriously,  a  confusion  of  thought,  a  failure  to  master 
the  problem  intellectually. 

This  intellectual  failure  still  continues.  Even  to- 
day there  is  no  union  in  plan  among  peace  organizations. 
The  Advocate  of  Peace,  the  official  organ  of  the  large 
American  Peace  Society,  is  vigorously  opposing  any 
increase  in  our  army  and  navy  while,  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  a  considerable  proportion  of  its  members  are 


xxxvi  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

favoring  some  increase.  The  Advocate  of  Peace  also 
opposes  the  newly  organized  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  this  League  has  been  officially 
endorsed  by  a  number  of  leading  peace  societies,  and 
probably  has  the  support  of  a  majority  of  peace  people 
throughout  the  country.  The  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace,  the  richest  peace  foundation  in 
the  world,  is  stated  to  be  so  divided  in  opinion,  in  its 
Board  of  Trustees,  that  it  must  confine  its  work  to 
advocating  Pan- Americanism,  aiding  the  extension 
of  International  Polity  Clubs  in  American  universities, 
and  urging  the  inviolability  of  international  law.  The 
leading  peace  societies  in  this  country,  furthermore,  are 
not  affiliated  with  the  foremost  peace  societies  abroad; 
and  so  far  as  our  organizations  have  definite  programs, 
they  do  not  coincide  exactly  with  those  in  Europe. 
All  are  agreed  that  war  is  not  the  proper  means  of 
regulating  the  intercourse  of  states,  but  the  mere 
intellectual  problem  of  knowing  how  war  may  be  done 
away  with  is  too  difficult.  From  a  broader  view,  the 
majority  of  the  world  wishes  to  abolish  war:  the  con- 
tinuance of  war  is  evidence  of  the  world's  intellectual 
bankruptcy. 

Aside  from  the  fact  that  peace  beliefs,  principles, 
and  platforms  show  marked  divergence  there  is  yet 
another  difficulty  to  be  met.  Practically  all  the  peace 
organizations  before  the  war,  and  a  large  proportion 
of  them  at  present,  are  based  upon  the  maintenance  of 
the  international  status  quo.  They  rest  upon  the 
supposition  that  the  world  has  been  permanently 
partitioned,  and  that  the  territories  and  possessions  of 
the  various  states  and  nations  are  to  remain  forever 
substantially  as  they  are  to-day.  This  is  a  very 
questionable  supposition.  Are  the  present  divisions  in 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxxvii 

Africa  to  remain  forever?  And  in  the  Balkans?  And 
in  the  Far  East?  In  the  latter  region  it  is  most  un- 
likely that  Europe  will  continue  to  hold  ports  and  is- 
lands and  slices  of  China,  after  the  450  to  500  millions 
of  Japanese  and  Chinese  have  all  become  efficiently 
organized  on  a  military  basis.  If  war  is  abolished, 
how  are  we  to  settle  the  problems  which  arise  from  the 
unsatisfactory  division  of  the  world?  Some  inter- 
national legislative  agency  or  agencies  might  be  gradu- 
ally developed ;  or  we  might  all  agree  that  although  the 
existing  division  of  the  World  is,  or  may  become, 
unsatisfactory,  it  is  much  preferable  to  war.  Mr. 
Roosevelt  has  seen  this  difficulty  very  clearly;  since 
the  war  began,  he  has  stated  that,  at  some  time  or 
other,  the  international  status  quo  must  be  recognized  as 
permanent.  Suppose  the  nations  do  agree  to  regard 
the  existing  territorial  arrangements,  even  in  Africa 
and  the  Far  East,  as  final  and  to  maintain  them  by 
force.  This  would  be  a  perfectly  logical  and  reasonable 
policy.  It  must  be  conceded,  however,  that  if  it  had 
been  put  into  operation  ten  years  ago,  it  would  have 
given  an  international  guarantee  to  the  existence  of 
European  Turkey. 

There  are  those,  however,  who  are  opposed  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  Professor  Muensterberg 
recently  wrote  of  the  peace  advocates,  that  they 

have  not  succeeded  as  yet  in  proposing  a  single  plan  by 
which  war  would  be  abolished  and  yet  at  the  same  time 
possibilities  be  given  for  the  healthy  growth  of  progressive 
peoples  and  for  the  historically  necessary  reduction  of 
decadent  nations. 

In  the  sentiment  here  expressed  we  find  one  of  the 
greatest  obstacles  to  a  system  of  international  peace. 


xxxviii  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Notice  the  last  part  of  the  quotation:  "for  the  healthy 
growth  of  progressive  peoples  and  for  the  historically 
necessary  reduction  of  decadent  nations."  This 
breathes  the  spirit  of  extreme  present-day  nationalism. 
It  is  the  spirit  which  makes  one's  nation  the  center  of 
the  most  intense  devotion  and  regards  it  as  a  rival 
and  possible  enemy  of  every  other  nation.  It  must 
gain  at  the  loss  of  others,  especially  of  dependent 
peoples  and  of  its  "decadent  neighbors." 

Each  people  has  or  has  recently  had  its  "historic 
mission,"  its  "manifest  destiny,"  its  "white  man's 
burden."  Russia's  mission  led  her  to  China;  so 
did  Japan's ;  they  fought.  In  the  Balkans,  the  Russian 
and  Teutonic  "historic  missions"  both  point  to-day 
towards  Constantinople;  while  among  the  little  Balkan 
countries  themselves,  the  "historic  mission"  of  no 
single  state  can  be  satisfied  without  conflicting  with 
that  of  one  or  more  of  the  other  states.  An  important 
cause  of  the  present  war  was  the  intense  desire  of  Servia 
to  fulfill  its  "historic  mission"  by  including  within 
its  territory  the  Serbs  in  the  adjoining  provinces 
of  Austria-Hungary.  Going  further  back  into  the 
causes  of  the  war,  we  see  the  "historic  mission"  of 
France  in  Morocco  conflicting  with  the  colonial  ambi- 
tions of  Germany.  The  territory  of  the  world  is 
limited  and  if  each  nationalism  is  watchful  to  push 
its  selfish  advantage  and,  even  in  extreme  instances, 
is  on  the  lookout  for  "decadent  nations  which  need 
to  be  reduced,"  how  can  we  well  avoid  the  likelihood 
of  war  ?  This  nationalism  is  dangerous  not  only  because 
it  naturally  leads  states  which  have  not  yet  fulfilled 
their  manifest  destiny,  and  which  are  still  unsatisfied 
with  the  extent  of  their  home  land  or  colonial  posses- 
sions, to  covet  other  territory  for  the  sake  of  the 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xxxix 

territory;  but  also  because  it  frequently  gives  to  great 
peoples  a  passionate  longing  to  extend  their  language, 
their  system  of  government,  and  their  culture  to  other 
parts  of  the  world.  Of  course,  the  surest  way  to  extend 
the  language  and  culture  of  a  nation  is  to  secure  some 
relatively  unoccupied  part  of  the  world,  and  there 
develop  a  new  England,  or  new  France,  or  new  Germany. 
The  world  has  stopped  fighting  wars  of  religion; 
it  has  stopped  fighting  wars  of  dynasties;  but  it  is 
fighting  wars  of  nationalism.  When  the  world  is 
divided  among  nations,  each  with  a  national  spirit 
unrestrained,  unlimited,  mutually  hostile,  suspicious, 
covetous,  and  passionate — how  may  we  permanently 
escape  war?  To  quote  part  of  a  sentence  from  the 
Presidential  address  of  Professor  H.  Morse  Stephens, 
before  the  American  Historical  Association  at  Washing- 
ton a  few  weeks  ago : 

Woe  unto  us  ...  professional  teachers  of  history, 
if  we  cannot  see,  written  in  blood,  in  the  dying  civilization 
of  Europe,  the  dreadful  result  of  exaggerated  nationalism. 

Is  it  possible  to  modify  such  a  force  as  nationalism, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  devise  some  agency  other  than 
war  to  serve  as  the  final  regulator  of  international  life  ? 
What  scheme  may  be  devised? 

The  object  of  this  paper  is  not  to  present  any  scheme 
—there  are  hundreds  of  schemes  already.  The  aim 
is  an  attempt  to  state  the  problem.  It  would  be 
unfair,  however,  not  to  point  out  the  general  evolution 
of  history  in  its  bearing  upon  this  issue.  This  extreme 
nationalism,  which  so  many  thoughtful  writers  are 
just  beginning  to  criticize  as  one  of  the  chief  roots  of  the 
present-day  evil,  is  regarded  by  most  of  us  as  about  as 
natural  and  necessary,  politically,  as  the  air  we  breathe 


xl 

or  the  city  pavements  we  walk  upon.  But  in  fact, 
present-day  nationalism  is  a  new  thing  historically; 
it  arose  with  the  French  Revolution  and  the  wars  of 
Napoleon.  So  it  is  possible,  even  probable,  that  it 
may  be  at  least  greatly  modified. 

The  trend  of  history  through  the  centuries  has 
been  towards  ever  larger  political  units.  At  the 
very  beginning  of  history,  the  political  unit  was  the 
family;  but  the  family  was  absorbed  by  the  tribe  and 
the  tribe  by  the  city  state.  Later  the  unit  was  the 
feudal  castle  on  the  hill;  then  the  feudal  county  and 
duchy;  then  the  kingdom  and  the  absolutistic  state; 
and  finally  the  nation  of  to-day.  Adams,  in  his 
History  of  Civilization,  written  before  the  war,  says : 

If  we  could  venture  to  put  any  trust  in  the  apparently 
regular  and  natural  character  of  this  progress,  the  next 
step  logically  would  seem  to  be  the  formation  of  some  kind 
of  an  international  federation  or  possibly  world  state. 

It  should  be  noted  that  devotion  or  loyalty  or  patriot- 
ism to  family,  city,  district,  and  state,  has  not  been 
destroyed  in  this  development;  each  patriotism  has 
been  constantly  absorbed  into  an  ever  wider  loyalty. 
Like  the  chambered  nautilus  patriotism  has  ever  been 
building  for  itself  a  larger  and  statelier  mansion. 

Notice  the  way  this  development  has  actually 
been  working  out  in  the  recent  past.  Not  a  long  time 
ago,  as  we  count  time  in  history,  Scotland  and  England 
were  bitter  enemies :  Scotland,  Celtic  and  Presbyterian ; 
England,  Anglo-Saxon  and  Episcopal.  For  centuries 
the  unending  border  warfare  lasted  on.  But  finally 
without  conquest,  these  two  old  enemies  were  united. 
While  each  retained  its  local  patriotism,  together  they 
joined  in  a  new  and  larger  British  loyalty.  Germany 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xli 

was  divided,  not  a  century  ago,  by  a  deep  and  long- 
standing hostility  between  the  Protestant  states  of 
the  north  and  the  Catholic  states  of  the  south.  But 
they  finally  formed  a  union  which  they  later  cemented, 
by  mutual  consent,  into  the  present  German  Empire. 
Loyalty  to  the  Empire,  however,  developed  more 
slowly.  Americans  who  speak  of  their  German  uni- 
versity days,  tell  of  hearing  famous  professors  of  south 
and  central  Germany  exclaim  in  private  conversation, 
"How  we  hate  the  Prussians!"  To-day,  however, 
no  one  would  deny  that  the  local  devotion  to  Bavaria, 
to  Saxony,  to  Wurtemberg  has  been  expanded  into  a 
glowing  patriotism  for  this  historically  new  political 
organization — the  German  Empire.  A  similar  evolu- 
tion took  place  in  Italy.  What  was  fiercer  than  the 
patriotism  of  the  Italian  city  states?  Nothing  except 
their  hatred  of  each  other.  But  they  all  united,  for  the 
most  part  by  voluntary  action,  and  the  little  patriotisms 
of  Venice,  Milan,  Genoa,  and  Florence  took  on  the 
larger  patriotism  of  Italy. 

Finally  there  are  our  own  thirteen  States.  We 
forget  to-day  the  vitally  Critical  Period  when  it  was 
yet  an  open  question  whether  they  would  or  would  not 
form  one  single  nation.  Soon  after  the  coercive  hand  of 
the  Revolutionary  War  relaxed,  there  arose  the  same 
kind  of  disputes  and  the  same  spirit  of  mutual  suspicion 
which  we  know  too  well  in  Europe.  New  York  State 
ordered  its  troops  to  march  to  the  Vermont  border. 
Connecticut  felt  that  it  had  ample  justification  for 
war  with  Pennsylvania  because  of  the  inhuman  treat- 
ment of  the  Connecticut  settlers  in  the  Wyoming 
Valley.  Tariff  squabbles,  of  much  bitterness,  arose 
between  New  Jersey  and  Connecticut,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  New  York  on  the  other.  Our  States  were 


xlii     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 


re 


__pidly  going  the  way  of  the  states  of  the  old  world. 
But  they  created  a  federal  government.  Even  then 
our  patriotism  was  first  of  all  State  patriotism.  When 
Washington  visited  Boston,  John  Hancock  wished  that 
as  Governor  of  Massachusetts  he  should  be  given 
official  precedence  over  George  Washington,  who  was 
only  President  of  the  United  States.  At  that  time  a 
good  and  loyal  citizen  could  openly  favor  or  oppose 
the  new  Union,  much  as  one  to-day  favors  or  opposes  a 
new  tariff  bill  before  Congress.  But  a  short  century 
passed,  and  in  thousands  of  the  towns  and  cities  of 
our  Northern  States,  there  arose  monuments  to  the 
memory  of  those  who  fell  in  the  Civil  War— monuments 
bearing  the  inscription:  "These  men  died  that  the 
Union  might  live."  A  new,  vital  patriotism  has  been 
born.  Our  devotion  to  our  States  has  not  been  lost; 
it  has  expanded  to  be  a  part  of  a  new  and  larger  loyalty. 

These  facts  are  all  in  line  with  the  natural  evolu- 
tion of  nationalism,  the  expansion  of  patriotism  from 
smaller  to  ever  larger  units.  But,  it  may  be  objected, 
there  seem  to  be  exceptions  to  this  rule.  To  be  sure, 
there  are  occasional  exceptions,  and  we  think  at  once 
of  Finland  and  Poland;  but  these  and  other  instances 
are,  as  a  rule,  due  to  the  refusal  of  the  larger  federation 
to  allow  the  unit  sufficient  autonomy.  Finland, 
before  its  privileges  of  local  government  were  taken 
away,  was  frequently  called  the  most  loyal  part  of  the 
Russian  Empire.  Poland  has  remained  unreconciled 
because  denied  the  free  use  of  its  native  language  and 
old  religion  and  the  right  of  regulating  its  strictly 
local  affairs. 

The  development  of  nationalism  does  not  naturally 
stop  when  it  has  reached  the  limitations  of  any  particu- 
lar unit.  Nationalism  does  not  depend  upon  unity  of 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xliii 

race,  religion,  language,  geographical  proximity,  or  of 
all  of  these  factors  combined.  Switzerland  and  the 
United  States  are  both  intensely  patriotic,  yet  Switzer- 
land is  composed  of  three  different  racial  groups,  Ger- 
man, French,  and  Italian,  each  dominant  in  part  of 
the  country  and  each  using  its  own  distinct  language, 
with  Catholics  and  Protestants  dividing  the  country 
religiously ;  while  the  United  States  is  a  mixture  of  every 
race  and  every  creed.  Above  all,  there  is  the  British 
Empire.  In  the  trenches  in  the  north  of  France  there 
are  to-day,  nearly  side  by  side,  regiments  of  French 
and  Anglo-Canadians  from  America;  Indian  Hindus 
from  Asia;  Australians  and  New  Zealanders  from  the 
South  Seas;  and  Irish,  Scotch,  and  English  from  the 
United  Kingdom  in  Europe — all  doing  their  "bit," 
with  loyalty  and  devotion,  for  the  British  Empire. 

It  is  especially  instructive  to  notice  the  process 
by  which  this  development  has  been  brought  about. 
In  each  of  these  four  recent  and  notable  cases  of  political 
consolidation,  England  and  Scotland,  Italy,  Germany, 
and  the  United  States,  mutually  suspicious  and  often 
mutually  hostile  states  have  first  of  all  created  the 
form  of  a  greater  state.  This  new  union  has  been  a 
common  guarantee  to  each  of  the  small  political  units 
against  attack  from  any  other  member  of  the  new 
federation.  It  has  also  done  away,  at  once,  with  the 
chief  causes  of  war,  such  as  rivalry  for  colonies  and  for 
preferential  privileges  in  foreign  markets.  Only  after 
this,  have  the  old  local  patriotisms  gradually  adjusted 
themselves  to  the  new  larger  government. 

Already  the  next  logical  step  in  world  federation 
is  now  taking  place  before  our  very  eyes.  Excluding 
China,  about  nine  tenths  of  the  world's  territory, 
the  world's  population,  and  the  world's  wealth  is  now 


xliv     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

grouped  into  only  three  great  new  units,  the  Entente- 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Japan,  Italy,  Servia, 
and  Portugal,  with  their  dependencies  and  colonies; 
the  Central  Powers— Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  with  their  dependencies ;  and  the 
Pan-American  Union,  which  is  binding  the  United 
States  and  the  Latin  American  countries  by  growingly 
strong  ties  of  political  interest.  Only  recently  the 
President  of  the  United  States  has  proposed  that  the 
twenty -one  American  republics  should  form  a  League 
to  Enforce  Peace  by  giving  to  each  of  the  American 
states  a  mutual  and  several  guarantee  of  its  political 
independence  and  its  territorial  integrity. 

It  is  possible  that  this  process  may  be  still  further 
developed.  Propositions  are  very  frequently  made 
nowadays  that  the  United  States  should  join  the 
Entente  Powers,  after  the  war,  in  a  great  world  league 
of  mutual  defense. 

Loyalty  to  the  idea  of  a  new  and  larger  union  is 
already  developing,  especially  between  Germany  and 
Austria,  and  between  those  old  hereditary  enemies, 
Great  Britain  and  France.  This  fact  is  sometimes 
shown  in  even  an  amusing  way.  When  the  British 
military  authorities  found  themselves  in  sore  need  of 
transportation  facilities  in  France,  they  commandeered 
a  large  number  of  London  busses.  At  that  time  these 
all  carried  conspicuously,  as  an  advertisement,  the 
name  in  huge  letters  of  a  theatrical  play  then  running 
in  London,  Potash  and  Perlmutter.  It  is  related  that 
when  these  busses  drove  through  one  of  the  cities  of 
northern  France,  the  French  crowds,  fired  with  new 
enthusiasm  for  the  joint  cause  of  the  Allies,  and  think- 
ing that  the  sign  was  the  name  of  the  local  commanding 
British  General,  shouted  lustily,  "Vive  le  General 


George  H.  Blakeslee  xlv 

Potash  et  Perlmutter. "  This  touch  of  humor  in  the 
grim  tragedy  of  war  shows  at  least  that  patriotic 
fervor  may  easily  be  extended  to  a  new  alliance  of 
nations. 

In  the  study  then  of  the  problem  of  developing 
some  agency  other  than  war  for  regulating  the  inter- 
course of  states,  the  teaching  of  historical  evolution 
points  to  a  limiting  of  present-day  national  sovereignty 
by  some  form  of  international  federation.  This  fact 
is  coming  to  be  realized,  in  a  degree,  by  the  peace 
forces  of  the  world.  A  very  large  majority  of  the 
thirty  most  prominent  and  recent  peace  plans  in  this 
and  other  countries  propose  some  form  of  international 
federation.  Upon  the  details  of  the  plan,  there  is, 
as  yet,  no  general  agreement;  but  if  we  know  the 
general  aim  towards  which  we  should  work  a  great 
advance  has  already  been  made. 

In  reading  of  the  present  world  tragedy  the  deepest 
pathos  lies  in  the  oft-repeated  cry  of  the  soldiers  of 
Great  Britain  and  of  France,  that  they  will  stand  the 
misery,  the  suffering,  and  the  death,  so  that  their 
children  and  their  grandchildren  may  never  have  to 
endure  this  horror;  and  in  the  determination  of  the 
soldiers  of  Germany— no  matter  how  we  may  judge 
their  leaders — grimly  fighting  on  with  the  resolution 
that  they  will  secure  some  guarantee  that  this  kind 
of  a  thing  may  never  happen  again. 

But  the  infinite  pity  of  it  all  is  that  this  present 
method,  mere  victory,  mere  crushing  of  the  enemy, 
no  matter  how  complete,  will  of  itself  alone  never 
bring  about  freedom  from  future  war.  Some  change 
must  be  made  in  the  present  international  system. 
If  this  struggle  ends  with  a  no  more  fundamental 
change  than  a  victory  of  the  old  type — as  former 


xlvi     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

world  wars  ended  by  the  treaties  of  Westphalia  in 
1648;  Utrecht  in  1713;  and  Vienna  in  1815 — if  it 
leaves  merely  more  intense  nationalism  and  more  bitter 
international  hates,  then  it  will  give  to  the  children 
and  grandchildren  of  the  present  generation,  no  matter 
who  wins,  a  guarantee  not  of  peace,  but  a  guarantee 
of  another  world  war. 


Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 


AMERICA'S    NEED    FOR    PREPAREDNESS    IN 

POLICY 

BY  NORMAN  ANGELL 

ARMS  are  for  the  defense  of  a  policy  rather  than 
for  the  defense  of  a  territory.  That  is  a  concep- 
tion to  which  this  people — like  most  other  peoples — 
are  very  rebellious.  I  suppose  if  you  were  to  ask  one 
hundred  Americans  for  what  purpose  the  proposed  in- 
crease of  armaments  was  to  be  employed,  what  policy 
it  stood  behind,  ninety -nine  out  of  the  hundred  would 
probably  reply:  "No  policy  at  all  save  that  of  the  de- 
fense of  this  soil.  Arms  are  simply  to  repel  the  invader 
and  nothing  else." 

I  want  to  suggest  to  you  that  this  is  a  very  incom- 
plete conception,  one  which  may  lead  us  astray.  No 
great  power  can  limit  the  use  of  its  arms  for  that  pur- 
pose; it  may  be  compelled  to  resent  the  policy  of  some 
other  nation,  a  policy  which  may  fall  a  long  way  short 
of  sheer  invasion  of  territory.  Take  this  present  war. 
It  is  a  war  of  policy.  It  began  in  Southeastern  Europe 
out  of  a  conflict  which  arose  from  Austria's  conception 
of  her  interests  with  reference  to  the  southern  Slavs. 
The  position  thus  taken  by  Austria  involved  virtually 


2        Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

all  the  great  powers  of  Europe.  But  Russia,  France, 
England,  Japan,  Portugal  did  not  fear  invasion  from 
Austria,  and  if  they  had  given  Austria  a  free  hand 
would  have  been  left  alone.  They  are  defending  what 
is  in  my  view  a  perfectly  just  policy :  the  rights  of  small 
nations,  and  resistance  to  aggression. 

You  can  illustrate  the  same  fact — that  arms  defend 
a  policy  rather  than  a  country — from  your  own  history. 
This  country  has  had  several  wars,  has  been  near  to 
several  more  wars.  Not  one  of  those  has  been  for  the 
purpose  of  repelling  an  invader.  Your  first  war  as  an 
independent  state,  that  against  the  Barbary  States, 
was  in  defense  of  an  American  policy  which  differed 
considerably  from  the  policy  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
The  other  states  were  ready  to  accept  the  Barbary 
interpretation  of  their  "rights,"  but  Americans  did  not; 
they  refused  to  pay  tribute — a  very  excellent  diver- 
gence from  the  accepted  policy  of  other  nations,  which 
led  to  a  war  on  the  other  side  of  the  world.  It  was 
not  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  an  invasion. 

The  War  of  1812  arose  out  of  the  problem  of  sea 
rights,  a  problem  still  unsolved  to-day.  The  North 
and  South  War  obviously  was  a  war  of  conflicting 
internal  policies.  The  Mexican  War,  if  concerned  with 
territory,  was  rather  for  the  purpose  of  taking  it.  Your 
war  with  Spain:  no  American  pretends  you  were  in 
great  danger  from  an  invasion  of  the  troops  of  the 
Spanish  boy  King,  Alfonso.  The  war  in  the  Philippines : 
surely,  no  one  contends  that  you  were  in  any  great 
danger  from  the  troops  of  Aguinaldo.  Take  your 
near-war  with  Mexico.  If  you  had  gone  into  Mexico 
after  Vera  Cruz  (as  you  may  still  be  compelled  to  go), 
it  would  not  be  because  you  thought  the  safety  of 
your  country  threatened  by  Huerta  or  Carranza,  or 


Norman  Angell  3 

any  of  the  other  interesting  presidents  whose  names  I 
happen  to  have  forgotten. 

I  am  not  trying  to  make  out  a  case  that  all  these 
conflicts  imply  a  provocative  or  aggressive  attitude  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States.  I  do  not  believe  that 
for  a  moment.  Those  foreign  policies,  in  regard  to 
Spain,  to  Mexico,  may  be  good  policies.  Some  I 
would  support  to  the  uttermost.  My  whole  point  is, 
the  trouble  did  not  arise  out  of  an  invasion,  it  arose  out 
of  a  conflict  of  your  policy  with  certain  other  peoples' 
policies.  The  difference  is  important  because,  while 
there  can  be  no  real  difference  of  opinion  as  to  your  right 
to  resist  an  invasion,  there  can  be  and  often  is  an  honest 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  policies,  to  avoid  which 
calls  for  clear  formulation. 

In  1895,  an  American  President  astonished  the  world 
by  virtually  threatening  Great  Britain  with  war  over 
a  certain  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which 
had  arisen  over  a  dispute  concerning  the  frontier  of 
a  very  disorderly  Spanish- American  republic,  several 
thousand  miles  from  our  shores.  And  we  know  that 
the  country  stood  as  one  man  behind  the  President, 
prepared  to  fight  on  behalf  of  this  vindication  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  And  yet  it  was  never  even  pre- 
tended that  England  was  contemplating  an  invasion 
of  the  soil;  it  was  not  even  pretended  that,  if  the  distant 
and  obscure  settlement  known  as  British  Guiana  were 
enlarged  by  a  few  hundred  miles  of  swamp,  it  could 
make  any  possible  difference  to  the  relative  power 
of  defense  in  this  country.  For  the  United  States 
has  three  thousand  miles  of  its  frontier  running  cheek 
by  jowl  with  a  vigorous  and  growing  British  colony. 
And  in  the  one  hundred  years  or  more  that  that  has 
existed,  Americans  have  felt  no  particular  menace 


4        Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

therefrom.  The  American  people  felt  that  a  principle 
of  foreign  policy — and  a  somewhat  abstract  principle, 
at  that — was  involved,  and  that  rather  than  suffer  any 
whittling-down  of  this  principle  of  policy  (which  inci- 
dentally is  based  upon  the  theory  of  the  balance  of 
power  and  grew  out  of  the  desire  of  an  English  Minister 
to  preserve  that  balance  in  Europe)  they  would  defend 
it  to  the  uttermost  .with  their  national  forces.  And  if 
war  had  come — and  there  were  very  many  who  felt 
we  were  very  near  to  it — it  would  not  have  been  to 
repel  an  invasion;  it  would  have  arisen,  as  the  war  in 
Europe  has  arisen,  over  a  conflict  of  two  rival  policies, 
and  it  would  have  come,  much  as  the  war  in  Europe  has 
come,  with  the  combatants,  it  may  be,  not  realizing 
very  clearly  just  what  those  policies  were.  You  know 
of  course  the  story  of  a  very  patriotic  American  of  that 
time  who,  meeting  his  friend  Brown,  said,  in  tones  that 
were  pained  and  shocked : 

"  What's  this  I  hear,  Brown,  about  your  not  believing 
in  the  Monroe  Doctrine?" 

"It  is  a  wicked  libel,"  replied  Brown.  "I  never 
said  any  such  thing.  I  do  believe  in  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. I  would  die  for  it.  I  would  gladly  lay  down  my 
life  for  it.  What  I  did  say  was  that  I  didn't  know 
what  it  meant." 

Wars  mainly  arise  from  the  refusal  of  a  people,  a 
nation,  sufficiently  to  consider  how  their  policies  may 
be  brought  into  conflict  with  others,  and  the  failure 
of  the  two  parties  to  adjust  those  policies  so  as  to  avoid 
conflict. 

I  think  this  country  is  heading  for  war.  I  think  you 
will  have  a  war.  But  it  is  very  unlikely  to  be  for  the 
purpose  of  repelling  an  invasion.  I  am  not  positive 
about  it,  of  course,  but  it  is  one  of  the  probabilities 


Norman  Angell  5 

of  the  future.  It  will  arise  in  some  such  way  as  this : 
When  you  have  created  your  great  army  and  your 
great  navy,  you  may  find,  under  some  future  adminis- 
tration less  long-suffering  than  the  present,  that,  after 
all,  the  Mexican  problem  is  insoluble  unless  you  go  and 
"clear  up  that  mess,"  as  Mr.  Roosevelt  would  say. 
Well,  you  go  in  there  and  clear  it  up  after  a  long  war, 
and  establish  your  government  therein:  that  means 
you  will  go  clear  to  the  Panama  Canal.  And  having 
established  your  sovereignty  in  those  countries  the 
American  administration  may  have  urged  upon  it  that 
Americans  are  fairly  entitled  to  some  favored  treat- 
ment in  the  matter  of  trade  in  those  Central  American 
countries.  Some  American  "interests"  will  de- 
mand, perhaps,  cancellation  of  those  rather  dubious 
concessions  granted  to  Europeans  by  the  governments 
of  Central  America.  When  the  European  concessions 
are  canceled  in  favor  of  American  concessionaires, 
the  expansive  European  nations — Germany  or  some 
new  nation  that  will  arise  from  this  present  struggle, 
or  Japan,  or  the  two  in  combination — will  naturally 
say,  "What  are  the  Americans  going  to  use  their  great 
power  for — canceling  concessions  which  have  been 
granted  to  us?  Obviously,  the  object  of  increasing 
American  military  power  is  to  secure  such  a  posi- 
tion on  the  Western  Hemisphere  as  to  exclude  the 
European  countries."  That  will  be  their  interpre- 
tation, unless  you  define  clearly  what  your  position  is. 
Unless  you  do  this  when  the  conflict  comes,  compli- 
cated, say,  by  the  Japanese  question  in  California,  you 
won't  discuss  policy;  you  will  try  to  make  yourselves 
more  powerful.  The  dispute  will  center  not  so  much 
upon  the  policy  itself  as  upon  the  method  of  executing 
it;  that  is  to  say,  upon  arms,  just  as  discussion  between 


6       Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

England  and  Germany  mainly  centered  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  naval  rivalry.  We  will  all  lose  our  tempers 
and  call  it  patriotism,  and  there's  your  war.  You  will 
be  victorious,  and  when  it  is  all  over  you  will  ask  what 
it  was  all  about.  You  will  then  find  that  you  cannot 
take,  with  reference  to  civilization  at  large,  the  attitude 
that  foreigners  have  no  rights  in  the  Western  world  at 
all;  and  you  will  be  offended  when  it  is  suggested  that 
this  was  a  possible  interpretation  of  your  attitude. 
You  will  realize  you  could  not  enforce  such  a  policy 
if  you  would,  and  would  not  if  you  could. 

My  whole  plea  is  that  you  should  formulate  this 
policy  before  the  war  takes  place  instead  of  after.  As 
you  increase  your  power  and  as  your  influence  extends 
(as  it  will)  upon  this  hemisphere,  you  must  make  clear 
to  yourselves  and  to  the  world  at  large  just  what  policy 
you  intend  to  enforce;  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
means;  how  far  you  are  prepared  to  go  in  recognizing 
the  claims  of  foreigners  upon  this  hemisphere.  Are 
you  prepared  to  give  equality  of  commercial  treatment, 
say,  in  Mexico;  come  to  a  joint  arrangement  with  the 
nations  as  to  policy  and  purpose?  That  is  what  I  mean 
by  formulating  your  policy  and  letting  it  be  known 
what  your  policy  stands  for.  If  you  do  not,  you  cannot 
enforce  your  rights,  however  great  your  power  may  be. 

I  have  said  that  military  power  of  itself,  however 
great,  is  ineffective,  in  the  absence  of  an  international 
policy,  to  vindicate  even  a  country's  elementary  rights. 
One  need  not  go  very  far  historically  or  geographically 
to  realize  that.  Take  the  problems  arising  out  of  the 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  That  issue  in  its  large  con- 
ception was  the  defense  of  neutral  right  in  war  time. 
Innocent  people  had  been  ruthlessly  slain  in  a  war  that 
did  not  concern  them.  Very  good.  Suppose  that 


Norman  Angell  7 

America,  in  possession  of  great  military  and  naval 
forces,  had  gone  to  war  over  that  matter;  had  joined 
the  Allies,  beaten  Germany,  and  taken  her  place  at  the 
table  of  the  Peace  Conference  after  the  war.  She 
would  then,  of  course,  find  this  very  suggestive  dif- 
ference between  what  she  was  demanding  and  what 
her  allies  were  demanding:  with  them  their  demands 
could  be  satisfied  on  the  spot ;  the  goods  could  be  deliv- 
ered ;  in  the  case  of  the  American  demands  they  could 
not. 

The  Allies  are  demanding  either  the  transfer  of  terri- 
tory— Alsace-Lorraine,  in  the  case  of  France;  Trentino, 
etc.,  in  the  case  of  Italy;  Constantinople,  say,  in  the 
case  of  Russia,  and  so  on — or  the  evacuation  of  occu- 
pied territory,  like  Belgium  or  Northern  France,  which 
Britain  is  demanding  because  she  believes  that  its 
permanent  German  occupation  might  menace  her. 
The  execution  of  these  demands  can  precede  the  signa- 
ture of  the  peace  treaty.  But  what  would  America 
be  asking?  That  in  future  wars  combatants  do  not 
sink  ships  with  American  passengers  on  board.  Well, 
how  do  you  propose  to  assure  yourselves  that  you  have 
got  what  you  would  have  been  fighting  for?  And  sup- 
pose that  your  own  allies  demanded — as  some  of  them 
have  always  demanded  in  the  past — the  right  to  use 
floating  mines  in  future  wars?  You  would  have  fought 
a  great  war  to  exact  a  promise  that  in  future,  ships  with 
Americans  on  board  should  not  be  sunk  by  submarine 
torpedoes,  but  leaving  it  open  to  sink  them  by  floating 
mines.  I  may  remark  that  the  passengers  would  be 
just  as  dead.  And  then,  what  of  your  very  serious 
claims  in  the  matter  of  sea  right  as  against  England? 
Are  you  going  to  accept  as  a  precedent  for  future  wars 
that  any  combatant  that  happens  to  command  the  sea 


8        Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

may,  for  instance,  seize  and  confiscate  a  ship  flying 
the  American  flag,  carrying  American  goods  between 
American  ports?  And  if  you  do  accept  that,  is  it  not 
time  that  some  of  the  political  philosophers  furnished 
us  with  a  new  definition  of  a  "sovereign  and  independ- 
ent state,"  which  America  is  supposed  to  be?  Is  this 
the  degree  of  sovereignty  and  independence  which  your 
might  has  assured  to  you?  (Incidentally,  I  do  not 
blame  England  in  the  least.  Any  other  power  would 
have  done  the  same.  When  we  deliberately  choose  to 
live  in  anarchy,  no  one  can  be  blamed  for  not  observing 
a  non-existent  law.) 

But  I  put  it  to  you:  How,  when  both  sides  violate 
what  you  regard  as  your  most  primary  rights,  are  you 
going  to  vindicate  those  rights  by  military  power? 
Do  you  propose  to  fight  both?  And,  if  on  joining  one 
side  you  come  to  a  bargain  with  him  about  those  rights, 
you  are  creating  an  international  policy;  you  are  put- 
ting your  force  behind  a  policy  of  some  kind,  which  is 
precisely  what  I  am  pleading  for.  But  I  submit  that 
this  policy  should  not  wait  the  occasion  of  war;  it 
should  be  general,  should  precede  war,  and  then  the 
war  may  not  be  necessary. 

If  you  are  serious  at  all  about  the  demands  you  are 
making  now  at  this  moment,  if  you  mean  business,  you 
will  in  the  future  have  to  decide  whether  you  will  place 
your  power  behind  some  general  rule  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  some  international  arrangement.  This  is 
very  revolutionary,  so  far  as  American  public  opinion 
is  concerned.  You  are  not  prepared  for  it.  Now  I 
know  that  it  is  fashionable  just  now  to  disparage  inter- 
national treaties.  You  are  told  that  the  wise  nation 
will  not  rely  in  any  way  upon  treaties,  but  simply  upon 
its  own  power.  If  it  were  true  that  treaties  cannot 


Norman  Angell  9 

be  relied  upon,  the  doom  of  Western  Democracy  would 
have  been  sounded. 

Let  us  assume  that  in  this  war  Germany  represents 
an  autocratic  government  threatening  Western  Democ- 
racy, and  that  if  the  Prussian  government  can  be 
successful,  free  government  in  Europe  will  be  at  an 
end.  If  that  is  true  (and  personally  I  don't  entirely 
accept  it,  though  it  is  a  very  common  thesis),  the  only 
hope  of  Western  Democracy  lies  in  the  durability  of 
the  treaty  between  the  eight  or  nine  powers  fighting 
Germany.  If  it  is  not  any  good,  if  this  treaty  does  not 
endure,  Germany  knows  perfectly  well  she  has  only  to 
bide  her  time  and  she  can  destroy  Western  Democracy 
in  detail.  The  only  hope  of  nations  is  that  the  treaty 
which  now  binds  them  together  will  continue. 

Don't  you  realize  that  force  is  not  a  thing  which  acts 
of  itself?  Its  direction  is  determined  by  a  human  will 
behind  it.  We  say  that  Belgium  depends  for  her  rights 
upon  force — the  force  of  England,  the  force  of  France, 
of  Russia — but  what  induced  the  force  of  England  to 
be  put  in  motion  in  that  direction,  if  it  was  not  some 
moral  thing,  the  respect  for  a  treaty?  Why  is  England 
in  Belgium  at  all  save  by  virtue  of  her  treaty?  If 
Belgium  could  not  depend  upon  a  treaty,  Belgium's 
cause  to-day  would  be  hopeless,  just  as  the  cause  of  the 
western  Allies  would  be  hopeless. 

The  warning  for  us  is  precisely  that  these  treaties 
do  not  endure  after  the  war  which  provoked  them  comes 
to  an  end.  The  prevailing  impression  seems  to  be  that 
when  the  militarist  menace  represented  by  Germany 
is  disposed  of,  and  the  element  in  Europe  that  has 
been  most  hostile  heretofore  to  international  arrange- 
ments removed,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  secure  radical 
reform  of  international  law  and  some  assurance  of  its 


io      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

future  observance.  But  though  the  defeat  of  Germany 
may  be  a  necessary  preliminary  to  a  more  secure  condi- 
tion for  us  all  in  the  world — I  think  it  is — that  defeat 
of  itself,  unaccompanied  by  an  international  policy  in 
which  this  country  must  cooperate,  will  accomplish 
nothing.  If  Europe  has  no  clearer  idea  of  what  its 
respective  armies  are  for  after  this  war  than  it  had 
before;  if,  in  other  words,  the  various  nations  cannot 
form  a  common  policy  of  intercourse,  cannot  agree  as 
to  what  kind  of  act  the  community  will  tolerate  and 
what  it  won't,  what  the  obligations  of  one  nation  are 
to  another,  then  the  defeat  of  Germany  will  merely 
mean  a  re-grouping  of  the  nations  for  future  wars. 

This  notion  that  the  mere  defeat  of  Germany  will 
of  itself  settle  anything  implies  at  least  three  things: 
First,  that  destruction  of  German  military  power  can 
be  made  permanent;  secondly,  that  the  military  alli- 
ance now  existing  between  Germany's  enemies  will 
also  be  permanent;  and  thirdly,  that  a  means  of  en- 
forcing international  law  that  depends  upon  military 
combinations  of  the  great  powers  will  be  dependable 
and  efficient. 

None  of  these  assumptions  can  be  accepted.  The 
destruction  of  the  German  state  is  a  mere  phase ;  noth- 
ing in  history  is  more  mutable  than  military  alliances 
like  those  framed  for  the  prosecution  of  this  war,  and 
the  very  incidents  that  have  created  our  issues  with 
Germany  are  themselves  proof  of  how  inefficient  is 
military  and  naval  power,  even  when  predominant, 
for  the  protection  of  life  and  the  enforcement  of  law. 

If  it  is  deemed  that  the  mere  destruction  of  the 
German  army  or  navy  would  have  any  permanent  effect, 
Germany  herself  has  supplied  a  dramatic  answer  within 
the  memory  of  fathers  of  men  still  living.  In  the  early 


Norman  Angell  n 

years  of  the  nineteenth  century  Prussia  was  annihi- 
lated as  a  military  power — at  Jena  and  Auerstadt. 
The  whole  country  was  overrun  by  the  French.  The 
German  states  were  weakened  and  divided  by  all  the 
statecraft  that  Napoleon  could  employ.  Within  a 
little  more  than  five  years  of  the  humiliation  of  the 
Peace  of  Tilsit,  the  last  French  army  in  Germany  was 
destroyed,  and  it  was  thanks  to  the  very  condition  im- 
posed by  Napoleon — with  the  object  of  limiting  her 
forces — that  Prussia  was  able  finally  to  take  the  major 
part  in  the  destruction  of  the  Napoleonic,  and  in  the 
restoration  of  the  German,  Empire.  It  was  from  the 
crushing  of  Prussia,  after  Jena,  that  dates  the  revival 
of  German  national  consciousness  and  the  desire  for 
German  unity,  even  at  the  cost  of  Prussian  predomi- 
nance therein. 

So  with  France  in  1870.  The  German  armies,  drawn 
from  states  that  within  the  memory  of  men  then  living 
had  been  mere  appanages  of  Napoleon  and  had,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  furnished  some  of  the  soldiers  of  his 
armies,  had  destroyed  the  armies  of  Louis  Napoleon. 
Not  merely  was  France  prostrate,  her  territory  in  the 
occupation  of  German  soldiers,  the  French  Empire 
overthrown,  and  replaced  by  an  unstable  republic,  but 
frightful  civil  conflicts  like  the  Commune  had  divided 
France  against  herself.  So  distraught,  indeed,  was 
she  that  Bismarck  had  almost  to  create  a  French 
government  with  which  to  treat  at  all.  An  indemnity 
— at  the  time  immense — had  been  imposed  upon  her, 
and  it  was  generally  believed  that  not  for  generations 
could  she  again  become  a  considerable  military  or 
political  factor  in  Europe. 

Her  increase  of  population  was  feeble,  tending  to 
stagnation;  her  political  institutions  were  unstable; 


12      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

she  was  torn  by  internal  dissensions;  and  yet,  as  we 
know,  within  five  years  of  the  conclusion  of  peace 
France  had  already  sufficiently  recuperated  to  become 
a  cause  of  anxiety  to  Bismarck,  who  believed  that  the 
work  of  "destruction"  would  have  to  be  begun  all 
over  again.  And  if  one  goes  back  to  earlier  centuries, 
to  the  France  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  to  her  recovery  after 
her  defeat  in  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  to 
the  incredible  exhaustion  of  Prussia  in  wars  like  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  when  her  population  was  cut  in 
half,  or  to  the  Seven  Years'  War,  it  is  the  same  story— 
a  virile  people  cannot  be  wiped  from  the  map. 

Moreover,  so  long  as  the  world  as  a  whole  does  not 
know  the  policy  which  the  forces  of  the  respective 
nations  defend,  military  alliances  are  forever  subject  to 
rearrangements  which  may  nullify  the  relative  strength 
of  any  one  nation.  A  year  ago  Italy  was  in  formal 
alliance  with  the  powers  that  she  is  now  fighting. 
Japan,  a  decade  since,  was  fighting  with  a  power  of 
which  she  is  now  the  ally.  The  position  of  Russia 
shows  never-ending  changes.  In  the  struggles  of  the 
eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries  England 
was  always  on  the  side  of  Russia;  then  after  two  gen- 
erations Englishmen  were  taught  to  believe  that  any 
increase  in  the  power  of  Russia  was  absolutely  fatal 
to  the  continued  existence  of  the  British  Empire — that 
statement  was  made  by  a  British  publicist  less  than 
ten  years  ago.  Britain  is  now  fighting  to  increase, 
both  relatively  and  absolutely,  the  power  of  a  country 
which,  in  her  last  war  upon  the  Continent,  she  fought 
to  check.  In  the  war  before  that  one,  also  fought  upon 
the  Continent,  England  was  in  alliance  with  Germany 
against  France.  As  to  the  Austrians  whom  England 
is  now  fighting,  they  were  for  many  years  her  faithful 


Norman  Angell  13 

allies.  So  it  is  very  nearly  the  truth  to  say  of  all  the 
combatants  respectively  that  they  have  no  enemy  to-day 
who  was  not,  historically  speaking,  quite  recently  an 
ally,  and  not  an  ally  to-day  who  was  not  in  the  recent 
past  an  enemy. 

However,  it  may  be  said  that  Europe  did  at  least 
deal  successfully  with  the  French  military  menace  that 
arose  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and 
that  the  problem  of  France  in  1815 — successfully  dealt 
with  by  Europe — resembles  in  its  essentials  the  prob- 
lem of  Germany,  with  which  Europe  has  now  to  deal 
a  hundred  years  later.  To  which  it  is  unhappily  neces- 
sary to  reply  that  the  German  problem  of  1915  does 
not  resemble  the  French  problem  of  1815,  and  that 
Europe  did  not  successfully  settle  this  latter  problem 
a  hundred  years  ago. 

First,  as  to  the  difference  between  the  two  cases. 
What  the  Allies  were  trying  to  do  in  1815  and  did — very 
temporarily — was  to  restore  to  France  the  old  govern- 
ment that  had  been  usurped  by  a  non-French  soldier, 
for  Napoleon  was  not  a  Frenchman.  The  Allies  of 
that  day,  were,  in  fact,  in  alliance  with  the  legitimate 
ruler  of  France,  and  were  supported  by  a  powerful 
French  party  and  by  the  entire  French  provinces. 

The  Allies  of  our  day,  should  they  come  to  their 
Vienna  Congress,  will  not  be  dealing  with  a  usurper 
alien  to  the  German  people,  nor  one  that  is  opposed  by 
Germans,  as  Napoleon  was  opposed  by  certain  of  the 
French.  There  are  no  powerful  and  influential  Ger- 
man classes  in  exile  and  at  home,  ready  to  restore  a 
government  desired  by  the  Allies.  The  historic  gov- 
ernment of  Germany  does  not  happen  to  represent  the 
political  and  dynastic  preferences  of  the  Europe  that  may 
have  the  task  of  reconstructing  the  German  Empire. 


14      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

So  much  for  the  resemblance.  Now  as  to  the  success 
of  Europe,  in  1815,  in  exorcising  the  Napoleonic  danger. 
The  victory  of  the  European  Allies  of  1815  was  pre- 
sumed to  have  restored  permanently  the  old  French 
dynasty  that  had  disappeared  and  to  have  overthrown 
the  Napoleonic  usurpation.  Yet,  within  four  decades 
of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  it  was  the  old  French  dy- 
nasty that  had  disappeared  and  the  Napoleonic  dynasty 
that  was  once  more  installed.  And  so  little  did  the  vic- 
tories of  the  Allies  exorcise  the  danger  of  Napoleonic 
military  ambitions,  that,  within  a  generation  after  the 
death  of  the  first  Napoleon,  another  Napoleon  had  en- 
tered into  alliance  with  England — the  jailer  of  the  first— 
and  with  her  was  busy  fighting  wars  the  result  of  which 
England  and  Europe  are  now  attempting  to  undo — that 
is,  fighting  to  keep  Russia  from  the  Dardanelles  and  to 
"secure  the  permanent  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire" !  For,  while  the  Crimean  War  was  fought  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  Russia  from  reaching  Constanti- 
nople and  for  fortifying  Turkish  power,  the  present  war 
is  being  fought,  of  course,  among  other  things,  for  the 
purpose  of  achieving  the  exactly  contrary  purpose.  The 
grim  horror  of  the  thing  is  complete  when  we  remember 
that  the  very  object  accomplished  by  the  last  war  in 
which  France  and  England  fought  together  is  in  no 
small  part  the  cause  of  the  present  war.  For  the  result 
of  the  Crimean  War  was  to  make  large  Balkan  popula- 
tions subservient  to  Turkish  rule,  and  the  present  war 
began  in  an  incident  to  which  the  intrigues  and  struggles 
of  that  situation  gave  rise:  it  was  a  part  of  the  unrest 
which  the  Crimean  War  made  inevitable. 

It  was  not,  therefore,  the  Allies  of  1815  who  got  rid 
either  of  the  Napolonic  dynasty  or  of  the  tradition 
and  evil  fermentation  that  it  represented.  What 


Norman  Angell  15 

finally  liberated  France  and  Europe  from  the  particular 
menace  of  French  imperialism  was  the  German  victory 
of  1870. 

The  lesson  of  1815,  of  1870,  and  the  four  or  five  simi- 
lar situations  that  have  preceded  it  in  Europe  at  inter- 
vals of  a  century  or  so,  is  that  the  menace  that  the 
two  Napoleons  represented  was  not  in  a  person,  or  even 
in  a  dynasty,  but  in  a  wrong  ideal.  For  modern  Ger- 
many has  produced  no  Napoleon  though  it  has  produced 
Napoleonism. 

Just  as  military  power  is  finally  nullified  or  ill-used 
when  we  do  not  know  the  definite  purpose  it  represents, 
so  is  a  nation's  economic  power  wasted  as  a  deterrent. 
At  this  present  moment,  for  instance,  you  are  using 
your  material  resources,  your  money,  credit,  supplies, 
ammunition,  etc.,  in  behalf  of  the  better  cause  in 
the  European  War;  throwing  your  national  resources 
against  a  policy  of  aggression.  Yet  the  value  of  this 
as  a  deterrent  of  aggression  is  entirely  sacrificed  be- 
cause it  is  not  linked  to  a  predetermined  and  definitely 
announced  policy. 

Let  me  make  this  clear.  If  we  go  below  diplomatic 
fictions  to  positive  realities,  America  is  decisively  in- 
tervening in  the  war.  She  is  perhaps  settling  its  issue 
by  throwing  the  weight  of  her  resources  in  money, 
supplies,  and  ammunition  on  the  side  of  one  combatant 
as  against  the  other.  The  American  government  has 
without  doubt  scrupulously  respected  all  the  rules  of 
neutrality.  But  it  would  have  been  equally  neutral 
for  America  to  have  decided  that  her  national  interests 
compelled  her  to  exercise  her  sovereign  rights  in  keeping 
her  resources  at  home  at  this  juncture  and  to  treat 
combatants  exactly  alike  by  exporting  to  neither. 
This  form  of  neutrality — just  as  legally  defensible  in 


16      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  opinion  of  many  competent  American  judges  as 
the  present  one— would  have  perhaps  altered  the  whole 
later  history  of  the  war.  I  am  not  giving  you  my  own 
opinion,  but  that  of  very  responsible  independent 
American  authorities — by  independent  I  mean  non- 
governmental—when I  say  that  had  American  opinion 
been  as  hostile  to  the  Allies  as  on  the  whole  it  is  to 
Germany  the  campaign  for  an  embargo  on  the  export 
of  arms  or  the  raising  of  a  loan  would  have  been 
irresistible.  You  see  I  am  speaking  with  undiplo- 
matic freedom:  saying  out  loud  what  everybody 
thinks. 

But  the  value  of  this  decision  of  the  American  people 
as  a  factor  making  for  a  better  code  of  conduct  as 
between  nations  is  nearly  altogether  lost  precisely 
because  of  this  diplomatic  fiction  we  are  compelled  to 
maintain  about  it.  The  American  government  in 
effect  tells  Germany  that  she  would  be  quite  prepared 
to  sell  arms  to  her  if  she  could  fetch  them.  So  Germans 
legitimately  argue:  "It  is  not  because  America  or  the 
world  disapproves  of  our  policy  that  we  are  unable  to 
get  American  economic  assistance  in  our  war,  but  simply 
because  Germany  has  not  a  large  enough  navy  to 
command  the  sea.  If  we  had  we  could  use  American 
arms  as  readily  as  does  England." 

Whereas,  suppose  America  were  in  a  position  to  say 
to  Germany:  "Your  enemies  get  our  money  and  sup- 
plies and  munitions  because  your  policy  is  a  menace 
to  the  society  of  nations.  If  your  conduct  had  been 
other  than  it  has  been  they  would  not  get  them."  Do 
you  not  see  that  then  America  would  be  using  her  great 
resources  to  penalize  a  policy  of  aggression  among  the 
nations  and  to  encourage  fair  dealing?  Her  good  will 
would  be  a  military  asset  that  the  strongest  military 


Norman  Angell  17 

nation  could  not  well  despise.  And  it  would  operate 
as  much  with  the  nations  that  do  not  control  the  sea 
as  with  those  that  do.  Those  that  don't  would  desire 
to  see  supplies  withheld  from  their  enemies;  those  that 
do  would  want  to  have  free  access  to  them.  I  am  per- 
fectly aware  of  course  that  this  would  not  be  neutrality 
as  how  understood;  or  permissible  under  international 
law.  It  would  involve  a  new  conception  of  interna- 
tional relationship.  But  it  is  precisely  that  for  which 
I  am  pleading. 

But  these  great  forces  are  wasted  in  so  far  as  con- 
tributing to  a  better  international  order  is  concerned 
because  this  country  has  no  international  policy.  For 
the  mere  defeat  of  Germany  will  virtually  have  served 
no  purpose  if  there  is  to  be  no  common  policy  of  the 
nations  afterwards.  It  will  no  more  render  the  nations 
more  secure  than  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  a  hundred 
years  ago  and  the  Vienna  Congress  which  followed  it 
gave  us  a  stable  Europe. 

All  the  preparedness  of  the  European  nations  was 
ineffective  in  the  stopping  of  war  because  no  one  really 
knew  what  all  the  arming  was  for.  The  English  feared 
the  invasion  of  England — the  very  last  thing  probably 
which  the  military  caste  in  Germany  was  contemplat- 
ing. That  caste  may  have  had  their  eyes  on  Asia  Mi- 
nor, possibly  Egypt,  possibly  India,  but  certainly  not 
Middlesex  or  Kent.  And  just  why  they  had  their  eye 
on  the  tropical  Empire  of  Great  Britain — if  they  had — 
whether  to  ensure  equal  commercial  treatment,  or 
merely  to  find  administrative  jobs  for  Prussian  bureau- 
crats, no  German  and  no  Englishman  can  tell  you. 
Whether  Germany  was  really  asking  something  which 
it  would  have  been  impossible  for  England  to  accord, 
equally  no  one  knows.  They  will  perhaps  discuss  these 


i8      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

things  after  the  war.  They  might  just  as  well  have 
discussed  them  before  and  fought  afterwards,  if  it 
seemed  that  the  fighting  was  necessary. 

Do  you  know  that  the  members  of  the  British  minis- 
try and  great  English  newspapers  are  still  discussing 
why  England  went  into  the  war?  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
tells  a  newspaper  man  that  but  for  the  invasion  of 
Belgium,  England  would  never  have  gone  into  the  war, 
and  is  next  day  flatly  contradicted  by  the  organ  of  the 
Foreign  Office  which  tells  him  that  he  does  not  know 
what  he  is  talking  about ;  that  England  would  have  had 
to  come  to  the  defense  of  France  and  to  oppose  the 
occupation  of  Channel  ports  and  maintain  the  balance 
of  power  on  the  Continent,  Belgium  or  no  Belgium; 
that  the  most  elementary  considerations  of  self -protec- 
tion on  England's  part  compelled  her  to  oppose  the 
imposition  of  a  German  hegemony  on  Europe.  Which 
is  true?  Nobody  knows. 

Was  Germany  really  "encircled"?  Could  Europe 
have  arranged  for  Germany's  legitimate  commercial 
expansion  without  yielding  anything  vital  to  itself? 
All  these  are  things  which  will  have  to  be  discussed 
after  the  war.  Would  it  not  have  been  as  well  to  have 
discussed  them  before? 

And  through  none  of  this  period  would  greater  pre- 
paredness on  anyone's  part  have  given  a  sensibly 
different  result.  It  is  said  that  if  England  had  only 
taken  Lord  Roberts's  advice  and  adopted  conscription 
years  ago,  Germany  would  not  have  made  war,  or 
would  quickly  have  been  beaten.  But  you  know,  of 
course,  that  when  the  National  Service  League  began 
operations,  some  seventeen  or  eighteen  years  ago  in 
England,  the  compulsory  service  which  it  advocated 
was  not  aimed  at  Germany  at  all,  but  at  France. 


Norman  Angell  19 

France  was  then  the  enemy,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain 
was  very  menacing  towards  her  and  publicly  advocated 
an  alliance  with  Germany  against  her.  Over  the 
Fashoda  business  the  two  countries  came  very  close 
to  war  and  if  both  had  had  greater  military  establish- 
ments and  had  been  very  confident  of  their  efficiency, 
and  if  there  had  not  been  a  strong  anti-military  party 
in  both  countries,  you  would  in  all  human  probability 
have  had  an  Anglo-German  combination  against 
France.  Where  then  to-day  would  be  the  German 
military  menace?  I  know  whereof  I  speak,  because 
I  happen  to  be  one  of  those  who  at  the  time  of  the 
Fashoda  crisis  and  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  Boer  War 
tried  to  stem  the  anti-French  current  in  England,  and 
found  that  it  cost  a  journalist  his  reputation  as  a  true 
patriot  to  say  a  good  word  for  France  or  a  bad  one  of 
Germany.  And  as  to  the  preparedness  of  the  other 
nations,  would  greater  preparedness  on  the  part  of 
Germany  or  Austria  or  Turkey  or  Bulgaria  or  even 
Italy  or  Japan  have  altered  the  case?  Or,  for  that 
matter,  on  the  part  of  Servia  or  Belgium?  If  Belgium 
had  put  under  arms  every  man  she  possessed,  she  could 
not  have  defended  herself  against  Germany.  And  if 
you  say  that  it  might  have  held  up  the  German  forces 
until  Belgium's  allies  came  to  her  aid,  you  are  only  ad- 
mitting what  I  am  trying  to  show,  that  military  force 
must  be  backed  by  an  international  policy.  Indeed, 
does  not  this  war  show  that  war  itself  has  become  inter- 
nationalized and  that  you  cannot  even  fight  wars  with- 
out treaties  and  engagements  of  some  kind  between 
nations?  Any  European  nation  which  had  said:  "We 
can  depend  on  our  own  force  alone;  we  do  not  need  to 
bother  about  arrangements  with  foreigners,"  would  have 
been  lost.  France  and  England  are  both  to-day  de- 


20      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

fended  in  part  by  treaty,  and  without  those  treaties 
would  both  be  overpowered. 

Now  this  principle  has  to  be  pushed  further.  It  is 
not  enough,  when  war  threatens,  over  some  dispute 
of  policy,  suddenly  to  improvise  a  treaty  with  other 
nations  and  patch  up  a  common  policy  which  is  so 
hurriedly  conceived  that,  as  all  history  shows,  it  hardly 
outlasts  the  military  need  of  the  moment.  So  long  as 
that  is  the  case,  so  long  as  a  power  whom  we  deem 
neutral — whose  demands  we  have  not  troubled  to 
understand — can  suddenly  join  our  enemies,  no  nation, 
however  great,  is  safe. 

Neither  military  nor  economic  strength  can  of  them- 
selves either  protect  your  rights  or  insure  your  security. 
They  can  only  do  that  if  they  are  linked  to  a  defined 
international  policy  known  to  yourselves,  to  the  world 
at  large,  and  to  your  prospective  enemies.  For,  as  I 
have  said,  in  the  last  resort  armies  and  navies  are  not 
for  the  protection  of  a  country,  but  a  policy. 

What  this  country  needs  as  well  as  armaments  is  a 
formulation  of  policy  which  the  world  cannot  mistake, 
as  to  what  the  armaments  are  for;  with  reference  to 
South  America,  Sea  Law,  Japan  and  the  Open  Door  in 
Asia,  and  the  support  of  some  international  code  for 
the  prevention  of  crude  aggression  by  any  nations. 

These  are  not  simple  questions.  They  will  need  a 
great  deal  of  discussion  on  the  part  of  the  American 
people.  They  are  not  getting  it.  But  a  decision  con- 
cerning them  is  as  necessary  for  security  as  battleships ; 
and  without  decision  America  will  get  into  the  same  kind 
of  muddle  that  Europe  gets  into,  however  many  battle- 
ships we  have.  Again,  that  is  not  an  argument  against 
battleships;  it  is  an  argument  for  something  else  as  well. 

Unless  your  power,  whether  military  or  economic, 


Norman  Angell  21 

does  so  stand  visibly  and  definitely  linked  to  your  policy, 
it  will  fail,  however  great,  to  vindicate  your  rights, 
protect  your  interests,  or  freedom,  or  your  form  of 
society. 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  AND  THE 

MAINTENANCE    OF    OUR    NATIONAL 

OBLIGATIONS 

BY  GEORGE  HAVEN  PUTNAM 

THE  nations  of  the  world  find  themselves  to-day 
confronted  with  a  series  of  world's  problems. 
The  United  States,  one  of  the  most  powerful  members 
of  this  community  of  nations,  cannot,  if  it  would,  shirk 
its  responsibilities  in  regard  to  the  part  that  it  should 
take  in  the  adjustment  of  these  problems.  It  is  not 
possible  as  the  world  is  now  constituted  for  any  state, 
and  particularly  for  a  state  with  the  history,  the  popula- 
tion, and  the  resources  of  the  United  States,  to  attempt 
an  isolated  existence.  We  Americans  cannot  say  that 
we  have  no  concern  with  the  affairs  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Our  national  relations  are  too  widespread,  too 
complex,  and  too  important.  We  have  American 
interests  to  consider  and  American  citizens  to  protect. 
Further,  we  have  obligations  to  maintain,  first,  those 
which  have  been  deliberately  assumed,  such  as  the 
control  of  affairs  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  under  the 
policy  announced  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  repeated 
from  decade  to  decade  during  the  past  ninety-five  years ; 
and,  secondly,  those  that  belong  to  all  civilized  states, 
to  all  men  of  the  twentieth  century,  which  are  based 
upon  the  ordinary  claims  of  humanity  and  the  stand- 
ards of  civilization.  The  United  States  has  a  part  to 

22 


George  Haven  Putnam  23 

play  in  using  its  influence  to  further  throughout  the 
world  the  cause  of  representative  government;  of  the 
rights  of  peoples  to  select  their  own  rulers  and  to  direct 
the  policy  of  those  rulers;  for  the  preservation  of  the 
independence  and  of  the  liberties  of  the  smaller  states; 
for  the  maintenance  throughout  the  world  of  justice 
and  fair  dealing;  and  for  bringing  to  a  "strict  account- 
ability" any  state  which,  in  defiance  of  the  accepted 
standards  of  civilization,  plays  the  part  of  the  bully, 
and  acts  as  an  oppressor  in  appropriating  the  goods  and 
the  liberties  of  its  neighbors. 

Even  if  it  might  be  possible  for  the  United  States  to 
continue  to  exist  in  peaceful  and  safe  isolation,  sitting 
back  and  growing  rich  without  care  for  the  troubles  of 
other  peoples,  the  Americans  would  be  ashamed  to 
accept  such  a  r61e,  to  play  the  part  of  shirkers  and  of 
selfish  cowards;  but  there  is  no  such  possibility.  The 
attempt  at  isolation  on  the  part  of  a  rich  people  that 
is  not  prepared  to  make  the  sacrifices  required  to  organ- 
ize its  resources  and  to  maintain  a  standard  of  dignity 
and  of  national  honor,  would  bring  such  misfortune 
and  indignities  upon  the  United  States  as  have  been 
the  lot  of  China.  The  way  to  avoid  the  repetition  of 
war  is  not  to  fold  one's  hands  and  shriek  that  war  is 
horrible,  that  war  is  wicked,  but  to  do  what  is  essential 
for  the  adjustment  of  the  problems  and  issues  arising 
from  decade  to  decade  which,  when  left  unsettled, 
bring  about  war.  The  United  States  has  two  great  sets 
of  responsibilities: 

A.  To  its  own  citizens. 

B.  To  the  world  at  large. 

The  responsibilities  to  the  outer  world  are  themselves 
of  two  classes: 

a.     Those  which  arise  from  the  definite  obligations 


24      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

assumed  by  the  Republic,  such,  for  instance,  as  those 
involved  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  those  resulting 
from  our  being  a  party  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris  or  to  the 
Hague  Convention;  and 

b.  Those  based  upon  what  may  be  called  the  ethics 
of  the  world,  the  universal  obligations  of  humanity. 

The  elementary  duty  to  its  citizens  on  the  part  of 
the  successive  administrations  of  the  Republic  calls 
for  such  organization  of  the  resources  of  the  nation  as 
shall  ensure  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  justice  within 
its  borders,  and  as  shall  make  substantially  secure  the 
defense  of  the  Republic  against  aggression  from  without. 
The  preservation  of  its  own  existence  is  the  first,  the 
elementary  duty  of  every  organized  state.  It  is  the 
policy  that  has  been  recognized  from  the  beginning  of 
the  Republic,  although  the  application  has  naturally 
varied  from  administration  to  administration,  according 
to  the  conditions  and  the  risks  of  the  time  and  accord- 
ing also  to  the  personality  of  the  men  entrusted  with 
the  direction  of  the  government.  In  1789,  Washington 
writes  to  Congress: 

"If  we  are  to  avoid  insult  and  to  fulfill  our  national 
obligations,  we  must  organize  our  resources  and  prepare 
against  the  risk  of  war." 

It  was  because  this  wise  counsel  had  been  forgotten 
by  President  Madison  and  the  Bryans  of  the  day  whose 
counsel  he  was  prepared  to  accept,  that  the  United 
States,  having  maintained  contentions  and  taken  steps 
that  were  likely  to  lead  to  issues  with  other  nations, 
found  itself  confronted  with  war,  and  at  a  time  when 
there  was  absolutely  no  preparation  for  national  de- 
fense. As  a  result  of  this  foolish  combination  of  large 
utterances  and  of  lack  of  organization  of  resources  for 
the  maintenance  of  its  contention,  the  nation  suffered 


George  Haven  Putnam  25 

a  series  of  humiliating  defeats.  It  escaped  being  entirely 
crushed  only  because  its  opponent,  Great  Britain,  was  at 
that  time  largely  occupied  with  a  great  conflict  in  Europe. 
The  orators  in  the  Congress  of  1812-13  who  were 
inveighing  against  the  expenditure  required  for  the 
organization  of  a  defensive  force,  pointed  out  that  the 
Atlantic  was  wide,  and  that  it  was  impossible  to  bring 
over  sufficient  troops  to  make  possible  an  attack  on  our 
coasts.  The  statement  was  made  one  hundred  years 
ago,  as  it  is  made  to-day,  that  "the  citizens  of  the  Repub- 
lic would  spring  to  its  defense."  With  the  hysterical 
methods  of  preparation  which  are  inevitable  when  the 
work  has  been  delayed  until  the  peril  is  immediately 
at  hand,  two  or  three  hundred  thousand  patriotic  citi- 
zens were  brought  under  arms,  with  the  result  that,  with 
the  single  exception  of  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  these 
citizens'  armies  opposed  to  small  groups  of  trained 
soldiers  were  at  one  point  or  another  on  our  continent 
brought  to  disgraceful  defeat.  The  armies  that  invaded 
Canada  were  thrown  back  in  confusion.  General  Hull 
surrendered  Detroit  to  a  force  one  quarter  of  his  own, 
and  two  or  three  thousand  British  troops,  after  defeat- 
ing at  the  battle  of  Bladensburg  three  times  their 
number,  marched  into  Washington  and,  to  the  disgrace 
of  the  British  commander,  burnt  the  capitol.  This  is  the 
risk  that  the  pacifists  of  to-day,  at  a  time  when  the  At- 
lantic is  for  practical  purposes  one  tenth  the  width  that 
it  was  a  century  ago,  are  prepared  to  take  so  jauntily. 
The  pacifists  who  criticize  our  attempts  at  national 
organization  as  new  and  hysterical  plans  for  wasteful 
expenditure  are  themselves  upholding  a  policy  that  is 
absolutely  novel,  a  policy  never  attempted  by  any 
nation  in  the  history  of  the  world,  with  the  single  excep- 
tion of  China. 


26      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

If  the  advocates  of  "peace  at  any  price"  are  to  be 
consistent,  they  should  contend  for  the  absolute  aboli- 
tion of  the  present  defensive  system.  The  forts  should 
be  dismantled  and  the  guns  thrown  into  the  Atlantic. 
The  fleet  should  be  put  upon  the  scrap  heap  and  the  few 
thousand  men  that  constitute  the  so-called  army  for  the 
defense  of  the  wealth  and  the  independence  of  our 
hundred  millions  of  people  should  be  sent  back  to  civil 
life.  There  is  no  sense  in  making  expenditures,  in  them- 
selves considerable,  for  defensive  measures  which  from 
the  "peace  at  any  price"  point  of  view  are  indefensible 
in  character,  and  which  on  the  authority  of  the  naval 
and  military  experts  are  absolutely  inadequate  in 
themselves. 

Provision  for  the  defense  of  our  territory  and  our 
coast  cities  is  to  be  considered  a  matter  of  "insurance," 
and  in  this  sense  it  may  properly  be  described  as  a  busi- 
ness necessity.  The  defense  of  our  national  obligations 
is  a  matter  of  honor.  A  nation  without  ideals  cannot 
look  forward  to  continued  existence,  and  is  in  any  case 
not  worth  preserving.  This  insurance  of  the  wealth 
and  the  independence  of  the  nation  is  a  costly  matter, 
but  the  cost  is  trifling  as  compared  with  the  enormous 
losses  simply  in  material  resources  that  would  be  caused 
by  a  successful  invasion  of  our  coasts  with  the  appro- 
priation of  two  or  three  of  our  great  coast  cities. 

The  merchant  who  is  willing  to  "take  the  chances" 
in  regard  to  the  safety  of  his  warehouses  against  the 
risk  of  loss  by  fire  may  be  within  his  individual  rights, 
unless  in  so  doing  he  is  risking  property  that  is  only  in 
part  his  own.  His  children  or  other  heirs  may  have 
rightful  claims  for  a  wiser  system  of  business  manage- 
ment. His  creditors  will  in  any  case  be  watching  very 
closely  the  balance  sheet  of  the  man  who  handles  under 


George  Haven  Putnam  27 

the  methods  of  a  gambler  his  business  responsibilities. 
The  risk  of  the  destruction  of  a  warehouse  in  New  York 
City,  for  instance,  is  something  less  than  one  per  cent. 
I  find  that  the  amount  paid  for  the  insurance  of  my 
own  warehouses  averages  one  per  cent.,  which  means 
(with  the  necessary  allowance  of  the  cost  of  maintaining 
the  insurance  companies)  an  absolute  risk  of  perhaps 
three  quarters  of  one  per  cent.  The  merchant  who 
might  be  willing,  for  the  sake  of  saving  the  expense  of 
the  annual  premiums,  to  abandon  this  precaution 
would  find  it  difficult  to  secure  credit  from  the  banks  or 
to  maintain  his  business  relations  with  creditors. 

Our  citizens  will  in  any  case,  irrespective  of  this 
matter  of  protecting  their  property,  refuse  to  accept  the 
teachings  of  the  Bryanites  who  call  upon  us  to  shirk 
our  national  responsibilities.  Sitting  back  and  keeping 
out  of  danger  is  in  itself  impossible.  It  can  only  be 
described  as  cowardly,  futile,  the  talk  of  babies.  Such 
counsel  would  be  laughable  if  it  did  not  involve  grave 
perils  and  the  risk  of  national  dishonor. 

Assuming  that  the  organization  of  our  resources  in 
men  and  in  material  for  national  defense  is  essential, 
there  are  two  methods  to  be  pursued.  The  necessary 
measures  can  be  undertaken  soberly,  quietly,  under  an 
intelligent  and  developing  system  which  will  save 
waste,  or  they  can  be  taken  up  hysterically  at  a  time 
when  some  great  international  issue  has  arisen,  or 
when  the  enemy  is  in  sight. 

The  teachers  of  the  Oswald  Villard  class  are  appar- 
ently in  favor  of  delaying  all  measures  of  defense  until 
the  enemy  is  in  sight.  History  shows  us  the  wicked 
wastefulness  of  this  kind  of  a  national  policy.  The 
present  European  war  is  the  text  which  has  made  it 
possible  to  bring  this  matter  effectively  to  the  attention 


28      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  our  public;  but  the  policy  of  an  effective  national 
defense  system  has  for  years  been  urged  by  the  skilled 
officials  of  the  government  and  has  been  particularly 
emphasized  by  the  veterans  of  my  generation.  We 
have  before  us  to-day  the  example  of  a  nation  which  in 
its  ambition  for  imperial  domination  has  shown  itself 
ready  to  carry  through  its  schemes  of  aggression  with- 
out regard  for  treaty  obligations,  for  the  rights  of 
neutrals,  for  the  precedents  of  international  relations, 
or  for  the  accepted  methods  of  warfare.  While  it  is 
the  action  of  Germany  that  gives  the  immediate  text 
for  our  preaching,  it  is  proper  to  remember  that  there 
may  arise  in  the  future,  as  there  have  arisen  in  the 
past,  other  states  equally  aggressive,  equally  forgetful 
of  national  responsibilities,  equally  ready  to  trample 
upon  the  rights  of  other  peoples  and  the  precedents 
accepted  by  civilization. 

The  imperial  aggression  of  Germany,  the  state  which 
is  to-day,  with  the  aid  of  its  allies,  or  rather  its  depend- 
ents, Austria  and  Turkey,  acting  as  the  bully  in  the 
civilized  world,  goes  back  to  the  close  of  the  Prussian 
War  of  1871.  It  was  then  that  arose  the  dream  of  a 
German  Empire  controlling  Europe  and  dominating 
the  civilized  world. 

As  far  back  as  1872,  the  Prussian  Minister  of  War, 
Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  makes  this  statement  of 
policy  and  of  the  scheme  of  imperial  development : 

Do  not  let  us  forget  the  civilizing  task  which  has  been 
assigned  to  us  by  the  decrees  of  Providence.  Just  as 
Prussia  was  destined  to  be  the  nucleus  of  Germany,  so  the 
regenerated  Germany  shall  become  the  nucleus  of  a  future 
Empire  of  the  West,  and  in  order  that  no  one  may  be  left 
in  doubt,  we  here  proclaim  that  from  henceforth  our  conti- 
nental nation  has  a  right  to  the  sea,  not  only  to  the 


George  Haven  Putnam  29 

North  Sea,  but  to  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic. 
Hence  we  intend  to  absorb  one  after  another  all  the  pro- 
vinces that  neighbor  on  Prussia.  We  shall  successively 
annex  Denmark,  Holland,  Belgium,  northern  Switzerland; 
then  Trieste  and  Venice ;  and  finally  northern  France  from 
the  Sambre  to  the  Loire.  This  is  the  program  which  we 
fearlessly  announce.  It  is  not  the  scheme  of  a  madman. 
The  Empire  that  we  shall  found  will  be  a  Utopia.  We 
have  ready  in  our  hands  the  means  for  bringing  this 
Empire  into  existence  and  no  coalition  in  the  world  can 
stop  us. 

This  utterance  of  von  Schellendorf  has  during  the 
past  forty -five  years  been  repeated  in  many  forms. 
The  theories  for  the  institution  and  world-wide  develop- 
ment of  the  German  Empire  have  been  emphasized 
by  a  series  of  writers  such  as  Treitschke,  Bernhardi,  and 
Reventlow.  Germany  has  from  an  early  date  recog- 
nized that  it  is  the  power  of  Great  Britain  that  stands 
in  the  way  of  such  a  world  Empire  as  now  constitutes 
Germany's  aim.  France  stands  between  Germany  and 
Britain  and  (in  the  utterance  of  more  than  one  recent 
German  writer)  "France  must  be  crushed  a  second  time 
and  so  thoroughly  that  never  again  will  she  stand  in 
the  way  of  Germany." 

The  destruction  of  Belgium  initiated  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  honor  of  the  German  word  in  the  cancel- 
lation of  its  treaty  obligations,  is  looked  upon  as  a 
mere  incident,  something  of  no  essential  importance. 
A  recent  utterance  of  the  Lokal  Anzeige  of  Berlin 
makes  specific  expression  of  the  Prussian  theory  in 
regard  to  the  smaller  states: 

"No  small  state  has  any  right  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  the  development  of  an  Empire  like  that  of 
Germany." 


30      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Reventlow  speaks  of  the  attempt  of  England  to  re- 
tain the  command  of  the  sea  as  an  example  of  "  constant 
egoism."  The  Emperor  William  says : 

"  Sea  power  is  world  power.  The  future  of  Germany 
is  on  the  sea.  The  trident  is  to  pass  into  our 
hands." 

I  have  myself  in  annual  sojourns  in  England,  extend- 
ing over  a  period  of  more  than  fifty  years,  come  to 
possess  some  personal  knowledge  of  English  opinion, 
English  aims,  and  English  policies.  I  have  during  that 
period  heard  many  expressions  of  doubt,  not  to  say 
dread,  as  to  the  imperial  plans  of  Germany.  I  have 
heard  expressions  of  annoyance, — mingled,  it  is  fair  to 
remember,  with  appreciation  of  the  enterprise  and 
capacity  for  using  skilled  service  and  of  the  genius  for 
organization — at  the  development  of  Germany's  manu- 
factories, its  world-wide  trade,  its  commercial  marine, 
its  financial  relations.  Never  in  that  time  have  I  heard 
or  read  a  single  British  utterance  expressing  a  desire 
to  possess  anything  that  belonged  to  Germany.  Dur- 
ing that  same  period,  in  frequent  visits  to  Germany,  I 
have  heard  repeatedly  the  assertion  that  "the  British 
Empire  must  be  broken  up  and  that  we,  the  Germans, 
are  the  natural  inheritors." 

I  remember  a  statement  made  by  a  University  Pro- 
fessor who  was  presenting  a  survey  of  the  centuries. 

During  the  eighteenth  century  [said  the  Professor] 
Europe  was  largely  under  the  domination  of  France ;  during 
the  nineteenth  century,  mainly  owing  to  the  superiority 
of  its  fleet,  the  influence  of  Great  Britain  was  paramount; 
the  twentieth  century  must  belong  to  Germany.  We 
have  made  the  sacrifices  required  to  bring  to  the  highest 
point  the  organization  of  the  wealth  and  the  strength  of 
our  people.  .  .  . 


George  Haven  Putnam  31 

Back  of  this  organization  stands  the  national  will, 
and  the  belief  that  the  enforcement  and  extension  of 
German  kultur  will  be  for  the  good  of  the  peoples  ruled 
over  and  of  the  world  at  large. 

It  is  for  the  Germans  to  show  how  an  Empire  should  be 
constituted  and  administered  so  that  instead  of  being  but 
a  passing  phase,  like  that  of  Napoleon,  it  shall  endure  during 
the  centuries  to  come. 

Is  it  natural  that  with  these  frank  utterances  on  the 
part  of  leaders  of  thought  throughout  Germany,  utter- 
ances which  have  been,  so  to  speak,  confirmed  by 
political  action  and  by  military  and  naval  preparation, 
Europe  should  have  continued  in  a  state  of  apprehen- 
sion in  regard  to  the  threatened  aggression  from  Ger- 
many ?  Germans  have  from  time  to  time  indulged  in 
naive  complaint  that  they  are  "not  loved"  by  their 
neighbors ;  that  there  was  being  constituted  around  them 
an  iron  ring  of  antagonistic  peoples,  and  that  the  pur- 
pose of  these  peoples  was  to  choke  off  the  natural  and 
legitimate  development  of  Germany.  "The  peoples 
of  Europe  do  not  like  us,"  say  these  writers.  Well, 
when  a  man  complains  that  those  with  whom  he  has  to 
do  are  in  substantial  accord  in  expressing  dislike,  we 
have  some  doubt  as  to  the  sweetness  of  nature,  or  the 
equity  of  dealing,  of  such  individual.  The  same  thing 
is  true  with  nations.  Every  state  is  in  contact  with 
neighbors  with  whom  it  must,  of  necessity,  carry  on 
relations,  commercial,  political,  etc.,  and  the  nation 
which  comes  under  general  dislike  has,  as  history  shows, 
only  itself  to  thank  for  the  result.  Suppose,  for  in- 
stance, that  Germany  should  carry  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion this  war  of  aggression,  and  should  complete 
its  annexation  of  Belgium,  how  many  generations  of 


32      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Belgian  mothers  and  fathers  must  come  and  go  before 
the  history  of  German  misdeeds  in  the  Belgian  territory 
can  be  forgotten  ?  The  first  act  of  infamy  in  the  tearing 
up  of  the  guaranty  treaty  (the  "scrap  of  paper");  the 
burning  of  the  cities;  the  shooting  of  hostages;  the  mis- 
treatment of  women ;  the  imposing  upon  communities, 
already  ruined  by  German  occupation,  crushing  indem- 
nities; the  carrying  from  Belgium  to  Germany  of  the 
selected  cattle  and  of  a  large  part  of  the  resources  by 
which  the  little  kingdom  had  made  itself  financially 
independent;  the  enforcement  of  orders  under  which 
Belgian  laborers  were  obliged  to  work  in  the  munition 
factories  to  produce  shells  and  cartridges  for  the  killing 
of  their  own  countrymen;  the  long  series  of  crimes  set 
forth  in  well-authenticated  documents,  will  for  genera- 
tions to  come  remain  stamped  not  only  in  the  memories 
of  Belgians,  but  in  those  of  all  civilized  peoples.  Back 
of  the  present  war,  we  have  had  from  time  to  time  in 
such  an  incident  as  that  which  occurred  at  Zabern  an 
example  of  German  methods  of  rule.  Germany  is  not 
popular  in  Holstein,  is  dreaded  in  Holland  (a  future 
province  of  Germany  according  to  the  present  plan); 
is  hated  in  Poland ;  has  in  fact  never  been  able  to  main- 
tain satisfactory,  decent,  or  civilized  relations  with 
any  communities  or  peoples  over  which  it  had  secured 
control.  Think  of  the  message  given  by  Emperor 
William  some  years  back  to  the  German  army  that 
was  invading  China: 

"You  will  behave  like  Huns,  so  that  in  the  years  to 
come  the  name  of  Germans  may  be  dreaded  throughout 
China." 

And  those  troops  behaved  like  Huns.  Reaching 
Pekin  too  late  for  the  fighting,  which  had  been  success- 
fully carried  on  under  the  direction  of  the  American 


George  Haven  Putnam  33 

General  Chaffee  by  the  contingents  from  the  United 
States,  from  France,  and  from  Japan,  the  German  troops 
began,  immediately  after  they  had  reached  Pekin,  a  dis- 
graceful series  of  looting  escapades  called  by  von  Wal- 
dersee  "punitive  expeditions."  There  was  no  one  to 
punish.  The  Chinese  at  that  time  were  quiet  enough; 
the  escapades  had  no  other  result  than  to  incense  and 
arouse  the  populace  with  a  natural  scorn  against  the 
debris  from  Europe.  The  German  troops  staggered 
back  to  their  section  in  Pekin  loaded  with  ill- won  booty. 
Complaints  came  to  the  generals  of  severe  mistreat- 
ment of  women , — including  some  of  high  rank.  General 
Chaffee  finally  brought  together  his  associates,  the 
representatives  of  the  armies  of  France  and  Japan,  and 
the  diplomatic  representative  of  Italy,  and  waited 
upon  von  Waldersee.  Chaffee  was  the  spokesman. 
When  his  protest  had  been  delivered,  Count  von  Wal- 
dersee replied  with  cool  insolence  that  he  had  no  inten- 
tion of  changing  his  policy.  The  "German  troops  must 
be  allowed  some  offsets  for  the  hardships  of  the  cam- 
paign." Chaff ee's  retort  was  prompt.  "We  have  not 
come  here  to  ask  you  to  change  your  policy.  We  are 
here  in  the  name  of  the  states  that  we  represent  to  say 
that  this  thing  must  be  stopped,"  and  stopped  it  was. 
Germany  was  not  at  that  time  ready  to  antagonize 
the  whole  of  the  civilized  world.  And  yet  the  poor 
Germans  complain  that  they  are  not  liked. 

The  Germans  contend  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  been  nothing  but  a  "gigantic  bluff,"  made  possible 
by  the  fact  that  Europe  was  too  busy  to  take  time  to 
make  war  with  us.  Bear  in  mind  what  this  so-called 
Doctrine  or  policy  involves  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States. 

We  have  since  1823  taken  the  ground  that  Europe 


34      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

must  not  consider  any  territory  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere as  available  for  colonization.  We  have  gone 
further.  We  have  forbidden  the  governments  of 
European  states  to  attempt  to  secure  by  force  the 
redress  of  grievances,  whether  real  or  alleged,  suffered 
by  their  citizens  in  South  America,  in  Mexico,  in  Central 
America,  or  in  the  West  Indies.  The  implication  is 
clear.  When  we  forbid  Great  Britain  or  Germany  to 
secure  redress  with  its  own  forces  for  the  appropriation 
of  British  or  German  property,  or  for  injury  to  British 
or  German  citizens,  we  assume  for  ourselves  the  re- 
sponsibility of  seeing  that  redress  is  secured.  This 
Western  Hemisphere  constitutes  a  pretty  large  Belgium 
for  the  safety  of  which  we  have  assumed  the  guaranty, 
and  for  the  fulfillment  of  this  vast  and  ill-defined  obli- 
gation we  have  a  movable  army  of  thirty  thousand  men. 
The  thing  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  ridiculous.  We  should 
either  throw  over  the  obligation,  or  we  should  recognize 
it  in  such  fashion  that  we  can  maintain  it  with  force 
and  with  dignity. 

Says  a  recent  writer:  "A  territory  becomes  a  diplo- 
matic problem  when  it  presents  natural  resources, 
tempting  markets,  and  a  defenseless  and  inefficient 
government."  Is  the  United  States  to  remain  in  the 
class  of  nations  such  as  China  and  Mexico,  which  do 
present  "diplomatic  problems"?  For  these  nations 
whose  national  resources  are  not  organized,  the  only 
question  has  been  who  should  act  as  the  successful 
aggressor.  If  we  fail  to  do  our  duty, — and  this  duty 
can  be  done  only  by  the  proper  organization  of  our 
resources, — we  not  only  incur  grave  risk  for  our  own 
independence — such  risk  as  has  been  incurred  by 
China  and  by  Mexico — but  we  abandon  our  legitimate 
influence  upon  the  rest  of  the  world.  If,  as  the  pacifists 


George  Haven  Putnam  35 

insist,  only  the  bullies  are  to  remain  armed  and  organ- 
ized, the  control  of  the  world's  policies  is  to  be  given 
up  by  the  humane  and  enlightened  people.  Peace 
comes  as  the  result  of  wise  organization.  It  does  not 
prevail  where  men  have  failed  to  act,  but  where  they 
have  had  the  sense  and  the  power  to  act  wisely. 

States  which  are  the  least  inclined  to  impose  upon 
or  to  attempt  to  subjugate  their  neighbors,  which 
have  the  highest  regard  for  the  rights  of  defenseless 
people,  will  lose  their  prestige  and  their  influence  in 
the  adjustment  of  the  world's  problems  if  they  commit 
themselves  to  the  dogma  that  force  is  evil,  even  when 
exerted  in  support  of  righteousness  and  justice.  If 
the  "peace  at  any  price"  propaganda  could  secure 
success,  it  would  not  mean  the  abandonment  of  force 
in  the  control  of  the  business  of  the  world,  but  the 
concentration  of  this  force  within  the  empire  which  had 
the  least  respect  for  democratic  principles,  for  repre- 
sentative government,  or  for  the  rights  of  the  people. 

The  issue  that  is  now  being  fought  out,  an  issue  in 
which  the  United  States  cannot  escape  taking  its  part, 
is  whether  the  nations  of  the  world  shall  be  controlled 
by  imperial  militarism,  or  by  democratic  representative 
government.  The  upholders  of  German  imperialism 
recognize  that  the  United  States  is  an  assured  opponent 
of  the  Hohenzollern  theories  of  government  and  of 
world  domination.  Successive  German  writers  have 
taken  the  ground  that  as  soon  as  the  British  Empire 
had  been  brought  to  submission,  and  had  been  com- 
pelled to  transfer  to  Germany  the  colonies  on  this  side 
required  to  fill  out  the  schemes  for  a  world-wide  impe- 
rial domination,  the  United  States  would  have  to  be 
taken  in  hand.  A  recent  utterance  in  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  warns  Americans  that  they  are  not  to  be  too 


36      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

self-asserting.  The  German  submarines,  says  the 
German  writer,  "now  have  a  range  of  four  thousand 
miles." 

It  is  the  general  belief  among  recent  German  military 
and  naval  authorities  that  as  soon  as  the  British  fleet 
has  been  shattered,  there  would  be  no  difficulty,  even 
with  operations  conducted  entirely  from  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic,  in  securing  a  domination  over  the 
United  States.  Late  writers,  however,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  von  Edelsheim,  whose  book,  Operations  on 
the  Sea,  was  published  some  four  or  five  years  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  take  the  ground  that 
it  will  be  best,  first,  to  secure  through  the  appropria- 
tion of  British  colonies  on  this  side,  harbors  suitable 
for  coaling  stations  and  as  bases  for  supplies.  When 
this  has  been  done,  says  von  Edelsheim,  there  will  be 
no  difficulty  in  getting  possession  of  two  or  three  of 
the  great  coast  cities,  for  instance,  Boston,  New  York, 
and  (not  because  it  has  any  real  importance,  but  as  a 
matter  of  sentiment)  Washington.  Von  Edelsheim 's 
volume,  which  is  the  precis  or  report  of  a  staff  officer, 
shows  that  with  the  transportation  that  was  available 
six  years  ago,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  making 
shipment  from  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe,  the  Weser, 
and  the  Ems  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men 
a  week  for  three  weeks.  The  first  two  shipments,  or 
even  the  first  shipment,  would,  in  the  writer's  opinion, 
probably  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose.  "It  is  not 
necessary  to  attack  the  fortifications  of  these  cities 
in  front,  although  the  guns  that  are  now  being  prepared 
(he  was  writing  about  1910)  will  doubtless  be  adequate 
for  the  purpose."  With  a  proper  selection  of  weather 
there  is,  of  course,  no  difficulty  in  landing  troops  at 
various  points  from  which  they  could  get  possession 


George  Haven  Putnam  37 

of  the  coast  forts  from  behind  and  then  they  have  the 
cities  at  their  mercy.  For  New  York,  for  instance, 
the  troops  could  either  be  landed  on  the  north  shore 
of  Long  Island  (there  would  in  his  calculation  be  no 
difficulty  in  forcing  the  eastern  entrance  of  the  Sound) 
or  say  at  Southampton.  "If  necessary,  the  water 
supply  could  be  cut  off,  but,  as  the  Americans  have  no 
army,  the  city  would  doubtless  surrender  promptly." 
New  Yorkers  would  then  have  to  decide  whether  they 
would  prefer  to  pay  a  substantial  indemnity  (say  one 
thousand  millions  of  dollars),  or  would  prefer  to  leave 
their  city  to  be  battered  down  or  burned  down.  In 
reading  such  an  utterance  in  1910,  Americans  would  have 
been  unwilling  to  believe  that  in  this  twentieth  century 
any  civilized  power  would  be  willing  to  destroy  a  city 
irrespective  of  any  military  requirement  or  advantage. 
With  the  history  before  us  of  Louvain  and  Aerschot 
and  with  the  record  of  instructions  under  which  the 
German  commanders  have  acted,  we  now  know  that 
they  would  have  been  ready,  if  only  for  the  purpose 
of  inspiring  terror  throughout  the  country,  to  burn  or 
to  batter  down  New  York. 

We  contend  that  to-day  the  safety  of  the  United 
States  depends  upon  the  British  fleet.  This  is  proba- 
bly for  the  time  at  least  a  sufficient  barrier,  but 
it  is  impossible  to  forecast  with  any  certainty  the 
chances  of  naval  warfare  when  any  week  may  produce 
some  new  destructive  mechanism.  Why,  also,  even 
supposing  that  the  British  fleet  should  remain  in  being, 
should  Americans  be  willing  to  leave  their  safety  and 
their  liberty  dependent  upon  the  use  of  the  men  and 
the  resources  of  another  state?  Leaving  out  the  ques- 
tion of  national  pride,  is  it  good  business,  as  a  matter 
of  risk  to  be  taken,  to  allow  our  national  independence 


38      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

to  be  left  subject  to  the  chance  that  Britain  will  not  be 
defeated? 

Pacifists  like  the  Rev.  John  Haynes  Holmes  are 
willing  to  go  so  far  with  their  counsel  for  peace  as  to 
advise  young  men  to  refuse  to  accept  suggestions  for 
enlistment  or  for  military  training.  They  tell  their 
fellow-citizens  to  remain  deaf  to  the  demand  of  the 
Republic  for  service.  In  1861,  when  the  Republic  was 
fighting  for  its  life,  we  had  a  very  simple  name  to  apply 
to  the  "peace  at  any  price"  men  who  tried  to  influence 
their  fellow-citizens  with  this  kind  of  counsel.  The 
men  who  have  acted  as  representatives  in  the  United 
States  of  German  policy  and  of  German  propaganda 
have  been  quick  to  utilize  for  their  purposes  the  service 
of  these  "peace  at  any  price"  men.  We  have  seen  in 
New  York  City  leaders  like  Mr.  Bryan  and  his  lieu- 
tenant, John  Brisben  Walker,  on  peace  platforms 
surrounded  by  Germans  who  had  recently  taken  part 
in  meetings  glorifying  the  German  navy  for  triumphs 
like  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  These  German 
representatives  are  in  full  unison  with  Bryan  and  his 
associates  in  demanding  the  prohibition  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  government  of  the  export  of 
munitions.  Such  prohibition  in  the  name  of  peace 
would  fit  in  well  with  the  propaganda  of  the  nation 
which  for  the  development  of  its  own  imperial  ambi- 
tions has  thrown  the  world  into  devastating  warfare. 
The  men  who  are  authorities  on  international  law  have 
made  clear  that  to  make  changes  during  the  continu- 
ance of  war  in  the  regulations  controlling  the  actions 
of  neutrals  in  regard  to  the  production  and  the  sale  of 
munitions,  would  in  itself  be  an  unneutral  act.  Ameri- 
can munitions  are  available  for  purchase  by  any  nation 
that  can  pay  for  them  and  can  take  them  away.  It 


George  Haven  Putnam  39 

is  not  the  responsibility  of  the  United  States  that  the 
British  fleet  has  been  successful  in  sweeping  German 
vessels  from  the  seas,  nor  is  it  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  take  any  action  that  would  help  to  offset  British 
naval  success.  It  should  further  be  made  clear  to  the 
peace  men  that  a  prohibition  upon  neutral  nations  to 
sell  munitions  to  nations  at  war  would  increase  instead 
of  lessening  the  amount  of  expenditure  (an  awful 
waste  in  itself)  for  preparation  for  war.  If  it  were 
understood  that  no  nation  going  to  war  could  purchase 
munitions,  each  nation  with  any  risk  or  dread  of  war 
would  be  under  the  necessity  of  instituting  plants  for 
the  production  of  munitions  and  of  keeping  available 
for  future  wars  stores  of  munitions.  This  is  in  fact 
exactly  the  course  taken  by  Germany,  which  at  the 
beginning  of  this  war  had  great  supplies  available. 
England,  desiring  and  expecting  no  war,  was  short  of 
munitions. 

The  organization  of  our  national  resources  is  de- 
manded by  our  citizens  not  only  for  the  defense  of  our 
coast  cities  and  of  our  national  liberties,  but  for  the 
maintenance  of  our  national  obligations,  and  for  the 
adequate  performance  of  our  part  in  the  adjustment  of 
world  issues.  Mr.  Bryan,  who  first  came  into  noto- 
riety though  the  advocacy  of  a  policy  for  the  payment 
of  debits  fifty  cents  on  the  dollar,  is  perfectly  ready  to 
advise  the  discharge  of  any  national  obligations  on  the 
same  basis.  He  takes  the  ground  that  in  case  the 
country  were  assailed,  a  "million  of  men  would  spring 
at  once  for  its  defense  from  the  streets  and  from  the 
fields."  We  could,  of  course,  depend  upon  the  patriot- 
ism of  the  country  for  a  prompt  response  on  the  part 
of  its  citizens,  but  men  of  the  Bryan  type  are  appar- 
ently too  ignorant  to  understand  that  the  million  of 


40      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

men  would  be  of  no  possible  use  when  they  had  re- 
sponded to  the  call  of  the  government.  They  would 
be  without  arms,  without  leaders,  and  without  training. 
The  plans  proposed  for  the  organization  of  our  national 
resources  will  involve  heavy  expenditure,  but  the  money 
required  is  very  much  less  than  what  would  be  called 
for  as  the  result  of  a  very  short  war  if  our  resources 
were  left  in  their  present  condition.  The  indemnity 
that  we  should  have  to  pay  to  prevent  our  coast  cities 
from  being  destroyed  would  in  itself  be  more  than  suffi- 
cient to  maintain  measures  of  defense  for  years  to  come. 

It  is  in  any  case  simply  a  question  of  insurance. 
These  pacifists  tell  us  that  military  preparations  lead 
of  necessity  to  war.  The  taking  out  of  an  insurance 
policy  against  fire  is  not  usually  understood  to  increase 
the  chance  of  fire  (although  we  may  admit  that  this 
has  been  occasionally  the  result  in  certain  commercial 
circles),  but  in  any  case  the  cost  of  defense  may,  as 
before  said,  be  described  as  the  cost  of  insurance. 

What  we  have  in  view  in  order  to  avoid  the  require- 
ment for  hysterical  preparation  practically  useless 
when  attempted  too  late,  is  the  shaping  of  a  system 
under  which  in  the  years  to  come,  with  the  most 
moderate  expenditure  required  for  effective  results, 
we  can  put  into  proper  shape  our  resources  of  men 
and  of  material.  There  is,  of  course,  need  for  the 
checking  of  useless  expense.  The  expenditure  now 
made  from  year  to  year  under  the  heading  of  army  and 
navy  includes  not  a  few  unnecessary  outlays  but  for 
these  the  authorities  of  the  army  and  the  navy  are 
not  responsible.  Year  after  year,  the  experts  in  both 
branches  of  the  service  have,  for  instance,  recommended 
the  closing  up  of  dead  army  posts  and  of  useless  navy 
yards.  Army  posts  which  were  established  a  century 


back  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier  against  Indians 
are  to-day  of  no  possible  service  from  the  military  point 
of  view.  These  posts  are  retained  through  political 
influence  and  because  the  Congressmen  desire  to  secure 
the  advantage  for  their  local  districts  of  the  post  ex- 
penditures. The  same  thing  is  true  of  a  number  of 
the  navy  yards.  The  first  duty  of  the  Congressman 
who  is  interested  in  the  matter  of  national  defense  is 
to  give  heed  to  the  reports  of  the  experts  in  regard  to 
the  cutting  off  of  useless  expenditures. 

National  expenditure  should  always,  of  course,  be 
considered  comparatively.  Our  trouble  is  with  the 
Congressman  who  prefers  to  secure  an  appropriation 
for  the  dredging  at  national  expense  of  Swamp  Creek 
in  his  district  or  for  the  construction  of  a  two  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  dollar  post  office  at  Podunk  rather 
than  to  apply  the  money  to  the  training  of  our  young 
men. 

The  cost  of  a  reserve  army  is  not  to  be  considered 
as  entirely  a  charge  against  the  productive  capacity  of 
the  country.  We  must  bear  in  mind  the  value  for  our 
younger  citizens  of  training  and  of  discipline.  We  are 
told  that  if  we  bring  into  existence  a  well-organized 
and  properly  trained  army  of  citizens,  there  will  be 
risk  of  the  country  becoming  dominated  by  a  military 
spirit.  Such  an  army  might  take  possession  of  the 
government,  and  bring  the  nation  into  a  widespread 
military  policy.  Such  a  dread  in  regard  to  action  by 
the  American  people  is  on  the  face  of  it  an  absurdity. 
We  are  not,  and  never  could  become,  militarists.  The 
whole  national  ideal  and  character  is  opposed  to  what 
is  known  as  a  military  policy. 

At  the  close  of  our  Civil  War  in  1865,  we  had  under 
arms  five  hundred  thousand  men.  The  German  writers 


42      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  that  day  were  prophesying  that  this  army  would, 
like  the  Praetorian  Guard  in  old  Rome,  take  possession 
of  the  government  and  the  country  and  administer  the 
national  resources  to  meet  the  army  requirements. 
We  all  remember,  however,  that  these  men  were  sol- 
diers only  for  the  purpose  of  saving  the  Republic  in 
the  emergency  of  the  Civil  War.  They  were  citizens 
first  and  last.  They  went  promptly  back  to  their  homes 
to  continue  their  work  as  citizens. 

We  do  not  contend,  as  the  pacifists  so  often  assert, 
that  organization  for  defense  will  prevent  war;  but  it 
is  absolutely  sure  that  such  organization  will  remove  a 
frequent  incentive  to  war,  namely  the  temptation  to  an 
easy  booty.  If  a  householder  should  leave  through  the 
night  his  full  purse  on  the  outer  edge  of  the  window 
of  his  house,  the  purse  would  probably,  in  a  city  like 
New  York  at  least,  disappear  before  the  morning.  If 
the  citizen  should  then  carry  his  grievance  to  the  sta- 
tion house,  he  would  be  likely  to  have  a  pretty  sharp 
reception  from  the  police  captain.  The  captain  would 
undoubtedly  take  the  ground  that  the  citizen  had  no 
right  to  give  unnecessary  temptation  to  the  passer-by, 
the  errand  boy,  the  milkman,  or  the  patrolman  himself. 
The  captain  would  make  clear  to  this  muddle-headed 
citizen  that  his  action  constituted  in  fact  an  incitement 
to  crime.  The  typical  pacifist  says  that  the  risk  of 
war  is  so  slight  that  he  "is  willing  to  take  the  chance." 
Our  retort  is  that  the  chance  is  not  his  to  take.  The 
resources  of  our  country  and  the  liberties  of  our  country 
are  not  the  property  of  any  one  generation.  They  are 
a  sacred  trust  handed  to  us  by  our  fathers,  some  of 
whom  did  their  share  in  fighting  to  preserve  them,  and 
to  be  passed  on  by  us  to  the  men  of  the  next  genera- 
tion. Americans  of  to-day  are  not  going  to  permit, 


George  Haven  Putnam  43 

under  the  influence  of  the  fads  of  the  preachers  of  peace 
at  any  price,  their  country,  their  homes,  and  their 
liberties  to  be  exposed  to  the  treatment  that  has  crushed 
the  life  out  of  poor  little  Belgium. 

There  will  be  at  the  end  of  the  present  war  a  tempta- 
tion for  the  victors  to  go  on  with  their  imperial  develop- 
ment, or  for  the  vanquished  to  secure  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  the  moneys  required  for  the  war  indemnities. 
The  Peace  Associations,  such  a  society,  for  instance,  as 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  headed  by  men  like  ex- 
President  Taft  and  President  Eliot,  are  looking  forward 
to  the  establishment  in  the  nearest  possible  future  of  a 
world's  court,  developed  possibly  from  the  present 
Hague  Tribunal.  This  court  will  have  the  responsi- 
bility of  adjusting  the  issues  arising  between  nations. 
It  is  a  part  of  the  scheme  that  has  been  worked  out  in 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  that  the  court  shall  have 
available  a  world's  police  strong  enough  to  enforce  its 
decisions  against  any  recalcitrant  state.  This  world's 
police,  naval  and  military,  will  be  made  up  by  the 
different  nations  in  contributions  of  men  and  material 
proportioned  to  the  population  and  the  resources  of 
these  nations.  The  proportion  that  will  be  due  from 
the  United  States,  a  nation  of  one  hundred  millions 
of  people,  a  nation  whose  wealth  as  compared  with  that 
of  the  other  peoples  of  the  world  will  be  greater  than 
ever  at  the  close  of  the  present  struggle,  must  be  con- 
siderable. We  should  be  called  upon  for  a  fleet  and 
for  an  army  very  much  larger  than  the  fleet  and  the 
army  that  are  now  recommended  by  our  naval  and 
military  experts.  It  is  essential  that  the  court  should 
have  the  power  to  enforce  decisions  against  any  nation 
that  acts  as  a  bully.  There  must  be  no  possibility  of  the 
recurrence  of  such  a  war  as  was  in  1914  initiated  by 


44      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Germany,  and  which  has  been  carried  on  with  unpre- 
cedented and  barbarous  methods.  The  principles  upon 
which  Germany  conducts  war  are  indicated,  for  instance, 
in  the  words  of  Bethmann-Hollweg : 

"We  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity,  and  necessity 
knows  no  law." 

This  is  simply  a  statement  that  might  makes  right. 
It  shows  the  condition  into  which  the  German  mind 
has  fallen  under  the  influence  of  the  Prussic  acid  fumes 
that  have  undermined  the  moral  sense  of  the  nation. 
The  United  States  must  do  its  part  to  prevent  such 
contentions  from  becoming  precedents  for  the  future. 
We  Americans  propose  to  do  our  part  in  securing  peace 
with  justice.  Peace  without  justice  is  a  rotten  peace. 
Ideas  that  are  sound  and  high  can  alone  preserve  the 
community  wholesome.  The  pacifists  are  taking  the 
chances  of  war;  they  are  gambling  with  the  future  of 
the  Republic.  A  supreme  effort,  even  a  supreme  agony 
may  have  in  it  more  real  living  than  is  found  in  years 
of  normal  existence.  Men  may  be  consecrated  and 
sanctified  by  devotion  to  a  cause.  It  is  only  the  weak- 
ling that  finds  nothing  worth  fighting  for.  Whoever 
cares  greatly,  whoever  cares  sufficiently,  will  give  all, 
even  life.  It  is  with  a  continuance  of  a  policy  for  peace 
and  for  the  maintenance  of  its  obligations  to  its  own 
citizens  and  to  the  world  at  large  that  the  great  Repub- 
lic must  be  passed  on  for  the  direction  of  the  coming 
generation,  and  with  its  influence  for  good  assured  and 
extended. 


THE  LESSONS  TO  THE  NAVY  IN  THE 
EUROPEAN  WAR1 

BY  IRA  N.  HOLLIS 

HPHIS  paper  is  prepared  at  the  request  of  Clark 
University  and  it  contains  little  that  may  not 
be  found  in  public  documents.  While  I  have  had  the 
advantage  of  conversation  with  officers  of  all  grades  in 
the  Navy,  I  have  used  only  that  which  any  other  civil- 
ian is  entitled  to.  The  only  advantage  I  have  had, 
therefore,  is  the  interpretation  of  official  documents  and 
officers'  views  in  the  light  of  long  experience  with  the 
service.  It  is  not  intended  here  in  any  way  to  advocate 
war  against  other  nations,  or  the  use  of  the  Navy  as  a 
threat.  In  spite  of  the  insinuations  of  a  few  peace 
talkers,  we  know  that  no  good  citizen,  either  in  the 
Navy  or  out  of  it,  wants  war  for  the  purpose  of  trying 
out  in  actual  practice  the  instruments  we  have  created 
against  it,  for  stimulating  the  sale  of  ships  and  munitions, 
or  for  any  other  reason  whatever.  Such  imaginings 
proceed  from  a  want  of  balance  and  perspective  in  a 
brain  that  has  thought  too  intensely  on  one  subject. 
The  American  people  have  been  aroused  as  not  since 
April,  1861,  and  the  President's  message  will  be  sup- 
ported in  the  prayerful  hope  that  our  improved  navy 
may  be  used  only  in  the  cause  of  righteousness  for  the 
support  of  the  principles  to  which  we  are  committed 
by  the  long  inheritance  and  traditions  of  our  race. 

'Written  November,  1915. 

45 


46      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  title  announced  would  be  misleading,  if  it  were 
taken  in  the  sense  of  something  entirely  new  to  be 
learned  from  the  naval  war,  whereas  the  contrary  is 
true.  There  is  nothing  that  has  not  been  predicted 
or  feared.  It  is  only  that  the  public  of  all  nations  have 
been  shocked  and  horrified  by  certain  striking  and 
unusual  events.  The  submarine,  the  aeroplane,  and 
the  siege  gun  have  developed  rapidly  under  the  pressure 
of  necessity  and,  in  the  naval  service,  the  activities 
of  types  of  ships  have  been  more  clearly  defined,  but 
no  single  thing  stands  out  as  the  unanticipated  dis- 
covery of  this  war  except  the  fact  that  a  highly  civilized, 
generous,  efficient  nation  can  in  this  century  make 
brutality  and  frightfulness  the  ethics  of  its  conduct 
against  its  enemies  and  alike  against  its  friends,  if  they 
seem  to  stand  in  the  way. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  state  of  mind  of  those 
good  men  and  women  who  believe  that  any  military 
or  naval  preparedness  is  wrong,  excepting  only  so  far 
as  the  country  must  be  armed  against  domestic  vio- 
lence. History  demonstrates  that  they  are  dwelling 
in  the  clouds,  nevertheless  one  cannot  help  sharing 
with  them  the  hope  that,  in  the  not  too  distant  future, 
war  may  cease  to  be  the  method  of  adjusting  in- 
ternational differences  and  interests.  Even  so  gro- 
tesque a  perversion  of  American  common  sense  as 
the  voyage  of  the  self-appointed  peace  commission 
to  neutral  countries  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  in- 
fluence to  bear  upon  the  war  ministers  of  belligerent 
countries  receives  a  kind  of  sympathy.  We  all  wish 
they  might  somehow  succeed.  Our  doubt,  however,  is 
based  upon  the  habit  of  exaggerated  and  combative 
statement  in  the  speech  of  all  peace-at-any-price 
people.  They  are  anything  but  peaceful  and  kindly 


Ira  N.  Hollis  47 

in   regard  to  the  motives  of  those  who  do  not  agree 
with  them. 

One  of  the  fatal  misunderstandings  in  the  minds  of 
pacifists  is  indicated  by  their  erroneous  use  of  the  word 
"militarist"  and  by  their  entire  inability  to  get  at  the 
point  of  view  of  the  officers  of  the  Navy,  who  are  re- 
garded as  eternally  concocting  schemes  to  promote  war. 
There  is  not  one  word  of  truth  or  justice  in  this  thought 
of  the  men  who  are  studying  their  profession  to  serve 
the  country  in  an  emergency  that  they  hope  may  never 
arise.  It  is  a  great  tribute  to  their  conscience  and  faith- 
fulness, to  find  them  struggling  under  discouraging 
conditions,  to  be  well  ready  to  do  what  their  country 
expects  them  to  do ;  namely,  to  defend  the  coast  against 
invasion.  Not  one  of  them  wants  war;  on  the  other 
hand,  not  one  of  them  wants  to  fail  in  his  profession 
lest  his  country  suffer.  The  sentiment  that  places 
them,  the  capitalists,  and  the  manufacturers  in  a  con- 
spiracy to  promote  war  for  selfish  ends,  is  the  fruit  of 
ill-regulated  or  intemperate  reasoning. 

It  is  also  simple  to  comprehend  the  point  of  view  of 
those  who  would  have  the  preparedness  against  war 
adequate  to  accomplish  the  end  in  view.  While  there 
may  be  differences  of  opinion  upon  what  constitutes 
adequateness,  these  men  and  women  have  the  logic  of 
history  with  them,  and  they  should  not  be  flouted  as 
unchristian  for  believing  that,  given  an  overflowing 
population  and  a  conflict  of  interests  among  nations, 
some  wars  are  inevitable.  To  them  it  is  the  age-long 
struggle  for  existence,  that  organic  law  of  nature,  which 
the  centuries  may  teach  us  to  control  at  least  for  man 
and  his  domestic  animals,  but  which  is  not  yet  greatly 
modified  after  nineteen  hundred  years  of  Christianity 
and  material  progress. 


48      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  war  burst  like  a  forest  fire  upon  mankind  and  is 
likely  to  continue  more  or  less  spasmodically  until  the 
combustible  is  all  burnt  out.  Will  it  end  with  a  lasting 
peace?  or  will  it  end  with  a  greater  armament  than 
ever?  These  are  vital  questions  to  us  and  to  this 
continent.  Every  American  hopes  that  this  is  the  last 
war,  in  that  nations  will  be  so  convinced  of  war's  futil- 
ity, that  they  will  disarm.  This  hope  has  been  in  the 
minds  of  good  men  after  every  war,  and  this  confident 
belief  has  formed  part  of  the  doctrine  of  every  dreamer 
since  the  world  began.  We  may  wish  for  more  dreamers 
and  we  may  share  in  that  happy  Utopian  outlook  on 
life  which  is  often  theirs,  but  the  difficulty  is  that  all 
history  is  so  clearly  against  them,  that  no  reasonable 
person  can  for  an  instant  believe  that  war  will  cease 
when  the  Allies  and  the  Central  Powers  sign  a  treaty  of 
peace.  Only  that  type  of  idealists  who  had  war  a  thing 
of  the  past  eighteen  months  ago  can  now  imagine  the 
reign  of  perpetual  peace.  The  history  of  mankind 
demonstrates  far  more  than  the  necessity  of  prepared- 
ness against  attack,  it  proves  the  inevitableness  of  it 
for  a  nation  situated  as  we  are.  This  is  one  of  the 
greatest  lessons  of  the  present  war.  We  have  no  choice 
but  to  learn  it  well,  and  we,  as  a  people,  ought  to  under- 
stand the  need  of  making  our  preparedness  ample, 
thorough,  and  efficient,  or  nothing. 

But  those  trimmers  who  are  neither  one  thing  nor 
the  other  are  incomprehensible.  A  compromise  in 
Congress  that  provides  one  battleship  when  two  are 
necessary  contemplates  war  as  entirely  possible  and 
prepares  for  disaster.  Only  the  timid  belong  to  this 
class  of  people.  If,  in  Congress,  they  are  afraid  of  their 
constituents;  if  only  voters,  they  are  fearful  of  expense 
and  of  a  growing  militarism. 


Ira  N.  Hollis  49 

I  hope  here  to  place  before  the  conference  so  far  as 
I  can  the  lessons  of  this  war  and  the  light  shed  upon 
our  own  state  of  preparedness  on  the  sea,  in  the  belief 
that  we  are  at  one  of  the  great  crises  of  our  existence 
as  a  democracy,  and  that  we  have  no  escape  from  arm- 
ing for  our  rights  and  policies.  Incidentally  this 
kind  of  militarism  may  teach  our  people  the  value  of 
organization  in  all  the  industries  and  in  the  business  of 
government. 

The  first  and  most  serious  lesson  relates  to  that  form 
of  government  censorship  and  secrecy  that  deprives 
a  people  of  full  information  about  their  affairs.  It 
may  be  that  excitable  nations  have  been  at  times 
held  back  from  war  by  the  discretion  of  a  few  strong 
men,  but  the  reverse  is  more  likely  to  be  true.  The 
public  may  be  denied  much  to  which  it  is  entitled 
by  a  narrow-minded  interpretation  of  regulations 
forbidding  officers  to  talk  or  write  on  naval  subjects. 
These  regulations  provide  five  articles  on  the  subject  of 
"Activities  of  Officers  in  Connection  with  Publicity." 
The  first  article  relates  to  "oral  or  written  communica- 
tions, information  that  might  be  of  possible  assistance 
to  a  foreign  power  in  time  of  peace,  or  to  an  enemy 
in  time  of  war."  The  second  article  prohibits  any 
communication  in  regard  to  the  foreign  policies  of  the 
United  States,  or  concerning  the  acts  or  measures  of 
any  department  of  the  government,  or  of  any  officer 
acting  thereunder,  or  any  comments  or  criticisms 
thereon.  The  third  gives  to  officers  and  other  persons 
in  the  naval  service  permission  to  publish  papers  on 
professional  subjects  after  having  submitted  the 
manuscript  to  the  Department  for  scrutiny.  These 
papers  may  or  may  not  be  authorized.  The  fourth 
article  is  a  concession  to  officers  that  they  may  submit 


50      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

through  official  channels  well-considered  comments  and 
suggestions  with  a  view  to  promoting  the  efficiency 
of  the  service.  The  last  article  prohibits  any  person 
belonging  to  the  Navy,  or  employed  under  the  Navy 
Department,  from  acting  as  correspondent  of  a  newspaper 
or  any  other  periodical,  without  express  permission. 

All  of  these  regulations  seem  natural  and  wise,  and 
yet  when  we  come  to  their  enforcement,  the  Secretary 
thereby  empowers  himself  to  prohibit  any  officer  from 
writing  anything  that  he  does  not  consider  it  expedient 
for  the  public  to  know.  Ordinarily  there  will  be  no 
abuse,  but  nevertheless,  in  plain  terms,  we  get  back 
to  one-man  power,  and  that  too  under  a  civilian  politi- 
cian, whose  interest  it  is  to  remain  in  office.  There  is 
absolutely  no  reason  why  officers  should  be  restrained, 
except  as  to  certain  plans  and  devices  that  must  be 
kept  secret.  Their  own  good  sense  and  the  power  of 
the  President  to  send  before  a  court  any  officer  who 
oversteps  the  boundary  for  conduct  prejudicial  to  the 
interests  of  the  country,  or  the  Navy,  are  sufficient 
check  upon  indiscreet  writing  and  speaking.  The 
working  of  military  law  is  illustrated  by  the  right  of 
any  officer  to  refuse  obedience  to  his  commanding 
officer,  in  case  of  an  illegal  order.  He  must,  however, 
be  prepared  to  show  that  the  order  was  illegal,  or  to 
take  the  consequences.  In  exactly  the  same  way  an 
officer  should  be  judged,  not  by  the  fact  of  having 
addressed  the  public,  but  by  what  he  communicates 
to  the  public.  Doubtless  some  disagreeable  incidents 
would  spring  out  of  so  democratic  an  organization, 
but  the  navy  would  at  once  be  relieved  of  a  regulation 
as  autocratic  as  anything  to  be  found  in  Germany  or 
Russia,  and  also  as  foolish  a  bar  between  it  and  the 
people  who  own  it.  This  regulation  if  strictly  carried 


Ira  N.  Hollis  51 

out  has  within  it  the  germs  of  autocracy  fatal  in  the 
end  to  a  republic,  inasmuch  as  it  places  within  the 
functions  of  the  executive  the  power  to  censor  every 
paper  or  report  prepared  by  an  officer,  or  a  board  of 
officers.  It  denies  the  country  first-hand  knowledge 
of  everything,  except  what  the  Secretary  permits  it  to 
know,  and  it  denies  the  officers  that  freedom  to  which 
they  are  entitled  as  good  American  citizens.  If  they 
were  allowed  to  talk,  much  of  the  misunderstanding 
in  regard  to  militarism  would  disappear. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  the  people  generally  are  not 
well  informed  on  the  navy,  lies  in  the  failure  of  the  press 
to  report  even  with  approximate  accuracy  things 
concerning  the  technical  side  of  the  service.  News- 
paper men  are  almost  invariably  uninformed  technically 
and  they  are  usually  more  interested  in  a  sensational 
story  than  they  are  in  the  cold  facts.  In  this  regard 
the  taste  of  our  people  is  being  degraded.  We  have 
various  lurid  accounts  of  the  naval  actions  of  this  war, 
and  yet  when  the  official  reports  appeared  in  the  last 
number  of  Brassey's  Annual,  few  of  the  daily  papers 
paid  the  slightest  attention.  The  battle  off  the  Falk- 
land Islands  is  one  of  the  most  thrilling  incidents  of  the 
century.  It  is  well  reported  in  official  documents,  but 
no  newspaper  seems  to  take  any  interest  in  it,  because 
it  is  no  longer  news.  This  habitual  tendency  toward 
the  sensation  of  the  moment,  added  to  the  navy  regula- 
tion forbidding  officers  to  write  anything  except  under 
censorship,  sets  up  an  effective  screen  between  the 
people  and  their  navy.  No  wonder  they  know  more 
about  the  baseball  records  and  the  football  games, 
than  they  do  about  their  own  property.  Often  misled 
by  ignorant  reporters,  sometimes  deprived  of  adequate 
information  by  stupid  naval  regulation,  and  occasionally 


52      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

jockeyed  by  shrewd  politicians,  they  are  driven  from 
one  hysterical  extreme  to  another,  until  democracy 
seems  hopelessly  inefficient  as  compared  with  a  strong 
autocratic  government;  and  yet  the  good  underlying 
common  sense  of  the  American  people  would  be  applied 
effectively  to  the  problems  involved  in  national  defense 
if  only  the  matter  could  be  taken  up  without  partisan- 
ship, and  without  that  kind  of  secrecy  which  naturally 
flourishes  in  a  bureaucratic  department. 

The  second  lesson  that  we  ought  to  learn  thoroughly 
by  a  study  of  all  contestants  in  this  war  is  that  we  want 
neither  an  autocrat  nor  a  blunderer  at  the  head  of  our 
Navy  Department.  Our  form  of  government  is  more 
likely  to  yield  the  latter  because  high  office  is  so  often 
given  for  party  service.  Then,  too,  we  have  not  yet  ac- 
quired a  respect  for  training  and  experience  in  the  ap- 
pointments under  the  government.  The  present  system 
has  given  us  some  good  secretaries,  some  of  mediocre 
ability,  and  some  who  would  appear  to  have  been  taken 
from  a  two  horse  power  mowing  machine  and  set  to  driv- 
ing our  five  hundred  thousand  horse  power  steam  turbine 
of  a  navy.  A  Secretary  of  limited  experience  in  large 
business  and  of  no  knowledge  of  the  sea  may  in  spite 
of  his  good  intentions  do  a  great  deal  of  harm  by  losing 
sight  of  the  fact  that  an  armed  navy  is  created  for  one 
purpose  alone:  namely,  the  preparation  for  war  and 
against  it. 

We  have  a  signal  illustration  of  this  fact  in  the  present 
administration,  during  which  the  fleet  has  lost  in 
efficiency  while  the  Secretary  has  been  paying  careful 
attention  to  the  instruction  of  enlisted  men  in  grammar 
and  arithmetic.  The  order  establishing  schools  on 
board  ship  is  intended  to  "supply  deficiencies  in 
academic  education  and  also  to  provide  systematic 


Ira  N.  Hollis  53 

means  by  which  all  enlisted  men  and  warrant  officers 
may  receive  the  assistance  and  encouragement  in 
technical  branches  which  may  be  necessary  to  fit  them 
for  promotion  in  the  navy,  or  which  will  better  prepare 
them  for  civil  trades  at  the  end  of  their  period  of 
service  afloat." 

So  far  as  this  order  makes  men  more  efficient  on 
board  ship,  by  giving  them  the  required  technical 
training,  so  far  as  it  makes  them  content  in  service, 
it  is  good;  but  so  far  as  it  proposes  to  fit  them  for 
trades  in  civil  life,  thereby  encouraging  them  to  get 
out,  and  so  far  as  it  raises  hopes  that  are  to  be  dis- 
appointed, it  is  unmitigatedly  bad.  In  the  first  place, 
it  imposes  upon  officers  duties  with  which  they  should 
not  be  saddled,  and  in  the  second  place,  it  forces  on  the 
men  preparation  that  does  not  form  a  natural  part 
of  their  service  on  board  ship.  I  have  no  doubt  that" 
good  gun  pointers  can  be  found  amongst  men  who 
cannot  even  read,  and  it  is  the  good  gun  pointer  that 
the  Navy  is  looking  for. 

Some  of  the  great  manufacturing  companies  have 
organized  apprenticeship  courses  for  boys  coming  from 
high  schools  and  colleges.  These  are  not  for  the 
purpose  of  educating  them,  but  to  prepare  them  to  do 
the  technical  work  in  the  service  which  they  have 
entered.  It  would  be  ridiculous  for  any  company  to 
train  and  educate  men  to  facilitate  their  finding  posi- 
tions in  other  trades.  Of  course,  no  man  who  passes 
through  the  course  of  the  General  Electric  Company 
binds  himself  to  remain  any  definite  length  of  time. 
Some  men  remain  with  the  company  and  become  very 
useful  in  the  manufacture  of  electrical  machinery. 
Some  men  leave  and  go  into  other  companies,  and  finally 
a  large  group  either  go  into  business  for  themselves, 


54      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

or  enter  other  occupations.  The  company  is,  however, 
the  gainer.  Does  this  apply  to  the  Navy?  The  sole 
measure  of  its  application  is  the  success  of  our  sailors 
at  sea.  We  must  never  forget  that  their  organization 
is  for  possible  war,  and  not  for  peace.  No  battleship 
will  ever  be  built,  except  to  defend  this  country  and  to 
surround  it  with  what  might  be  called  an  iron  wall 
against  invasion  and  war  on  our  soil.  It  is  well  to 
remark  here  that  the  Navy  has  for  years  possessed 
on  shore  at  Coaster's  Island  an  excellent  apprenticeship 
school  for  enlisted  men,  and  that  it  has  always  paid 
great  attention  to  the  training  of  men  for  their  special 
duties  without  the  new  order  establishing  what  has 
been  called  the  largest  university  in  the  country  with 
the  Secretary  as  Professor  and  President. 

One  of  the  chief  difficulties  with  any  system  of  educa- 
tion, such  as  the  present  administration  has  proposed, 
lies  in  the  daily  routine  of  the  ship,  especially  in  port 
where  repairs  are  being  made.  The  routine  should  be 
primarily  arranged  to  promote  efficiency  in  seamanship, 
gunnery,  and  engineering,  for  the  single  purpose  of 
maximum  effectiveness  in  war.  There  is  the  thought 
in  most  American  minds  that  we  are  never  going  to 
have  a  war  and  that  war  is  a  poor  settlement  of  disputes 
between  nations.  Nevertheless,  the  Navy  exists  for 
that  one  thing,  and  for  no  other.  Almost  all  those 
fads  that  are  conceived  in  the  hope  of  getting  service 
out  of  men  in  time  of  peace,  different  from  what  would 
be  required  in  time  of  war,  are  based  on  a  hopeless 
attitude  of  mind.  A  school  for  "reading,  writing, 
arithmetic,  spelling,  geography,  and  history"  is  simply 
fooling  with  the  problem. 

One  aspect  of  this  school  on  board  ship  may  relate 
to  the  possibility  of  reducing  desertion  from  the  Navy 


Ira  N.  Hollis  55 

in  time  of  peace.  It  would  be  indeed  strange  to  find 
men  deserting  in  time  of  war.  Every  ship  is  subject  to 
conditions  that  cause  men  to  be  dissatisfied  at  times. 
However  sympathetic  and  kindly  the  officers  may  be, 
men  become  restless  especially  when  the  service  is  not 
very  active.  The  enlisted  force  of  the  United  States 
is  as  fine  a  body  of  men  as  any  country  can  supply 
for  the  same  purpose,  but  life  at  sea  is  confining.  If 
the  school  prevents  the  men  from  leaving  without 
discharge,  it  may  justify  itself,  even  though  there  be  a 
risk  of  some  loss  in  realities  on  the  battleship.  Still  this 
subject  is  so  complicated  that  the  evidence  is  not 
satisfying.  Desertions  began  to  decrease  in  the  last 
administration  and  they  have  continued  to  be  less 
than  they  ever  were  in  the  old  navy.  There  has  been 
for  the  past  ten  years  a  gradual  change  in  the  privileges 
and  mode  of  life  of  the  crews  on  shipboard.  Many 
improvements  designed  into  the  newer  ships  have 
tended  to  the  content  of  men  who  are  quite  different 
in  type  from  the  old  sea  dog  who  manned  the  sailing 
navy. 

By  just  so  much  as  officers  and  men  are  worried  with 
unnecessary  regulation,  by  just  so  much  as  they  are 
diverted  from  the  essentials  of  their  profession  into 
side  issues,  they  lose  interest  and  effectiveness.  That 
is  perhaps  one  reason  why  the  efficiency  of  the  navy 
has  not  continued  to  improve  under  this  administration, 
that  is  why  one  finds  now  a  certain  sense  of  resentment 
and  disgust  in  the  minds  of  so  many  officers.  Under 
a  high  sense  of  duty,  they  will  obey  orders  and  silently 
accept  the  fate  that  our  political  system  may  offer 
them,  but  nevertheless  they  will  find  it  hard  to  face 
issues  that  ought  never  to  be  put  before  them.  One 
consolation  we  have  in  what  seems  a  dismal  picture  is 


56      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

that  Americans  are  generally  willing  to  learn  and 
most  secretaries  know  more  in  the  second  half  of  their 
administration  than  they  did  in  the  first  half. 

This  is  not  intended  to  signify  that  I  think  the  head 
of  the  Navy  ought  to  be  a  naval  officer.  He  should  be 
a  civilian  of  wide  experience  in  large  affairs,  and  his 
office  should  be  absolutely  divorced  from  politics. 
He  should  know  how  to  assimilate  and  apply  the  advice 
of  naval  men  under  his  command,  and  in  most  cases 
their  advice  and  opinions  should  be  known  to  the 
public  directly  through  Congress.  One  instance  of  the 
fatal  rut  into  which  the  Navy  has  descended  is  its 
organization  solely  for  the  conduct  of  business  during 
the  time  of  peace,  whereas  its  real  function  is  the 
protection  of  the  coast  in  time  of  war.  We  have  within 
the  memory  of  most  people  now  living  the  scandal 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War.  Nothing  was 
ready  in  the  Army  and  many  volunteer  soldiers  need- 
lessly lost  their  lives  through  inattention  to  sanitary 
measures.  The  Navy  was  well  enough  prepared 
as  to  the  capital  ships,  but  so  unprepared  in  the  other 
units  necessary  to  support  them,  that  millions  of  dollars 
were  wasted  in  worthless  ferryboats  and  other  poor 
substitutes  for  effective  auxiliaries.  We  were  fortunate 
for  the  time  being  in  having  against  us  a  poverty- 
stricken,  unready  enemy,  but  we  were  exceedingly 
unfortunate  in  supplying  to  politicians  a  text  on  the 
readiness  of  this  country  to  meet  any  enemy  without 
adequate  preparation.  The  rising  overnight  class  to 
sweep  the  invader  into  the  sea  are  commanded  chiefly 
by  an  uninformed  demagogue  who  quit  his  job  at  the 
time  of  grave  emergency. 

The  third  lesson  of  the  war  reveals  a  curious  twist 
in  the  American  mind.     We  are  generally  considered 


Ira  N.  Hollis  57 

a  very  practical  people  with  a  habit  of  going  straight 
to  the  essentials  of  any  matter.  Yet  here  is  our  Navy 
Department  organized  to  do  business  only  in  time  of 
peace.  The  bureau  chiefs  are  well  qualified  to  carry 
on  the  work  of  their  departments  and  usually  they  do  it 
admirably,  but  the  sole  centralizing  influence  is  the 
Secretary  o'f ,  the  Navy  who  is  not  by  training  or  experi- 
ence capable  of  reconciling  the  numerous  conflicting 
differences  in  his  own  staff.  He  does  not  even  know 
the  vocabulary  of  their  profession.  Furthermore,  there 
is  no  legalized  board,  or  committee  of  officers,  authorized 
to  safeguard  him  against  mistakes  in  what  relates  to 
the  military  side  of  the  Navy,  and  he  is  almost  certain 
to  fall  under  the  influence  of  one  clique  or  another. 
A  worse  phase  of  this  matter  is  the  lack  of  a  staff 
legally  constituted  to  coordinate  ships,  men,  and 
materials  into  effective  units  or  groups  for  the  one  thing 
that  justifies  the  support  of  a  great  naval  establish- 
ment, viz.,  efficiency  in  war.  Two  reasons  seem  to 
have  retarded  the  growth  of  a  good  organization  for 
war. 

The  first  is  the  fear  of  many  secretaries  that  a  Naval 
General  Staff  will  lessen  their  real  power  and  in  some 
way  set  up  a  military  control  superior  to  their  own. 
We  must  take  that  risk.  After  all,  the  country  is  far 
less  interested  in  the  dignity  and  prerogatives  of  a 
secretary  than  it  is  in  the  complete  success  of  its  fleet  ; 
and  so  long  as  Congress  is  on  the  job  there  is  little 
to  be  feared  from  a  military  staff.  The  second  reason 
seems  to  be  a  shivering  hesitation  to  take  the  final 
plunge  into  an  organization  that  will  get  our  ships 
ready  for  war  and  keep  them  ready.  It  is  impossible 
to  imagine  what  might  have  happened  to  England 
in  the  fall  of  1914  if  her  fleet  had  not  been  ready  and 


58      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

if  its  use  had  not  been  definitely  planned  beforehand 
by  naval  experts. 

The  sharpening  of  instruments  for  war  is  a  shock 
to  our  peace-loving  people,  but  it  is  in  reality  no  worse 
than  the  preparation  of  the  surgeon's  knife.  Both 
are  for  the  same  purpose,  the  conservation  of  health 
and  strength,  one  in  the  nation  and  the  other  in  the 
individual.  This  subject  contains,  perhaps,  the  lesson 
we  should  take  most  to  heart,  viz.,  study,  organization, 
and  preparation  of  what  we  have  now,  whether  we  build 
any  more  ships  or  not.  It  is  only  through  some  cen- 
tralizing staff  backed  up  by  the  Naval  War  College 
that  adequate  use  of  our  resources  can  ever  be  made. 
A  similar  statement  applies  equally  well  to  all  the 
arts  of  peace.  We  want  more  careful  study  of  every- 
thing. 

Science  has  revolutionized  the  whole  method  of 
carrying  on  war.  This  is  so  intimately  connected  with 
the  attitude  of  the  country  towards  expert  manage- 
ment, that  is,  management  of  naval  matters,  by  the 
officers  of  the  Navy,  and  relates  so  closely  to  the 
effectiveness  of  our  form  of  government,  that  a  few 
words  will  be  useful  in  clearing  away  certain  mis- 
conceptions. One  hears  so  often  that  the  officers 
of  the  Navy  must  not  be  trusted  with  the  decision 
of  preparation  for  fear  of  militarism,  for  fear  of  ex- 
travagant expense;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
have  never  been  trusted.  They  have  invariably  been 
met  at  the  doors  of  Congress  with  a  certain  atti- 
tude of  suspicion.  There  is  a  perfectly  definite  field 
for  the  activities  of  officers  and  I  venture  to  say  they 
prefer  to  live  within  it.  The  people  through  Congress 
must  always  decide  questions  of  policy  and  the  amount 
of  money  they  are  willing  to  expend  on  the  naval 


Ira  N.  Hollis  59 

establishment.  The  Navy  should  always  be  allowed 
to  decide  the  most  effective  organizations  and  equip- 
ment for  carrying  out  the  wishes  of  the  people.  If  we 
have  naval  or  army  officers  deciding  the  policy  of  this 
government,  or  if  we  have  them  even  too  influential 
in  its  councils,  we  may  be  drifting  away  from  the 
republic.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  Congressmen 
meddling  too  much  with  the  details  of  either  service, 
we  have  chaos.  The  two  fields  between  Congres- 
sional action  and  actual  execution  on  the  part  of 
the  Navy  are  well  marked  out.  Between  them,  there 
is  a  well-defined  area  of  mutual  discussion  and  co- 
operation. 

It  is  clearly  the  fault  of  Congress,  if  the  whole  truth 
does  not  come  out  in  regard  to  the  efficiency  and  suffi- 
ciency of  the  Navy.  The  committees  have  the  legal 
right  to  call  before  them  any  officer  for  consultation 
and  advice.  The  Secretary  is  at  the  head,  but  Congress 
holds  the  final  power.  It  is  easy  to  escape  responsi- 
bility by  telling  the  country  that  naval  officers  do 
not  agree  and,  therefore,  do  not  know  what  they  want. 
That  is  a  mere  crawl.  Year  after  year,  they  have 
urged  the  appointment  of  an  authoritative  board, 
call  it  what  you  may,  "A  Naval  General  Staff,"  or 
a.  "Strategy  Board,"  and  Congress  has  refused 
to  approve.  As  already  stated,  such  a  board  is  a 
necessity  in  times  of  war, — witness  the  "Strategy 
Board"  during  the  war  with  Spain — and  it  would 
be  most  useful  during  peace  to  produce  what,  in  the 
language  of  sport,  is  team  play.  As  Admiral  Knight 
has  well  said, 

There  is  much  about  the  Navy  which  is  splendidly  efficient. 
But  as  a  whole  it  is  far  less  efficient  than  it  can  and  ought 


6o      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

to  be.  Our  ships  are  fine.  Our  officers  are  capable, 
industrious,  and  ambitious.  Our  enlisted  men  are  the 
equals  of  those  in  other  navies.  But  efficient  ships  and 
officers  and  men  do  not  alone  make  an  efficient  Navy. 
They  must  be  welded  into  an  efficient  whole  by  a  unity 
of  organization  and  administration  and  purpose  which 
coordinates  their  capabilities  and  directs  their  efforts 
toward  a  common  end  wisely  selected  and  very  clearly 
seen.  Here  is  the  first  point  in  which  we  are  lacking.  We 
are  lacking,  also,  in  that  harmonious  composition  of  the 
fleet  which  is  needed  to  give  to  every  element  of  it  the 
support  that  it  needs  from  other  elements,  to  make  up  a 
symmetrical  and  well-balanced  whole.  And  we  are  lacking 
to  a  marked  degree  in  absolutely  essential  facilities  for  the 
care  and  preservation  of  our  ships,  especially  in  the  matter 
of  dry-docks. 

The  duties  of  a  General  Staff  cover  all  that  is  sug- 
gested in  this  quotation  under  two  heads:  first,  to  see 
that  ships  and  fleets  are  properly  manned,  equipped, 
and  ready  at  the  appointed  place  and  time;  second,  to 
supply  authoritative  and  definite  information  on  the 
needs  of  the  Navy.  The  first  involves  a  study  of 
strategy,  naval  bases,  and  the  kinds  of  units  that  go 
to  make  up  a  superior  fleet,  and  the  work  of  the 
board  should  be  done  in  close  consultation  with 
the  Naval  War  College.  The  second  would  put  an 
end  to  the  half-baked  programs  that  sometimes  go 
before  Congress.  No  doubt  would  be  left  in  the 
public  mind  about  the  elements  of  a  well-rounded 
Navy. 

The  Naval  Board  as  at  present  organized  is  not 
authorized  by  Act  of  Congress  and  it  has  no  definite 
responsibility,  except  as  questions  are  referred  to  it  by 
the  Secretary.  This  is  fatal  to  a  consistent,  construe- 


Ira  N.  Hollis  61 

tive  policy.  The  last  session  of  Congress  approved  the 
appointment  of  a  Chief  of  Operations  and  it  may  well 
be  that  the  present  excellent  selection  to  that  office, 
Rear- Admiral  Benson,  will  draw  about  him  the  ele- 
ments of  a  staff.  If  so,  the  present  serious  flaw  in  our 
naval  organization  may  disappear  in  course  of  time. 
Even  under  the  present  unsatisfactory  system,  the 
Navy  has  gradually  improved  in  material.  It  is  not 
true  that  officers  disagree  on  important  general  ques- 
tions. They  may  differ  as  to  the  relative  number  of 
types  in  a  fleet  or  even  as  to  the  conduct  and  result  of 
maneuvers  for  practice;  but  no  naval  officer  would 
ever  advise  building  a  battleship  without  at  the  same 
time  providing  for  the  crew  and  the  small  units  necessary 
to  safeguard  her  against  surprise  attack  from  guns 
and  torpedoes,  and  to  supply  her  with  fuel  and  all 
other  stores,  without  which  she  cannot  keep  the  sea. 
What  would  be  thought  of  a  railroad  company  that 
provided  a  fine  track  and  splendid  locomotives  without 
any  water  tanks  or  coal  supply?  The  spectacle  of  a 
line  of  men  filling  the  locomotive  tender  with  buckets 
of  water  from  the  farmer's  well  would  be  no  more 
ludicrous  than  the  voyage  of  a  fleet  of  battleships 
without  a  supply  of  fuel  and  stores.  It  has  been  the 
most  difficult  thing  in  the  world  to  persuade  Congress 
even  to  think  of  the  auxiliaries  needed  for  effective 
management  of  the  fleet.  Once  they  provide  two  battle- 
ships, they  rest  from  their  labors,  until  it  appears  that 
battleships  cannot  be  run  without  men,  and  then  they 
provide  the  men  or  permit  the  Secretary  to  lay  up  some 
ship  to  get  them.  After  the  battleships  are  in  commis- 
sion they  discover  that  a  fleet  cannot  be  made  effective 
without  auxiliaries,  and  then  they  provide  some  of  the 
auxiliaries. 


62      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  fourth  lesson  of  this  great  tragedy  concerns  the 
Navy  in  its  daily  work  during  war.  The  popular 
conception  of  naval  warfare  as  two  fleets  seeking  each 
other  on  the  high  sea  to  fight  a  great  decisive  battle 
is  a  mistaken  one.  As  the  man  in  the  street  asks  of 
the  present  conflict,  Why  don't  they  come  into  the 
North  Sea  and  fight  it  out?  That  is  exactly  what  they 
will  not  do  under  present  conditions.  The  war  may 
even  end  without  a  single  conflict  between  battle- 
ships. The  purpose  of  a  fleet,  or  Navy,  is  to  pro- 
tect the  sea  routes,  not  to  fight  duels  unless  they 
are  necessary  to  that  end.  When  Admiral  Sturdee 
went  to  the  South  Pacific  with  his  cruisers,  he 
was  not  spoiling  for  a  fight;  he  had  the  definite 
purpose  of  clearing  the  ocean  of  German  commerce 
destroyers. 

Another  popular  misconception  is  that  a  battleship 
is  complete  in  itself.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from 
the  truth. 

Alone  it  is  a  very  nearsighted  man  who  cannot 
see  from  what  point  he  is  going  to  be  hit.  As  a 
warrior  without  support  and  without  supplies  he 
would  be  a  perfect  example  of  the  battleship  with- 
out auxiliaries.  A  fleet  when  formed  should  be  well 
rounded  in  all  respects  and  this  is  what  seems  so 
hard  to  make  Congress  understand.  Still  more  it  must 
have  the  necessary  docks  and  bases  for  repairs  and 
shelter. 

The  cost  always  seems  to  stand  in  the  way  of  proper 
consideration,  whereas  cost  should  not  weigh  at  all 
as  between  a  wholly  equipped  unit  and  one  that  is 
crippled  because  incomplete.  We  want  four  legs  under 
the  table  or  none.  For  years,  the  General  Board  of  the 
Navy  has  supplied  the  Secretary  with  full  information 


Ira  N.  Hollis  63 

on  what  is  required  to  keep  our  Navy  up  to  full  fighting 
efficiency  in  any  probable  contingency,  and  its  advice 
has  generally  been  disregarded  by  the  Secretary  and 
Congress.  It  is  the  old  suspicion  that  the  Navy  wants 
the  earth,  and  there  is  a  habit  of  giving  them  only 
just  enough  to  keep  them  quiet.  A  definite  building 
plan  was  favored  in  1903  to  provide  an  adequate 
fleet  but  it  has  never  been  carried  out.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  any  building  policy  can  be  adopted  and 
followed  unless  the  whole  necessary  sum  is  made 
available  by  loan  or  appropriation  at  one  session  of 
Congress. 

It  will  be  instructive  here  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion, What  is  a  well-rounded  fleet?  In  general 
terms,  it  is  one  accompanied  by  the  auxiliaries 
necessary  to  accomplish  a  given  task.  The  num- 
ber and  nature  of  the  auxiliaries  will  then  depend 
upon  the  distance  of  the  naval  base  from  the  point 
where  they  are  to  be  used.  If  in  the  Philippines, 
the  colliers,  supply  ships,  and  other  types  some  of 
which  might  be  drawn  from  the  merchant  fleet 
would  predominate.  On  the  coast,  few  of  these 
would  be  needed,  especially  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  navy  yards.  To  make  the  matter  concrete,  let 
us  suppose  that  a  fleet  of  sixteen  battleships  is  to  be 
located  at  Guantanamo,  Key  West,  or  near  some  other 
good  coaling  base  convenient  to  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  suppose  it  is  to  be  kept  ready  for  use  anywhere 
on  our  Atlantic  Coast;  also  suppose  that  only 
the  ships  ordinarily  manned  by  the  Navy  are  in- 
cluded. Others  could  be  recruited  from  the  mer- 
chant service  as  required.  Then,  giving  also  the  cost 
of  construction  and  equipment,  the  fleet  would  be  as 
follows : 


64      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

16  Battleships $304,000,000 

4  Battle  Cruisers 68,000,000 

16  Scout  Cruisers 64,000,000 

64  Sea-going  Destroyers 89,000,000 

16  Submarines 24,000,000 

2  Destroyers'  Tenders 4,000,000 

4  Supply  Ships 6,000,000 

2  Ammunition  Ships 3,000,000 

4  Fuel  Ships 5,000,000 

2  Repair  Ships 4,000,000 

2  Transports 4,000,000 

2  Hospital  Ships 5,000,000 

20  Aeroplanes 300,000 

Motor  Boats  and  other  small  craft 700,000 


Total $581 ,000,000 

This  list  has  no  reference  to  the  cost  of  naval  bases, 
reserve  of  guns,  ammunition,  and  supplies,  or  to  the 
strictly  coast  defense  vessels  not  adapted  to  deep  sea 
service.  Furthermore,  there  will  be  found  differences 
of  opinion  on  the  number  and  types  of  ships.  One  year 
ago  the  value  of  submarines  was  probably  overrated 
and  there  was  a  tendency  to  call  for  a  very  large  number. 
It  is  after  all  a  question  of  intelligent  guesswork.  The 
commander  who  guesses  best  will,  of  course,  stand  the 
best  chance.  I  claim  nothing,  therefore,  for  this  list 
except  that  it  is  not  unreasonable.  The  actual  cost  of 
the  ships  cannot  be  exactly  determined  without  bids, 
but  the  above  figures  will  not  be  exceeded  unless  the 
qualities  and  specifications  are  beyond  anything  the 
department  is  now  considering. 

The  Navy  list  contains  to-day  the  following  vessels 
in  commission,  in  reserve,  in  process  of  construction, 
and  laid  up: 


Ira  N.  Hollis 


Battleships 

Armored  Cruisers 

ist,  2d,  3d  Class 
Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Submarines 

Torpedo  Boat 
Tenders 

Gunboats 

Supply  Ships 
Fuel  Ships 

Transports 

Ammunition  Ships 
Repair  Ships 
Mine  Layers 
Hospital  Ships 


in  commission 
in  reserve 
out  of  commission 
under  construction 

I  in  commission 
in  reserve 

(in  commission 
in  reserve 
out  of  commission 

in  commission 
in  reserve 
out  of  commission 
under  construction 

Jin  commission 
[under  construction 

in  commission 

in  reserve 

under  construction 

in  commission 

in  reserve 

out  of  commission 

!in  commission 
under  construction 

(in  commission 
out  of  commission 
under  construction 

in  commission 
out  of  commission 
under  construction 


23 

7 
3 
9 
6 
4 

13 

9 

.3 

37 
18 

2 

17 

37 
38 

7 
i 

2 

21 

I 

7 

4 
i 

22 

I 
2 

2 

3 

i 

i 

2 

3 
I 


66      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

There  are  a  number  of  tugs,  converted  yachts,  moni- 
tors, and  torpedo  boats  of  no  military  value.  In  this 
list,  very  few  ships  not  in  commission  would  be  of 
consequence  in  time  of  war.  Most  of  them  are  out  of 
date,  or  well  on  the  way  to  the  scrap  heap.  The  ships 
marked  under  construction  are  all  the  way  from  98% 
complete  down  to  the  plans  on  paper.  By  the  time 
they  are  all  completed  some  of  the  older  ships  will  be 
out  of  date. 

When  we  stop  a  moment  to  consider  that  the  Oregon 
and  all  of  Sampson's  ships  before  Santiago  would 
have  been  driven  off  the  sea  by  one  dreadnought  like 
the  Nevada,  just  about  to  go  into  commission,  we  can 
well  understand  the  estimate  that  places  our  Navy  in 
1921  at  seventeen  dreadnoughts  and  a  very  mixed  lot 
of  auxiliaries.  The  constant  complaint  that  our  ships 
become  worthless  in  so  short  a  time  might  be  applied 
to  many  other  things  in  modern  life  as  a  reason  for  doing 
nothing.  Every  great  power  station  for  supplying 
the  electric  current  to  a  city  is  subject  to  exactly  the 
same  changes,  only  more  quickly.  Many  of  them  have 
found  their  machinery  antiquated  within  five  years 
after  its  installation. 

One  of  the  large  Edison  stations  installed  a  number  of 
steam  engines  in  1902.  Each  unit  was  for  5000  horse- 
power and  cost,  including  auxiliaries  and  erection, 
about  $225,000.  They  were  superseded,  and  kept  on 
account  of  their  value  as  a  reserve,  in  1907  by  8000  h.-p. 
steam  turbines  at  a  unit  cost  of  $280,000  which  now 
are  so  antiquated  that  they  must  give  way  to  units 
of  30,000,  50,000,  and  even  100,000  horse-power.  This 
change  is  just  as  it  is  with  the  battleship  a  question  of 
efficiency ;  besides,  naval  construction  was  revolutionized 
by  the  dreadnought  in  1908. 


Ira  N.  Hollis  67 

Experience  with  the  different  types  of  ships  during 
the  progress  of  this  war  has  not  brought  out  much  that 
is  new.  It  has  thrown  certain  facts  and  theories  into 
bolder  relief  and  it  has  quickened  invention  against 
perfectly  well-known  dangers.  For  instance,  all  naval 
officers  knew  that  a  torpedo  would  sink  a  ship,  but 
nothing  was  done  about  it  until  the  spur  of  necessity 
came.  Now,  the  minds  of  experts  are  turned  in  that 
direction  and  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  something 
practically  unsinkable  were  devised.  The  English 
are  said  to  have  built  such  a  ship  during  the  past  year. 
Speed  has  long  been  considered  equivalent  to  the 
weather  gauge  of  the  old  sailing  navies,  and  this  is 
confirmed  in  the  few  battles  that  have  taken  place. 
When  the  German  squadron  appeared  off  the  Falkland 
Islands,  it  was  overwhelmed  by  ships  superior  in  speed 
and  gunfire.  The  only  one  to  escape  was  the  Dresden 
which  had  greater  speed  than  any  ship  in  either  squad- 
ron. The  lesson  is  perfectly  plain,  as  it  was  in  the 
battle  when  the  Blucher  was  overhauled  and  sunk 
by  Admiral  Beatty  in  the  North  Sea. 

A  non-technical  audience  will  understand  the  case 
better  by  a  brief  description  of  types  of  ships  and  of 
their  success  in  this  war. 

BATTLESHIPS 

A  battleship  is  a  combination  of  the  old  side-armored 
English  ship  with  the  American  Monitor.  It  has 
steadily  grown  in  size  until  our  own  plans  call  for  a 
displacement  of  32,000  to  36,000  tons.  The  Oregon 
carried  four  1 3-inch  guns  in  two  turrets  and  made 
a  speed  of  16  knots  per  hour,  but  she  has  long  been  a 
thing  of  the  past.  In  1906,  the  English  brought  out 


68      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  Dreadnought  which  gave  her  name  to  a  class  of 
ships  carrying  a  large  battery  of  heavy  guns  and  making 
high  speed.  The  Queen  Elizabeth,  one  of  the  latest, 
has  a  battery  of  eight  1 5-inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns 
with  side  armor  13  inches  thick,  speed  of  25  knots,  and 
a  displacement  of  27,500  tons.  The  war  has  made  no 
change  whatever  in  the  reliance  on  these  ships  for  a 
nation's  chief  defense.  Those  writers  whose  enthu- 
siasm for  the  submarine  misled  them  put  all  battle- 
ships in  the  scrap  heap  a  few  months  ago,  but  they  were 
wrong,  at  least  so  far  as  the  past  eighteen  months 
have  shown.  It  may  be  said  that  her  battleships  have 
kept  Great  Britain's  dominion  of  the  sea  without  firing 
a  shot.  The  type  will  doubtless  be  changed  to  get 
more  speed  and  greater  protection  from  torpedoes, 
but  it  will  persist. 

BATTLE  CRUISERS 

This  ship  is  simply  a  compromise  in  which  armor  is 
sacrificed  to  machinery  in  order  to  get  high  speed.  The 
first  step  in  this  direction  was  the  armored  cruiser, 
of  which  our  New  York  was  the  type  and  the  English 
Aboukir,  Cressy,  and  Hague  and  the  German  Blucher, 
Gneisenau,  and  Scharnhorst  were  like  her.  The  British 
ships  were  completed  in  1902  and  their  displacement 
was  12,000  tons  with  a  speed  of  21  to  22  knots.  The 
final  development  of  the  type  dates  from  1908  in  the 
battle  cruiser  of  the  English  Invincible  class.  The 
latest  examples  are  found  in  the  Lion  and  Princess 
Royal,  completed  in  1912,  and  the  Tiger  and  Queen 
Mary,  completed  during  the  present  war.  The  last 
named  has  a  displacement  of  27,000  tons,  a  speed  of  28 
knots,  armor  of  9  inches  on  the  side  belt,  eight  13.5-inch 


Ira  N.  Hollis  69 

guns,  sixteen  4-inch  guns,  and  some  rapid  firers.  The 
armor  has  been  sacrificed  to  what  is  characteristic  of 
these  ships,  speed,  sea  endurance  and  large  guns.  They 
can  under  some  conditions  be  used  against  battleships 
without  being  considered  completely  outclassed.  Their 
speed  would  keep  them  out  of  range  of  a  battleship's 
guns,  and  at  the  great  distance  at  which  firing  begins, 
17,000  yards,  the  angle  of  fire  would  be  so  great  as  to 
make  the  deck  the  principal  target,  instead  of  the  side. 
Inasmuch  as  the  deck  can  never  be  heavily  armored, 
a  fourteen-inch  shell  would  thus  at  great  range  be  as 
dangerous  to  the  battleship  as  to  the  battle  cruiser. 
Their  chief  value  is  found  in  clearing  the  seas  of  an 
enemy's  commerce  destroyers  and  in  scouting  before  a 
fleet.  The  battle  off  the  Falkland  Islands  was  decided 
by  them,  and  their  speed  fits  them  for  all  kinds  of 
dangerous  patrol  duty.  The  American  Navy  has 
much  to  learn  from  them.  In  the  study  of  strategy 
at  the  Naval  War  College,  they  have  proven  themselves 
indispensable  to  a  fleet  of  battleships. 

CRUISERS 

The  cruiser  type  presents  rather  a  wide  range  and 
may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  in  accordance 
with  the  service  required  of  them  and  the  armament 
needed:  the  armored  cruiser,  the  scout  cruiser,  and 
the  light  cruiser.  All  of  these  ships  have  for  their 
main  purpose  scouting  to  discover  the  presence  and 
power  of  an  enemy,  and  scouting  to  act  as  a  screen 
against  an  enemy,  so  that  their  own  fleet  may  be  an 
unknown  quantity,  until  it  actually  comes  into  battle. 
A  secondary  use  of  such  ships  is  for  sweeping  the  sea 
of  an  enemy's  commerce,  and  in  time  of  peace,  for 


70      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

general  patrol  duty  in  remote  regions.  In  every  case 
this  class  of  ships  must  be  of  high  speed,  not  less  than 
twenty-five  knots  and  preferably  thirty.  The  light 
cruisers  would  be  more  generally  useful  in  time  of 
peace.  Gunboats  can  be  replaced  entirely  by  them. 
They  may  carry  some  armor  on  the  side  or  on  a  turtle- 
back  deck  near  the  water  line. 


DESTROYERS 

These  enlarged  torpedo  boats  vary  greatly  in  size 
and  may  be  separated  into  two  classes,  the  sea-going 
and  the  harbor  defense  types.  As  scouts  in  the  North 
Sea  and  the  Channel,  they  have  proven  very  effective 
against  submarines.  Their  high  speed  and  gunfire 
give  them  an  advantage,  but  against  well-armed 
fighting  ships  they  depend  for  success  so  much  on  the 
element  of  surprise  that  they  are  of  doubtful  value. 
In  course  of  time  they  may  be  replaced  by  a  high-speed 
submersible. 

SUBMARINES 

These  might  be  called  submersibles,  as  they  ordinarily 
live  on  the  surface  and  dive  only  to  hide  their  move- 
ments. They  have  developed  from  small  size  for 
harbor  defense  into  formidable  destroyers  having  a 
radius  of  several  thousand  miles.  Their  classification 
into  the  coast  defense  and  sea-going  types,  dependent 
upon  the  stores  they  can  carry,  is  natural.  The  latter 
can  be  built  to  replace  the  destroyer,  if  a  suitable  engine 
can  be  found.  Steam  is  not  well  adapted  to  the 
purpose  and  it  has  been  little  used,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  internal  combustion  engine  for  surface 


Ira  N.  Hollis  71 

propulsion   and   the   storage   batteries   for   submarine 
use  leave  much  to  be  desired. 

Mr.  Churchill  said  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war: 

Submarines  introduced  entirely  novel  conditions  into 
naval  warfare.  The  old  freedom  of  movement  which 
belonged  to  the  stronger  power  is  affected  and  restricted 
in  narrow  waters  by  the  development  of  this  new  and 
formidable  arm.  A  division  of  soldiers  cannot  be  annihi- 
lated by  a  cavalry  patrol.  But  at  any  moment  a  great  ship 
equal  in  power  as  a  war  unit  to  a  division  of  an  army  may 
be  destroyed  without  a  single  opportunity  of  its  fighting 
strength  being  realized  or  a  man  on  board  having  a  chance 
to  strike  a  blow  in  self-defense. 

Another  writer  on  this  subject  stated  that  battleships 
would  all  be  destroyed  by  the  submarines  and  led  us  to 
think  that  if  we  only  built  enough  of  them  we  should 
be  safe  against  attack  from  the  sea. 

The  submarine  has  proven  a  disappointment  in 
actual  warfare  and  its  employment  in  a  blockade 
against  merchant  ships  seems  too  inhuman  to  become 
established  practice,  because  the  lives  of  non-com- 
batants cannot  be  safeguarded.  The  means  of  defense 
against  it  have  demonstrated  that  its  success  is  re- 
stricted only  to  cases  of  false  security  or  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  an  enemy.  The  sinking  of  the  Aboukir, 
Cressy,  and  Hogue  on  September  22,  1914,  is  an  example 
in  point.  These  ships  were  steaming  slowly  on  patrol 
duty  in  the  North  Sea  when  one  of  them  was  struck  by 
a  torpedo.  Instead  of  leaving  boats  to  rescue  drowning 
men  and  steaming  away  rapidly,  the  other  two  stopped 
and  permitted  themselves  to  be  struck  by  torpedoes, 
probably  from  the  same  submarine.  Nevertheless, 
so  far  as  we  know  at  this  time,  these  boats  have  not 


72      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

accomplished  one  thing  of  first  magnitude  against 
a  war  fleet  and  the  expectation  of  wearing  down  the 
English  battleships  has  been  a  woeful  disappointment 
to  the  Germans.  It  is  fortunate  that  our  naval 
officers  have  been  conservative  and  have  not  committed 
us  to  a  huge  expenditure  for  submarines  to  be  scattered 
all  along  the  coast  as  a  first  line  of  defense.  They  have 
steadily  held  to  the  capital  ships  as  our  dependence 
in  time  of  war.  The  submarine  is  like  a  whale  which 
can  be  attacked  when  it  comes  to  the  surface  by  a 
small  boatload  of  men,  and  that  idea  has  given  its 
enemies  their  protection  from  it.  Every  motor  boat, 
trawler,  yacht,  destroyer,  and  aeroplane  can  be  sent 
out  for  patrol  duty.  Such  craft  with  marine  nets  have 
given  the  English  transport  system  and  the  battle 
fleet  complete  immunity  up  to  this  time.  The  war 
is  not  yet  over  and  unexpected  qualities  may  yet 
appear,  but  it  seems  doubtful. 

AEROPLANES 

These  may  be  classed  as  air  ships  and  thus  become  a 
natural  part  of  the  fleet.  Their  highest  value  at  sea 
is  for  scouting,  although  circumstances  might  arise 
where  they  would  become  useful  as  despatch  bearers 
or  as  weapons  of  offense  against  armed  ships.  Up  to 
this  stage  of  the  war,  they  have  been  most  numerous 
on  land,  developing  a  technique  of  their  own  on  scout 
duty,  on  raids,  and  even  in  attack.  It  has  been  said 
that  either  side  in  possession  of  twenty-five  thousand 
large  armed  aeroplanes  could  end  the  war  in  a 
month.  This  may  or  may  not  be  true  but  we  know 
they  are  constantly  being  improved.  Their  possibili- 
ties are  almost  beyond  the  imagination.  The  United 


Ira  N.  Hollis  73 

States  is  practically  without  them.  Even  with  the 
skill  to  build  the  fixed  parts  and  the  planes,  we  have 
not  yet  found  a  good  reliable  engine.  Foreign  nations 
are  so  far  ahead  of  us  that  we  should  be  hopelessly 
outclassed  if  we  came  to  a  struggle.  A  large  amount  of 
experiment  will  be  necessary  to  develop  a  first-rate 
machine;  and  then  we  should  have  one  on  every  fast 
cruiser.  An  interesting  lesson  of  the  war  is  that  there 
will  be  no  more  surprise  attacks,  if  both  sides  are  well 
provided  with  aeroplanes,  and  this  applies  to  the  navy 
as  well  as  the  army.  The  dropping  of  bombs  on  the 
defenseless  part  of  a  city  even  though  there  may  be 
outlying  fortifications,  or  on  merchant  ships,  is  funda- 
mentally as  wrong  as  the  attack  of  submarines  on 
commerce.  That  is  another  principle  we  should  take 
to  heart.  The  plea  of  necessity  claims  the  right  of 
existence  only  for  the  most  brutal  and  would  destroy 
all  the  advance  that  humanity  has  made  since  the  first 
sword  was  forged. 

OTHER     SHIPS 

The  unarmed,  or  only  partly  armed  vessels,  required 
for  service  with  a  fleet,  to  carry  fuel,  ammunition,  and 
supplies,  have  been  brought  very  forcibly  to  our  atten- 
tion by  the  conviction  of  certain  men  for  conspiracy 
against  our  clearance  laws.  The  war  has  emphasized 
their  value.  They  can  to  some  extent  be  taken  from 
the  merchant  service,  and  added  to  the  nucleus  which 
must  be  with  the  fleet  in  time  of  peace.  Two  different 
theories  exist  with  regard  to  them.  One  is  that  they 
should  be  managed  and  owned  by  private  corporations, 
built  under  government  specifications  and  subsidized 
during  peace,  with  easy  transfer  to  the  government  in 


74      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

time  of  war.  The  other  is  that  they  should  be  built, 
owned,  and  operated  by  the  government  during  peace 
in  the  freight  and  passenger  business,  so  that  they  can 
be  readily  available  for  war.  In  the  first  case,  the 
government  pays  out  money  to  a  losing  private  enter- 
prise and  in  the  second  it  pays  an  equal  or  greater 
amount  to  run  ships  at  a  loss.  The  best  course  is 
not  plain,  but  it  is  a  curious  psychological  process 
that  places  men  who  are  in  favor  of  individual  freedom 
and  initiative  on  the  side  of  government  ownership. 
We  may  well  take  a  lesson  from  England  and  Germany 
in  the  building  of  their  merchant  marine  and  the 
preparation  preceding  this  war. 

A  number  of  smaller  vessels  deserve  study  by  the 
United  States.  The  mine  sweeper  has  become  highly 
important  through  the  use  of  mines  in  lanes  of  travel 
and  for  closing  the  outlet  from  an  enemy's  harbor. 
Thus  our  own  fleet  might  find  it  very  dangerous  to 
leave  the  Chesapeake  or  Delaware  Bay,  if  an  enemy's 
mine  layers  had  one  night  to  close  the  entrance. 

The  motor  boats  of  America  would  be  immensely 
valuable,  if  well  organized  for  war.  We  ought  to  have 
a  large  reserve  of  motor  boats  and  their  owners  properly 
registered  in  the  Navy  Department.  Furthermore 
every  sound  ship  and  boat  in  the  United  States  should 
be  examined  and  listed  for  use  in  emergency,  so  that 
we  may  always  be  ready. 

One  lesson  to  our  Navy  may  be  taken  from  the 
experience  with  the  English  army.  The  government 
had  little  or  nothing  in  reserve,  neither  men  nor  muni- 
tions, and  ths  consequences  were  well-nigh  fatal  to 
France.  They  might  possibly  have  been  fatal  to 
England  if  Germany  had  been  ready  to  strike  with 
her  whole  fleet  and  an  army  on  the  English  coast 


Ira  N.  Hollis  75 

while  the  English  army  was  engaged  in  France  and 
Belgium. 

We  have  a  shortage  of  nearly  everything.  The  powder 
and  other  munitions  are  in  a  fair  way  to  be  available 
through  the  great  increase  of  machinery  for  manu- 
facture, and  the  United  States  can  easily  increase 
its  reserves  or  its  power  of  producing  quickly  what  is 
needed  in  war  by  taking  over  all  machinery  after  the 
present  emergency  is  past.  The  men  cannot  be  ob- 
tained so  quickly.  Training  and  understanding  of 
the  service  are  absolutely  necessary  on  the  part  of  the 
enlisted  force  and  of  the  reserve.  A  full  year  is  required 
to  bring  a  crew  to  the  maximum  of  power.  Every 
individual  may  be  splendidly  efficient  and  yet  the  ship 
as  a  whole  may  be  badly  managed,  because  cooperation 
and  instinctive  comprehension  by  every  man  in  the 
crew  of  what  the  others  are  doing  are  needed  to  make 
a  first-class  fighting  machine.  One  of  the  finest  ex- 
amples of  what  cooperation  means  in  a  battleship 
occurred  at  Santiago  when  the  chief  engineer  of  the 
Oregon  asked  the  captain  to  fire  a  shot  from  the  forward 
turret  by  way  of  heartening  up  the  firemen.  The  long 
voyage  around  South  America  had  welded  the  crew, 
gunners,  seamen,  firemen,  and  coal  passers,  into  a 
united  whole  under  Charles  Clark's  splendid  command. 
The  time  element  is  essential  in  teaching  men  the 
sea.  Crews  cannot  be  improvised  over  night.  Hence 
the  great  importance  of  having  enough  men  to  man  our 
Navy  in  peace  and  a  considerable  reserve  for  war. 
At  present  the  number  of  enlisted  men  authorized  by 
law  is  51,500  and  on  December  loth  of  this  year  there 
were  51,576  actually  under  the  flag,  but  this  is  about 
25,000  short  of  the  number  necessary  to  keep  our  ships 
fully  manned.  A  new  ship  put  into  commission  now 


76      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

simply  means  another  in  reserve  unless  the  crews  of 
all  are  depleted.  No  navy  can  ever  reach  its  highest 
efficiency  under  such  a  system,  and  the  sooner  Congress 
understands  this  the  better.  A  reserve  should  be  pro- 
vided by  the  enrollment  of  every  man  who  has  ever 
served  in  the  Navy  or  in  the  naval  militia  of  the  States. 
Still  more,  this  should  be  supplemented  by  giving  mem- 
bers of  colleges  and  technical  schools  opportunity  for 
summer  training  on  board  ship.  An  arrangement  to 
this  end  was  completed  by  Secretary  Meyer,  but  it  was 
held  up  or  disapproved  by  his  successor.  Our  indus- 
tries would  be  the  gainer  by  the  drill  and  training  of  a 
reserve  in  time  of  peace  by  getting  the  men  out  of  a 
mental  and  physical  slouch. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  is  an  engineers'  war  in  the 
sense  that  machinery,  machine  guns,  and  automobiles 
have  played  a  far  more  important  part  in  it  than  ever 
before.  But  to  call  it  an  engineers'  war  in  the  sense 
that  men  are  less  important  would  be  a  serious  mistake. 
Never  have  preparation  and  skill  been  so  in  demand, 
especially  on  board  ship  where  even  the  guns  are 
huge  power  machines  capable  of  doing  effective  work 
only  with  well-trained  men  behind  them.  For  this 
reason  the  Secretary's  Naval  Consulting  Board  may 
be  a  great  disappointment  by  diverting  the  public 
mind  from  the  real  facts  of  the  case,  thus  giving  a 
false  sense  of  security.  A  war  is  not  terminated  by 
some  lucky  invention  on  the  eve  of  the  first  battle; 
it  cannot  be  invented  out  of  defeat  in  war.  The  indi- 
vidual members  of  such  a  board  even  though  of  high 
attainment  in  their  specialties  cannot  replace  the  com- 
missioned officers  of  the  Navy  who  must  take  the  ulti- 
mate responsibility  of  decision  and  action.  Their 
function  then  will  be  most  valuable,  if  defined  strictly 


Ira  N.  Hollis  77 

as  of  an  advisory  character  in  regard  only  to  questions 
referred  to  them. 

One  of  the  serious  lessons  learned  from  the  war  is  that 
every  officer  should  know  thoroughly  some  specialty 
or  have  high  qualities  for  command.  The  need  for 
trained  men  in  aviation,  submarines,  wireless,  gunnery, 
and  machinery  of  all  kinds  was  never  more  strongly 
felt.  Yet  our  own  Navy  is  almost  hopelessly  muddled 
in  that  respect. 

In  the  early  months  of  1899  a  new  personnel  bill 
passed  Congress,  intended  to  reorganize  the  Navy  to 
fit  modern  conditions;  namely,  the  complete  disappear- 
ance of  sails  and  the  use  of  power  machinery  for  prac- 
tically everything.  Outside  of  some  changes  in  the 
pay  and  the  retirement  of  officers,  the  great  feature  of 
the  bill  was  an  amalgamation  of  the  commission  deck 
officers  and  engineers,  thus  turning  every  officer  into 
what  Mr.  Roosevelt  at  that  time  called  "a  fighting 
engineer."  This  term  is  a  correct  one,  as  proven  by 
the  war,  even  on  land,  a  struggle  between  great  machines 
in  the  hands  of  skilled  men.  Of  course,  these  machines 
are  not  automatic  and  men  are  just  as  essential  as 
they  ever  were.  The  two  elements  in  the  Navy  to-day 
relating  to  education  are  the  command  of  men  and  the 
application  of  science.  It  was  fully  recognized  when  the 
personnel  bill  was  introduced  that  few  men  are  fitted 
by  nature  for  high  command,  and  few  for  great  technical 
knowledge  of  material.  The  theory  of  the  bill  was 
clearly  to  give  all  officers  the  same  education  at  the 
Naval  Academy  in  applied  and  naval  science,  and 
then  to  permit  them  to  determine  their  own  fields  of 
activity,  drawing  upon  the  whole  Navy  for  officers 
particularly  gifted  in  science.  This  necessarily  con- 
templated a  certain  number  of  officers  set  apart  per- 


78      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

manently  for  design,  construction,  maintenance,  and 
operation  of  machinery  and  all  kinds  of  apparatus. 
The  first  bill  proposed  had  a  clause  in  it  fixing  the 
status  of  officers  for  technical  duty,  but  the  clause 
was  cut  out  as  being  an  administrative  matter.  This 
omission  was  not  sound,  because  no  administration 
has  the  power  to  set  aside  a  line  officer  for  technical 
duty  without  the  prospect  of  command  at  some  later 
time  in  his  life.  The  consequence  is  that  the  personnel 
has  never  been  sufficiently  developed  for  technical 
purposes,  and  too  much  of  the  amateur  will  be  found, 
especially  after  the  older  engineers  have  retired.  There 
are  plenty  of  first-rate  officers  available  and  the  educa- 
tion in  engineering  at  the  Naval  Academy  is  equal  to 
anything  in  the  United  States,  but  except  in  rare 
instances  they  are  not  allowed  to  remain  long  enough 
in  one  place  to  learn  it  well.  The  attempt  to  make 
every  officer  equally  good  in  all  branches  is  a  viola- 
tion of  fundamental  principles.  Furthermore,  it  is  a 
marked  violation  of  the  intention  of  the  personnel 
bill,  to  give  the  Navy  a  wider  range  of  choice  for  men 
of  special  attainment. 

The  officers  of  the  Navy  as  a  whole  do  their  work 
with  admirable  fidelity  and  conscience,  but  the  intensive 
training  stops  when  the  Naval  Academy  leaves  off. 
Every  encouragement  should  be  given  to  specialties, 
with  a  reliance  for  the  gunnery,  the  routine,  and  the 
command  upon  the  great  body  of  men  who  have  no 
great  technical  leanings. 

While  the  personnel  bill  was  under  discussion  in 
Washington,  it  was  suggested  that  some  increase  in 
pay  should  be  allowed  to  officers  who  qualified  in  gun- 
nery and  engineering.  Admiral  Sampson  was  on 
the  Board  and  his  reply  to  this  suggestion  was  char- 


Ira  N.  Hollis  79 

acteristic.  He  said  that  a  special  allowance  was  not 
necessary  to  induce  officers  to  qualify  in  anything  that 
was  in  the  line  of  duty.  Their  sense  of  duty  was 
superior  to  any  other  inducement  for  the  interest 
and  service  of  their  country.  This  sentiment  was  what 
anyone  might  have  expected  from  a  man  of  his  noble 
qualities  and  high  position.  Unfortunately,  it  does 
not  always  hold  good  in  this  world. 

A  few  years  ago  the  Navy  Department  established 
a  graduate  school  for  engineering  at  the  Naval  Academy. 
So  far  as  it  interested  young  officers  in  technical  matters 
connected  with  their  profession  it  was  a  very  good 
thing,  but  the  difficulty  that  has  always  faced  the 
school  is  the  matter  of  subsequent  duties.  There  is 
small  good  to  the  service  if  an  officer  spends  two  or 
three  years  studying  marine  engineering,  and  then 
goes  to  sea  as  the  navigator  of  a  ship.  His  attain- 
ments do  not  come  into  proper  use.  It  is  very  important 
to  the  naval  service  that  the  present  condition  be 
remedied  without  delay. 

One  of  the  long  debated  questions  of  the  Navy  relates 
to  the  flow  of  promotion.  The  English  officers  in 
active  command  at  sea  are  much  younger  than  ours. 
They  come  to  responsible  duties  earlier  and  they  learn 
their  profession  through  a  better  rounded  experience. 
American  legislation  is  spasmodic  and  unintelligent 
in  this  matter. 

During  the  years  succeeding  the  Civil  War,  there 
was  a  group  of  officers  who  came  to  command  rank 
early  and  remained  there  for  a  whole  generation  while 
those  below  them  were  fretting  out  their  lives  in  sub- 
ordinate duties.  They  were  known  as  the  hump.  I 
was  on  board  a  cruiser  in  the  Pacific  with  a  lieutenant 
who  had  been  twenty-two  years  in  that  one  grade  and 


8o      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

was  promoted  to  lieutenant-commander  at  somewhat 
over  fifty.  He  finally  rushed  through  the  command 
ranks  without  getting  time  actually  to  command, 
and  finally  retired  a  Rear- Admiral  who  had  always  done 
subordinate  work.  The  situation  would  be  laughable 
if  it  did  not  have  a  tragic  side  for  the  Navy ;  for  there  is 
another  hump  now  and  young  officers  who  graduated 
last  June  can  hardly  hope  even  to  get  into  the  lieu- 
tenant's grade  short  of  twenty  years.  If  one  of  them 
marries,  it  will  be  entirely  possible  for  himself  and  his 
son  to  serve  as  watch  officers  on  the  same  ship.  This 
is  another  lesson  in  preparedness  and  Congress  should 
find  some  good  solution  for  so  deadening  a  condition. 
Various  remedies  have  been  suggested,  such,  for 
example,  as  promotion  by  selection.  This  may  be  a 
way  out,  if  it  can  be  kept  free  from  social  or  political 
influence  in  Washington,  but  it  does  not  provide  for 
the  aged  who  are  not  selected  and  who  remain  at  the 
base  of  the  pyramid.  Reserve  lists  on  graded  pay 
might  be  established  for  those  who  would  go  into  civil 
life.  It  is  not  intended  to  propose  the  remedy  here, 
but  the  Navy  and  Congress  must  do  something  about 
it. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  covers  many  of  the 
points  referred  to  here  and  it  should  be  read  by  every 
citizen  who  has  an  interest  in  the  Navy  as  a  defense 
against  invasion.  The  recommendation  for  increase 
in  ships  of  all  classes  is  moderate  and  should  be  ap- 
proved by  Congress  either  as  the  Secretary  requests 
or  better  still  as  outlined  by  the  General  Board,  in  its 
first  report.  Five  years  seems  too  long  for  the  program 
as  it  really  means  eight  years,  if  we  hope  to  be  pre- 
pared for  contingencies  that  may  arise  after  this  war 
is  over. 


Ira  N.  Hollis  81 

To  those  who  are  against  preparation,  the  declaration 
of  the  English  Articles  of  War  should  be  quoted:  "It  is 
upon  the  Navy  that,  under  the  good  providence  of  God, 
the  wealth,  safety,  and  strength  of  the  Kingdom  chiefly 
depend."  This  is  nearly  as  true  of  our  Republic,  as  it  is  of 
Great  Britain.  Our  coast  line  is  immensely  greater  and 
the  Caribbean  is  an  American  sea  controlling  the  Panama 
Canal.  Only  by  means  of  the  Navy  can  we  find  time  on 
shore  to  get  ready  against  attack.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War  the  Germans  were  fully  prepared  with 
soldiers  and  munitions  for  land  service.  The  English 
were  not  prepared  at  all,  but  their  fleet,  which  had  never 
been  more  ready,  saved  them.  Even  a  few  days'  delay 
might  have  been  fatal.  That  is  our  great  lesson.  Let  us 
learn  it  as  our  only  escape  from  war  and  the  rule  of  brute 
force. 

A  volume  would  be  needed  for  a  complete  exposition  of 
our  naval  problems  as  revealed  by  the  war.  They  all  come 
under  the  head  of  study  and  preparation  and  the  Naval 
War  College  with  its  fine  staff  forms  a  natural  source  of 
instruction  to  our  people.  The  officers  should  be  en- 
couraged to  make  their  views  public  except  where  inter- 
national questions  are  involved.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
they  should  write  on  the  plans  and  strategy  of  possible 
future  campaigns  but  they  should  work  them  out  for 
use  when  the  need  arises.  There  is  no  possible  doubt  that 
at  least  one  nation,  if  not  two,  will  have  everything  ready, 
as  Louis  Napoleon  said,  "to  the  last  button  of  the  uniform," 
for  use  against  us.  Our  Navy  should  be  large  enough 
and  ready  to  defend  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  as  well  as  our 
base  in  the  Caribbean.  Half-way  measures  are  useless. 

It  is  conceivable  that  we  might  lessen  our  risk  by  with- 
drawing within  a  continental  area  containing  Alaska,  the 
Hawaian  Islands,  Panama,  Porto  Rico,  and  our  own  United 
States,  leaving  the  Philippine  Islands  to  their  own  devices 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  scrap  heap  of  moral 
failures.  Are  we  prepared  to  do  that?  I  think  not. 


82      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Even  though  we  are  reaping  while  others  are  fighting  the 
battle  of  democracy,  even  though  we  failed  in  our  great 
opportunity  when  little  Belgium  was  trampled  under  foot, 
a  certain  sense  of  humiliation  will  make  this  country  all  the 
more  determined  to  fulfill  its  duties  and  its  obligations. 
Our  lesson  is  learned.  We  shall  build  our  Navy  that  we 
mav  face  the  world  a  free  nation. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  NAVAL  CONSULTING 
BOARD  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

BY  ARTHUR  GORDON  WEBSTER 

THE  recent  announcement  by  Secretary  Daniels 
of  the  appointment  of  a  board  of  engineering 
and  scientific  experts  to  serve  as  a  consulting  board 
for  the  Navy  with  respect  to  inventions  and  applica- 
tions of  science  has  been  received  by  the  public  with 
marked  interest,  but  with  expressions  of  opinion  vary- 
ing from  extreme  enthusiasm  through  faint  praise  to 
decided  condemnation.  Inasmuch  as  many  of  the 
reactions  of  the  press  and  of  publicists  seem  based 
upon  misapprehensions  of  the  purpose  and  functions 
of  this  board  it  seems  of  interest  to  present  a  short 
explanation  of  the  results  that  it  may  possibly  achieve. 
On  the  one  hand  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Edison,  un- 
doubtedly one  of  our  most  fertile  inventors,  as  the 
chairman,  has  led  to  the  hasty  conclusion  that  the 
members  of  the  board  would  immediately  throw  them- 
selves into  such  an  ardor  of  inventive  effort  that  new 
devices  would  be  brought  to  birth  from  their  fertile 
brains  that  would  make  our  Navy  invulnerable  and 
relieve  the  country  from  fear  of  attack.  At  the  other 
extreme  from  this  preposterous  view  is  the  statement 
of  an  ex-President  of  the  United  States  that  the  Navy 
needs  no  civilian  board,  but  only  naval  experts,  and 
also  the  sometimes  thinly  disguised  view  that  it  is  an 

83 


84      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

insult  to  the  officers  of  the  Navy  to  suggest  that  any 
advice  may  be  offered  to  them.  The  truth  undoubtedly 
lies  between  the  extremes  here  indicated.  The  first 
view  is  easily  disposed  of  when  we  point  out  that  all 
persons  having  any  knowledge  of  invention  know  that 
it  can  no  more  be  compelled  than  can  poetry  or  other 
creative  art,  and  that  people  cannot,  and  do  not,  make 
great  inventions  to  order.  The  sudden  creation  of 
marvelous  and  unexpected  inventions  cannot  then 
be  the  function  of  this  board. 

A  second  view  is  that  this  board  shall  serve  as  a 
mediator  between  the  thousands  of  inventors  who 
have,  as  they  believe,  made  inventions  of  great  impor- 
tance, but  cannot  obtain  the  ear  of  the  authorities  of  the 
Navy  in  order  to  have  their  inventions  tried.  Such  a 
board  might,  they  suppose,  examine  without  prejudice 
inventions  submitted  to  it,  and  advise  the  Navy  with 
regard  to  such  of  them  as  seem  promising.  Such  a 
function  might  be  delegated  to  this  board,  but  is  not 
at  present  contemplated.  In  fact  the  idea  of  offering 
or  of  forcing  advice  upon  the  Navy  is  especially  dis- 
avowed, and  in  order  to  make  this  particularly  plain 
the  name  originally  proposed  of  Naval  Advisory  Board 
has  been  given  up  for  the  explicitly  descriptive  title  of 
Naval  Consulting  Board.  It  is  meant  that  the  officers 
of  the  Navy  shall  have  the  services  of  this  board  for 
consultation  upon  such  technical  matters  of  a  scientific, 
in  contradistinction  to  a  military,  nature  as  they  shall 
deem  needful  or  expedient. 

With  regard  to  the  view  that  only  a  board  of  naval 
experts  could  be  of  service  to  the  Navy,  and  that  it 
would  be  improper  for  civilians  to  offer  any  assistance, 
let  us  take  a  brief  survey  of  some  of  the  problems  of 
the  Navy.  The  Navy  consists  of  ships,  provided 


Arthur  Gordon  Webster  85 

with  guns  for  offense  and  armor  for  defense.  In 
addition  it  uses  mines  for  defense,  and  of  late  years 
submarines  and  automobile  torpedoes  under  water, 
and  aeroplanes  and  dirigible  balloons  for  scouting  over- 
head. With  regard  to  ships  we  have  the  problems 
of  construction,  stability,  propulsion,  and  resistance. 
Under  propulsion  we  have  the  matter  of  the  generation 
of  power,  and  its  transmission  to  the  organs  of  propul- 
sion. In  connection  with  guns  we  have  the  question 
of  construction  and  mounting,  and  the  questions  of 
interior  ballistics,  concerning  the  motion  of  the  pro- 
jectile inside  the  gun,  and  exterior  ballistics,  or  the 
motion  of  the  projectile  from  the  gun  to  the  target. 
All  of  these  problems  are  problems  of  physics,  and  are 
to  be  dealt  with  by  engineers  and  theoretical  and 
applied  physicists,  chemists,  and  metallurgists.  It  is 
obvious  that  most  of  them  may  be  contributed  to  in  a 
high  degree  by  persons  who  have  the  required  special 
scientific  knowledge  even  if  they  have  never  seen  or 
smelled  salt  water.  It  is  of  course  possible  that  the 
persons  in  a  country  who  know  the  most  about  such 
problems  are  to  be  found  in  the  Navy,  but  it  is  also 
possible  that  they  are  to  be  found  outside.  The  day  is 
evidently  long  since  past  when  the  amour  propre  of 
any  set  of  officials  should  stand  in  the  way  of  the 
development  of  the  efficiency  of  either  of  the  military 
arms  by  any  means  in  the  power  of  the  state.  Nor  is 
this  in  the  least  to  be  expected.  The  high  quality  of  the 
personnel  of  the  United  States  Navy  and  its  great 
traditions  make  it  unnecessary  to  impugn  either  its 
ability  or  its  disinterestedness. 

If  the  facts  be  admitted  to  be  as  I  have  stated,  and  if 
it  be  found  that  questions  arise  which  require  more 
attention  and  research  than  can  be  given  to  them  in  the 


86      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

regular  routine  of  the  duties  of  the  officers  of  the  Navy, 
does  it  not  seem  an  extremely  natural  idea  that  the 
attempt  should  be  made  to  aggregate  to  the  special 
technical  knowledge  of  the  naval  officers  the  combined 
powers  of  the  organized  scientific  brains  of  the  country 
for  the  improvement  of  the  material  side  of  the  Navy  ? 
In  order  to  do  this  Secretary  Daniels  proceeded  in  the 
only  possible  way.  As  the  judgment  of  any  individual 
in  so  many  various  subjects  must  be  fallible,  it  was 
necessary  to  appeal  to  the  organized  societies  having 
to  do  with  the  various  branches  in  question,  to  which 
was  delegated  the  task  of  selecting  their  most  fitting 
representatives.  Thus  the  national  societies  of  civil, 
mechanical,  electrical,  and  mining  engineers  were 
naturally  chosen,  as  well  as  two  aeronautical  societies 
and  one  of  automobile  engineers.  The  appropriateness 
of  the  last  choice  is  seen  when  we  think  of  the  enormous 
changes  already  wrought  in  all  questions  of  propulsion 
by  the  introduction  of  the  gas  engine  in  its  many 
forms.  For  more  abstract  and  purely  scientific  ques- 
tions there  were  called  the  American  Chemical  Society, 
the  American  Electrochemical  Society,  and  the  Ameri- 
can Mathematical  Society,  the  latter  for  assistance  in 
the  many  questions  of  mathematical  physics  likely 
to  arise.  Finally  the  Inventors  Guild  completes  the 
eleven  societies  already  invited.  It  can  hardly  be 
denied  that  such  a  selection  is  likely  to  furnish  as 
competent  a  board  to  deal  with  the  questions  proposed 
as  could  be  secured  in  this  country.  The  absolute 
disregard  of  individual  interests  or  of  political  considera- 
tions is  immediately  obvious.  Let  me  add  to  this  the 
statement  that  each  member  of  the  board  considers 
himself  the  intermediary  between  the  Navy  and  the 
combined  talent  of  his  scientific  colleagues,  of  whom 


Arthur  Gordon  Webster  87 

he  is  the  representative  on  the  board.  Was  it  not 
then  proper  for  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  state  that 
he  had  thus  mobilized  the  talent  and  genius  of  the 
country  for  the  service  of  the  Navy  ? 

What  now  are  to  be  the  methods  of  operation  of  this 
board,  and  in  what  way  can  civilians  be  of  use  when 
the  technically  instructed  minds  of  the  Navy  need 
assistance?  It  will  readily  be  admitted  that  the 
chief  characteristic  of  modern  navies  is  their  rapid 
change  and  the  ever-present  tendency  to  become 
obsolete.  With  the  continual  development  of  science 
there  come  applications  that  to  a  previous  generation 
were  unheard  of  or  chimerical.  When  we  consider 
that  it  was  only  eleven  years  ago  that  the  Wright 
brothers  were  making  their  first  flight  with  a  motor- 
propelled  glider  at  Kittyhawk,  N.  C.,  and  that  to-day 
battles  are  being  waged  above  the  clouds  and  military 
tactics  are  being  forever  altered  because  of  the  new 
mode  of  aerial  scouting,  we  get  a  vivid  idea  of  this 
truth.  When  we  remember  that  it  is  but  eighteen  years 
ago  that  we  first  heard  of  the  experiments  of  Marconi 
on  Salisbury  plain,  applying  the  electrical  waves 
discovered  eight  years  previously  by  Hertz  to  the 
transmission  of  intelligence  across  empty  space,  and 
that  now  we  have  had  conversation  from  Washington 
to  Hawaii  and  Paris  by  the  same  astonishing  means,  we 
have  a  further  example  of  the  same  thing.  Let  me  also 
call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  none  of  the  persons 
named  in  this  connection  were  members  of  any  army 
or  navy.  In  fact  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  chief  new 
scientific  contributions  to  the  art  of  war  do  not  come 
from  military  men.  I  need  mention  only  a  few 
examples,  such  as  the  Monitor  of  John  Ericsson,  a 
highly  educated  engineer  born  in  Sweden,  the  steam 


88      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

turbine  of  the  Englishman  the  Hon.  Charles  Parsons, 
the  gas  engine  developed  in  Germany  and  France, 
and  the  gyrostatic  compass  simultaneously  developed 
by  Anschutz  in  Germany  and  by  Sperry  in  this  country. 
It  is  evident  that  the  discipline  of  armies  and  navies 
does  not  encourage  that  free  play  of  imagination, 
experiment,  and  research  that  is  essential  for  the 
development  of  original  ideas.  This  is  not  to  say 
anything  against  these  military  departments,  but  merely 
to  call  attention  to  a  well-recognized  fact. 

We  come  now  to  the  most  important  method  pertain- 
ing to  the  successful  performance  of  investigation,  and 
the  characteristic  that  most  differentiates  it  from 
military  activity.  I  mean  the  method  of  scientific 
research.  It  would  seem  scarcely  necessary  to  explain 
here  in  Worcester  the  nature  and  purposes  of  research, 
for  since  the  foundation  of  Clark  University  twenty- 
six  years  ago  the  performance  of  scientific  research 
has  been  considered  its  chief  function  and  raison  d'etre. 
And  yet  it  has  sometimes  been  carelessly  assumed 
that  discoveries  are  born  fully  armed  from  the  brain 
of  the  thinker  like  Pallas  from  the  head  of  Zeus,  and 
that  nothing  more  than  a  drawing-board  is  necessary 
for  their  creation.  How  different  is  the  actual  course  of 
procedure!  Consider,  for  example,  the  development 
of  wireless  communication.  First  came  the  magnificent 
experimental  investigations  of  Faraday  and  Henry, 
eighty  years  ago,  then  the  great  mathematical  investiga- 
tion of  Maxwell  in  1864,  culminating  in  the  announce- 
ment of  the  existence  of  electromagnetic  waves,  then 
the  long  and  painstaking  experiments  of  Hertz  in  the 
laboratory  twenty-four  years  later,  culminating  in  the 
actual  production  of  the  waves,  and  finally  the  out- 
of-door  experiments  of  Marconi  which  resulted  in  ever 


Arthur  Gordon  Webster  89 

increasing  their  field  of  action,  followed  by  the  work  of 
thousands  of  experimenters  and  theorists  from  that 
day  to  this.  In  the  case  of  the  steam  turbine  laboratory 
experiment  and  mathematical  development  went  hand 
in  hand,  until  we  have  the  huge  turbines  of  the  Maure- 
tania  of  to-day.  In  the  case  of  the  aeroplane  the  process 
was  somewhat  different,  beginning  with  the  develop- 
ment of  a  sport,  and  then  the  art  of  gliding  by  power, 
and  out-of-door  experiment,  resulting  eventually  in  the 
loss  of  hundreds  of  lives  for  want  of  more  perfect 
experimental  and  theoretical  data.  Here  the  mathe- 
matical theory  and  the  laboratory  development  followed 
later,  at  great  cost,  but  now  every  country  has  its 
aeronautic  indoor  laboratory,  supplemented  by  an 
out-of-door  proving-ground.  In  the  case  of  ordnance, 
mathematical  theories  of  stress  and  of  thermodynamics 
go  hand  in  hand  with  experimental  assembling  of  data, 
while  in  the  production  of  explosives  the  chemical 
laboratory  is  the  battle-ground.  The  production  of 
armor  involves  problems  not  only  of  the  rolling-mill 
but  of  metallurgy  and  of  the  chemistry  of  alloys  and 
pure  metals.  And  so  I  might  go  on.  It  seems  therefore 
obvious  that  if  a  navy  is  to  be  in  the  van  in  the  applica- 
tion of  science  it  should  have  not  only  a  large  staff 
of  persons  skilled  in  the  methods  of  scientific  research, 
but  also  suitable  laboratory  facilities  for  the  perform- 
ance of  all  the  many  complicated  researches  that  may 
be  necessary.  It  is  true  that  some  of  these  researches 
could  be  carried  out  in  private  or  university  laboratories 
now  existing,  but  it  will  be  immediately  obvious  that 
it  would  be  impracticable  to  at  once  concentrate  the 
activities  of  such  institutions  on  problems  whose 
immediate  solution  may  be  matters  of  life  or  death 
for  the  navy.  The  facilities  of  which  I  speak  exist  at 


90      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

present  only  in  small  degree  in  the  United  States  Navy. 
The  first  act  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board  has  there- 
fore been  to  recommend  the  building  of  a  large  station 
for  research  in  all  branches  of  engineering,  physics, 
and  chemistry  connected  with  naval  application, 
comprising  laboratories  of  various  sorts,  with  shops 
for  the  production  of  the  experimental  machines  and 
apparatus  to  be  tested.  Such  a  station  will  eventually 
cost  several  millions  of  dollars,  a  sum  hardly  to  be 
wondered  at  in  comparison  with  the  cost  of  similar 
laboratories  here  or  abroad,  or  with  the  cost  of  a  single 
battleship  which  may  be  saved  by  the  results  of  the 
researches  here  to  be  performed.  Such  a  laboratory 
would  demand  a  large  staff  of  skilled  research  scientists 
and  artisans,  many  of  which  would  have  to  be  drawn 
from  civil  life.  It  is  hardly  to  be  characterized  as  an 
inventions  mill  but  rather  as  a  place  where  the  scientific 
questions  involved  in  invention  may  be  tested,  data 
obtained,  and  in  due  time  the  resulting  invention 
submitted  to  practical  test. 

Finally  a  few  words  may  be  said  about  the  manner  in 
which  the  board  is  already  proceeding,  before  it  has  in 
fact  been  recognized  by  law,  and  while  it  is  merely  an 
association  of  friendly  advisers  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.  Following  the  methods  of  business  which  are 
thoroughly  familiar  to  most  of  its  members,  it  has  been 
divided  up  into  sixteen  subcommittees,  dealing  with 
the  various  most  important  questions  which  it  may 
have  to  consider.  No  member  belongs  to  more  than 
five  such  subcommittees.  Various  questions  already 
submitted  to  the  board  by  chiefs  of  bureau  have  been 
communicated  to  the  members  of  the  appropriate 
committees,  who  have  engaged  in  an  active  series  of 
suggestions  and  experiments  in  their  private  labora- 


Arthur  Gordon  Webster  91 

tories  or  studies.  Some  of  these  questions  are  very 
difficult  of  solution,  and  may  require  years  of  study. 
Others  are  such  as  are  bound  to  yield  to  the  serious 
methods  of  scientific  attack.  Let  me  mention  in 
closing  one  such  question  that  has  been  attacked  with 
great  success  in  the  Navy  by  the  most  modern  of 
research  methods, — I  mean  the  question  of  the  design 
of  ships  in  order  to  decrease  the  resistance,  increase 
the  speed,  and  save  the  coal.  For  this  purpose  the  great 
experimental  model  basin  was  constructed  in  Washing- 
ton, where  the  remarkable  experimental  results  in  the 
towing  of  models  obtained  by  Chief  Naval  Constructor 
D.  W.  Taylor  have  set  a  mark  for  high  scientific  value 
that  constitutes  one  of  the  glories  of  our  Navy.  Let  us 
hope  that  when  proper  facilities  are  offered  many  of 
the  other  problems  of  the  Navy  may  be  solved  in  an 
equally  satisfactory  way. 

Finally  I  desire  to  call  your  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  terrible  war  now  going  on  in  Europe  has 
forced  the  various  nations  involved  to  mobilize  their 
scientific  talent.  In  England  a  committee  for  the 
promotion  of  chemical  industries  has  been  constituted, 
headed  by  Lord  Rayleigh,  who  is  not  only  the  Chancellor 
of  the  University  of  Cambridge,  but  the  most  distin- 
guished physicist  in  England,  and  perhaps  of  the 
world.  An  inventions  committee  has  also  been  con- 
stituted, upon  which  are  such  men  as  Sir  Joseph 
Thomson,  Sir  Ernest  Rutherford,  and  Sir  Oliver 
Lodge,  all  leading  physicists,  and  which  has  had  the 
fate  of  being  criticized  as  not  containing  enough  practi- 
cal men.  At  the  same  time  France  has,  since  the 
constitution  of  our  board,  created  not  a  board,  but  a 
ministry  of  inventions,  having  at  its  head  the  distin- 
guished mathematician  Professor  Paul  Painleve.  It  is 


92      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

to  be  seen  that  in  these  older  civilizations  there  is  no 
doubt  felt  as  to  the  utilization  of  brains  devoted  to 
abstract  science  when  the  existence  of  the  country  is 
at  stake. 


THE  POISON  OF  PREPAREDNESS 
BY  WARREN  WORTH  BAILEY 

IT  seems  to  me  that  I  cannot  better  begin  what  I  have 
to  say  before  this  distinguished  body  to-day  than 
by  recalling  the  observation  of  Blackstone  to  the  effect 
that  in  a  land  of  liberty  it  is  extremely  dangerous  to 
make  a  distinct  order  of  the  profession  of  arms. 

In  absolute  monarchies  [said  the  great  commentator], 
this  is  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  prince  imperial ;  and 
armies  form  the  main  principle  of  their  constitution,  which 
is  that  of  governing  by  fear ;  but  in  free  states  the  profession 
of  a  soldier  taken  singly  and  merely  as  a  profession  is 
justly  an  object  of  jealousy.  In  these  no  man  should  take 
up  arms  but  with  a  view  to  defend  his  country  and  its  laws. 

There  is  now  a  serious  proposal  in  this  country  that 
we  shall  very  greatly  enlarge  the  profession  of  arms. 
Coupled  with  the  demand  that  we  shall  have  an  army 
of  400,000  continentals  is  the  other  demand  that  the 
output  of  West  Point  shall  be  doubled  or  perhaps 
quadrupled.  And  what  is  true  in  regard  to  the  land 
forces  of  the  Republic  is  equally  true  of  maritime  forces. 
If  our  army  is  to  be  augmented  by  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands, so  is  the  navy  to  be  expanded  in  line  with  an 
ambitious  and  really  imperial  program  involving  the 
expenditure  of  a  thousand  millions  of  dollars  within  the 

93 


94      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

next  five  years  and  a  consequent  increase  in  the  burden 
of  taxation. 

Advocates  of  this  program  tell  us  that  its  adoption  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  safety  of  the  Republic.  They 
tell  us  that  our  country  is  utterly  defenseless.  They 
insist  that  we  are  despised  among  the  nations  on  ac- 
count of  our  physical  weakness.  Yet  naval  experts 
have  testified  within  a  year  that  our  navy  is  second 
only  to  that  of  Great  Britain.  They  tell  us  that  it  is 
superior  to  that  of  Germany  or  of  any  other  country 
in  the  world  save  Britain.  This  was  the  testimony 
of  Admiral  Fletcher  before  the  Committee  on  Naval 
Affairs  when  the  naval  appropriation  bill  was  before 
it  a  year  ago.  And  Admiral  Fletcher  was  corroborated 
by  other  naval  experts.  It  was  left  to  the  Navy  League 
of  the  United  States  and  its  collaborators  to  discover 
that  a  fighting  machine  upon  which  we  have  spent 
nearly  a  thousand  millions  within  the  last  decade  is 
worthless. 

For  one  I  do  not  agree  with  the  Navy  League  of  the 
United  States.  I  do  not  agree  with  those  who  insist 
that  we  are  unprepared  for  possible  emergencies.  I 
am  profoundly  convinced  that  we  are  very  adequately 
prepared,  over-prepared,  if  anything.  Our  navy, 
built  and  building,  is  the  strongest  navy  in  the  world, 
bar  that  of  England.  Our  navy  is  stronger  than  that 
of  Germany;  it  is  far  superior  to  that  of  France;  more 
than  twice  as  strong  as  that  of  Japan  or  of  any  other 
nation  with  the  exception  noted.  Then  why  should 
it  be  pretended  that  we  are  unprepared  and  incapable 
of  self-defense  in  the  event  of  trouble? 

At  this  point  let  me  ask  whence  the  demand  has  so 
suddenly  and  so  insistently  come  for  a  tremendous 
increase  in  our  fighting  outfit.  Has  it  come  from  the 


Warren  Worth  Bailey  95 

toilers  of  the  land?  What  labor  organization  has 
manifested  fear?  What  organization  of  farmers  has 
uttered  an  appeal  for  more  battleships  and  submarines  ? 
What  body  representing  the  smaller  business  interests 
of  the  country  has  taken  ground  in  favor  of  adding 
to  the  tax  burdens  of  a  tax-ridden  people  for  war 
purposes  in  a  time  of  profound  peace?  Is  there  any 
evidence  anywhere  of  a  popular  demand  for  this  wide 
departure  from  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Republic? 

I  think  not.  But  we  find  on  examination  that  the 
patriotic  societies  which  have  been  so  much  in  evidence 
during  the  recent  months  in  cultivating  sentiment  in 
favor  of  military  and  naval  expansion  and  in  working 
upon  the  fears  of  the  timid  and  the  credulity  of  the 
uninformed  are  curiously  and  suggestively  related  in 
their  distinguished  personnel  to  certain  great  industrial 
concerns  which  in  the  event  of  increased  appropriations 
for  war  purposes  would  almost  necessarily  profit  there- 
from. It  is  not  my  wish  to  be  personal.  It  is  not  my 
purpose  to  question  the  patriotism  or  the  good  faith 
of  any  man.  But  self-interest  is  one  of  the  most  power- 
ful of  all  human  motives.  It  influences  men  without 
their  knowledge.  It  tends  in  many  cases  to  obliquity 
of  vision.  It  sways  men  even  when  they  honestly 
believe  themselves  superior  to  its  suggestions.  And 
so  we  may  fairly  assume  that  self-interest  has  played 
a  very  great  and  commanding  part  in  this  remarkable 
propaganda  which  those  who  have  been  busiest  in 
promoting  it  have  professed  to  be  inspired  alone  by 
love  of  country  and  undertaken  solely  with  the  high 
purpose  of  safeguarding  our  liberties  against  some 
unidentified  enemy. 

It  would  doubtless  be  impertinent  for  me  in  this 
presence  to  pursue  this  phase  of  the  matter  further. 


96      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Yet  right  here  I  am  sure  we  should  find  traces  of  the 
poison  of  preparedness  were  the  test  applied.  As  I 
have  said,  there  has  been  no  popular  clamor  for  in- 
creased armament.  The  great  body  of  the  people 
have  been  quietly  engaged  in  their  accustomed  pursuits. 
They  have  been  sowing  and  reaping  without  suspicion 
or  apprehension.  They  took  President  Wilson  at  his 
word  when  he  assured  them  through  Congress  a  year 
ago  that  we  were  at  peace  with  all  the  world  and  that 
no  one  who  spoke  counsel  based  on  fact  or  drawn  from  a 
just  and  candid  interpretation  of  realities  could  say  that 
our  independence  or  the  integrity  of  our  territory  was 
threatened  from  any  quarter.  It  has  therefore  been  a 
surprise  and  a  shock  to  be  told  in  more  recent  utter- 
ances that  the  "whole  nation  is  convinced  that  we 
ought  to  be  prepared  and  very  adequately  prepared 
for  defense" — the  word  defense  implying  danger  of 
attack.  Yet  in  the  message  delivered  to  Congress 
December  7th  the  country  was  again  assured  that  we 
have  nothing  to  fear.  We  are  still  at  peace  with  all 
the  world.  Our  independence  and  the  integrity  of  our 
territory  are  still  unmenaced.  Our  liberties  and  our 
institutions  are  still  unthreatened. 

Yet  here  we  are  face  to  face  with  a  program  of 
staggering  proportions.  It  is  a  program  so  far-reaching 
in  its  possibilities  that  it  should  give  every  thoughtful 
American  most  serious  pause. 

A  standing  military  force  [said  James  Madison],  with  an 
overgrown  executive,  will  not  be  safe  companions  to  liberty. 
The  means  of  defense  against  foreign  danger  have  always 
been  the  instrument  of  tyranny  at  home.  Among  the 
Romans  it  was  a  standing  maxim  to  excite  war  whenever 
a  revolt  was  apprehended.  Throughout  all  Europe  the 
armies  kept  up  under  pretext  of  defending,  have  enslaved 


Warren  Worth  Bailey  97 

the  people.  It  is  perhaps  questionable  whether  the  best 
concerted  system  of  absolute  power  in  Europe  could  main- 
tain itself  in  a  situation  where  no  alarms  of  external  danger 
could  tame  the  people  to  the  domestic  yoke. 

Has  a  revolt  been  apprehended  in  this  country  and 
are  we  hearing  much  about  defense  against  foreign 
danger  because  a  fear  has  possessed  the  kings  and 
potentates  of  our  day  of  what  the  people  may  do  if 
not  diverted  from  the  study  of  the  conditions  which 
privilege  and  monopoly  have  brought  about  in  this 
free  Republic?  Madison  was  no  alarmist  himself. 
He  was  not  among  the  unrestful.  He  wrote  in  the 
serenity  of  age  and  out  of  the  vision  gained  through 
long  experience.  He  understood  that  a  standing  mili- 
tary force  is  not  a  fit  companion  to  liberty.  He  knew 
the  two  to  be  mutually  antagonistic.  He  knew  that 
all  the  republics  which  had  risen  before  our  own  had 
gone  down  at  last  under  the  iron  heel  of  militarism. 
And  so  he  warned  his  countrymen  against  what  is  now 
being  so  vehemently  and  so  persistently  urged  by  those 
who  would  fill  us  with  fear  of  some  unidentified  foreign 
aggressor. 

Ought  we  not  to  ask  the  alarmists  to  tell  us  whence 
and  from  whom  they  expect  the  danger  which  they  say 
lies  close  at  hand?  Is  it  asking  too  much  of  them 
that  they  should  be  specific  in  pointing  out  the  foe 
against  whom  we  are  proposing  to  arm?  Thus  far 
they  have  been  tantalizingly  vague.  Of  course  we  have 
had  hints  and  implications  and  titillating  suggestions. 
The  Yellow  Peril  was  the  ready  resource  of  Mr.  Hobson 
for  several  lurid  years.  The  German  ghost  has  haunted 
the  visions  of  the  New  York  editorial  fraternity  for 
months.  But  when  the  cold  fact  that  Japan  is  out- 


98      Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

classed  by  us  on  the  sea  and  infinitely  outclassed  by  us 
in  resources  and  in  men,  the  Yellow  Peril  shrinks 
into  insignificance.  And  when  it  is  remembered  that 
naval  experts  rank  our  navy  as  superior  to  that  of 
Germany,  it  becomes  difficult  for  men  of  sober  mind 
to  become  excited  over  the  thought  that  the  Kaiser 
may  have  designs  upon  us  following  the  small  diversion 
in  which  he  is  now  more  or  less  engaged. 

But  the  thing  that  alarms  me  is  the  spirit  which 
runs  through  this  inflammatory  propaganda.  It  is 
not  the  spirit  of  our  free  institutions.  It  is  not  the 
spirit  upon  which  we  have  relied  during  all  our  previous 
history.  No.  It  is  the  spirit  which  has  culminated 
in  the  fearful  tragedy  now  enacting  in  Europe,  the 
spirit  of  force,  the  spirit  of  empire,  the  spirit  of  aggres- 
sion and  conquest.  For  let  no  one  believe  that  the 
program  which  has  been  outlined  is  the  end.  It  is 
merely  the  beginning.  It  is  perhaps  a  trifle  bolder 
than  any  previous  program  with  which  the  country 
has  been  confronted,  but  it  is  in  line  with  militaristic 
purposes  as  they  have  found  expression  from  year  to 
year  since  Whitney  began  the  rehabilitation  of  the 
navy  back  in  the  days  of  Grover  Cleveland.  That  the 
end  of  the  journey  has  now  been  reached,  who  is  so 
simple  as  to  believe?  All  history  tells  the  story  of 
similar  beginnings  and  of  how  the  course  has  run  from 
the  little  to  the  great,  from  the  neglible  to  the  dominant, 
from  the  army  that  no  one  paused  to  consider  to  the 
army  which  seized  the  reins  of  power  and  with  the 
bayonet  pinioned  liberty  to  the  earth. 

If  it  were  only  a  matter  of  money  I  should  feel  it 
scarcely  worth  while  to  protest  against  proposals 
which  go  no  further  than  that  of  placing  a  per  capita 
burden  of  ten  dollars  on  the  people  of  the  United  States. 


Warren  Worth  Bailey  99 

But  something  immeasurably  more  important  than 
any  question  of  money  and  taxes  and  debts  lies  back  of 
all  this  clamor  for  a  great  armament.  What  I  see 
before  us  is  a  military  system,  a  military  caste,  a 
military  autocracy.  The  poison  of  preparedness  is 
spreading  through  the  seats  of  learning;  it  is  corrod- 
ing the  sanctuary  itself;  it  is  coloring  the  language  and 
the  thought  of  our  daily  lives;  it  is  stirring  strange 
dreams  in  the  minds  of  men  which  take  shapes  so 
menacing  that  we  may  well  recoil  when  they  project 
themselves  upon  the  screen  that  hides  the  future. 
Empire  beyond  the  seas.  Entangling  alliances  with 
kingdoms  and  concerts  upheld  by  the  sword.  An 
America  no  longer  resting  on  the  secure  base  of  reason 
and  justice,  but  supported  by  the  bayonet  and  but- 
tressed round  about  by  forces  that  will  grow  and  grow 
until  within  their  grasp  all  powers  will  be  held  and  all 
authority  centered.  Is  this  vision  a  welcome  one? 
Is  it  one  we  would  have  reduced  to  reality?  Can 
Americans  look  upon  it  with  complacence  or  refrain 
from  offering  it  a  fervent  and  determined  challenge? 
Some  of  us  in  this  crisis  of  the  Republic  find  ourselves 
most  unhappily  out  of  touch  with  leaders  we  had 
hitherto  followed  unfalteringly  and  with  glad  steps. 
It  is  a  grief  to  us  that  a  difference  of  opinion  has  resulted 
in  a  divergence  of  our  paths.  But  here  I  am  reminded 
of  something  written  by  Thomas  Jefferson  a  long  time 
ago.  It  seems  to  fit  the  situation  which  faces  us  to-day 
as  it  fitted  the  situation  which  he  had  in  mind. 

During  the  throes  and  convulsions  of  the  ancient  world 
[he  wrote],  during  the  agonizing  spasms  of  infuriated  man, 
seeking  through  blood  and  slaughter  his  long  lost  liberty, 
it  was  not  wonderful  that  the  agitation  of  the  billows 


ioo    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

should  reach  even  this  distant  shore;  that  this  should  be 
more  felt  and  feared  by  some  and  less  by  others ;  and  should 
divide  opinion  as  to  measures  of  safety.  But  every  differ- 
ence of  opinion  is  not  a  difference  of  principle.  We  have 
called  by  different  names  brethren  of  the  same  principle. 
Error  of  opinion  may  be  tolerated  where  reason  is  left  to 
combat  it. 

And  it  is  to  reason  that  we  who  stand  for  peace  are 
appealing  to-day.  We  are  not  questioning  the  patriot- 
ism of  those  who  differ  with  us  in  this  hour  of  stress. 
We  believe  them  or  most  of  them  actuated  by  motives 
as  high  and  as  unselfish  as  our  own.  But  we  honestly 
and  most  sincerely  question  the  wisdom  of  the  method 
they  have  chosen  in  dealing  with  a  great  and  momen- 
tous occasion.  The  United  States  has  been  mightily 
stirred  by  the  awful  conflict  raging  across  the  Atlantic. 
Nearly  .all  of  us  have  kin  over  there.  No  home  is 
bereft  there  without  a  shadow  falling  across  the  thres- 
hold of  a  home  in  this  haven  of  the  oppressed.  The 
agitation  of  the  billows  of  the  Baltic  and  the  North 
Sea  has  reached  even  this  distant  and  peaceful  shore 
and  many  emotions  in  American  breasts  have  been 
the  response, — emotions  of  fear,  emotions  of  sympathy, 
emotions  of  hatred,  emotions  of  suspicion,  emotions  of 
sheer  selfishness  and  greed.  And  out  of  these  emotions 
have  come  many  and  varied  differences  of  opinion. 
Some  of  us  have  been  concerned  with  respect  to  our 
own  safety.  These  have  feared  that  out  of  the  blood 
and  fury  of  the  mighty  conflict  in  which  Europe  is 
weltering  may  come  a  fearful  danger  to  our  own  land 
and  our  own  institutions.  And  this  fear  has  been 
played  upon  magically  by  some  who  nurse  ambitions 
and  by  others  who  harbor  sordid  desires  and  by  still 
others  who  cherish  race  prejudices  or  national  bigotries 


Warren  Worth  Bailey  101 

— all  together  conspiring,  perhaps  unconsciously,  to 
bring  about  a  state  of  the  public  mind  which  tends  to 
find  expression  in  terms  of  force,  in  battleships  and  air 
craft,  in  submarines  and  long-range  guns,  in  shrapnel 
and  men  in  khaki. 

But  happily  reason  is  left  to  combat  errors  of  opinion 
which  may  have  obtained  in  connection  with  the  great 
conflagration  which  has  touched  us  with  its  searing 
tongues.  We  are  not  bound  to  accept  the  word  of  author- 
ity. Each  of  us  is  free  to  exercise  his  own  judgment,  to 
follow  his  own  conscience,  to  consult  his  own  convic- 
tions. Are  we  in  danger  ?  If  so,  there  is  no  American 
unready  to  meet  it,  none  who  would  pause  to  count  the 
cost  involved  in  meeting  it.  We  have  been  told  and 
repeatedly  told  that  we  are  not  threatened  from 
without.  But  are  we  threatened  from  within?  If  so 
will  continentals  and  war  ships  avert  the  danger? 
May  they  not  enhance  it?  Revolutions  are  not 
stopped  by  armed  men.  But  a  thousand  revolutions 
might  have  been  averted  by  turning  soldiers  into 
husbandmen  and  artisans.  If  we  are  endangered  from 
within,  the  situation  is  to  be  met,  not  by  building 
battle  fleets  and  planting  our  harbors  with  mines;  it  is 
not  to  be  averted  by  turning  the  Republic  into  a  military 
camp ;  it  is  not  to  be  disposed  of  by  levying  fresh  taxes 
on  the  toilers  of  the  land ;  it  is  to  be  dealt  with  success- 
fully only  by  removing  the  causes  which  produce 
unrest  and  removing  the  injustices  which  provoke 
resentment  and  incite  bitterness  of  class  feeling. 

May  I  not  in  conclusion  appeal  to  reason  and  to 
common  sense  in  the  consideration  of  this  vital  issue? 
The  poison  of  preparedness  has  undeniably  crept  subtly 
through  our  whole  system  of  thought  and  national 
effort.  It  has  brought  a  sort  of  madness  upon  many 


102    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

minds.  It  has  obsessed  thousands  with  the  dread  of 
some  awful  consequence  to  ourselves  of  the  European 
struggle.  Yet  what  I  contend,  to  paraphrase  the 
language  of  the  great  Richard  Cobden,  is  that  America 
is  to-day  so  situated  in  every  particular  of  her  domestic 
and  foreign  circumstances  that,  by  leaving  other 
governments  to  settle  their  own  business  and  fight 
out  their  own  quarrels,  and  by  attending  to  the  vast 
and  difficult  affairs  of  her  own  enormous  realm  and  the 
conditions  of  her  own  people,  she  will  not  only  be 
setting  the  world  an  example  of  noble  morality— 
which  no  other  nation  is  so  happily  free  to  set — but 
she  will  be  following  the  very  course  which  the  mainte- 
nance of  her  own  greatness  most  imperatively  demands. 
It  is  precisely  because  America  is  so  strong  in  resources, 
in  courage,  in  institutions,  in  geographical  position, 
that  she  can,  before  all  other  powers,  afford  to  be 
moral  and  to  set  the  example  of  a  mighty  nation  walk- 
ing the  paths  of  justice  and  of  peace. 


PREPAREDNESS:  THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAM1 
BY  WILLIAM  I.  HULL 

RESULTS  OF  PREPAREDNESS 

'"THERE  must  be  no  misunderstanding  of  the  full 
A  significance  and  certain  results  of  getting  down 
to  business  on  the  military  program.  If  we  give 
ourselves  whole-heartedly  to  it,  we  must  bid  farewell 
forever  to  those  American  ideals  of  peaceful  industry, 
of  genuine  education,  of  real  democracy,  and  of  inter- 
national relations  dominated  by  law  and  justice.  The 
military  powers  of  the  Old  World  and  of  all  history- 
have  shown  us  but  too  plainly  by  precept  and  example 
the  necessary  consequences  to  industry,  education, 
democracy,  and  international  morality  of  a  whole- 
souled  devotion  to  a  consistently  "adequate"  military 
program. 

Both  reason  and  recent  experience  have  burned  in 
upon  us  the  lesson  that  adequate  preparedness  includes 
the  preparation  of  plans  for  making  war.  The  "cam- 
paign" must  necessarily  be  mapped  out  beforehand, 
and  its  strategy  and  tactics  decided  upon  in  advance. 
The  German  officers'  clubs,  with  their  debates  on  "the 
best  plan  "  and  prizes  for  its  author;  with  their  incessant 
construction  and  criticism  of  "projects  of  attack  and 
defense,"  and  their  habitual  and  enthusiastic  toast 
to  "The  Day"  when  these  projects  might  be  tested, 
have  taught  this  lesson  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt. 

'This  address  will  appear  later  as  a  chapter  in  Professor  Hull's 
volume,  Preparedness:  The  Military  and  the  American  Programmes, 
Revell  &  Co. 

103 


104    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  "agreements"  and  "arrangements"  between 
Great  Britain  and  France  have  taught  this  same 
lesson,  with  the  further  one  of  the  futility  of  anything 
short  of  absolute  adequacy  in  military  preparedness. 
Even  Germany,  with  its  phenomenal,  apparent  military 
success,  is  learning  anew  that  Kant's  dictum,  ' '  We  can- 
not grasp  the  absolute  by  the  wool, "  is  true  in  the  mili- 
tary and  material  world  as  well  as  in  the  intellectual. 

Many  events  have  proven  the  truth  of  reason's 
prophecy  that  on  the  occasion  of  every  international 
dispute  the  country  "prepared"  with  big  armaments 
rattles  the  saber  in  its  sheath,  or  draws  the  sword  from 
its  scabbard,  in  its  effort  to  back  up  its  diplomacy 
and  incline  "justice"  to  its  side.  In  this  era  when  the 
whole  world  is  a  neighborhood,  such  preparedness  on 
the  part  of  one  nation  is  emulated  by  the  others  who 
regard  the  iron  fist  as  a  necessary  concomitant  of  their 
own  diplomacy. 

But  "preparedness"  instills  the  poison  of  militarism 
not  only  into  international  relations:  it  militarizes 
national  and  individual  life  and  character  as  well: 
"The  Earth  rests  not  more  securely  on  the  shoulders 
of  Atlas  than  Germany  on  her  Army  and  Navy":  so 
said  one  of  the  prime  supporters  of  military  prepared- 
ness, the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia. 

After  all  [said  the  editor  of  a  great  London  journal], 
the  British  Empire  is  built  up  by  good  fighting  by  its 
Army  and  Navy.  The  spirit  of  war  is  native  to  the  British 
race. — Only  by  militarism  can  we  guard  against  the 
abuses  of  militarism. 

Such  are  the  natural  fruits  of  military  preparedness; 
and  their  counterparts  are  already  pressing  upon 
public  attention  in  our  own  Republic. 


William  I.  Hull  105 

Military  preparedness,  which,  to  be  adequate,  must 
necessarily  be  based  on  despotism  in  the  army,  has 
caused  despotism  to  be  retained  in  the  monarchies  of 
Continental  Europe,  and  to  be  revived  in  many  open 
and  insidious  ways  in  its  republics.  In  practice,  the 
rights  of  freemen  have  been  ruthlessly  disregarded 
in  Germany  and  in  Great  Britain  alike,  under  the 
stress  of  providing  a  greater  preparedness;  in  theory, 
the  Germans  insist  that  efficiency  in  military  prepared- 
ness is  possible  only  when  power  is  strictly  concentrated, 
and  the  English  have  grown  doubtful  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  its  achievement  in  a  democracy.  In  Germany, 
a  member  of  the  Reichstag  voted  against  the  military 
budget;  his  fellow  members  shouted  to  him,  "We 
won't  permit  the  supreme  military  authorities  to  be 
criticized";  and  the  government  promptly  ordered 
him  to  the  trenches.  In  England,  an  unprecedented 
campaign  for  enlistment  has  come  to  the  verge  of 
conscription;  the  state  church  has  been  ordered  to 
"preach  more  patriotic  sermons";  and  the  workmen 
in  fuel  and  munitions  plants  have  been  made  to  feel 
that  they  are  the  wards  of  the  government. 

One  of  the  prime  characteristics  of  the  progress  of 
civilization  is  a  growing  respect  for  law  and  for  the 
sanctity  of  human  life ;  and  yet  our  Republic  is  summoned 
to  prepare  to  engage  in  international  anarchy  and  in 
the  wholesale  destruction  of  human  life.  One  of  our 
leading  prepareders,  in  a  public  debate  in  Boston, 
pictured  Uncle  Sam  with  a  chip  on  each  shoulder 
(the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Mongolian  Exclusion), 
and  with  both  arms  (the  army  and  navy)  in  a  sling. 
To  such  an  ideal  of  our  Republic  does  the  demand  for 
"preparedness"  logically  lead.  Shall  it  be  permitted 
to  eclipse  the  traditional  ideal  of  Uncle  Sam  with 


106    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

international  rights  on  one  shoulder  and  international 
duties  on  the  other,  with  one  hand  bearing  the  torch 
of  liberty,  education,  and  industry  enlightening  the 
world,  and  the  other  pressing  upon  the  nations  the 
scales  of  international  justice? 

Is  it  possible  that  we  are  going  to  permit  our  own 
beloved  Republic  to  enter  upon  that  foolish,  fatal, 
bloody,  brutal  path  of  militarism  which  has  led  the 
nations  of  to-day  into  the  abyss, — which  inevitably 
has  led  and  must  lead  always  to  the  abyss?  We  are 
standing  to-day  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  Which  shall 
we  take?  The  irrational,  anarchistic,  inadequate, 
uncivilized,  un-Christian,  un-American  path  of  so-called 
adequate  armaments  ?  Or  the  rational,  legal,  adequate, 
civilized,  Christian,  and  American  path  of  adequate 
justice? 

The  United  States  has  to-day  an  opportunity  un- 
paralleled in  its  history, — in  all  history, — of  answering 
this  question  aright,  and  of  leading  the  world  along  the 
better  way. 

THE  GREAT  EXPERIMENT  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 

The  American  people  have  not  yet  become  a  blood- 
thirsty, a  militaristic  nation.  They  will  assuredly 
reject  with  scorn  and  contempt  the  irrational,  anar- 
chistic, inadequate,  uncivilized,  un-Christian,  and 
un-American  program  of  the  militarists,  and  accept  glad- 
ly and  eagerly  the  rational,  legal,  adequate,  civilized, 
Christian,  and  American  program  of  the  Madisons, 
Hamiltons,  and  Washingtons  of  our  time.  We  have, 
once  before  in  our  history,  faced  the  same  great  question 
and  answered  it  aright. 

In  the  gloomy  "critical  period"  of  our  history,  from 


William  I.  Hull  107 

1783  to  1789,  the  burning  question  arose:  Shall  each 
of  the  thirteen  States  build  up  its  armaments  on  land 
and  sea,  to  the  utmost  of  its  power,  and  by  means  of 
them  defend  its  soil  from  invasion  by  the  other  jealous, 
rival,  hostile  States  ?  Or,  shall  the  great  experiment  of 
the  Constitution  be  tried,  by  means  of  which  inter- 
State  disputes  may  be  settled  by  judicial  process,  and 
the  armaments  of  each  State  be  reduced  to  a  minimum? 

The  answer  was  not  so  simple  and  easy  and  matter-of- 
course  as  it  appears  to-day  after  a  century  and  a  quarter 
of  successful  operation  on  the  part  of  the  Constitution. 
Undoubtedly,  as  the  Founders  themselves  acknowledge, 
the  Constitution  was  ' '  wrung  from  the  grinding  necessi- 
ties of  a  reluctant  people."  There  were  many  men, 
then,  in  the  various  States,  as  there  are  in  the  various 
nations  to-day,  who  declared  that  they  would  not 
entrust  the  safety  of  their  State  and  homes  to  a  "mere 
scrap  of  paper";  and  insisted  that  the  "good  old  plan" 
of  adequate  armaments  and  preparedness  should  be 
adhered  to,  and  the  new-fangled  follies  of  the  molly- 
coddle pacifists  and  poltroon  legalists  should  be  re- 
jected. Fortunately  for  America  and  the  world,  the 
Founders  of  the  Republic  triumphed,  and  an  end  was 
put  forever  within  the  States  of  the  Union  to  that 
policy  of  adequate  armaments  and  preparedness  which 
would  inevitably,  if  allowed  to  continue,  have  made  of 
the  Constitution  a  mere  scrap  of  paper,  just  as  the 
adequate  armaments  and  preparedness  of  to-day  have 
made  mere  scraps  of  paper  of  treaties  between  the 
nations. 

Of  course,  it  is  wholly  undesirable  and  impossible 
for  the  world  to-day  to  establish  a  national  union  such 
as  was  established  in  1789  between  the  States.  The 
day  for  a  world-empire,  or  even  a  world-republic,  has 


io8    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

probably  passed  away  forever.  But  it  is  possible, 
practicable,  and  mandatory  for  the  world  to  adopt 
unreservedly  and  adhere  to  unwaveringly  the  national, 
legal,  adequate,  civilized,  Christian,  and  American 
program  which  it  entered  upon  at  the  two  Hague 
Conferences. 

THE   PARTS    OF  THE   PROGRAM 

This  program  is  not  vaguely  indefinite  and  purely 
theoretical,  as  is  that  of  the  militarists.  On  the 
contrary,  every  part  of  it  is  clear-cut  and  every  part  of 
it  has  been  put  into  successful  operation.  Thus 
back  of  it  is  the  convincing  force  of  sound  reason,  and 
the  overwhelming  proof  of  successful  practice.  Let 
us  examine  it  briefly,  and  at  the  same  time  consider 
the  relation  of  adequate  armaments  and  preparedness 
to  the  program  as  a  whole  and  to  each  of  its  parts. 

Its  parts  are  four  in  number,  namely,  the  limitation 
of  armaments,  the  exclusive  use  of  mediation  and  good 
offices,  of  international  commissions  of  inquiry,  and  of 
international  arbitration. 

I.      THE  LIMITATION  OF  ARMAMENTS 

The  limitation  of  armaments  has  been  tried  for  a 
century  with  preeminent  success  between  the  United 
States  and  the  British  Empire,  and  for  a  quarter-century 
between  Chile  and  Argentina.  Its  adoption  in  some 
form — preferably  the  conversion  of  all  national 
armaments  into  an  international  police  force — is 
absolutely  essential  to  prevent  the  other  parts  of 
the  program  from  being  torn  into  scraps  of  paper. 
The  whole  world  of  civilization,  both  within  the  bel- 


William  I.  Hull  109 

ligerent  and  the  neutral  nations  as  well,  is  looking 
forward  to  the  time  when,  after  the  demolition  of 
adequate  armaments  in  the  present  great  war,  an 
end  shall  be  put  forever  to  the  persistent  and  frightful 
competition  between  the  nations  in  the  building  up 
of  adequate  armaments,  of  preparedness,  on  land 
and  sea.  And  even  the  terrible  evils  of  this  frightful 
war  are  borne  with  some  equanimity  in  the  prime  hope 
of  humanity  that  God  may  bring  out  of  these  evils  the 
total  destruction  of  the  nations'  means  of  mutual 
destruction. 

Here,  then,  will  be  the  first  great  opportunity  of 
America  to  lead  the  world;  but  this  opportunity  will 
belong  only  to  an  America  with  clean  hands  and  pure 
heart.  In  that  future  conference  of  the  nations  which 
is  to  put  an  end  forever  to  competition  in  the  building 
up  of  armaments,  what  possible  influence  for  good 
can  the  American  delegates  exert  if  their  country  should 
have  itself  adopted  in  earnest  the  military  program? 
Would  not  the  other  delegates  say,  with  entire  justice 
and  finality:  "While  we  were  destroying  each  other's 
armaments,  you  seized  the  opportunity  of  building  up 
your  own;  go  to,  we  will  go  and  do  likewise"?  So 
far  from  influencing  a  world  conference  to  limit  arma- 
ments, the  United  States  would  give  such  an  impulse 
to  competition  in  the  building  up  of  armaments  as  the 
world  has  never  known  before!  And  it  would  thus 
become  its  own  chief  opponent  in  leading  the  world  to 
adopt  the  rest  of  the  truly  American  program.  It  would 
be  as  if  Virginia,  the  home  of  Madison  and  Washington, 
or  New  York,  the  home  of  Hamilton,  had  said  to  the 
other  States :  ' '  Let  us  adopt  a  judicial  means  of  settling 
all  disputes  between  us";  and  had,  at  the  same  time, 
persisted  in  building  up  armaments  on  land  and  sea. 


i  io    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

At  the  first  Hague  Conference  in  1899,  Russia  earn- 
estly advocated  the  limitation  of  armaments ;  but  at  the 
second  Conference  in  1907,  after  Russia's  war  with 
Japan  had  impelled  it  to  undertake  an  enormous  in- 
crease in  its  armaments,  it  refused  not  only  to  advocate 
limitation  of  armaments  but  even  to  place  the  subject 
upon  the  program  for  discussion. 

It  will  take  the  United  States  years,  according  to  our 
military  and  naval  experts,  to  reach  even  the  standard 
of  preparedness  set  by  this  present  war.  Meanwhile, 
immediately  on  the  close  of  the  war,  the  third  Hague 
Conference  must  be  held,  and  the  delegation  from  the 
United  States  should  be  prepared,  and  enabled  by  their 
country's  attitude  on  armaments,  to  accomplish  that 
limitation  of  armaments  which  was  defeated  at  the 
first  two  conferences  by  a  reliance  upon  "adequate 
armaments,"  and  which  a  bleeding  and  panting  world 
will  demand  with  a  thousand-fold  more  imperiousness 
after  Armageddon  that  has  followed  the  "preparedness  " 
of  past  years. 

II.      MEDIATION  AND  GOOD  OFFICES 

Mediation  and  good  offices  were  placed  in  the 
program  by  the  Hague  Conferences.  They  have 
been  tried  by  the  United  States  scores  of  times,  both 
before  and  since  the  Conferences,  and  with  conspicuous 
success.  On  many  occasions,  Latin-American  wars 
have  been  prevented  or  ended  by  American  mediation. 
Through  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States,  the 
Russo-Japanese  War— up  to  that  time  the  most 
terrible  of  modern  wars — was  brought  to  an  end. 

This  means  of  preventing  war  is  obviously  capable 
of  far  greater  use  and  success;  and  it  was  not  only 


William  I.  Hull  in 

endorsed  by  the  Hague  Conferences  as  useful  and 
desirable,  but  it  was  unanimously  declared  not  to  be 
an  "unfriendly"  act  on  the  part  of  the  mediator  either 
before  or  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Why  has  it  not  been  successful  in  preventing  or 
ending  the  present  great  war?  Because  of  adequate 
armaments.  It  was  pressed  repeatedly  before  the 
war  began,  but  was  rejected  because  of  the  belief  on  the 
part  of  the  respective  disputants  that  they  could  gain 
more  by  means  of  their  adequate  armaments.  Our  own 
President  was  prompt  and  urgent  in  the  extension  of 
good  offices  and  mediation  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  His  offer  was  rejected.  Why?  Because  of 
adequate  armaments.  Our  country  and  humanity 
is  watchfully  and  hopefully  waiting  for  a  repetition  of 
that  offer.  When  will  the  opportunity  to  offer  them 
again  and  with  success  occur?  When,  and  only  when, 
the  adequate  armaments  of  one  side  or  the  other  shall 
have  been  smashed  into  smithereens. 

The  unanswerable  logic  of  this  proposition  is  fortified 
by  the  mediation  at  Portsmouth  when  it  was  found 
possible  to  mediate  only  after  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
armaments  had  been  greatly  reduced  and  when  the 
financial  resources  of  the  belligerents  prevented  them 
from  speedily  renewing  those  armaments.  As  a  man 
must  sow  what  he  reaps,  a  country  will  assuredly  get 
what  it  prepares  for,  whether  it  be  a  peaceful  adjustment 
of  disputes  or  war. 

A  conference  of  the  neutral  nations  to  offer  continuous 
mediation  in  the  present  war  has  been  repeatedly 
urged  in  and  upon  the  United  States,  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that  it  could  be  summoned  and  could  act  with 
success  were  it  not  for  "adequate"  armaments, — 
armaments  adequate,  so  their  respective  possessers 


ii2    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

believe,  to  secure  "justice"  by  means  of  them.  In- 
deed, we  have  the  testimony  of  the  British  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  even  a  conference  of 
the  belligerent  nations  themselves  could  have  prevented 
this  war.  He  places  the  blame,  of  course,  upon  Ger- 
many for  not  agreeing  to  this  conference;  but  the 
impartial  observer  sees  behind  Germany's  refusal  the 
specter  of  preparedness  on  both  sides.  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  words,  spoken  in  Parliament  nearly  nine  months 
after  the  war  began,  were  as  follows : 

The  expenditure  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  money  and 
the  loss  of  millions  of  lives  might  have  been  avoided  by  a 
conference  of  the  European  powers  held  in  London  or  at 
The  Hague,  or  wherever  and  in  whatever  form  Germany 
would  have  consented  to  hold  it.  It  would  have  been 
far  easier  to  have  settled  the  dispute  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia,  which  Germany  made  the  occasion 
of  the  war,  than  it  was  to  get  successfully  through  the 
Balkan  crisis  of  two  years  ago. 

Precisely  so.  The  Serbian,  or  Balkan,  or  Moroccan, 
or  almost  any  other  "incident"  is  liable  to  be  made 
the  occasion  of  war,  when  athwart  such  incidents  lies 
the  shadow  of  "preparedness." 

III.      INTERNATIONAL  COMMISSIONS  OF  INQUIRY 

International  commissions  of  inquiry  were  also  en- 
dorsed by  the  Hague  Conferences,  and  they  too  have 
been  put  into  successful  practice.  Founded  upon  the 
principle  of  ordinary  common  sense  that  we  should  in- 
vestigate before  we  fight,  it  has  been  found  that,  in 
nine  cases  out  of  ten,  if  we  investigate  we  will  not  fight 
at  all.  Among  the  applications  of  this  rational  means 


William  I.  Hull  113 

of  settling  international  disputes  may  be  mentioned  the 
famous  incident  of  the  Dogger  Bank.  On  this  occasion, 
Great  Britain,  Japan's  ally  and  Russia's  suspicious 
rival,  was  prevented  from  going  into  the  Russo-Japanese 
war,  by  an  impartial,  international  investigation  of  an 
occurrence  which  had  destroyed  British  lives  and 
touched  closely  British  honor. 

How  eminently  suitable  would  have  been  the  resort 
to  an  international  commission  of  inquiry  for  the 
prevention  of  the  present  war.  This  war — it  has 
almost  been  forgotten — was  precipitated  by  the 
assassination  of  an  Austrian  archduke  and  duchess. 
Austria  accused  the  Servian  government  of  complicity 
in  the  crime.  Here  was  a  question  of  fact,  which  an 
impartial,  international  commission  of  inquiry  could 
have  readily  sifted  and  reported  upon  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  world's  public  opinion.  This  rational  course 
was  repeatedly  urged  before  the  war  began.  Why  was 
it  not  resorted  to ?  Because  of  ' ' adequate  armaments." 
Because  Austria  and  her  allies,  and  Servia  and  her 
allies,  believed  that  they  had  invincible  or  irresistible 
armaments,  adequate  to  secure  "justice"  for  their 
respective  contentions. 

IV.      ARBITRATION 

This  is  another  preeminently  American  and  rational 
means  of  settling  disputes  between  nations,  and  it  is 
one  which  has  been  applied  with  success  many  scores 
of  times.  One  of  the  proudest  pages  in  American  his- 
tory is  that  which  records  the  success  of  scores  of  arbi- 
trations of  international  disputes  to  which  the  United 
States  has  been  a  party.  The  Founder  of  Pennsylvania 
advocated  two  centuries  ago  the  creation  of  an  interna- 


ii4    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

tional  court  of  arbitration  whose  counterpart  was  estab- 
lished by  the  first  Hague  Conference,  largely  under 
American  initiative  and  support.  The  Jay  Treaty  of 
1794  provided  for  the  arbitrations  which  ushered  in 
the  modern  history  of  arbitration;  and  on  the  roll  of 
such  arbitrations,  that  at  Geneva,  which  settled  the 
Anglo-American  dispute  over  the  Alabama  claims, 
stands  out  conspicuous  because  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  claims,  the  bitterness  of  feeling,  and  the  national 
honor  and  vital  interests  involved  in  the  case. 

More  than  two  hundred  disputes  between  sundry  na- 
tions had  been  settled  by  arbitration  before  the  first 
Hague  Conference  assembled.  At  that  Conference  a  re- 
sort to  arbitration  was  unanimously  approved;  and  at 
that  Conference  the  very  Prime  Minister  of  England 
who  had  condemned  and  derided  arbitration  as  "  a  quack 
nostrum  of  our  time,"  just  a  quarter-century  before, 
instructed  the  British  delegates  to  move  the  adoption 
of  a  court  of  arbitration  and  a  regular  code  of  arbitral 
procedure. 

This  court — the  "Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration, " 
and  the  first  truly  international  court  in  history- 
was  unanimously  agreed  upon  by  the  delegates  and 
ratified  by  their  governments.  Four  years  later,  on 
the  initiative  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
it  was  assigned  its  first  case.  A  dozen  years  have 
passed  since  then, — only  a  tiny  span  in  history, — and 
yet  already  that  court  has  settled  sixteen  disputes 
between  the  nations.  Some  of  these  disputes  have 
involved  grave  issues  of  national  honor  and  vital 
interests;  and  before  this  greatest  of  earthly  tribunals 
have  bowed  not  only  the  "little  fellows"  in  the  family 
of  nations,  like  Venezuela  and  Belgium,  but  every 
one  of  the  eight  "great  powers, "  with  the  single  excep- 


William  I.  Hull  115 

tion  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  United  States  re- 
peatedly, Great  Britain,  Japan,  Russia,  Italy,  France, 
Germany, — each  and  all  of  them  have  recognized  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  and  yielded  to  its  decision. 
One  of  these  disputes  was  between  the  bitter  enemies 
of  a  generation,  Germany  and  France;  and  yet  this 
dispute  like  all  the  others  was  settled  by  the  court  and 
settled  so  thoroughly  that  the  world  has  well-nigh 
forgotten  that  it  ever  existed.  In  fact,  of  all  the 
two  hundred  and  forty-odd  cases  of  arbitration  in 
history,  there  has  not  been  a  single  one  in  which  the 
award  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  was  resisted!  Thus 
potent  is  the  rule  of  reason  and  an  enlightened  public 
opinion. 

Now  why  is  it  that  arbitration  did  not  prevent  the 
present  war  ?  Because  it  did  not  do  so,  the  work  of  the 
Hague  Conferences  has  been  condemned  and  derided, 
and  their  conventions  called  "mere  scraps  of  paper." 
But  here  again,  as  in  the  case  of  the  other  measures 
adopted  at  The  Hague,  the  existence  of  "adequate 
armaments"  has  been  responsible  for  its  rejection. 
Of  course  it  could  not  be  successful  in  preventing  or 
ending  the  war,  unless  it  were  resorted  to ;  and  a  resort 
to  it,  though  repeatedly  urged,  was  rejected  by  the 
belligerents  concerned  because  of  Germany's  and  of 
Russia's  armies  and  of  Britain's  fleet. 

Experience  as  well  as  reason  proves  conclusively 
that ' '  adequate  armaments  "  are  inevitably  and  insuper- 
ably opposed  to  arbitration.  At  the  first  Hague 
Conference,  when  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration 
was  proposed,  a  German  military  delegate  declared: 
"Germany  will  have  none  of  arbitration.  It  has  an 
army  ready  to  fight  at  the  drop  of  the  hat,  and  by  means 
of  that  it  will  settle  its  quarrels."  A  British  naval 


ii6    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

delegate  said  practically  the  same  thing:  "Great 
Britain  has  a  navy  that  rules  the  sea:  by  means  of 
that  it  will  secure  justice.  Arbitration  is  merely  a 
device  to  enable  the  other  fellow  to  get  ready." 

Fortunately,  the  military  and  naval  delegates  were 
brushed  aside,  in  this  matter,  at  The  Hague;  the 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  was  established ;  and 
it  has  proved  its  efficacy,  in  preventing  war  and  enforc- 
ing justice,  by  the  unanswerable  logic  of  accomplished 
facts. 

The  doors  of  the  Temple  of  Justice  at  The  Hague 
were  open  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war.  The 
famous  Twenty-seventh  Article  of  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes 
had  made  it,  not  merely  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  the 
governments,  separately  or  together,  to  call  the  atten- 
tion of  the  disputants  to  the  fact  that  these  doors  stood 
hospitably  open  for  the  rational  adjudication  of  the 
dispute  between  them.  This  duty  was  fulfilled  by 
various  governments,  our  own  included.  But  the 
Temple  of  Janus  still  held  the  faith  and  worship  of  the 
leaders  of  the  peoples,  and  that  temple  was  filled  with 
Dogs  of  War  whose  braying  drowned  the  voice  of 
reason.  So  it  has  always  been,  so  it  must  ever  be  until 
those  Dogs  of  War  are  converted  into  the  genuine 
watchdogs  of  civilization. 

AN  "AMERICAN"  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

But,  in  the  adoption  of  the  true  American  program, 
shall  we  have  no  army  and  navy,  or  keep  them  inade- 
quate, inefficient,  unprepared  ?  No.  Whatever  we  have, 
we  want  to  be  adequate,  efficient,  prepared.  But  ade- 
quate for  what  ?  For  the  legitimate  needs  of  a  twenti- 


William  I.  Hull  117 

eth-century  republic.  For  whatever  police  service 
may  be  required  of  them  to  enforce  national  law  on 
land  and  to  suppress  pirates  or  other  criminals  within 
the  three-mile  limit  of  our  shores;  for  such  magnificent 
sanitary  and  medical  service  as  has  been  rendered  in 
the  Canal  Zone  and  the  Philippines;  for  such  splendid 
engineering  work  as  has  been  done  at  Panama.  These 
are  the  legitimate  tasks  of  a  twentieth-century  army 
and  navy;  and  for  these  they  should  be  as  adequate, 
efficient,  and  prepared  as  possible. 

One  of  the  great  advantages  of  an  army  and 
navy  used  for  such  purposes  is,  that  with  the  ad- 
vance of  progress  and  civilization,  the  size  of  the 
army  and  navy  decreases  proportionately  to  popu- 
lation, and  its  expense  decreases  proportionately  to 
wealth. 

But  let  us  no  longer  load  ourselves  in  times  of  peace 
with  enormous  and  constantly  increasing  military 
burdens  in  order  to  prepare  for  the  settlement  of  dis- 
putes between  nations  by  means  of  war.  National 
armies  and  navies  are  strictly  national  tools,  and  they 
should  have  no  place  nor  function  in  international 
affairs. 

THE  TWO  DIVERGENT   PATHS 

These,  then,  are  the  two  paths  that  stretch  fatefully 
before  our  country  and  the  world  to-day.  Which  shall 
we  take,  and  lead  the  world  to  take?  Let  us  make 
no  mistake  about  it:  we  cannot  take  them  both.  We 
cannot  gather  grapes  from  thorns,  or  figs  from  thistles. 
If  we  sow  the  wind,  we  must  reap  the  whirlwind:  if 
we  prepare  for  war,  we  cannot  preserve  the  peace. 
No  nation  can  serve  both  the  God  of  Battle  and  the 


ii8    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Prince  of  Peace.  Reason  and  experience  prove  con- 
clusively that  the  military  program,  if  adopted  in 
earnest,  makes  impossible  the  desire  to  adopt,  as  well 
as  the  adoption  of,  the  American  program.  And  a 
military  program  that  is  not  adopted  in  earnest  is 
mere  foolishness  and  a  criminal  waste  of  money,  brains, 
and  men. 

To  lead  the  world  along  the  American  path  is  difficult  ? 
Yes;  so  have  been  all  of  the  world's  great  reforms.  But 
it  is  not  impossible;  and  there  are  considerations  which 
make  it  most  promising.  If  our  own  great  Republic 
keeps  the  faith,  and  reassures  the  world  both  by  precept 
and  example  that  it  has  definitely  turned  its  face  away 
from  militarism  and  towards  judicial  settlement  of 
international,  as  of  State  and  individual,  disputes,  then 
indeed  it  will  be  in  a  position,  not  only  to  play  a  useful 
r61e  in  shortening  the  present  war  and  influencing  the 
terms  of  peace,  but  also  in  persuading  the  world  to 
adopt  the  American  program.  A  generation  of 
groaning  under  the  terrible,  increasing,  and  apparently 
unending  burden  of  competitive  armaments;  an  un- 
known period  of  suffering  and  dying  in  the  throes 
of  the  present  war;  and  the  prospect  of  a  long  future 
burdened  to  the  earth  by  the  economic,  physical,  and 
moral  losses  of  this  war,  will  assuredly  incline  the 
nations  to  the  better  way.  The  voice  of  democracy 
at  home  and  of  international  law  and  equity  abroad 
must  infallibly  and  invincibly  be  heard.  Let  America 
prepare  now  and  persist  then  in  giving  expres- 
sion to  that  voice,  which  is  its  natural,  its  historic, 
and  its  destined  r61e.  Friendships,  not  battleships, 
statesmen,  not  men-of-war,  must  and  can  per- 
form this  great  service  to  ourselves  and  to  all 
mankind. 


William  I.  Hull  119 

Thou,  too,  sail  on,  O  Ship  of  State! 
Sail  on,  O  Union,  strong  and  great! 
Humanity  with  all  its  fears, 
With  all  the  hopes  of  future  years, 
Is  hanging  breathless  on  thy  fate ! 

The  triumph  of  the  American  program  will  be 
difficult  of  achievement?  Yes.  But  consider  the 
alternative.  Even  the  Prussianization  of  our  Republic 
will  not  suffice  to  achieve  victory  over  a  first-class 
power  in  twentieth-century  war.  Shall  our  America 
be  made  a  twentieth-century  Sparta?  No!  Life 
under  such  circumstances  would  no  longer  be  dear  to 
any  true  American.  Give  us  liberty, — freedom  from 
tyranny  of  any  militarism, — or,  for  ourselves  and  our 
Republic,  give  us  death  I 

THE  PRESENT  CRISIS 

These,  then,  are  the  two  paths  that  have  opened  up 
before  us.  Which  shall  we  choose?  In  this  great 
national  and  international  crisis,  let  us  recall  and  act 
rightly  upon  those  appealing  and  prophetic  words 
which  one  of  our  own  great  poets  uttered  in  another 
crisis  of  world-history: 

Once  to  every  man  and  nation  comes 

the  moment  to  decide, 
In  the  strife  of  Truth  and  Falsehood, 

for  the  good  or  evil  side. 

Hast  thou  chosen,  O  my  people,  on 

whose  party  thou  shalt  stand, 
Ere  the  Doom  from  its  worn  sandals  shakes 

the  dust  against  our  land? 


120    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

New  occasions  teach  new  duties ; 

Time  makes  ancient  good  uncouth ; 
They  must  upward  still,  and  onward, 

who  would  keep  abreast  of  Truth ; 
Lo,  before  us  gleam  her  camp-fires! 

we  ourselves  must  Pilgrims  be, 
Launch  our  Mayflower,  and  steer  boldly 

through  the  desperate  winter  sea, 
Nor  attempt  the  Future's  portal  with  the 

Past's  blood-rusted  key. 


ECONOMIC  POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AFTER  THE  WAR 

BY  GEORGE  E.  ROBERTS 

THE  war  in  Europe  has  reacted  violently  upon  the 
United  States,  and  not  in  all  respects  as  was 
expected.  The  man  in  the  street  who  judged  by 
superficial  reasoning  and  what  tradition  said  of  the 
effects  of  past  wars  seems  to  have  been  nearer  right 
up-to-date  in  his  forecasts  as  to  the  effects  in  the 
United  States  than  the  financiers  and  students  of 
economics.  It  is  a  tradition  that  war  makes  good  times, 
but  the  idea  is  so  paradoxical,  so  evidently  superficial 
in  its  broad  application,  that  thoughtful  men  hesitate 
to  accept  it  in  even  a  limited  or  temporary  sense.  Any- 
one who  is  convinced  of  the  essential  harmony  of  all 
human  interests,  and  that  the  prosperity  of  every 
people  is  best  promoted  by  the  prosperity  of  all  other 
peoples,  is  bound  to  be  suspicious  of  any  prosperity 
that  is  promised  as  an  outcome  of  war.  It  is,  however, 
evident  that  in  the  United  States  to-day  business  is 
better  and  the  productive  forces  of  the  country  are  more 
fully  employed  than  when  the  war  broke  out,  or  at 
any  time  within  several  years. 

It  was  believed  that  the  enormous  demand  for 
capital  by  the  warring  governments  would  raise  the 
price  of  capital  all  over  the  world,  that  the  holdings 
of  American  securities  in  Great  Britain  and  Europe 

121 


122    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

would  be  returned  here  for  sale,  and  that  their  pur- 
chase would  absorb  the  free  capital  of  this  country 
to  such  an  extent  that  enterprise  and  improvements  at 
home  would  be  restricted,  and  that  this  would  result 
in  unemployment  and  poor  trade. 

But  the  credit  resources  of  the  warring  countries 
have  proved  to  be  greater  than  anybody  would  have 
ventured  to  estimate;  foreign  holders  of  our  securi- 
ties have  been  less  eager  to  sell  them  than  we  antici- 
pated, and  the  enormous  purchases  of  goods  made 
in  the  United  States  have  thrown  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments heavily  in  favor  of  this  country. 

The  aggregate  of  American  securities  returned  to 
this  country  is  very  considerable,  and  the  movement 
tends  to  increase  as  our  markets  rise  and  the  pressure 
on  the  other  side  increases.  Moreover,  the  United 
States  has  taken  during  the  year  approximately  $1,000- 
000,000  of  foreign  loans,  and  has  received  on  balance 
over  $400,000,000  in  gold,  a  movement  of  the  standard 
metal  that  is  without  a  precedent  in  history. 

Industry  is  exceedingly  active  in  the  country  to-day. 
While  the  initial  impetus  to  recovery  came  from  the 
war  business,  and  the  foreign  orders  are  still  an  im- 
portant factor,  the  country  has  developed  a  spirit  of 
confidence  and  ambition  which  has  not  been  apparent 
for  some  years.  The  country  is  accumulating  capital 
and  enlarging  its  productive  equipment  faster  than 
ever  before  in  its  history. 

At  the  end  of  the  war  we  shall  owe  very  much  less 
abroad  than  we  did  at  its  beginning,  and  as  an  offset 
to  the  remaining  debts  will  hold  an  important  amount 
of  foreign  obligations.  If  this  position  is  maintained, 
less  of  our  earnings  in  the  future  will  be  sent  abroad 
as  interest  and  dividends,  and  we  will  have  more  for 


George  E.  Roberts  123 

investments  on  our  own  account.  In  some  lines  of 
manufacture  we  have  been  thrown  upon  our  own 
resources,  and  new  industries  are  being  established  here. 
During  the  war  a  considerable  amount  of  trade  has 
been  diverted  to  this  country  and  our  manufacturers 
are  having  an  opportunity  to  introduce  their  goods  in 
new  markets.  Foreign  dealers  in  some  instances  have 
found  it  advisable  to  open  branches  here  both  for  manu- 
facture and  sale  in  international  trade.  An  important 
amount  of  shipping  has  been  brought  under  the  Ameri- 
can flag,  and  our  shipyards  are  crowded  with  ships 
under  construction.  The  large  additions  of  gold  to 
our  bank  reserves  have  made  the  New  York  money 
market  at  the  present  time  the  lowest  discount  market 
in  the  world,  and  practically  the  only  international 
market  for  any  kind  of  financing.  If  we  may  accept 
the  figures  of  our  Census  Bureau,  the  United  States  now 
has  more  wealth  and  productive  power  than  any  other 
two  nations  in  the  world. 

In  some  of  the  most  important  lines  of  production, 
particularly  in  steel  products,  machinery,  and  all  the 
appliances  for  the  most  effective  equipment  of  in- 
dustry, our  facilities  are  just  now  being  largely  in- 
creased. This  is  the  age  of  the  engineer,  of  electricity, 
of  steel  and  mechanical  agencies,  and  the  United  States 
is  prepared  for  leadership  in  these  things.  In  the  year 
of  greatest  steel  production  ever  known,  that  of  1913, 
the  world's  output  was  71,000,000  tons,  and  our  pro- 
duction is  now  at  the  rate  of  38,000,000  tons,  with  an 
important  amount  of  new  capacity  under  construction. 

All  of  this  is  positive  strength.  Moreover,  as  a 
country's  relative  position  in  world  affairs  is  determined 
not  only  by  its  own  strength  but  by  the  strength  or 
weakness  of  other  countries,  the  losses  which  the 


124    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

countries  at  war  are  suffering  must  have  the  effect  of 
making  the  United  States  a  relatively  more  important 
factor  in  world  affairs. 

Undoubtedly  general  opinion,  and  that  includes 
very  intelligent  and  expert  opinion,  the  world  over 
now  holds  that  the  United  States  is  profiting  by  the 
war,  and  that  it  is  destined  as  a  result  of  the  war  to 
occupy  a  much  more  important  position  in  world  affairs 
than  in  the  past.  Naturally  that  view  is  shared  in  this 
country,  and  some  people  are  sanguine  enough  to  pre- 
dict that  the  dollar  is  about  to  supplant  the  pound 
sterling  in  the  international  exchanges,  and  that  New 
York  will  take  the  place  of  London  as  the  financial 
center  and  clearing  house  of  the  world. 

There  is  apparently  much  in  the  situation  to  sup- 
port this  view,  but  men  who  are  familiar  with  the  con- 
ditions that  determine  the  flow  of  trade,  the  location 
of  industries,  and  the  concentration  of  financial  power 
are  skeptical  about  the  permanency  of  sudden  changes 
effected  by  temporary  causes.  They  know  that  there 
is  a  strong  tendency  to  reaction  from  such  changes,  and 
that  the  final  outcome  will  depend  upon  whether  the 
center  of  gravity  has  been  permanently  moved. 

What  makes  the  center  of  gravity  in  industry  and 
finance?  Summed  up,  it  is  the  net  result  of  the  various 
influences  which  make  for  economical  production  and 
distribution.  Heretofore  the  center  of  gravity  con- 
fessedly has  not  been  in  the  United  States.  We  have 
grown,  prospered,  and  built  up  great  wealth,  out  of  the 
natural  resources  of  this  continent,  but  there  has  been 
a  steady  flow  of  raw  materials  from  this  country  to 
Great  Britain  and  Western  Europe,  to  be  there  manu- 
factured and  distributed  around  the  world.  We  have 
held,  by  means  of  a  protective  tariff,  some  of  these 


George  E.  Roberts  125 

materials  for  manufacture  here,  mainly  for  our  own 
consumption.  I  mention  the  protective  tariff  not  as  a 
subject  of  controversy  but  as  practical  evidence  that 
in  the  judgment  of  our  people  the  center  of  gravity  for 
manufacture  and  distribution  has  not  been  here.  The 
sum  of  the  influences  for  cheap  production  and  dis- 
tribution has  been  against  us. 

These  influences  have  been  labor  supply,  capital  sup- 
ply, experience  in  industry  and  world  trade,  and  the 
prestige,  good-will,  and  facilities  of  an  established  busi- 
ness. The  "experience  and  facilities"  count  for  more 
than  you  may  think.  The  superabundance  of  capital 
has  caused  an  overflow  from  Great  Britain  around  the 
world,  and  developed  in  that  country  a  large  body  of 
investors  accustomed  to  employ  their  capital  in  other 
countries,  and  those  investments  have  been  channels  of 
outlet  for  the  products  of  British  industry. 

Great  Britain  led  the  world  in  the  application  of 
steam-power  and  machinery  to  industry,  and  she  has 
had  a  great  career,  supplying  capital  in  the  form  of 
equipment,  machinery,  supplies  for  industry,  and  goods 
for  consumption  to  countries  that  were  behind  her  in 
development.  She  has  not  only  sold  machinery  and 
equipment,  but  she  has  sent  out  the  skilled  laborers  to 
install  and  operate  it,  and  the  managers  to  direct  it 
and  to  a  great  extent  she  has  retained  proprietary  con- 
trol, so  that  the  head  offices  of  enterprises  operating  in 
all  parts  of  the  world  are  kept  in  London.  These  com- 
panies, managers,  and  workmen  are  resident  repre- 
sentatives of  British  industry  and  enterprise.  They 
introduce  and  advertise  British  goods.  British  rail- 
ways in  the  Argentine  lay  British  rails,  build  British 
bridges,  use  British  cars  and  locomotives,  burn  British 
coal  under  the  boilers,  use  British  tools  in  the  machine 


126    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

shops,  British  pumps  for  pumping  water,  and  so  on. 
They  accustom  domestic  mechanics  to  the  use  of 
British  tools,  and  in  a  hundred  ways  serve  as  con- 
necting links  between  the  community  of  their  residence 
and  the  home  country. 

Here  you  will  see  is  a  stupendous  combination:  A 
great  industrial  organization  backed  by  a  world's 
market  for  securities  and  a  world's  market  for  goods, 
served  by  shipping  lines  radiating  to  all  countries, 
and  branch  banks,  branch  mercantile  houses,  and 
tributary  investments  everywhere.  There  has  been  a 
great,  free,  readily  accessible  market  in  London  for  all 
the  commodities  of  commerce — not  simply  a  market  for 
the  country's  own  products  and  for  what  it  consumes, 
but  a  world's  distributing  market.  British  ships  have 
been  in  every  port,  British  banks  and  traders  in  every 
market,  British  capital  everywhere,  ready  to  build  a 
railway,  buy  a  brewery,  open  a  mine,  or  move  the 
products  of  the  country  to  market.  It  has  been  all  of 
these  conditions  together  that  has  made  London  the 
clearing  center  of  the  world,  and  the  pound  sterling 
the  standard  of  value.  London  has  advanced  money 
for  American  cotton  before  the  crop  was  picked,  and 
for  our  wheat  before  it  was  threshed,  and  then  financed 
our  purchases  of  coffee  in  Brazil  and  hides  in  Argentina 
to  the  docks  in  New  York. 

Now  this  has  all  been  natural,  legitimate,  and  bene- 
ficial. With  a  superabundance  of  capital  and  labor  in 
Great  Britain,  both  have  been  forced  out  upon  the  sea 
and  to  other  countries  to  find  employment  while  the 
wonderful  resources  of  this  new  continent  have  kept 
us  busily  employed  at  home.  It  has  been  an  advantage 
to  us,  as  it  has  been  to  other  countries,  to  have  Great 
Britain  do  this  work  for  us  while  we  were  more  profit- 


George  E.  Roberts  127 

ably  employed.  She,  upon  her  tight  little  island,  and 
we  upon  this  continent,  have  each  been  doing  our 
appropriate  work. 

The  question  is  whether  a  radical  change  has  taken 
place  or  is  about  to  take  place  in  the  position  of  the 
United  States.  To  what  extent  has  the  center  of 
gravity  been  shifted? 

It  will  be  recognized  that  conditions  with  us  have 
been  changing  for  some  time.  This  is  no  longer  an 
undeveloped  country  as  compared  with  many  others ; 
we  have  reached  the  stage  where  it  is  a  fair  question 
whether  better  results  may  not  be  had  by  diverting  a 
part  of  the  products  of  our  industries  to  the  develop- 
ment of  more  backward  countries,  following  the 
example  of  Great  Britain.  In  the  great  steel  and  equip- 
ment industries,  and  in  numerous  lines  in  which  large- 
scale  production  has  been  developed,  our  advantages 
and  efficiency  have  enabled  us,  notwithstanding  higher 
wage  rates,  to  compete  successfully  in  the  markets  of 
the  world.  Our  new  banking  system  has  now  provided 
more  efficient  machinery  than  we  have  had  before  for 
financing  commerce  at  low  rates  of  interest.  These  con- 
ditions had  evolved  before  the  war.  We  were  ready, 
we  had  begun,  to  reach  out  for  world  trade,  and  to 
take  a  share  in  world  finance. 

Now  comes  an  accession  of  capital  to  us,  while  the 
resources  of  the  countries  which  have  heretofore  led 
in  world  trade  are  being  wasted  in  war.  It  is  not 
pleasant  to  discuss  the  calamities  of  others  as  the 
source  of  gains  to  ourselves,  and  that  is  not  the  light 
in  which  I  would  present  the  subject.  The  United 
States  will  get  in  foreign  trade  in  the  long  run  about 
what  it  is  entitled  to  have,  based  upon  the  service  it 
is  able  to  give  to  other  peoples. 


128    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

There  is  now  great  confusion  in  world  trade.  The 
peoples  accustomed  to  deal  with  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  turn  to  us  for  goods,  for  capital,  for  all  the 
help  and  service  they  have  received  from  those  sources 
heretofore.  We  have  the  opportunity,  looking  at  it 
from  a  purely  business  standpoint,  to  make  closer 
acquaintance  with  these  people,  to  introduce  our  goods, 
to  demonstrate  our  ability  and  readiness  to  cooperate 
with  them  in  the  development  of  their  countries,  and 
to  be  not  only  of  temporary  but  lasting  service  to  them. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  only  our  privilege  to  do  this,  but 
there  is  a  high  obligation  upon  us  to  mitigate  so  far 
as  lies  in  our  power  the  effects  of  a  world  calamity,  and 
to  develop  to  the  broadest  possible  usefulness  our  own 
powers  of  production.  Whatever  remains  to  us  of 
these  connections  and  new  business  after  permanent 
conditions  are  restored  will  be  what  we  are  entitled  to 
have  on  our  merits. 

There  are  certain  inevitable  limitations  upon  our 
activities,  and  there  is  a  certain  balance  or  equilibrium 
in  affairs  which  in  the  nature  of  things  must  be  main- 
tained. You  cannot  eat  your  cake  and  have  it  too. 
You  cannot  be  in  this  audience  and  in  Boston  at  the 
same  time.  You  cannot  give  your  full  energies  to  each 
of  several  tasks  at  the  same  time.  There  is  a  familiar 
saying  that  you  cannot  have  it  both  ways,  but  people 
are  always  trying  in  theory  to  have  it  both  ways. 

If  anything  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  in  recent 
months  it  is  that  you  cannot  have  a  permanently  one- 
sided trade.  You  soon  reach  the  point  where  you  have 
to  lend  to  your  customer  to  enable  him  to  continue  his 
purchases,  and  evidently  that  policy  cannot  go  on 
indefinitely. 

If  we  should  find  ourselves  after  the  war  able  to 


George  E.  Roberts  129 

exclude  Great  Britain  and  Germany  from  the  South 
American  trade,  we  would  have  to  take  the  South 
American  products  that  have  been  exported,  in  pay- 
ment for  South  American  purchases,  or  additional 
products  from  somewhere  in  lieu  of  them.  That,  how- 
ever, would  be  possible  because  in  order  to  supply  the 
exports  to  South  America  we  would  have  to  bring  more 
workmen  into  the  country  to  make  them,  and  that  we 
might  be  able  to  do,  provided  we  continue  to  elect 
Presidents  who  will  veto  measures  restricting  immi- 
gration. 

We  must  recognize  that  after  the  war  is  over  all 
the  peoples  now  engaged  in  it  will  be  factors  in  world 
affairs  as  before.  If  they  are  forced  out  of  one  market, 
they  will  appear  in  another;  or  if  they  are  compelled 
to  sell  less  they  will  be  obliged  to  buy  less,  and  all  of 
them  have  been  very  good  customers  of  ours.  If  Ger- 
many, for  example,  is  not  able  to  sell  abroad  she  will 
be  lost  as  a  market  to  other  countries.  If  all  of  the 
warring  countries  should  exterminate  each  other,  we 
would  be  relieved  of  a  lot  of  competitors  and  lose  the 
same  economic  quantity  in  customers. 

I  question  whether  the  warring  countries  will  be 
as  badly  crippled  as  we  are  disposed  to  think.  They 
are  expending  an  enormous  amount  of  energy  unpro- 
ductively,  and  this  is  waste,  but  it  does  not  all  signify 
loss  as  compared  with  what  they  had  before  the  war. 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  as  yet  have  their  productive 
equipment  practically  untouched.  Even  the  property 
destroyed  does  not  represent  total  loss,  for  property 
is  being  destroyed  daily  in  normal  times  to  be  replaced 
with  something  better.  The  loss  of  life  and  of  physical 
capacity  in  the  maimed  is  appalling,  but  we  do  not 
know  what  psychological  forces  may  be  awakened  by 


130    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

this  experience.  The  inner  resources  of  a  people  and 
the  response  that  may  come  under  the  pressure  of  an 
emergency  cannot  be  calculated.  We  know  that  a 
single  invention  may  revolutionize  an  industry,  and  it 
is  possible  that  these  peoples  may  soon  have  greater 
powers  of  production  than  ever  before. 

As  for  the  burdens  placed  upon  the  future,  they,  too, 
may  be  exaggerated.  The  past  may  fall  short  of  its 
duty  to  the  future,  but  it  cannot  draw  on  the  future. 
All  the  production  of  the  future  will  belong  to  the 
producing  generation;  none  of  it  will  go  to  the  dead. 
The  expenditures  of  the  war  are  being  made  out  of 
the  labor  and  energy  of  the  present ;  as  soon  as  the  war 
is  over  all  labor  will  be  turned  to  reconstruction  and 
production.  All  of  the  food  grown  next  year  will  be 
available  to  feed  the  population  of  that  time;  the  armies 
of  to-day  are  not  being  fed  from  next  year's  crops.  The 
debts  will  be  large  and  there  will  be  controversies  about 
taxation,  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  consider  capital  collected 
and  paid  out  as  interest  as  capital  lost  to  the  com- 
munity. It  continues  for  the  most  part  to  be  capital 
available  for  investment,  for  the  employment  of  labor, 
and  for  the  upbuilding  of  the  community. 

The  waste  and  loss  occurs  during  the  war;  all  the 
world  shares  in  it  through  failure  to  make  normal 
progress.  I  am  not  among  those  who  think  that  the 
competition  of  Europe  will  be  more  formidable  after 
the  war,  but  I  believe  it  quite  possible  to  overestimate 
its  disabilities.  There  will  be  a  trying  period  of  con- 
fusion and  readjustment,  and  I  would  expect  industrial 
costs  to  be  higher. 

On  the  other  hand,  how  will  the  United  States  be 
situated?  It  will  have  received  a  large  amount  of 
capital,  and  have  the  new  opportunities  in  foreign  trade. 


George  E.  Roberts  131 

How  fast  can  we  develop  the  trained  organization  to 
deal  with  these  opportunities?  The  institution  with 
which  I  am  connected  has  had  some  experience  with 
branches  abroad.  It  has  great  difficulty  in  finding  men 
fitted  for  the  foreign  work,  who  are  willing  to  go  abroad 
to  make  their  homes.  Those  who  have  gone  have 
usually  left  their  families  here;  their  children  are 
in  school  and  they  prefer  to  have  their  children  brought 
up  and  started  in  life  in  the  United  States.  After  these 
men  have  been  away  a  year  they  become  restless  and 
want  to  be  relieved.  This  matter  of  a  trained  organiza- 
tion is  all-important,  and  it  is  a  difficult  problem.  We 
can  develop  it  in  time,  but  it  will  take  years. 

There  can  be  no  general  revival  of  trade  in  the 
countries  where  we  hope  for  it  most,  no  large  oppor- 
tunities, unless  we  take  the  place  of  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  in  providing  capital  for  development  pur- 
poses. We  must  enter  into  the  industrial  life  of  those 
countries,  engage  in  enterprises  with  them,  and  create 
out  of  their  resources  the  new  wealth  from  which  will 
come  our  pay.  Habits  of  investment  are  acquired  by 
experience,  and  conditions  in  this  country  have  favored 
investments  in  land  and  local  enterprises.  We  are 
practically  without  experience  in  investments  out- 
side of  the  country,  and  it  is  a  problem  how  long  it 
will  take  us  to  develop  in  this  country  a  body  of  cosmo- 
politan investors  such  as  there  is  in  England.  Our 
commercial  banks  cannot  properly  tie  up  their  cus- 
tomers' deposits  in  stocks  and  bonds  of  foreign  corpo- 
rations, no  matter  how  good  they  may  be.  Savings 
banks  cannot  do  it.  We  must  look  to  private  investors. 

This  movement  cannot  develop  without  method  and 
organization.  The  individual  investor  cannot  go 
abroad  to  look  up  opportunities,  nor  would  it  be  prudent 


132    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

for  him  to  participate  unless  ample  guaranties  are 
afforded  as  to  the  soundness  of  the  enterprises  offered. 
A  responsible  organization,  headed  by  men  of  known 
experience  in  the  enterprises  which  are  undertaken, 
must  investigate  the  opportunities,  organize  the  prop- 
erties, put  them  into  successful  operation  and  manage 
them.  Already  several  corporations  have  been  or- 
ganized under  capable  leadership  to  operate  in  this 
manner  in  the  foreign  fields,  and  this  is  one  of  the  most 
tangible  steps  of  progress  we  have  made. 

So  far  we  have  not  considered  the  direct  effect  of 
the  war,  or  of  this  inflow  of  gold,  or  of  the  new  activities 
which  we  are  contemplating,  upon  conditions  in  this 
country,  and  this  is  the  most  interesting  phase  of 
all.  I  have  said  that  there  is  a  certain  balance  or 
equilibrium  in  affairs  which  when  disturbed  is  bound 
to  reestablish  itself.  If,  as  the  result  of  favorable  trade 
conditions,  gold  flows  from  one  country  to  another,  the 
effect  will  be  to  augment  the  bank  reserves  in  the 
one  case  and  deplete  them  in  the  other.  An  increase 
of  bank  reserves  will  encourage  the  expansion  of  credit, 
stimulate  enterprise,  create  a  demand  for  labor  and 
goods,  and  cause  prices  generally  to  rise.  In  the 
country  from  which  gold  is  flowing,  the  opposite 
phenomena  are  seen.  A  reduction  of  bank  reserves  re- 
sults in  a  contraction  of  credit,  a  check  upon  enter- 
prise, a  relaxation  of  the  demand  for  labor  and  goods, 
and  falling  prices.  Now,  with  prices,  interest  rates, 
and  securities  rising  in  one  country  and  falling  in  the 
other,  and  free  movements  between,  the  two  countries 
will  react  upon  each  other,  and  all  influences  in  both 
will  work  together  to  restore  the  equilibrium. 

Through  the  automatic  operations  of  these  in- 
fluences, the  world's  output  of  gold  is  distributed  over 


George  E.  Roberts  133 

the  earth.  It  does  not  stay  in  the  countries  where  it 
is  produced;  they  keep  only  so  much  as  their  share  of 
the  world's  business  will  entitle  them  to  hold;  the  rest 
finds  its  way  to  where  it  is  needed  just  as  water  hunts 
out  the  low  spots.  At  present,  however,  the  influences 
which  normally  tend  to  maintain  an  equilibrium  be- 
tween this  country  and  Europe  are  suspended.  Gold 
has  poured  into  this  country  in  an  unprecedented 
amount  and  is  still  coming.  The  rates  of  interest  at 
the  centers  are  phenomenally  low,  and  there  is  every 
encouragement  to  credit  expansion.  Industry  has  now 
recovered  and  is  under  full  headway.  The  labor  force 
is  fully  employed  r  the  productive  agencies  of  the 
country  are  in  full  operation,  and  yet  the  stimulus  of 
new  supplies  of  gold  continues  to  be  applied.  Under 
these  conditions  there  is  only  one  way  in  which  addi- 
tional supplies  of  money  can  find  employment  and  that 
is  by  diluting  the  value  of  the  existing  stock,  raising 
wages  and  prices,  so  that  a  larger  amount  of  money 
will  be  required  in  order  to  handle  the  same  volume  of 
business. 

Such  a  rise  of  wages  and  prices  does  not  signify  real 
prosperity,  but  we  are  so  accustomed  to  regard  it  as 
a  sign  of  prosperity  that  people  are  easily  deceived. 
They  are  induced  by  these  symptoms  to  act  as  though 
prosperity  was  assured.  They  spend  money,  and, 
worst  of  all,  incur  obligations,  upon  the  strength  of 
their  belief,  and  the  whole  business  situation  becomes 
honeycombed  and  weakened  by  an  extension  of  credit. 

Since  the  flow  of  gold  into  this  country  is  now  un- 
restrained by  the  usual  counter-influences  which  spring 
from  international  relations,  its  influence  will  naturally 
go  far  beyond  what  would  be  possible  under  normal 
conditions.  Unless  we  are  on  our  guard,  the  stimulus 


134    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  more  and  more  gold,  with  a  continuance  of  easy 
money  and  low  interest  rates,  will  continue  to  expand 
credits,  and  force  prices  and  wages  upward  until  the 
level  of  costs  upon  which  business  is  done  in  this 
country  will  be  far  above  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

When  the  war  ends  and  Europe  goes  back  to  in- 
dustry, the  influences  which  normally  work  to  restore 
the  equilibrium  of  trade  and  of  credit  between  countries 
will  be  released  and  come  quickly  into  full  operation. 
The  United  States  will  have  more  than  its  normal  share 
of  the  world's  gold,  according  to  the  distribution  of 
capital,  trade,  and  industry  before  the  war.  Can  we 
hold  it?  Only  so  much  as  our  share  of  the  world's 
business  will  enable  us  to  hold.  What  will  our  share 
be,  if  we  are  exalted  upon  a  plane  of  costs  far  above  the 
rest  of  the  world?  Can  we  immediately  and  volun- 
tarily reduce  wages  and  prices  all  along  the  line  to 
meet  the  competition  of  Europe  ?  Unless  we  do  so,  our 
exports  will  fall  off,  gold  will  flow  out,  credits  must 
be  contracted,  and  the  readjustment  will  be  forced  in 
rude  and  unrelenting  terms. 

If  money  remains  easy  here,  and  interest  rates  are 
lower  and  security  prices  higher  here  than  in  Europe 
when  the  war  ends,  securities  will  come  this  way  faster 
than  they  do  now.  European  holders  who  have  hesi- 
tated from  timidity  to  part  with  their  safe  American 
investments  will  do  so  then,  and  there  will  be  less 
timidity  here  about  buying  European  securities.  All 
of  this  will  promote  an  outward  gold  movement.  Every 
influence  will  tend  to  drain  gold  from  us,  if  we  have 
allowed  ourselves  to  be  lifted  to  an  artificial  basis. 

Of  course,  if  we  have  self-denial  enough  to  simply 
receive  the  gold  and  hold  it  unused,  until  we  have 
opportunity  to  exchange  it  for  goods  or  securities 


George  E.  Roberts  135 

abroad,  we  shall  escape  these  evil  effects.  In  that 
event  we  shall  have  merely  given  our  goods  for  some- 
thing for  which  we  have  no  present  use,  and  which  will 
be  dead  property  while  we  hold  it. 

If  we  hold  money  idle  under  such  conditions,  we 
will  show  more  self-restraint  than  any  other  people 
has  ever  exhibited.  All  in  all,  it  will  be  safer  to  have 
this  abnormal  flow  of  gold  into  the  country  stopped. 
We  do  not  need  any  more  for  the  full  employment  of 
our  people  or  to  enable  us  to  work  our  industries  to  the 
limit  of  their  capacity.  More  will  have  in  it  great 
potentialities  for  mischief.  It  will  be  much  better  to 
use  additional  credits  that  accrue  in  our  favor,  first, 
in  the  purchase  of  our  own  securities  now  held  abroad ; 
second,  in  the  purchase  of  securities  representing  good 
properties  in  other  countries,  preferably  the  countries 
of  Latin-America,  with  whom  we  desire  to  establish 
more  intimate  relations;  and,  finally,  by  temporary 
investments  in  commercial  bills  or  government  obliga- 
tions in  the  countries  from  which  we  are  likely  to 
experience  a  demand  for  gold  after  the  war  is  over. 
None  of  these  forms  of  investment  will  derange  the 
home  situation;  they  are  all  better  than  idle  gold  in 
vaults,  and  all  can  be  resold  in  foreign  markets  after 
the  war  is  over,  if  desirable  to  do  so,  as  a  means  of 
offsetting  claims  against  us  for  gold.  This  is  the 
prudent  policy.  It  avoids  taking  gold  which  we  can- 
not hope  to  hold  permanently,  and  the  acceptance  of 
which  means  in  reality  the  creation  of  a  dangerous  lia- 
bility; it  enables  us  to  stay  down  on  a  level  of  costs 
where  we  can  make  a  hopeful  contest  for  trade  after 
the  war  is  over,  and  it  will  afford  us  a  favorable  entry 
into  countries  where  there  is  a  possibility  of  building 
up  permanent  trade. 


136    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Concluding,  I  have  the  impression  that  I  have  not 
given  a  very  hopeful  or  encouraging  view  of  the  posi- 
tion we  are  likely  to  occupy  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
I  have  thought  it  more  important  to  dwell  upon  the 
perils  of  the  situation  than  upon  the  opportunities.  As 
already  indicated,  I  have  little  faith  in  temporary  gains 
from  the  crippling  of  Europe.  Those  injuries  will  be 
reflected  upon  us  through  all  the  countries  with 
which  we  try  to  do  business.  We  have  a  wonderful 
industrial  equipment  for  the  production  of  things 
that  all  the  world,  including  Europe,  will  want,  but 
we  can  build  up  no  permanent  business  abroad  except 
as  we  can  stand  the  test  of  efficiency  in  comparison 
with  others.  We  ought  to  welcome  that  test  and  pre- 
pare ourselves  for  it.  We  ought  to  embrace  this 
opportunity  to  get  out  into  the  world.  We  will  be 
broadened  and  stimulated,  and  do  better  work  for 
ourselves,  because  of  competition  outside.  Some  of 
our  people  have  already  been  winning  at  it,  by  the 
genius  of  genuine  leadership. 

We  need  to  have  all  the  facts,  all  of  the  perils  and 
opportunities  of  this  complicated  situation  understood 
by  our  people,  from  the  captains  of  industry  down  to 
the  humblest  worker.  They  are  all  alike  concerned. 
More  than  anything  else  in  this  country  we  need  a 
better  understanding  between  capital  and  labor.  The 
wage-earner  must  come  to  see  that  the  problem  of 
increasing  production  and  lowering  costs  is  his  problem 
as  well  as  the  employer's. 

An  appeal  must  somehow  be  made  to  his  spirit,  to 
his  creative  powers,  which  will  draw  out  his  latent 
capabilities.  This  is  the  problem  of  American  industry. 
We  have  the  highest  wage  scale  in  the  world  and 
we  want  it  to  be  still  higher,  but  you  cannot  make  wages 


George  E.  Roberts  137 

higher  by  increasing  production  costs.  Higher  costs 
simply  go  around  to  the  rear  entrance  and  settle  down 
on  the  same  premises. 

More  scientific  production,  larger  output,  better 
service,  these  are  the  watchwords  by  which  American 
industry  can  not  only  win  a  leading  position  in  world 
trade,  but  point  the  way  to  more  satisfactory  social 
conditions  at  home. 


THE  ECONOMIC  ROAD  TO  PERMANENT 
PEACE 

BY  WILLIAM  ENGLISH  WALLING 

THE  question  has  been  widely  discussed  of  late, 
"Can  economic  pressure  be  used  as  a  substitute  for 
war?"  It  seems  more  probable  that  economic  pressure 
will  continue,  for  a  few  years  more  at  least,  to  be  used, 
as  it  has  been  in  the  past,  as  an  aid  to  war.  But 
economic  pressure  as  an  aid  to  war  promises  to  put  an 
end  to  war — and  at  an  earlier  date  than  would  the  use  of 
economic  pressure  as  a  substitute  for  war. 

The  reason  for  this  may  be  stated  in  general  terms 
in  a  few  words.  War,  waged  as  it  is  for  economic 
objects,  is  hastening  economic  evolution:  economic 
pressure  developed  for  war  purposes  will  still  further 
hasten  economic  evolution,  until  the  point  has  been 
reached  when  one  vast  combination  of  nations  shall 
first  dominate  the  other  nations,  and  then  pave  the 
way  for  a  world  federation. 

War  has  long  since  been  internationalized.  For 
centuries  the  great  powers  have  been  unable  to  wage 
decisive  wars  without  the  aid,  or  at  least  the  consent, 
of  other  nations.  The  period  of  two  great  combinations 
corresponding  to  the  stage  of  cut-throat  competition 
in  industry  has  been  reached.  We  know  that  this 
stage  of  industrial  war  and  of  maximum  waste  and 
loss  immediately  precedes  the  stage  of  industrial 

138 


William  English  Walling  139 

peace,  economy,  and  efficiency  represented  by  the 
formation  of  the  trust. 

Already  a  little  less  than  two  thirds  of  the  military 
and  productive  power  of  the  world  is  now  involved — 
in  the  two  groups  of  belligerents ;  and  a  careful  computa- 
tion would  doubtless  show  that  little  more  than  one 
third  of  the  world's  producing  power,  measured  by 
wealth  and  income,  is  held  by  the  neutral  nations. 
Already  one  of  the  groups  of  belligerents  controls 
about  forty  per  cent,  of  the  world's  wealth.  If  they 
were  joined  by  one  power  alone,  the  greatest  of  the 
neutrals,  the  United  States,  the  Allies  would  easily 
represent  two  thirds  of  the  world's  productive  power. 
If,  to  make  the  picture  complete,  we  assume  the  re- 
maining neutrals — who  altogether  represent  less  than 
twenty  per  cent,  of  the  world's  wealth — were  divided 
equally  among  the  two  belligerent  groups,  the  larger 
one  would  represent  an  absolutely  invincible  and  pre- 
dominant ' '  trust  of  nations. ' ' 

This  picture  illustrates  as  a  probability,  not  of  the 
present,  but  of  the  future.  Only  a  few  months  ago 
the  United  States  was  near  enough  to  being  drawn  into 
the  war,  so  that  we  were  very  close  to  the  actual  forma- 
tion of  this  "trust  of  nations."  But  the  entrance  of 
America  into  the  war  is  now  improbable;  and,  more- 
over, the  permanence  of  the  alliance  known  as  the 
Entente  is  highly  doubtful.  I  use  this  illustration 
merely  to  indicate  a  tendency,  the  goal  toward  which 
economic  evolution  is  carrying  the  nations,  the  economic 
road  to  permanent  peace. 

The  steps  along  this  road  are  made  not  necessarily 
by  means  of  the  formation  of  larger  and  larger  military 
alliances,  but,  rather,  by  the  increasing  importance  of 
the  economic  bonds  which  tie  the  nations  of  each  of  the 


140    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

two  groups  of  present  belligerents  together,  and  at  the 
same  time  by  the  increasing  importance  of  the  economic 
bonds  that  connect  the  larger  of  these  two  groups  with 
the  more  important  neutrals.  For  it  is  to  the  economic 
interest  of  neutrals  (i)  to  trade  chiefly  with  the  wealthier 
of  the  two  groups  at  war, — especially  the  group  with  the 
larger  trading. interests;  and  (2)  they  are  forced  now 
and  always  to  trade  with  the  group  which  dominates 
on  the  sea,  as  opposed  to  the  group  that  dominates,  or 
divides  the  control  of,  the  land.  This  is  true  of  course 
only  of  those  neutral  nations  which  are  separated 
from  the  dominant  land  powers  by  the  sea.  It  is 
not  true  of  those  neutrals  which  are  geographically 
separated  from  the  dominant  land  powers  by  interven- 
ing land  powers — for  they  may  be  reached  by  indirect 
pressure  on  these  intervening  powers.  However  we 
may  estimate  the  total  wealth  and  productive  force 
of  the  neutrals  of  the  world,  at  least  two  thirds  of  it  is 
separated  from  the  leading  land  powers  by  the  ocean. 
There  can  be  no  question  that  the  United  States  alone 
is  far  wealthier  than  all  the  other  neutrals  put  together. 
Already  this  war  has  shown  that  military  power 
depends  far  more  upon  industrial  power  than  it  does 
upon  mere  numbers  or  the  organization  of  numbers. 
If  Russia  has  fought  as  well  as  she  has  of  late,  this  is 
admitted  on  all  sides  to  be  due  to  the  tremendous 
supply  of  arms  and  munitions  from  Great  Britain, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States.  It  is  also  clear  that  the 
process  of  attrition,  by  which  the  Allies  announced  they 
expected  to  win  the  war,  is  unlikely  to  have  a  decided 
effect  unless  the  war  lasts  for  a  number  of  years — and 
then  the  blood  cost  on  their  side  would  probably  be 
more  than  the  Allies  would  be  willing  to  pay.  On  the 
other  hand  a  sufficient  and  continued  superiority  in  the 


William  English  Walling  141 

supply  of  arms,  such  as  the  Germans  enjoyed  all 
throughout  the  first  year  of  the  war,  it  would  be  conceded 
by  any  military  expert,  might  decide  the  issue  within 
a  comparatively  short  time,  perhaps  a  few  months, 
certainly  within  a  year  or  two.  It  is  perhaps  safe  to 
go  a  step  further.  The  present  war,  and  any  future 
world  wars,  depend  upon  the  power  of  belligerents  to 
import  arms.  It  is  obvious  that  all  of  the  Allies,  not 
only  Russia,  but  England  and  France,  would  be  in  a 
very  serious  position  without  the  aid  of  the  United 
States,  but  people  are  likely  to  forget  that  if  Germany 
were  separated  from  Austria  by  the  ocean,  or  any 
impassable  barrier,  the  latter  nation  would  also  be 
unable  to  supply  herself  with  very  many  of  the  most 
indispensable  of  munitions. 

The  economic  basis  of  war  then,  may  be  summed  up 
under  four  heads : 

(1)  Home  production. 

(2)  Production  of  allies. 

(3)  Financial  power    for    the   purchase    of    arms    and 
ammunitions  from  neutrals. 

(4)  The    power    to    secure    them    during    war,    which 
with  the  present  conformation  of   world   politics  means 
practically — sea  power. 

Sea  power,  however,  like  land  power,  is  no  mere 
accidental  force.  It  varies  directly  and  almost  pro- 
portionately with  the  amount  of  sea  trade.  The 
powers  with  the  greatest  sea  trade  are  alone  able  to  make 
of  themselves  great  sea  powers,  and  have  the  strongest 
motive  for  doing  so,  namely,  the  protection  of  that 
trade.  The  sea  trade  of  England  and  her  allies  is  more 
than  three  times  as  great  as  the  sea  trade  of  Germany 
and  her  allies.  But  this  does  not  present  the  whole 


142     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

story.  Only  a  little  more  than  one  third  of  Germany's 
foreign  trade  is  oversea;  practically  two  thirds  of  that 
of  France  is  oversea,  and  of  course  all  of  England's. 
But  it  will  be  said  that  the  Entente  is  far  wealthier 
than  the  Germanic  powers.  Even  allowing  for  this 
fact,  twice  as  great  a  proportion  of  wealth  of  the  Entente 
depends  upon  the  sea  as  of  the  wealth  of  the  Germanic 
powers. 

But  we  must  return  at  this  point  to  deal  with  the 
question  as  to  the  lasting  character  of  the  two  great 
military  alliances  now  in  operation.  They  are  lasting 
merely  in  proportion  as  they  have  an  economic  founda- 
tion. Can  we  doubt  that  the  economic  bonds  between 
Austria  and  Germany  are  now  such  as  to  make  any 
future  war  between  them  extremely  improbable? 

When  we  return  to  the  Entente,  we  find  at  once  a 
more  doubtful  situation.  However,  the  financial  rela- 
tions between  London  and  Paris  have  been  growing 
more  and  more  intimate  every  year,  and  the  French  and 
English  seem  to  have  evolved  a  colonial  policy  which 
eliminates  the  causes  of  future  friction.  While  not 
impossible,  a  future  war  between  France  and  England 
seems  highly  improbable.  Russia,  both  in  view  of  her 
situation  and  her  present  undeveloped  condition,  is  the 
greatest  enigma  of  the  future.  Japan,  I  shall  refer 
to  in  discussing  the  sea  power;  and  it  seems  evident 
now  that  Italy  also  is  to  be  classed  as  a  sea  power, 
rather  than  a  land  power. 

The  differences  between  sea  and  land  power  are  very 
poorly  realized  in  this  country.  Indeed  the  whole 
situation  has  been  greatly  clouded  by  the  efforts  of  the 
pro-Germans  to  make  out  that  they  are  essentially 
of  the  same  character,  so  as  to  reach  the  conclusion 
that  England  is  as  great  a  menace  to  world  peace  as 


William  English  Walling  143 

Germany.  But  the  differences  are  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. 

First,  sea  power  cannot  be  divided,  as  land  power 
can.  The  nation  or  group  of  nations  which  controls 
one  part  of  the  sea,  controls  it  all.  As  the  great  sea 
power  cannot  be  divided,  there  can  be  no  neutral 
territory  on  the  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  no  given 
part  of  it  can  be  conquered.  There  is  thus  always 
a  single  dominant  force  on  sea.  The  only  question  is 
whether  this  force  is  a  single  nation  or  a  group  of 
nations  representing  the  majority  of  all  sea-interests,  and 
so  establishing  majority  rule  on  the  ocean — which  is 
the  nearest  practicable  approach  to  internationalization 
in  world  politics  and  gives  promise  of  complete  inter- 
nationalization. Just  as  majority  rule  is  the  nearest 
practicable  approach  to  socialization  in  home  politics, 
so  majority  rule  on  the  ocean  offers  the  most  promising 
road  to  a  complete  economic  world  organization  in  the 
future. 

Second,  sea  power  depends  upon  trade  and  shipping 
and  these  in  turn  depend  largely  upon  producing  power, 
and  only  to  a  small  degree  on  mere  numbers,  or  military 
organization.  Hence  the  richest  nations  and  those 
with  the  greatest  international  shipping  and  trade  will 
dominate  the  sea.  But  the  largest  and  richest  nations 
are  the  most  highly  developed  economically,  and  have 
the  closest  economic  bonds  tying  them  to  other  nations, 
and  therefore  give  the  greatest  pledges  of  a  peaceful 
policy. 

Third,  control  of  the  land  is  control  of  production 
itself  and  only  incidentally  of  a  highway;  this  land  high- 
way, moreover,  is  a  highway  only  with  a  handful  of 
neighboring  nations.  The  economic  function  of  the 
sea,  on  the  other  hand,  is  almost  exclusively  that  of 


144    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

a  highway;  as  a  factor  in  production  it  amounts  to 
almost  nothing.  Its  control  is  therefore  by  its  very 
nature  international,  and  concerns  all  nations  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  dependent  upon  sea  trade.  A 
land  power  may  develop  a  career  of  localized  conquest 
without  disturbing  all  the  world.  It  is  not  to  the 
interest  of  a  sea  power  to  attempt  the  conquest  of 
any  other  developed  and  organized  nation  by  sea,  for 
this  necessarily  arouses  the  fears  and  hostility  of  all 
such  nations — in  proportion  as  they  are  dependent 
upon  the  sea.  The  fact  that  sea  power  is  international 
by  its  very  character,  and  tends  to  develop  international 
trade  rather  than  to  tempt  to  conquest,  is  shown  by 
the  whole  history  of  England  with  its  free  trade  on  the 
one  hand,  and  its  self-governing  colonies  on  the  other. 
The  spread  of  a  military  land  power  necessarily  means 
the  spread  of  despotism.  For,  since  its  expansion  is 
limited  to  neighboring  territory,  no  such  territory  is  free 
from  attack.  The  sea  powers  have  chiefly  to  do  with 
economically  and  politically  independent  developed 
countries.  So  when  South  Africa  was  without  industrial 
development,  England's  control  maintained  a  number 
of  despotic  features  which  are  rapidly  disappearing  with 
the  growing  industrialization  of  the  country.  Ninety 
per  cent,  of  Great  Britain's  foreign  investments  are  with 
such  powers  as  the  United  States,  the  Argentine,  and 
Canada,  and  nearly  as  large  a  proportion  of  her  foreign 
trade. 

Norman  Angell  says  that  to  internationalize  the 
sea  means  to  internationalize  the  world.  This  would 
be  true  only  if  international  relations  by  sea  were 
more  important  than  international  relations  by  land. 
Undoubtedly  the  relative  proportion  of  the  world's 
international  trade  that  goes  by  sea  is  increasing 


William  English  Walling  145 

rapidly.  But  international  land  trade  is  still  of  equal 
or  greater  importance  and  will  remain  in  that  position 
for  many  years.  To  internationalize  sea  power  will  be 
to  internationalize  the  world  only  (i)  when  this  inter- 
nationalized sea  power  can  be  used  to  control  or  check 
land  power,  or  (2)  when  land  power  is  correspond- 
ingly internationalized.  The  moral  is  evident:  Let 
the  rights  of  belligerents  at  sea  be  not  diminished,  but  inter- 
nationalized, that  is,  used  against  any  land  power  which 
attempts  aggressive  measures  against  the  powers  that 
control  the  sea. 

To  neutralize  sea  power  without  at  the  same  time  either 
neutralizing  land  power  or  securing  the  predominance  of 
international  sea  power  over  the  whole  world  would  be  to 
weaken  the  more  progressive  nations,  as  compared  with 
the  more  militaristic.  Sea  power  must  not  be  neutralized 
until  the  necessity  is  over  of  using  it  as  a  balance  against 
the  domination  of  the  world  by  land  power.  For  this 
is  the  function  of  sea  power  at  the  present  day.  It  is 
barely  able  to  bring  about  a  balance  against  the  land 
power.  We  must  not  have  even  a  partial  disarmament 
on  sea  until  we  have  a  partial  disarmament  on  land.  It  is 
evident  that  if  Great  Britain  or  America,  or  both  of 
them,  decided  to  stand  merely  for  a  policing  of  the  seas 
and  for  a  form  of  international  sea  law  that  aimed 
exclusively  at  the  free  use  of  the  sea  for  international 
commerce,  and  refused  to  regard  sea  power  as  a  weapon 
against  the  preponderance  of  land  power,  two  things 
would  result: 

First,  the  land  power  would  secure  a  dominating  posi- 
tion in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa;  and, 

Second,  this  predominant  land  power  would  give  the 
nations  behind  it  such  wealth  and  industrial  develop- 
ment that  they  would  soon  be  able  to  dominate  the  sea 


146    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

also.  In  a  word,  if  the  sea  policy  of  the  leading  sea 
powers  demands  the  mere  policing  of  the  seas,  it  will 
ultimately  fail  even  to  police  the  seas.  If  sea  law  and 
sea  power  are  developed  purely  in  order  to  make  inter- 
national commerce  free,  in  the  long  run  they  will  not 
even  succeed  in  keeping  international  commerce  free. 

But  how  is  a  sea  power  to  exercise  power  on  the  land  ? 
In  proportion  as  it  has  concentrated  its  attention  on  the 
development  of  its  fleets  it  has  limited  its  resources  for 
land  warfare;  in  proportion  as  it  has  developed  economic 
relations  by  sea,  it  has  limited  its  power  to  apply 
economic  pressure  by  land.  The  problem  seemed 
insoluble  until  the  present  war.  But  now  appears 
the  new  and  revolutionary  fact,  the  overwhelming 
importance  of  arms  and  ammunition.  Just  as  the 
invention  of  gunpowder  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  feudal  system,  the  establishment  of 
modern  nations,  and  the  foundation  of  our  industrial 
civilization,  so  the  new  importance  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition probably  means  permanent  peace  and  a  federa- 
tion of  a  majority  of  the  nations.  For  it  gives  the 
relatively  pacific  and  democratic  sea  powers  an  over- 
whelming advantage  over  the  relatively  militaristic  and 
autocratic  land  powers. 

I  have  been  dealing  with  general  tendencies.  What 
now  is  the  application  of  these  principles  to  the  present 
war,  and  especially  to  the  position  of  the  United  States  ? 
It  seems  highly  improbable  that  the  present  war  will 
be  fought  to  an  altogether  definite  conclusion.  How 
then  will  the  struggle  between  the  sea  power  and  the 
land  power  continue  to  be  carried  on?  Will  it  simply 
mean  preparation  for  another  armed  conflict? 

Or  will  the  use  of  economic  pressure  give  to  one  side 
such  an  overwhelming  preponderance  as  to  make  an- 


William  English  Walling  147 

other  war  useless?  Economic  pressure  is  now  an  aid  to 
the  sea  powers  in  war.  Will  it  become  a  substitute  ? 
It  seems  highly  probable  that  it  may. 

It  has  been  said  that  if  two  groups  of  states  form 
alliances  for  the  purpose  of  waging  war,  then  prepara- 
tion for  war,  already  so  onerous,  may  become  intoler- 
able. In  this  case  there  will  be  strong  grounds  to 
substitute  for  such  military  preparations  (as  far 
as  practicable),  a  tariff  war  against  the  common 
enemy. 

But  there  is  another  motive  for  waging  such  a  peaceful 
economic  war.  It  is  this:  such  a  war  may  actually 
be  made  to  pay  if  the  high  tariffs  against  the  enemy 
countries  are  accompanied  by  a  sufficiently  effective 
lowering  of  the  tariffs  between  the  countries  entering 
into  the  alliance;  in  other  words,  if  the  existing  econo- 
mic war  between  the  allies  is  moderated  more  rapidly 
than  the  economic  war  with  present  military  enemies  is 
intensified. 

Such  economic  unions  have  already  played  a  tre- 
mendous political  r61e.  It  is  the  German  Zollverein 
of  1813  that  created  the  present  unity  and  greatness  of 
Germany,  and  not  the  battle  of  Jena  or  the  victories 
of  1870.  The  celebration  of  the  hundredth  anniversary 
of  Jena,  two  years  ago,  indicated  very  strongly  that  the 
German  nation  has  made  the  fatal  error  of  attributing 
its  unity  and  power  rather  to  sheer  force  of  arms  than 
to  the  natural  processes  of  economic  evolution.  But 
the  natural  processes  will  not  be  denied.  Austria  and 
Germany  are  now  entering  into  a  new  Zollverein  and 
this  assures  the  future  of  this  greater  Germany,  no 
matter  what  the  outcome  of  the  present  war.  More- 
over the  continued  domination  of  Great  Britain  at  sea 
and  the  participation  of  her  colonies  in  the  war  fore- 


148    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

shadows  the  victory  of  the  land  party  over  the  sea 
party  in  Germany.  For  it  is  known  that  the  German 
ruling  classes  have  been  divided  into  two  or  more  less 
equal  parts,  one  striving  to  put  the  greater  emphasis 
on  sea  power,  the  other  to  place  it  on  land  power. 
The  party  which  advocates  a  tariff  union,  not  only 
of  Germany  and  Austria,  but  of  all  central  Europe,  is 
certain  to  gain  the  upper  hand,  and  the  demonstrated 
military  power  of  Germany — no  matter  what  the 
later  results  of  the  war — is  sure  to  have  an  effect  on 
some  of  the  smaller  neighboring  powers.  With  the 
new  Zollverein  between  Austria  and  Germany  appar- 
ently assured,  the  coming  into  the  combination  of 
some  of  the  Balkan  and  Scandinavian  powers  and  of 
Switzerland  is  highly  probable. 

A  central  European  tariff  union  would  represent 
a  very  great  world  power.  But  after  all  two  thirds, 
if  not  three  fourths,  of  the  world's  producing  power 
lies  outside  of  the  control  of  such  a  union.  The 
oversea  powers,  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  the 
United  States  and  the  South  American  countries, 
would  alone  represent  a  considerably  greater  power. 

The  forces  compelling  the  nations  to  such  tariff  unions 
are  many.  But  the  most  important  are  undoubtedly 
the  effort  to  secure  economic  independence  in  war 
time  and  the  hope  at  the  same  time  to  circumscribe 
the  economic  development  of  the  enemy.  That  the 
Germans  and  the  Austrians  already  fear  that  their 
move  will  lead  to  a  dangerous  counter-move  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  is  indicated  by  the  demand  for 
"economic  guarantees."  Even  David,  the  new  leader 
of  the  Social- Democrats,  expresses  himself  as  willing 
to  prolong  the  war  to  prevent  such  an  economic  isola- 
tion of  Germany.  But  a  prolongation  of  the  war  for 


William  English  Walling  149 

such  a  purpose  would  be  fruitless  unless  it  should 
result  in  the  complete  defeat  of  the  Allied  powers. 

No  doubt  the  evolution  of  a  complete  series  of  trade 
treaties  directed  against  the  Germanic  Powers  will 
take  place  very  gradually.  But  in  view  of  the  tre- 
mendous emergency  that  confronts  the  Entente,  there 
is  no  sufficient  reason  to  suppose  that  the  obstacles 
will  prove  insuperable.  The  British  colonies  alone  can 
deliver  an  extremely  costly  blow  to  Austria  and  Germany. 

What  now  is  the  relation  of  the  neutral  powers  to 
this  situation,  and  especially  that  of  the  United  States, 
which  controls  perhaps  three  fifths  of  the  neutrals' 
productive  power?  Either  one  of  two  general  policies 
could  be  adopted.  America,  acting  alone,  or  as  the 
head  of  a  league  of  neutrals,  could  intervene  in  order 
to  hasten  peace,  and  reestablish  the  status  quo  occupied 
by  the  neutrals  before  the  war,  or  she  could  interfere 
in  behalf  of  international  principles  which  might 
establish  permanent  peace,  and  therefore  put  the  neu- 
trals in  a  far  better  position  than  they  occupied  before 
the  war.  To  express  the  same  thing  in  terms  of  inter- 
national law,  America  could  use  her  power  in  favor 
of  the  present  inter-nation  law,  or  in  order  to  take  the 
first  steps  towards  the  establishment  of  a  world  law. 
She  could  stand  for  the  existing  morality  between  the 
nations,  or  she  could  stand  for  the  organization  of  the 
nations  on  a  solid  economic  basis. 

This  country's  power  in  world  affairs  is  enormous. 
America  probably  controls  nearly  one  fourth  of  the 
world's  wealth  and  producing  power.  This  is  almost  as 
much  as  England  and  Germany  put  together,  as  much 
as  the  whole  British  Empire  together  with  France,  and 
undoubtedly  more  than  the  whole  combination  of  the 
Germanic  Powers.  That  this  is  the  case  is  indicated 


150    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

not  only  by  the  figures  of  production  but  also  by  all  the 
estimates  of  the  wealth  and  income  of  the  Great  Powers 
—even  if  we  allow  liberally  for  the  difference  in  prices 
and  the  cost  of  living.  If  this  country  continues  its 
present  relation  with  the  Entente,  it  will  doubtless 
secure  for  them  the  advantage  at  the  close  of  the 
present  war.  If  America  should  desire  to  increase 
the  aid  she  is  giving  the  Allies  she  could  undoubtedly 
give  them  a  still  more  decided  victory  at  the  end. 
On  the  other  hand  if  she  should  withdraw  her  present 
supply  of  war  materials  it  seems  highly  probable  that 
the  Central  Powers  might  be  able  to  keep  the  advantage 
they  now  hold. 

These  economic  principles  have  not  been  clearly 
grasped  by  American  business  men  and  statesmen, 
only  because  the  war  created  an  entirely  novel  situation. 
There  can  be  little  question  that  the  economic  forces 
which  control  this  country  will  shortly  come  to  see, 
if  they  have  not  already  done  so,  that  the  future  of 
America,  of  world  peace,  and  of  the  peaceful  and  demo- 
cratic economic  development  of  all  nations,  even  of  the 
present  militaristic  land  powers,  depends  upon  America, 
itself  predominantly  a  sea  power,  throwing  all  the 
weight  that  may  be  necessary  on  the  side  of  the  sea 
power  in  its  struggle  against  the  land  power.  This 
does  not  require  a  military  alliance  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States;  it  does  not  require  a  naval  alliance.  It 
requires  only  that  (i)  the  United  States  should  be  ready 
to  supply  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  sea  powers,  not 
only  at  present,  but  in  all  future  wars,  and  (2)  that  it 
should  be  ready  to  enter  into  reciprocal  and  preferential 
tariff  arrangements  with  these  powers  after  the  present 
war.  A  genuine  reciprocity  treaty  with  Canada  would 
be  an  important  step  in  this  direction;  other  similar 


William  English  Walling  151 

treaties  could  follow.  If  Great  Britain  continues  her 
present  war  tariffs,  as  seems  probable,  we  shall  have  a 
special  reason  for  entering  into  a  trade  treaty  with 
her.  And  the  fact  that  the  total  sea  trade  controlled 
by  the  Entente  is  more  then  three  times  as  great  as  the 
total  sea  trade  controlled  by  the  Germanic  Powers 
will  be  decisive  in  this  direction.  If  we  enter  into  a 
series  of  reciprocal  tariff  or  trade  treaties,  there  can  be 
no  question  that  we  shall  find  it  to  our  advantage  to 
deal  first  with  the  more  powerful  economic  group  which 
at  the  same  time  is  the  leading  trading  group. 

No  further  steps  may  be  necessary.  Already  the 
wealth  and  income  of  the  Entente  is  nearly  twice  as 
great  as  that  of  the  Germanic  Powers.  And  as  natural 
trade  conditions  inevitably  draw  America  economically 
to  the  Entente  side,  the  economic  and  military  power 
of  this  group  will  be  so  overwhelming  that  the  peace  of 
the  world  will  be  assured,  and  even  the  great  trade 
war  I  have  outlined  will  be  but  a  passing,  though  costly, 
necessity. 

The  supply  of  arms  in  the  present  war  and  the  cer- 
tainty that  we  shall  continue  to  supply  arms — and  far 
more  efficiently — in  case  of  future  war,  together  with 
reciprocity  treaties  among  the  sea  powers,  will  almost 
certainly  be  sufficient  to  prevent  future  wars.  This  is 
the  economic  road  to  permanent  peace. 

Germany's  leading  newspaper  shows  that  the  situa- 
tion is  clearly  recognized  in  that  country. 

The  whole  war,  says  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  in  a  recent 
editorial,  is  being  waged  to  determine  whether  "land 
power"  or  "sea  power"  gives  the  dominance: 

Moltkeism  or  Mahanism? — that  is  the  question. 

Are  essentially  land  powers,  like  Germany,  Austria,  and 


152    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Bulgaria,  impotently  at  the  mercy  of  England — and 
Yankee-land,  which  stands  behind  her — simply  because 
Great  Britain  at  present  still  commands  the  seas,  or  are 
those  land  powers  strong  enough  to  enforce  their  liberty 
and  room  for  their  future  development  even  against  the 
tyrant  of  the  sea — and  his  slavish  menial — and  if  need  be 
in  spite  of  them?  That  is  the  question. 


That,  indeed,  is  the  question — though  it  cannot  be 
admitted  that  Great  Britain  has  any  advantage  over 
the  United  States  in  this  tacit  economic  alliance,  or 
that  the  land  powers  are  standing  for  any  form  of  inter- 
national liberty. 

In  closing  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  present  also  the  dark 
side  of  the  picture.  It  has  chiefly  fallen  to  the  lot 
of  the  sea  powers  to  come  into  contact  with  the  back- 
ward peoples  and  undeveloped  parts  of  the  earth. 
Thus  there  is  developed  not  only  among  the  ruling 
classes,  but  in  all  sections  of  the  peoples  without  excep- 
tion, the  principle  that  one  economic  rule  applies  to 
the  white  races  and  another  to  the  colored.  This 
means  that  the  whites  reserve  for  themselves  certain 
economic  opportunities  which  they  deny  to  the  colored. 
Of  course,  we  are  not  really  dealing  with  a  race  question, 
but  merely  with  a  question  of  exploitation  of  backward 
races,  facilitated  by  skin  color.  A  crucial  instance 
will  prove  the  point.  There  is  now  little  tendency 
to  try  to  demonstrate  scientifically  the  inferiority  of  the 
Japanese.  Why  is  this?  Because  there  is  practically 
no  hope  of  exploiting  them  as  has  been  done  with  other 
colored  peoples.  The  conclusion  is  unavoidable.  The 
hundreds  of  millions  of  colored  peoples  in  the  world 
will  either  have  to  accept  a  semi-servile  condition,  or 
combine  together  against  the  two  leading  sea  powers, 


William  English  Walling  153 

Great  Britain  and  America,  which  are  chiefly  responsible 
for  the  effort  to  keep  them  in  subjection. 

There  is  some  talk  both  in  America  and  England  of  a 
future  combination  of  the  white  races  against  the 
colored,  but  this  talk  is  utterly  baseless,  since  it  is  now 
confined  entirely  to  these  two  nations.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  in  the  near  future  there  is  a  war  on  so-called 
race  lines,  it  is  evident  that  the  Germanic  Powers  will 
throw  their  whole  weight  with  the  colored  peoples,  and 
there  are  excellent  probabilities  that  some  of  the 
Slavic  or  Latin  powers — among  whom  there  is  no  race 
prejudice  (or  rather  none  of  those  national  principles 
of  economic  exploitation  known  as  race  prejudice)— 
will  be  found  in  the  same  camp.  Even  South  American 
countries,  where  the  rights  of  colored  peoples  are  fully 
recognized,  that  is,  where  they  have  become  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  economic  structure,  will  be  found 
against  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations. 

At  present,  it  looks  as  though  the  situation  I  have 
been  foreshadowing  may  bring  on  the  next  war;  cer- 
tainly there  is  as  yet  no  sign  whatever  of  the  so-called 
Anglo-Saxon  races  taking  up  a  more  enlightened  view 
on  the  race  question.  On  the  contrary  we  see  the 
steady  intensification  of  economic  discrimination  against 
the  backward  peoples.  The  only  chance  that  this 
war  will  be  avoided  is  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  will  see 
the  hopelessness  of  this  policy.  But  I  shall  not  pursue 
this  subject  further.  I  have  introduced  it  merely  to 
indicate  the  possibility  that  the  Germanic  Powers  may 
become  an  even  more  valuable  factor  for  peace  in  the 
future  than  the  sea  powers  are  to-day.  But  in  the 
meanwhile,  the  sea  powers  will  have  lived  out  their 
r61e,  namely,  that  of  demonstrating  the  value  and  ne- 
cessity of  forming  the  largest  possible  combination  of 


154    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

nations  and  of  basing  it  upon  a  solid  economic  founda- 
tion— and  the  probability,  if  the  combination  is  suf- 
ficiently inclusive,  that  it  will  pave  the  way  to  permanent 
peace. 


ELIMINATING   THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF 

WAR 

BY  ROGER  W.  BABSON 

ONE  of  the  economic  causes  of  war  is  the  fact  that 
it  is  possible  for  one  nation  to  control  the  seas; 
another  of  the  economic  causes  of  war  is  that  one 
nation  is  able  to  legislate  against  the  growth  of  another 
nation.  Discriminatory  tariff  laws  and  discriminatory 
immigration  laws  are  economic  causes  of  war.  It  is 
one  of  the  economic  causes  of  war  that  when  a  man 
and  his  money  go  to  some  foreign  land  his  country  feels 
that  it  has  a  right  to  go  into  that  foreign  country, — it 
may  be  Mexico,  Brazil,  China,  or  some  other  land — and 
dictate  what  shall  or  shall  not  be  done  to  that  man 
and  his  property. 

In  regard  to  the  Lusitania,  my  sympathies  are  largely 
with  President  Wilson ;  but  I  fail  to  see  any  difference 
between  his  saying  what  shall  and  what  shall  not  be 
done  on  the  seas  or  our  country  alone  saying  what  shall 
or  shall  not  be  done  on  the  seas,  and  England  or 
Germany  attempting  to  dictate  laws  for  the  sea. 

These  seem  to  me  to  be  economic  causes  of  war  that 
really  exist.  They  are  fundamental,  and  must  be 
eliminated  before  there  is  anything  but  hypocrisy  in 
most  of  our  peace  prayers. 

We  shall  lack  peace  so  long  as  our  plans  affect  only 
the  other  fellow.  The  trouble  with  us  is  that  things 

155 


156    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

are  not  right  when  they  are  not  to  our  advantage  or 
when  they  are  to  the  advantage  of  some  other  nation. 
But  are  we  willing  to  give  up  something  ourselves? 
This  is  the  whole  matter  in  a  nutshell.  This  is  the 
real  question  we  have  to  face.  It  seems  to  me  nine 
tenths  of  the  peace  talk  is  avoiding  the  point.  We  fail 
to  face  the  question.  We  want  to  hang  onto  all  we 
have  ourselves  and  at  the  same  time  ask  others  to  give 
up  something.  This  is  hypocrisy. 

The  first  step  is  to  recognize  that  before  there  can 
be  any  such  thing  as  permanent  peace  we  have  got  to 
be  willing  to  give  up  something;  and,  if  necessary,  to 
have  the  result  work  to  the  advantage  of  Germany, 
Japan,  or  any  other  country. 

As  is  the  case  with  many  business  men,  I  ally  myself 
with  neither  the  militaristic  nor  the  peace  group. 
Until  nations  are  federated — at  least  commercially — 
and  until  some  sort  of  an  inter-nation  is  organized 
for  control  of  the  trade  routes,  each  nation  must 
continue  to  arm  independently. 

I  recognize  the  tremendous  waste  of  war  and  the 
waste  in  preparing  therefor.  I  agree  with  the  mili- 
tarists, that  it  is  useless  to  talk  about  disarmament 
until  the  economic  causes  of  war  are  eliminated;  as 
these  are  removed,  the  nations  will  of  their  own  accord 
give  less  attention  to  armament. 

I  go  further  and  say  there  should  be  no  halfway 
position  between  peace  and  a  strong  military  and 
naval  policy.  Either  we  should  continue  to  arm 
or  else  insist  upon  the  placing  of  inter-nation  trade 
and  like  affairs  under  the  general  control  and  pro- 
tection of  all  nations.  Although  opposed  to  force- 
ful aggression,  I  just  as  violently  object  to  holding 
the  world  in  statu  quo.  I  believe  the  fittest  must 


Roger  W.  Babson  157 

survive,  whether  it  be  American,  Teuton,  Latin,  or 
Japanese. 

Hence,  although  endorsing  plans  for  a  world  organiza- 
tion, I  feel  that  such  an  organization  must  embrace 
more  than  a  court  and  a  great  police  power.  Before 
the  growing  nations  can  consent  to  the  plan  of  the 
Carnegie  pacifists,  there  must  be  a  law-making  body 
in  which  nations  are  represented  according  to  their  self- 
supporting  literate  population.  In  other  words,  the 
most  any  world  organization  can  accomplish  is  to  pro- 
vide some  means  by  which  the  fittest  shall  rule  without 
resort  to  war.  Furthermore,  statistics  show  that  an 
international  organization  can  be  devised  which  will 
do  this.  Such  a  plan  was  outlined  by  Dr.  Nasmyth 
and  is  being  urged  to-day  by  all  who  realize  that  before 
an  international  court  can  be  respected  there  must  be 
an  international  parliament  to  determine  fairly  what 
that  world  policy  shall  be. 

I  suppose  you  think  it  queer  that  the  secretary  of  a 
peace  society  should  speak  in  favor  of  military  pre- 
paredness. I  am  willing  to  speak  in  defense  of  this 
until  there  is  such  a  commercial  federation  as  will 
eliminate  at  least  the  economic  causes  of  war.  Cer- 
tainly, under  present  chaotic  conditions  we  should 
unite  in  asking  Congress  for  land  and  naval  defenses. 
Until  at  least  the  economic  causes  of  war  are  eliminated, 
international  conflicts  are  inevitable  and  we  should  be 
prepared  to  fight. 

This  is  important  at  the  present  time,  when  so  many 
pacifists  are  against  preparedness,  as  I  believe  much  of 
their  talk  is  doing  harm.  Militarism  can  never  be 
wiped  out,  any  more  than  disease  can  be  abolished, 
by  passing  resolutions.  Until  at  least  the  economic 
causes  of  war  are  removed,  we  must  be  prepared  for  it. 


158    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

This  can  only  be  done  by  removing  the  temptations  to 
war,  and  by  providing  the  means  whereby  the  nations 
can  secure  peacefully  the  ends  which  they  could  other- 
wise secure  through  war. 

Although  the  world  cannot  remain  in  statu  quo,  there 
must  be  a  more  efficient  means  of  bringing  about 
changes  than  by  war. 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  causes  of  war  in 
modern  times  are  largely  matters  of  commerce  and  other 
economic  conditions.  If  a  plan  can  be  found  by  which 
international  trade  routes  shall  be  neutralized  and 
opportunity  for  industry  and  trade  shall  be  more 
nearly  equalized,  and  further  legislation  by  one  nation 
against  another  shall  cease,  a  long  step  towards  peace 
will  have  been  taken. 

A  government  appropriation  to  secure  these  three 
things  I  believe  would  be  a  step  towards  the  elimination 
of  these  economic  causes  of  war: — first,  the  adoption 
of  an  international  trade  flag,  which  shall  serve  com- 
merce at  all  times  as  the  Red  Cross  flag  serves  its 
purpose  in  times  of  war;  second,  the  systematic  teaching 
in  the  public  schools  that  discrimination  against  any 
one  nation,  color,  class,  or  sex  results  to  the  disadvan- 
tage of  all ;  third,  the  organization  of  a  representative 
international  commission  which  shall  have  the  super- 
vision of  rules  or  codes  to  protect  persons  outside  their 
own  country  connected  with  or  carrying  on  manu- 
facture or  trade  in  a  foreign  country.  These  three 
things  would  extend  more  equal  opportunity  and 
security  to  the  peoples  of  all  nations.  Only  by  so 
doing  can  war  be  eliminated. 

These  methods  would  provide  what  perhaps  no  other 
plan  does,  a  step  toward  the  establishment  of  intimate 
commercial  relations  among  states.  Nations  will 


Roger  W.  Babson  159 

naturally  cooperate  to  protect  neutrality,  once  such 
neutrality  and  general  regulations  to  support  it  have 
been  secured,  as  the  cheapest,  easiest  method  of  pro- 
tection. Commercial  alliances  have  seldom  failed 
while  political  alliances  have  seldom  been  permanent. 

Of  course,  this  means  the  yielding  of  some  of  our 
so-called  sovereign  rights,  but  this  is  more  than  offset 
by  the  ultimate  advantage  which  is  of  great  value. 
Unless  nations  are  willing  to  join  in  international  co- 
operation, they  must  continue  to  compete  for  national 
defense.  There  cannot  be  any  halfway  ground. 

I  cannot  share  the  hopes  of  many,  for  it  is  quite 
obvious — although  they  do  not  seem  to  realize  it,  that 
the  world  cannot  remain  in  statu  quo,  nor  can  I 
sympathize  with  those  who  prepare  for  war.  We  should 
be  willing  to  eliminate  the  economic  causes  of  war  or 
else  prepare  for  war.  To-day  we  are  doing  neither. 

So  much  for  the  philosophy  of  this  question.  What 
does  this  all  mean?  It  seems  to  me  the  real  difficulty 
is  that  we  refuse  to  face  and  answer  the  real  questions 
which  I  mentioned  in  my  introduction.  The  first 
question  is:  Can  there  be  any  reasonable  hope  of  peace 
between  nations  until  we  are  fully  agreed  to  be  willing 
to  give  up  something?  We  talk  about  the  "open  door" 
and  we  send  a  note  to  other  nations  regarding  the  open 
door  in  China,  for  instance.  Are  we  willing  to  extend 
the  principle  of  the  open  door  to  the  Philippines?  If 
we  are,  that  will  be  a  step  towards  peace.  If  not,  we 
are  simply  hypocrites.  The  same  thing  applies  to  our 
restriction  against  Japanese  immigration. 

I  say  we  must  be  willing  to  give  up  something.  Yes, 
even  though  it  will  not  come  back  to  us  later,  although 
I  do  believe  it  will  come  back.  I  believe  giving  up 
is  the  only  real  and  lasting  form  of  preparedness,  and, 


160    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

hence,  my  second  question  is:  Can  any  nation  perma- 
nently prosper  except  through  a  policy  which  will  permit 
other  nations  likewise  to  prosper  with  it?  I  believe  that 
no  nation  (and  history  clearly  shows  it)  can  perma- 
nently prosper  until  it  is  prepared  to  work  on  a  basis 
by  which  other  nations  can  prosper  with  it.  Moreover, 
this  does  not  apply  simply  to  nations.  It  applies  to 
classes,  races,  sexes,  as  well.  Labor  can  never  save 
itself  until  it  devises  a  plan  which  will  save  capital  as 
well;  and  capital  can  never  be  secure  until  it  works 
out  a  plan  which  will  secure  labor  also.  That  may  be 
applied  to  the  color  question,  the  sex  question,  and 
every  other  question. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  fundamental  need  to-day  is 
that  we  fearlessly  discuss  these  two  questions.  Until  it 
is  realized  that  we  permanently  prosper,  as  individuals, 
classes,  or  nations,  only  through  methods  which  cause 
others  to  prosper  with  us,  all  hope  of  permanent 
progress  is  useless. 

This  means  that,  owing  to  the  unchangeable  law  of 
action  and  reaction,  when  we  harm  others  we  ourselves 
ultimately  suffer;  while,  when  we  help  others,  we  our- 
selves get  a  beneficial  reaction.  This  is  a  fundamental 
law  but  it  is  not  believed.  It  is  not  recognized.  Only, 
however,  as  it  is  recognized  can  we  make  real  headway 
toward  real  peace  of  any  kind. 

This  is  the  end  of  my  talk,  but  before  returning  to  the 
audience  I  want  to  show  you  a  little  illustration.  Here 
are  three  glasses.  They  should  be  of  different  sizes, 
and  we  will  assume  they  are  of  different  sizes.  We 
will  also  assume  that  they  are  connected  with  pipes 
at  their  bases.  This  [indicating]  is  the  United  States. 
This  is  Great  Britain  and  her  allies ;  and  this,  Germany 
and  the  central  powers. 


Roger  W.  Babson  161 

The  present  level  of  water  shows  the  conditions 
before  the  war.  Keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  glasses 
were  of  different  sizes  and  therefore  there  was  a  different 
amount  of  water  in  these  glasses.  But  I  believe, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  foreign  exchange  was  on  a  par 
between  these  countries  before  the  war,  that  the 
water  was  at  the  same  level  in  these  different  glasses 
even  though  there  were  different  amounts  of  water  in 
each  owing  to  their  difference  in  size.  The  water  was 
at  a  level  in  the  three  as  these  glasses  were  connected 
by  pipes  at  their  bases.  These  pipes  represent  steam- 
ship lines,  cables,  foreign  trade,  etc. 

What  has  happened  during  the  war?  I  will  say  the 
water  in  the  German  glass  has  been  dissipated  so  it  is 
now  like  this  [indicating].  But  the  Allies  have  been 
dissipating  theirs,  too,  only  they  have  been  pouring 
their  water  into  our  glass  so  that  the  condition  to-day 
is  like  this: — here,  our  glass  representing  the  United 
States  is  full,  while  the  glasses  representing  Germany 
and  the  central  powers,  and  Great  Britain  and  the 
Allies,  are  nearly  empty. 

I  said  those  glasses  were  connected  by  a  pipe 
which  necessitated  that  the  water  should  be  at  the 
same  level.  We  take  some  out  of  one  and  the  water 
in  all  will  be  lower  in  normal  times.  But  now  it  is  not  a 
normal  time.  The  pipe  connecting  our  glass  with  the 
German  glass  has  been  cut — absolutely  cut — so  that 
the  water  in  these  two  glasses  cannot  become  level. 
The  pipe  connecting  our  glass  with  the  English  glass  is 
so  congested — from  high  freight  rates,  abnormal  busi- 
ness, etc., — that  the  water  in  these  two  glasses  cannot 
be  equalized. 

And  so,  to-day  we  glory  in  our  strength  and  think 
that  we  are  the  only  people  that  are  profiting  from  this 


1 62     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

war,  and  we  think  that  we  are  going  to  have  a  great 
boom  after  this  war,  because  our  glass  is  nearly  full 
and  these  two  others  are  nearly  empty.  So  long  as  the 
majority  of  people  believe  that  we  can  prosper  by  the 
misfortune  of  others,  I  believe  there  is  no  possibility 
of  securing  world  peace. 

What  will  happen  after  the  war  is  over?  These 
pipes  are  going  to  be  connected  again ;  the  pipe  connect- 
ing our  glass  with  Germany  is  to  be  mended;  the  pipe 
connecting  our  glass  with  Great  Britain  is  going  to  be 
cleaned  out,  and  the  water  is  going  to  flow  freely  again 
between  them  all.  What  is  the  result  going  to  be? 
I  can  see  but  one  result — the  water  in  our  glass  is 
going  to  become  lower,  the  water  in  these  is  going  to 
rise.  That,  to  my  mind,  is  the  thing  that  is  going  to 
happen.  As  it  is  recognized  that  a  nation  cannot 
prosper  by  the  misfortunes  of  another;  that  the  teach- 
ings of  Jesus  of  Nazareth  were  simply  economic  truths 
— then,  we  are  going  to  get  busy  and  protect  ourselves 
by  working  for  the  extension  of  more  equal  security 
and  opportunity  for  the  peoples  of  all  nations.  Then 
one  of  the  great  causes,  or  the  great  economic  causes, 
of  war  will  be  eliminated. 


THE  WORLD-WIDE  EXTENSION  BY  INTER- 
NATIONAL AGREEMENT  OF  THE  PRINCI- 
PLE OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE,  AS 
NECESSARY  TO  PEACE 

BY   REAR-ADMIRAL   F.    E.    CHADWICK 

THIS  paper  is  a  thesis  in  support  of  an  extension  of 
the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  include 
the  world  and  thereby  lay  the  road  to  peace. 

As  a  preliminary  we  must  take  stock  of  the  chief 
ownership  of  the  world,  of  the  distribution  of  its 
57,600,000  square  miles  of  land  and  1,732,000,000  of 
population.  To  avoid  a  strain  upon  memory  I  shall 
omit  the  smaller  figures  involved. 

Great  Britain  is  the  largest  landholder,  controlling 
over  13,000,000  square  miles,  and  434,000,000  people. 
A  fourth  of  this  has  been  gathered  in  since  1881.  All 
but  121,000  square  miles  are  exterior  to  the  United 
Kingdom.  In  other  words  the  possessions  of  the  British 
Islands  are  108  times  their  size. 

Russia  has  2, 100,000  square  miles  in  Europe  and  more 
than  three  times  that  much  in  Asia,  leaving  aside  part  of 
Persia  which  she  has  lately  taken  under  her  wing. 
She  has  a  population  of  171,000,000. 

France  has  207,000  square  miles  in  Europe  and  very 
nearly  5,000,000  square  miles  outside  of  Europe.  Her 
home  population  is  about  39,000,000,  her  exterior 
population  about  70,000,000. 

163 


164    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Germany  has  209,000  square  miles  in  Europe  with 
about  1,000,000  outside  of  Europe.  At  home  she 
has  a  population  approaching  70,000,000;  abroad  about 
12,000,000. 

The  United  States  controls  in  its  main  portion 
3,026,789  square  miles,  591,000  in  Alaska,  122,000  in 
the  Philippines,  3600  in  Puerto  Rico,  6700  in  Hawaii, 
200  in  Tutuila,  and  54  in  Guam,  a  total  of  3,750,343 
square  miles.  It  controls  9,800,000  island  population 
besides  about  100,000,000  in  continental  America. 
Brazil,  with  an  area  larger  than  the  main  portion  of  the 
United  States,  has  less  than  a  fourth  of  the  latter's 
population.  China,  exclusive  of  Thibet  and  Mongolia 
(the  former  with  463,000  square  miles,  the  latter  with 
1,367,000)  has  an  area  of  2,169,000  square  miles  and  a 
population  of  325,000,000.  In  this  are  included 
Manchuria's  363,000  square  miles  of  area  (a  third  larger 
than  Texas),  and  22,000,000  people.  It  looks  very 
much  as  if  we  shall  have  to  call  Manchuria  part  of 
Japan,  and  some  express  doubts  as  to  the  future  of 
China  itself. 

Nor  in  considering  this  question  of  world  ownership 
can  we  leave  aside  Holland  and  Belgium,  the  former 
with  an  area  of  but  12,600  square  miles,  and  a  popula- 
tion of  but  6,200,000,  controlling  990,000  square  miles 
and  about  45,000,000  of  people;  the  latter,  with  11,373 
square  miles  of  area  and  seven  and  a  half  million  of 
population,  owns  the  Congo  State  of  900,000  square 
miles  and  an  indefinite  number  of  people  therein  rated 
to-day  at  9,000,000.  It  is  estimated  that  there  were 
1 2,000,000  more  before  the  ruthless  collection  of  rubber 
was  inaugurated  under  King  Leopold.  I  would  refer 
you  to  Lord  Cromer's  introduction  to  J.  H.  Harris's 
Dawn  in  Darkest  Africa  for  this  statement. 


Rear-Admiral  F.  E.  Chadwick        165 

Analyzing  the  foregoing,  Great  Britain  rules  22  per 
cent,  of  the  earth's  land  and  25  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion; Russia  15  per  cent,  of  the  land  and  10  per  cent, 
of  the  population;  France  9  per.  cent  of  the  land  and 
•5  per  cent,  of  the  population;  the  United  States  6.4 
per  cent,  of  the  land  and  6.3  per  cent,  of  the  population; 
Brazil  5.6  per  cent,  of  the  land,  and  1.4  per  cent,  of  the 
population;  China  nearly  4  per  cent,  of  the  land  and 
nearly  19  per  cent,  of  the  population.  These  six  are 
the  great  land  owners  of  the  world,  controlling  62  per 
cent,  of  its  land  area.  They  all,  except  China,  which 
has  suffered  from  land  grabbing  in  more  modern  times, 
have  been  land  grabbers.  Brazil,  which  when  dis- 
covered had  but  a  very  scattered  population  of  Indians 
of  a  debased  sort,  has  practically  not  expanded  from  the 
boundaries  first  set  when  it  became  a  Portuguese 
possession.  All  the  other  South  American  states  were 
seizures  without  any  question  of  "by  your  leave" 
to  the  aborigines.  The  same  with  North  America, 
Africa,  Oceanica,  Australia,  etc. — all  have  been  the 
result  of  conquest  or  unresisted  occupation.  But  shall 
we  say  that  the  expansion  of  the  white  races,  the 
Russian,  Anglo-Saxon,  French,  Spanish,  Portuguese, 
and  their  occupancy  of  the  vast  spaces  thinly  occupied 
by  savage  peoples  has  been  wrong?  We  ourselves 
stretched  our  borders  from  892,000  square  miles  in 
1800  to  over  3,000,000  square  miles  in  1880.  No,  there 
is  a  difference  between  the  conditions  of  1600  and  those 
of  three  centuries  later.  The  Americas  and  Australia 
were  practically  waste  lands.  The  evil  of  their 
occupancy  was  in  the  treatment  of  the  natives. 
Had  all  expanders  of  empire  been  William  Penns 
we  should  have  nothing  to  regret.  But  the  time 
came  when  things  had  radically  changed  and  ancient 


166    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

and  in  their  way  highly  civilized  regions  were  thus 
invaded. 

While  the  subject  is  a  delicate  one  in  the  present 
posture  of  affairs,  I  trust  I  may  deal  with  it  without 
offending  any  susceptibilities,  particularly  as  I  shall 
only  deal  with  history  before  the  war  and  without  any 
application  of  such  history  to  the  war.  For  the  subject 
of  imperialism  is  a  general  one  having  its  beginnings 
centuries  antecedent  to  the  present,  but  having  its 
worst  and  most  injurious  development  in  our  own 
generation  and  the  one  just  preceding,  in  what  are 
known  as  "Spheres  of  Special  Influence."  Also  I  shall 
let  an  Englishman  speak,  a  well-known  publicist,  Henry 
Noel  Brailsford.  He  asks : 

What  then  is  the  meaning  of  Imperialism?  It  is  only 
when  we  turn  from  the  figures  of  trade  to  the  figures  which 
measure  the  export  of  capital,  that  statistics  begin  to 
correspond  with  our  expansion,  and  our  bookkeeping 
to  bear  some  relation  to  our  aggressions.  Mr.  Mulhall 
calculated  for  the  Dictionary  of  Political  Economy  that  our 
foreign  and  colonial  investments  grew  between  1882  and 
1893  at  the  prodigious  rate  of  74  per  cent,  per  annum.  .  .  . 
Sir  George  Paish  stated  in  a  paper  which  he  read  to  the 
Royal  Statistical  Society  that  our  profits  from  foreign  and 
colonial  investments  amounted  to  140 millions  (sterling). 

Mr.  Brailsford  states  in  a  note  that :  In  his  Budget 
speech  (1915)  Mr.  Lloyd  George  estimated  the  total 
of  British  capital  invested  outside  the  British  islands 
as  £4,000,000,000.  The  annual  interest  is  about 
£200,000,000.  This  amounts  to  about  one  twelfth 
of  the  whole  national  income,  which  is  estimated  at 
£2,400,000,000. 

Mr.  Brailsford  continues: 


Rear- Admiral  F.  E.  Chadwick        167 

One  no  longer  enquires  why  the  un aggressive,  anti- 
militarist,  anti-imperialist  liberalism  of  the  free-trading 
England  which  was  content  to  take  Cobden  as  its  guide, 
has  given  place  to  the  expansionist,  militarist,  financially 
minded  Imperialism  of  to-day.  Regarded  as  a  national 
undertaking,  Imperialism  does  not  pay.  Regarded  as  a 
means  of  assuring  unearned  incomes  to  the  governing  class, 
it  emphatically  does  pay.  It  is  not  true  that  trade  follows 
the  flag.  It  is  true  that  the  flag  follows  investments. 

I  would  here  inject  that  one  of  the  most  marked 
examples  of  this  statement  was  in  the  case  of  the  gold 
mines  of  the  Transvaal. 

Mr.  Brailsford  continues: 

The  trader  is  in  one  sense  a  nomad.  If  one  market 
begins  to  fail  him,  he  turns  to  another.  If  a  country  to 
which  he  used  to  export  goods  is  torn  by  civil  war  or 
threatened  with  bankruptcy,  he  does  not  call  for  inter- 
vention. He  goes  elsewhere  or  waits  for  better  times. 
The  investor  on  the  other  hand  acquired  a  "stake"  in 
some  foreign  country,  and  anchored  his  fortunes  irrevocably 
upon  it.  Unless  he  is  prepared  to  lose  his  stake,  he  must, 
if  the  country  in  question  goes  bankrupt  or  is  threatened 
by  civil  war  or  revolution,  call  in  the  Imperial  arm  to 
defend  him.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  our  Navy  is  an 
"insurance"  for  our  mercantile  shipping,  since  it  protects 
from  piracy  or  from  capture  in  time  of  war.  It  would  be 
more  accurate  to  say  that  both  our  Navy  and  our  Army 
overseas  are  an  insurance,  provided  and  maintained  by  the 
nation  at  large,  for  the  capital  owned  abroad  by  our  leisured 
class. 

Here  at  length  we  have  discovered  the  stake  which  an 
armed  Imperialism  watches  and  seeks  to  enlarge.  The 
fear  of  war,  the  struggle  for  balance  of  power,  the  competi- 
tion in  armaments  ...  all  this  is  seen  to  be  a  characteristic 
product  of  modern  finance  and  modern  capitalism.  It 


1 68    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

makes  the  slum  and  it  makes  the  Dreadnought.  One  may 
go  further.  It  makes  the  Dreadnought  because  it  made  the 
slum.  Imperialism  is  simply  the  political  manifestation 
of  the  growing  tendency  of  capital  accumulated  in  the 
more  civilized  industrial  countries  to  export  itself  to  the 
less  civilized  and  less  settled.  To  secure  itself,  it  seeks  to 
subdue  or  to  "civilize"  its  new  fields  of  investment — 
as  it  understands  civilization  ...  it  is  to  diplomacy  that 
it  turns  to  protect  it  from  risks. 

I  have  to  pass  over  much  of  Mr.  Brailsford's  most 
interesting  argument,  merely  mentioning  the  much 
greater  profits  generally  expected  from  English  in- 
vestments abroad  over  those  usual  in  England,  the 
greater  profits  arising  mainly  from  long  hours  of  labor 
and  pitiable  wages. 

He  mentions  as  another  great  inducement  to  foreign 
investment,  the  ease  with  which  some  countries  can  be 
robbed.  Thus  he  cites  a  Turkish  railway  on  which  he 
traveled,  which  seemed: 

as  though  the  line  had  laid  itself  across  the  countryside  in 
the  track  of  some  writhing  serpent ...  it  bent  and  doubled 
so  that  a  passing  train  resembled  nothing  so  much  as  a 
kitten  pursuing  its  own  tail.  Yet  the  country  was  a  vast 
level  plain.  There  were  neither  mountains  nor  rivers  to 
avoid. 

The  explanation  is  simple  enough.  There  was  a 
kilometric  guarantee ;  the  more  miles,  the  more  money. 
Such,  put  into  very  small  compass,  is  imperialism. 
Mr.  Brailsford  proceeds  to  a  concrete  example — Egypt 
— as  a ' '  perfect  epitome  of  the  tendencies' '  (using  his  own 
words),  which  he  sketches  through  fifty  pages.  He 
thus  says:  "The  origin  of  the  Egyptian  question  in 
its  present  phase  was  financial."  That  is  the  opening 


Rear- Admiral  F.  E.  Chad  wick        169 

sentence  of  Lord  Cromer's  Modern  Egypt,  and  it  spares 
us  any  historical  controversy. 

Our  statesmen  drifted,  our  agents  schemed  their  way 
into  the  occupation  of  Egypt,  at  the  bidding  of  high  finance, 
and  for  no  other  reason.  Capital  had  been  exported  from 
France  and  England  to  the  Nile  Valley  at  an  extravagant 
rate  and  with  consummate  imprudence.  There  came  a 
moment  when  both  countries  perceived  that  the  Khedive 
was  injuring  the  security  on  which  their  capital  reposed. 
They  stepped  in,  precisely  as  a  bank  may  foreclose  on  a 
mortgaged  estate,  first  through  the  Dual  Control  (France 
and  England)  and  then  through  the  British  occupation 
...  it  was  no  chronic  or  deep-seated  disorder  which  led  to 
the  foreign  occupation  .  .  .  the  beginning  of  this  spoliation 
was  that  the  money-lenders  and  contractors  robbed  the 
Khedive;  European  contractors  engaged  in  his  great  works 
of  building  and  irrigation  were  known  to  have  overcharged 
him  anything  from  80  to  400  per  cent.  For  floating  loans 
he  had  latterly  to  pay  as  much  as  25  per  cent,  in  interest. 
Of  the  68  millions  (of  pounds)  which  was  raised  as  a  national 
debt  Egypt  received  only  44  millions,  so  that  the  nom- 
inal interest  of  7  per  cent,  amounted  in  reality  to  12  or 
13  per  cent.  Of  a  loan  of  32  millions  (pounds)  which  he 
raised  in  1873  only  20  millions  ever  reached  the  exchequer. 
Such  were  the  transactions  which  British  and  French 
diplomacy  covered  with  their  support.  ...  By  delaying 
their  consent  to  any  satisfactory  composition,  the  Powers 
kept  their  hold  on  Egypt.  It  was  not  until  Lord  Cromer 
was  firmly  in  the  chair  that  the  debt  was  unified  and  the 
interest  lowered  to  an  equitable  rate.  ...  In  1877,  a  year 
of  famine,  to  pay  the  coupon  due  to  the  clients  of  the 
Rothschilds,  taxes  were  collected  actually  in  advance  from 
the  ruined  peasants. 

Achmet  Arabi  Pacha  appeared  as  a  national  leader. 
It  was,  says  Mr.  Brailsf ord,  ' '  because  he  had  opposed 


170    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  unmeasured  pretensions  of  the  financial  control, 
that  Arabi  was  declared  a  rebel  and  crushed  at  Tel-el- 
Kebir."  The  British  armed  occupation,  Lord  Beacon- 
field's  "secret  and  in  some  respects  perfidious  purchase 
of  the  Suez  Canal  shares"  (to  use  Mr.  Brailsford's 
words),  caused  France  to  feel  "herself  cheated,  out- 
maneuvered,  and  humiliated  "  and  "France  in  due  time 
became  the  ally  of  our  traditional  rival  Russia."  Eng- 
land, despite  the  many  declarations  that  the  occupation 
of  Egypt  was  but  temporary,  remained.  France  was 
finally  soothed  by  the  arrangement  with  respect  to 
Morocco,  which  was  to  become  a  Pandora's  box  to 
bring  the  crucifixion  of  Europe. 

The  action  in  Egypt  taken  in  behalf  of  the  Paris  and 
London  bankers  was  at  the  time  regarded  as  only 
temporary.  I  was  myself  then  in  London  stationed 
there  officially.  In  calling  toward  the  end  of  1882— 
soon  after  the  occupancy — at  the  Colonial  office  on  some 
affairs,  the  official  with  whom  I  had  my  conversation 
asked,  after  our  business  was  completed:  "What 
do  you  think  of  Egypt?  Do  you  think  we  shall  stay 
there?"  It  makes  no  difference  what  my  answer 
was,  but  my  friend  in  reply  said:  "I  have  just  seen 
Mr.  Gladstone  and  know  that  he  is  most  anxious  to 
withdraw;  he  is  morbidly  anxious  not  to  increase  our 
foreign  responsibilities."  Notwithstanding  the  several 
times  repeated  statements  of  withdrawal,  the  British 
flag  is  finally  hoisted  over  Egypt  as  a  possession,  along 
with  adjacent  territory  equal  in  extent  to  the  United 
States.  I  am  but  stating  facts.  I  am  impugning  no 
one;  we  probably  would  in  the  situation  and  in  the 
state  of  international  morals  have  done  the  same. 

Is  the  story  of  India,  when  analyzed,  any  better; 
or  Madagascar,  or  French  Indo-China,  or  Siam,  or 


Rear- Admiral  F.  E.  Chad  wick        171 

Manchuria,  or  the  Philippines?  It  is  ever  the  same, 
seeking  special  commercial  advantage,  the  furnishing 
of  "out-door  relief,"  as  James  Mill  expressed  it,  "for 
the  upper  classes."  Mr.  J.  Ellis  Barker,  a  well-known 
English  publicist,  states  very  precisely  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  and  After,  for  May,  1907,  our  mother  country's 
springs  of  action.  He  says : 

Three  centuries  ago  England  was  a  backward  and 
ignorant  agricultural  country  without  enterprise,  without 
trade,  without  wealth,  without  colonies.  But  England, 
though  poor,  was  ambitious.  Her  leading  men  wished  her 
to  become  a  World-Power.  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  wrote: 
"Whosoever  commands  the  sea  commands  the  trade; 
whoever  commands  the  trade  commands  the  riches  of  the 
the  world,  and  consequently  the  world  itself,"  and  Lord 
Bacon  declared  "The  rule  of  the  sea  is  the  epitome  of 
monarchy,"  and  advised  this  country  to  conquer  the 
wealth,  and  the  colonies  of  Spain,  because  Spain's  power 
was  no  longer  sufficient  to  defend  her  vast  and  wealthy 
possessions.  Following  the  advice  of  her  greatest  states- 
men, England  made  war  upon  Spain,  not  for  political  or 
religious  reasons,  but  because  Spain  owned  the  wealth  of 
the  New  World.  Spain  declined  and  Holland  became  by 
war  and  by  work  the  heir  to  the  larger  part  of  Spain's 
wealth.  Then  England  transferred  her  hostility  from 
Spain  to  Holland.  Attacked  by  England,  who  was  later 
joined  by  France,  the  Netherlands  declined,  England  and 
France  fell  to  fighting  over  the  great  Dutch  inheritance, 
and  had  to  decide  whether  the  New  World  was  to  become 
French  or  English.  Thus  by  three  centuries  of  war, 
firstly  against  Spain,  then  against  Holland,  and  lastly 
against  France,  was  the  British  Empire  won,  and  the 
struggle  for  empire  ended  only  in  1815  when  at  last  Great 
Britain  had  vanquished  all  her  European  rivals.  British 
colonial  and  commercial  supremacy  is  barely  a  century  old. 


172     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

We  have  here  a  very  frank  statement  of  the  processes 
by  which  Special  Spheres  of  Influence  are  obtained; 
processes  which  are  still  continuing  and  which  have  had 
their  highest  culmination  in  the  great  war  now  waging. 
We  ourselves  have  taken  part  in  the  process.  We 
were  the  receiver  of  stolen  goods  in  accepting  at  the 
hands  of  Napoleon  for  about  one  and  a  half  cents  an 
acre  the  great  estate  west  of  the  Mississippi  which 
Napoleon  had  forced  Spain  to  yield  to  France  with  a 
promise  that  it  should  never  be  alienated  to  another 
power.  It  came  to  us  because  Napoleon  knew  that  the 
breaking  of  the  peace  of  Amiens  would  mean  its  seizure 
by  England.  We  have  California  and  the  extension 
to  the  present  Mexican  boundary  by  conquest ;  we  have 
the  Philippines  by  a  purchase  to  which  Spain  had  to 
accede  by  a  threat  of  a  continuance  of  war  which  could 
only  mean  Spain's  further  ruin;  we  have  Puerto  Rico 
and  Guam  by  conquest  pure  and  simple.  The  skirts 
of  no  country  are  clear.  The  vast  colonial  empire  of 
the  French  is  through  seizure  and  by  the  sword.  A 
few  years  ago  China  was,  in  the  minds  of  the  European 
diplomats,  to  be  divided  into  special  spheres,  the  great 
Yangtze  Valley  to  be  the  special  field  of  England,  and 
indeed  it  was  for  a  time  so  regarded.  China's  integrity 
to-day,  which  let  us  hope  is  not  threatened  as  some 
think,  is  due  to  the  stand  taken  by  our  Department  of 
State,  John  Hay,  of  happy  memory,  being  Secretary. 
It  is  his  noblest  monument;  he  could  have  none  finer. 

We  cannot  say  that  extension  of  power  and  commer- 
cial influence  by  individual  states  has  been  all  wrong. 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  New  Guinea,  the  peopling 
of  our  own  country  by  the  whites,  the  occupancy  of 
South  America  by  Europeans,  were  necessities  for  the 
well-being  of  the  world  as  a  whole,  but  the  time  has  come 


Rear- Admiral  F.  E.  Chad  wick        173 

to  call  a  halt,  and  not  only  a  halt,  but  a  reconsideration 
of  much  that  has  gone  on  in  our  own  and  the  just 
preceding  generation. 

Except  for  the  treatment,  in  many  cases,  of  the 
aboriginal  races,  colonization  of  the  New  World  and 
Australia  was  pacific.  There  was  no  reason  for  ill- 
treatment  or  extinction  of  such  races.  This  was  the 
product  of  the  simple  rule  of  "man's  inhumanity  to 
man,"  which  is  ever  in  full  vigor  until  the  world  can 
be  induced  to  come  under  the  Golden  Rule.  Shall  we 
endeavor  to  apply  it  in  some  large  degree  at  least- 
The  means,  it  appears  to  me,  is  in  an  application  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  not  only  to  America  but  to  all  the 
world.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  simply  meant  that  there 
should  not  be  set  up  in  the  Americas  any  more  Special 
Spheres  of  Influence.  These  fifteen  words  epitomize  the 
whole  of  the  declaration.  It  meant  that  the  Americas 
should  develop  on  their  own  lines,  let  them  be  good  or 
bad,  and  some,  it  must  be  admitted,  have  been  very 
bad.  All  the  same  we  took  a  stand  that  the  peoples 
of  the  world  had  a  right  to  their  own  soul,  besides  the 
right  to  live  in  such  peace  as  they  themselves  could 
establish  within  their  own  borders.  This  phrase 
brings  to  mind,  no  doubt,  Mexico,  the  great  problem 
of  these  western  continents.  That  Mexico  must  be 
assisted  in  establishing  peace  is  but  too  evident,  but 
it  must  only  be  assistance.  This  should  be  given  with 
no  interest  or  idea  of  a  hegemony,  which  would  be  a 
danger  to  our  political  system.  We  want  no  imperial- 
ism; we  want  only  justice  in  the  world.  We  see  too 
well,  from  Mr.  Brailsford,  what  imperialism  means; 
the  exploitation  of  other  lands  for  special  benefit. 
Let  us  put  forward  therefore  for  adoption  by  the  whole 
world  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  doctrine  of  justice 


174    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

for  all,  viz.,  that  there  should  nowhere  be  any  Special 
Spheres  of  Influence.  I  think  the  time  has  come  for 
such  application. 

And  it  must  be  retroactive.  It  must  apply  to  all 
lands  seized  since  1880:  to  Egypt,  the  Philippines  and 
Puerto  Rico,  Madagascar,  Tunis,  Morocco,  the  Congo, 
and  all  the  other  vast  areas  of  partitioned  Africa 
north  of  Cape  Colony  (and  why  not  that  also?),  to 
Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Indo-China,  Burma,  and  still 
others.  If  the  several  nations  which  now  administer 
these  countries  desire  to  continue  such  administration, 
it  should  be  under  the  clear  understanding  of  the 
"Open  Door";  that  all  nationals  shall  be  admitted 
to  trade  or  exploitation  on  terms  of  absolute  equality. 
Such  arrangement  would  at  once  remove  desire  for 
conquest;  for,  as  remarked  by  Mr.  Brailsford,  "To 
attempt  to  conquer,  where  one  can  trade  without  con- 
quest, is  a  sheer  squandering  of  national  resources" 
(p.  65.) 

Germany's  only  demand  regarding  Morocco,  though 
it  was  so  abused  in  the  Paris  and  London  press,  was 
but  for  the  Open  Door,  for  equal  rights  to  all  nations, 
and  this  was  accomplished,  so  far  as  any  treaty  may  be 
said  to  accomplish  anything,  by  her  convention  with 
France  in  November,  1911.  Her  statesmanship  in 
this  was  perfectly  correct  and  such  as  the  United  States, 
when  it  comes  to  understand  the  matter,  cannot  but 
approve.  In  fact,  so  far  as  I  can  read  into  the  meaning 
of  things,  Germany  stands  for  the  Open  Door  quite 
as  fully  if  not  more  so  than  ourselves,  for  we  have 
shown  no  great  signs  of  opening  it  in  the  Philippines. 
In  this  connection  I  would  advise  the  reading  of  Dawn 
in  Darkest  Africa  by  the  English  missionary  John  H. 
Harris.  It  is  a  wise  and  enlightening  book. 


Rear- Admiral  F.  E.  Chad  wick        175 

But  we  must  go  still  further.  If  we  do  not  want 
wars,  we  must  give  freedom  to  the  whole  world ;  freedom 
for  all  ships  upon  the  seas  and  upon  all  waterways 
wheresoever.  In  my  younger  days  the  Cattegat 
could  be  used  only  by  paying  toll  to  Denmark;  the 
Scheldt  was  equally  a  closed  waterway;  they  are  now 
free  to  all  ships.  It  must  be  made  so  with  the  Darda- 
nelles. The  same  right  of  way  on  all  rivers  and  arms 
of  the  sea  must  be  made  to  exist  as  exists  now  in  the 
Chesapeake,  the  Cattegat,  the  Thames,  and  the  Scheldt. 
And  I  go  still  further.  If  we  are  to  have  world-peace, 
the  custom  house  must  be  abolished  wholly  as  a  com- 
merce preventer.  I  would  have  all  men  trade  with  all 
countries  precisely  as  the  man  in  Maine  can  trade 
freely  with  the  man  in  California.  The  most  beneficent 
provision  of  the  Constitution  of  1787  was  that  which 
prohibited  the  before-existing  interstate  customs- 
imposts.  We  cannot  now  imagine  such  a  thing,  say, 
between  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  To  quote 
from  an  article  of  my  own  in  the  North  American 
Review  of  June,  1915: 

In  our  own  country,  so  typically  protective,  we  have 
established  a  free  trade  in  all  races  of  Slav,  Jew,  Turk, 
Persian  (whether)  Christian  or  Mohammedan.  In  the 
nature  of  things  the  sons  of  these  men  will  in  time  be  the 
husbands  of  our  daughters;  their  daughters  the  wives  of  our 
sons.  Certainly  such  a  free  receptivity  of  people  is  much 
more  drastic  free-trade  than  the  free  receptivity  of  their 
manufactures.  But  whether  so  or  not,  the  main  thesis — 
that  war  is  in  a  general  sense  always  the  result  of  unequal 
opportunity  in  trade — holds  good,  and  also  that  this  in- 
equality must  be  removed  as  a  first  step,  the  only  real  step 
to  anything  like  universal  peace. 

All  logic  is  with  the  proposition.     All  will  grant  that  trade 


176    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

has  always  been  and  remains  the  great  civilizer,  the  great 
missioner.  For  trade,  all  roads,  steamships,  and  railways 
exist;  without  it  nations  would  have  remained  in  darkest 
ignorance  and  savagery.  Thus  being  the  great  and  benefi- 
cent thing  it  is,  the  greatest  lever  in  the  uplift  of  mankind, 
the  spreader  of  light  and  Christianity,  it  stands  to  reason 
that  it  is  the  greatest  of  errors  to  put  trammels  in  its  way. 

The  logic  of  the  proposition  demands  of  our  peace 
societies  the  support  of  this  proposition.  I  am  em- 
phatically no  believer  in  such  things  as  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  by  judicial  process,  or  by 
the  prevention  of  war  by  an  association  of  powers 
to  whip  a  recalcitrant  nation  into  peace.  It  is  too 
much  like  the  Holy  Alliance  against  which  Monroe 
made  the  famous  declaration.  Such  things,  as  I  see 
them,  are,  to  use  the  phrase  of  the  ancient  preacher, 
but  a  "wrestling  with  the  wind."  You  must  remove 
the  causes  of  dispute  and  you  will  have  no  disputes, 
and  practically  the  only  great  cause  is  in  trade  .restric- 
tion and  in  trade  discrimination.  To  talk  peace  and 
encourage  restriction  and  discrimination  in  trade  are 
diametric  propositions. 

A  final  word  to  clinch  what  I  believe  should  be  the 
meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to-day.  It  has  served 
its  purpose  so  far  as  the  Americas  are  concerned. 
All  nations  know,  as  France  recognized  in  1866,  that  a 
real  infraction  would  mean  war  with  the  United  States. 
Our  position  is  one  of  altruism,  but  it  is  a  fine  altruism, 
for  it  is  going  to  spread  the  full  meaning  of  the  immortal 
Doctrine  and  teach  all  the  world  that  it  is  immoral  to 
appropriate  others'  lands  for  any  nation's  particular 
benefit;  that  if  one  governs,  it  must  be  for  the  benefit 
of  the  governed,  and  this  of  course  carries  the  corollary 
that  none  should  be  excluded  from  participation  in 


Rear-Admiral  F.  E.  Chadwick        177 

trade  on  absolute  equality.  When  we  shall  couple 
with  this  and  shall  arrive  at  the  great  desideratum,  a 
world  freedom  of  trade  intercourse,  imperialism  will 
cease  to  have  a  meaning.  It  will  at  least  cease  to 
mean  what  it  does  to-day,  an  exploitation  for  the 
benefit  of  the  few,  of  those  who  cannot  defend  them- 
selves. We  may  then  turn  our  warships  into  peaceful 
freighters  and  lay  the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  the  shelf; 
it  will  have  accomplished  its  true  purpose — not  confined 
to  the  Americas,  but  extended  to  all  the  world — Peace. 
All  this  means  a  good  deal  more  of  the  Golden  Rule; 
a  good  deal  more  of  Christian  spirit  whether  in  Christian, 
Jew,  or  Mohammedan,  but  I  take  it,  or  at  least  hope, 
that  this  is  what  we  are  striving  toward.  Jf  not  then 
all  our  talk  here  is  vanity. 

And  now  as  to  procedure.  Let  us  for  the  moment 
drop  these  minor  efforts  which  can  never  be  effective 
and  come  to  the  real  thing :  the  removal  of  causes.  Let 
there  be  a  World  Congress,  naturally  at  The  Hague  and 
bring  before  it  the  whole  question  of  Spheres  of  Influ- 
ence, and  demand  everywhere  in  the  countries  seized  so 
immorally  in  the  last  and  this  generation  the  absolutely 
open  door.  Egypt,  Madagascar,  the  Philippines,  Indo- 
China,  Morocco,  the  Congo,  Tunis,  Manchuria,  and  all 
the  lately  partitioned  portions  of  Africa  should  be 
included.  I  do  not  pretend  to  give  a  full  list.  And 
why  not  India  itself?  All  this  would  very  well  come 
within  the  work  of  world  reconstruction  which  must 
follow  this  mighty  war. 

And  to  effect  all  this  there  should  be  a  permanent 
international  board  to  supervise  the  actual  carrying 
out  of  this  great  step  to  freedom;  to  see  that  all  play 
fair ;  that  America  give  the  Englishman  as  fair  a  chance 
in  the  Philippines  as  it  itself  may  have;  that  France 


178    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

in  Morocco  shall  put  nothing  in  the  way  of  absolute 
equal  treatment  to  Englishman  or  German.  With 
such  rights,  who  will  demand  lands  for  expansion?  If 
the  German  may  go  to  the  Congo  and  be  treated  as 
if  it  were  German,  he  will  be  well  content  to  leave 
the  Congo  to  Belgium,  or  Morocco  or  Indo-China  to 
France. 

This  may  sound  somewhat  Utopian,  but  what  is 
Utopia?  It  is  what  we  are  striving  for,  and  we  must 
in  the  nature  of  things  arrive.  Think  of  the  steps 
thitherward  in  the  last  hundred  years.  There  is  no 
use  in  talking  Christianity,  the  brotherhood  of  man, 
the  Golden  Rule,  unless  you  take  actual  steps  toward 
such.  You  have  got  to  construct  a  new  order  of  things, 
the  very  beginning  of  which  is  to  establish  a  democracy 
of  states,  a  democracy  as  fully  important  as  a  democ- 
racy of  men. 

I  believe  what  is  here  suggested  will  be  a  step— 
a  great  step.  We  have  our  choice:  Special  Trade 
Advantage  and  War;  the  absolutely  Open  Door  and 
Peace.  I  beg  you  to  think  it  over. 


DOES    NATIONALISM    MEET    PRESENT-DAY 

NEED? 

BY  EDWARD  KREHBIEL 

IV 1 ATIONALISM  is  the  present  political  system  of  a 
A  ^  world  consisting  of  nations.  The  thesis  of  this 
paper,  put  baldly  for  the  sake  of  challenge,  is  that  this 
system  is  out  of  date,  that  the  nation  is  no  longer 
the  true  cohesive  unit  of  society. 

What  is  a  nation?  Ask  the  man  on  your  streets 
and  he  will  glibly  reply  that  his  nation  is  the  people 
to  which  he  belongs,  that  it  is  the  best  people  on  earth, 
stands  for  what  is  finest  in  any  field,  leads  in  govern- 
ment, prosperity,  science,  art,  in  short  everything, 
that  it  has  uniformly  been  victorious  in  war  partly 
because  its  generals  are  the  greatest  and  its  soldiers 
the  bravest,  partly  too  because  God  was  on  its  side, 
since  his  nation  has  always  been  in  the  right;  and  he 
regards  foreigners  with  contempt  or  at  best  with  pity 
as  an  inferior,  benighted  and  perhaps  even  a  hopeless 
lot.  And  the  foreigner  has  the  same  opinion  of  his 
nation. 

Ask  the  publicist  or  lawyer  what  a  nation  is  and  he 
will  guardedly  describe  it  in  terms  of  its  external  features 
or  manifestations,  but  will  say  little  of  its  composition, 
and  less  of  what  distinguishes  one  nation  from  another. 

Whatever  nationalism  is,  it  has  led  to  an  awful 
catastrophe  in  Europe,  for  when  all  the  befogging 

179 


i8o    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

details  and  prejudices  regarding  the  cause  of  the  great 
war  are  summed  up  they  leave  the  blame  on  the  national 
spirit  and  the  supposition  that  nations  are  funda- 
mentally different  and  bound  to  get  into  conflict. 

What  is  the  truth  about  this  supposed  fundamental 
difference  of  nations  ? 

A  convenient  method  of  attacking  this  question  is 
to  decide  what  a  nation  is  not. 

A  nation  is  not  a  geographic  unit,  for  rarely  are 
nations  bounded  by  natural  features.  For  a  thousand 
years  France  and  Germany  have  fought  over  the 
question  whether  the  Rhine  River  or  the  Vosges  Moun- 
tains should  be  the  boundary.  There  is  no  natural 
boundary  between  Germany  and  Russia  to  fight  over. 
Great  Britain,  with  her  naval  supremacy,  does  not 
regard  the  ocean  as  a  boundary  but  holds  possessions 
beyond  the  seas.  The  boundaries  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada  illustrate  very  well  how  national 
limits  are  often  determined — that  is,  arbitrarily  and 
even  accidentally. 

A  nation  is  not  a  closed  racial  or  ethnical  unit.  That 
a  nation  is  not  identical  with  a  nationality  is  most 
conspicuously  demonstrated  by  Austria-Hungary,  and 
in  a  lesser  degree  by  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  United  States  notoriously  consists  of  an  amalgama- 
tion of  nationalities.  If  a  given  nation  contains  different 
peoples,  the  converse,  that  different  nations  contain 
identical  peoples,  is  also  in  some  measure  true.  There 
are  Poles  in  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia.  The  Walloons 
of  Belgium  are  more  like  the  French  than  like  their 
countrymen  the  Flemings.  Switzerland  consists  of 
Germans,  French,  and  Italians,  not  distinguishable 
from  those  just  across  the  border. 

A  nation  is  not  a  linguistic  unit,  though  it  should  be 


Edward  Krehbiel  181 

said  at  the  start  that  language  is  a  most  significant 
national  characteristic.  Indeed  if  nations  consisted 
of  nationalities,  language  would  practically  decide 
national  affiliations.  However,  as  things  are,  this  is 
not  the  case.  Austria-Hungary  is  a  nation,  but  it 
contains  many  languages.  There  are  many  mutually 
unintelligible  dialects  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  Russia, 
to  mention  but  a  few  instances.  If  it  be  true  that 
philologically  these  dialects  belong  together,  it  still 
remains  true  that  the  persons  in  a  nation  speaking 
different  dialects  do  not  understand  each  other  and 
that  for  practical  purposes  they  might  as  well  be  speak- 
ing to  genuine  foreigners. 

Neither  is  a  nation  a  religious  unit,  for  national 
boundaries  and  the  areas  occupied  by  religious  creeds 
are  not  at  all  identical.  Persons  holding  different 
faiths  are  fighting  side  by  side  in  the  trenches  in  Europe 
against  persons  of  their  own  faith  in  the  opposing  battle 
line.  Nothing,  indeed,  is  clearer  in  this  war  than  that 
religious  belief  comes  after  loyalty  to  nation. 

Again,  a  nation  is  not  a  closed  economic  unit.  What 
could  demonstrate  more  clearly  the  economic  inter- 
dependence of  nations  than  the  derangement  of  the 
trade  of  neutrals — to  say  nothing  of  belligerents — 
by  the  present  war?  Everybody  knows  that  the 
world  is  a  market  for  any  given  commodity  and  that 
prices  are  everywhere  fixed  by  world  supply  and  de- 
mand. This,  of  course,  means  that  capital,  and  there- 
fore labor,  are  international;  it  means  that  all  the 
facilities  of  transportation  and  communication  are 
molded  to  accommodate  this  international  traffic. 
And  the  various  interests  affected — the  railroad  men, 
freight  handlers,  insurance  underwriters,  capitalists, 
labor  unions,  farmers,  news  agents,  and  the  like — have 


1 82    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

international  organizations  or  congresses  in  which  they 
discuss  ways  and  means  to  expedite  their  own  success. 

That  a  nation  is  not  a  social  unit  need  not  be  amplified 
in  view  of  what  precedes  and  follows. 

The  nation  is  likewise  not  a  watertight  cultural  unit. 
Though  hardly  necessary  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  note 
that  the  word  culture  is  not  here  used  in  the  sense  of 
Kultur.  Culture  means  the  fine  arts,  and  the  intel- 
lectual and  professional  interests  of  men.  The  fine 
arts,  that  is,  painting,  music,  and  literature,  since  they 
appeal  chiefly  to  sentiment,  may  be  said  to  be  cultural 
elements  of  an  emotional  character.  The  intellectual 
and  professional  elements  of  culture,  that  is,  the 
historic,  economic,  social,  and  natural  sciences,  as  also 
theology,  law,  and  the  like,  appeal  chiefly  to  the 
intellect  and  are  therefore  rational  in  character. 

Premising  this  distinction  the  thesis  is  that  a  given 
culture  is  not  necessarily  national. 

It  has  been  contended  that  all  culture  depends  for  its 
creation  upon  a  national  soil — for  instance,  that  music 
is  a  peculiar  product  of  the  German  in  Germany,  art 
of  the  Frenchman  in  France,  and  certain  kinds  of 
literature  of  the  Russian  living  in  Russia.  In  proof 
of  this,  it  is  pointed  out  that  the  Germans  in  Brazil 
or  the  United  States,  the  French  in  Quebec  or  New 
Orleans,  and  the  British  in  Australia  or  the  other 
dominions,  have  not  been  culturally  productive  after 
the  fashion  of  their  native  land.  Lamprecht,  indeed, 
contends  that  the  Germans  in  the  United  States  have 
retained  only  the  externals  of  Germanism  and  have 
to  a  large  degree  lost  the  essentials  of  German  culture 
and  in  any  event  have  become  entirely  unproductive 
of  it. 

In  rebuttal  it  is  asserted  that  the  Jewish  people  have 


Edward  Krehbiel  183 

retained  a  distinct  culture  without  any  national  exist- 
ence whatever,  and  at  first  blush  it  would  appear  that 
this  is  good  and  sufficient  proof  that  cultures  are 
created  without  a  nation  to  back  them.  To  this  it  is 
however,  rejoined  that  the  Jewish  people,  though 
contributing  relatively  more  than  their  neighbors,  have 
not  a  Jewish  culture,  but  that  their  product  everywhere 
appears  as  an  integral  part  of  the  culture  of  the  nation 
in  which  they  are.  The  question  raised  by  this  con- 
tention is  not  easy  to  decide,  and  must  here  go  un- 
decided. 

But  even  if  in  its  creation  culture  is  national,  it  is 
not  national  in  its  consumption,  for  peoples  can  appreci- 
ate and  adopt  foreign  cultures  if  they  but  choose  to  do 
so.  The  clearest  illustration  of  this  is  the  wholesale 
adoption  by  Japan  of  such  features  of  Western  civiliza- 
tion as  were  desired.  The  sciences  are  almost  neces- 
sarily non-national  because  they  rest  upon  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  these  operate  the  same  everywhere. 
It  is  so  with  all  rational  cultures.  Theology  and 
philosophy  never  were  national.  The  legal  and 
political  institutions  of  Rome  influenced  all  subsequent 
peoples,  just  as  those  of  England  and  the  Code  Napoleon 
have  gone  far  beyond  the  confines  of  the  land  of  their 
origin.  The  emotional  parts  of  culture  have  shown  less 
ability  to  travel  abroad,  but  they  have  not  found  it 
impossible.  The  music,  art,  and  literature  of  a  nation 
are  often  enough  far  more  appreciated  by  "cultured" 
foreigners  than  by  "uncultured"  natives.  It  is  the 
power  of  appreciation,  not  the  nationality,  that  decides. 
Given  cultured  persons  of  different  nations,  it  would 
be  rash,  and  just  as  likely  as  not  fallacious,  to  declare 
that  the  native  possessed  a  deeper  grasp  or  appreciation 
of  his  national  culture  than  the  foreigner. 


1 84     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Finally,  it  follows  from  the  above,  that  a  nation  is 
not  a  personality.  For  convenience  we  may  speak  of 
China  or  Germany;  only  it  cannot  be  said  too  often 
that  these  are  but  time-saving  expressions  which  do  not 
represent  a  real  unity.  Germany  is  not  a  single- 
minded  body-politic,  but  a  community  of  separate  and 
very  diverse  interests  and  purposes.  Witness  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  Witness  also  as  further  instances  of  the 
same  kind  England  and  Ireland,  Austria  and  Hungary, 
Russia  and  Finland.  A  nation  is  not  like  a  person,  it 
is  like  a  beehive.  It  contains  many  individuals;  most 
of  them  are  at  home,  but  not  a  few  are  abroad.  Not  a 
few  of  those  at  home  have  their  major  interest  abroad ; 
quite  enough  others  privately  believe  that  some  foreign 
nation  is  superior  to  their  own.  A  few  say  so.  Such 
common  purpose  and  action  as  a  nation  knows  is  gov- 
ernmental. Practical  unity  in  a  nation  will  come  only 
with  absolute  government.  We  must  choose  between 
absolutism  and  a  unified  nation  or  personal  freedom  and 
a  nation  at  odds  within.  Nationalism  favors  absolutism. 

Nations,  then,  are  not  like  corrals  within  which 
citizens  must  stay.  It  is  one  of  the  most  vital  factors 
in  present  international  relations  that  nations  and 
their  influence  are  not  at  all  limited  to  those  areas 
which  form  a  nation,  but  that  outside  these  limits 
nations  claim  and  freely  exercise  great  power.  What 
are  the  methods  by  which  modern  nations  extend  their 
sway  beyond  their  apparent  confines? 

Over  its  own  territory  the  nation  exercises  political 
jurisdiction,  and  it  may  enlarge  this  jurisdiction  by 
annexation  of  additional  territory.  This  is  the  simplest 
form  of  expansion,  and  the  only  one  known  to  many 
of  the  less  informed.  Yet  it  is  only  one  form  of  expan- 
sion and  not  the  most  favored.  Nations  exercise 


Edward  Krehbiel  185 

semi-sovereign  powers  over  outside  regions  either  by 
establishing  protectorates,  or  by  designating  spheres  of 
paramount  -influence.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an 
instance  of  the  latter.  We  do  not  claim  political 
sovereignty  in  Latin  America,  but  we  do  assert  the 
supremacy  of  our  interests  over  those  of  non- American 
states.  It  is  a  form  of  political  expansion  beyond  our 
actual  boundaries.  Russia  has  similar  spheres  in  Persia, 
China,  and  Turkey;  Germany  in  Asia  Minor;  Great 
Britain  in  Persia,  parts  of  Turkey,  and  many  places 
besides;  Japan  in  Manchuria  and  other  parts  of  the 
Far  East. 

Less  understood  but  more  important  are  the  com- 
mercial spheres  of  nations  secured  by  means  of  pre- 
ferential tariffs,  advantageous  concessions,  loans,  or 
financial  investments  which  mean  economic  control. 
The  world  too  little  knows  the  true  inwardness  of 
European  control  of  Turkey,  Persia,  and  China  by  means 
of  loans  and  irksome  commercial  treaties,  which  en- 
slave these  states  and  prevent  them  from  meeting  the 
demands  of  civilization.  Part  of  the  alleged  back- 
wardness of  these,  and  other  peoples  is  caused  by  the 
hindrances  to  progress  placed  by  the  "civilized" 
exploiting  nations  of  the  West.  They  have,  to  be  sure, 
insisted  upon  the  Open  Door,  but  this  merely  means 
that  each  demands  a  share  in  the  exploitation  and  makes 
the  position  of  the  victim  the  more  hopeless.  For  the 
latter  it  means  domination  through  financial  and 
commercial  forces. 

Finally,  there  is  the  cultural  sphere  of  a  nation, 
that  region  beyond  its  confines  in  which  its  ideals  and 
institutions  have  found  favor,  perhaps  been  to  some 
extent  adopted.  The  cultural  sphere  of  France  was 
some  centuries  ago  practically  the  whole  of  the  Western 


1 86    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

European  continent;  the  United  States  is  to-day  as  a 
whole  in  the  British  cultural  sphere,  as  certain  parts  of 
the  Balkans  are  in  the  Russian.  Missionaries  were 
formerly  the  advance  agent  of  a  national  culture  in 
a  new  country.  This  has  changed  since  the  middle  of 
the  last  century  and  to-day  the  forerunner  of  national 
influences  is  the  representative  of  trade.  Nowadays 
national  expansion  is  economic  first,  cultural  afterwards. 

Summarizing,  it  appears  that  nations  are  in  fact 
not  isolated,  but  that  beyond  their  boundaries  they 
have  semi-political,  commercial,  or  cultural  spheres  of 
dominion;  they  consist  not  merely  of  the  actual  nation, 
but  comprise  an  ill-defined  but  very  real  surrounding 
nebula.  It  is  in  the  latter  that  most  modern  wars 
are  born,  inasmuch  as  the  undefined  claims  of  one 
nation  come  into  contact  with  equally  vague  claims  of 
another,  and  have  the  reaction  of  causing  each  nation 
to  declare  that  its  vital  interests,  if  not  its  honor,  are 
at  stake,  and  must  be  protected. 

Now,  if  a  nation  is  not  a  geographic,  racial,  linguistic, 
religious,  economic,  or  cultural  unit,  and  if  it  is  not 
even  a  unified  personality,  what  then  is  it?  That  it  is 
none  of  these  things  does  not  mean  that  it  is  nothing. 
Surely  there  must  be  something  real  represented  by 
the  deep-seated  feelings  we  call  love  of  country  and 
patriotism.  Strip  the  nation  of  all  non-essentials, 
and  subject  the  essentials  to  rigid  and  demolishing 
logic,  there  still  remains  a  real  if  not  substantial  some- 
thing that  the  average  man  calls  his  country.  He  may 
not  be  able  to  tell  what  it  is,  but  he  swears  that  it  exists. 
To  him  it  is  the  embodiment  of  what  he  regards  as  the 
peculiar  ideals,  aspirations,  institutions,  and  qualities 
of  the  political  group  to  which  he  belongs.  It  is  a 
sentiment,  a  faith.  The  nation  is  something  spiritual, 


Edward  Krehbiel  187 

may  be  called  the  spiritual  state.  And  this  is 
quite  in  keeping  with  that  excellent  definition  not 
long  since  given  by  the  London  Nation.  "A  nation 
exists  when  its  component  units  believe  it  to  be  a 
nation." 

This  belief  had  a  basis.  In  the  first  place  there  was 
a  time  when  nations  were  largely  exclusive  or  isolated, 
the  time  of  rival  monarchs  who  possessed  the  several 
nations.  The  political  institutions  of  that  time  ex- 
pressed the  facts  of  existence  and  became  embodied 
in  human  notions  where  to  this  day  they  remain  as 
influential  traditions.  Furthermore,  the  concept  of  a 
nation  has  an  economic  basis,  for  all  the  business 
interests  of  a  country  favor  the  nation  as  an  institution 
which,  by  means  of  tariffs,  subsidies,  or  diplomacy, 
may  help  to  advance  their  own  enterprises  at  the 
expense  of  foreign  competitors.  The  heartiness  of 
approval  of  nationalism  by  these  interests  cannot  be 
overrrated.  Nationalism  is  also  advocated  by  what 
may  be  called  extra-national  commercialism — that  is, 
enterprises  which  lie  outside  of  national  bounds. 
Ventures  of  this  kind  find  the  nation  very  useful 
and  therefore  are  among  the  foremost  preachers  of 
nationalism. 

Whatever  basis  the  concept  of  nationalism  may  have 
had  originally,  that  basis  has  been  altered.  It  has 
already  been  noted  that  a  nation  is  to-day  not  a  unit 
in  language,  race,  religion,  culture,  or  spirit.  This 
is  in  its  essentials  a  product  of  the  nineteenth  century 
which,  along  with  a  wide  acceptance  of  democracy,  or 
human  equality,  broke  down  national  seclusion  and 
caused  national  boundaries  to  pale  away  in  many 
particulars.  Even  the  economic  interests,  which,  as 
has  just  appeared,  are  among  the  remaining  backers  of 


i88     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

nationalism,  have  in  engaging  in  extra-nationalyentures 
set  forces  in  motion  which  tend  to  weaken  nationalism. 
It  is  not  merely  or  chiefly  that  their  business  is  no 
longer  national,  it  is  the  use  they  make  of  the  nation. 
Capital  seeks  foreign  investments  because  they  yield 
greater  profits,  not  ordinarily  because  of  economic 
necessity.  It  finds  that  it  can  earn  larger  percentages 
when  it  is  free  from  the  control  and  burdensome  restric- 
tions and  taxes  of  the  home-land — that  is,  when  it  is 
free  to  make  money  fast  in  any  convenient  way. 
Though  it  escapes  the  control  of  the  nation,  it  does  not 
for  that  reason  divest  itself  of  national  protection. 
So  long  as  the  enterprise  succeeds,  control  by  the  nation 
would  be  resisted;  when  it  suffers,  the  nation  is  at  once 
called  upon  for  succor.  The  profits  of  success  go  to  the 
enterprise, — the  costs  of  making  it  successful  go  to 
the  nation — that  is,  to  the  taxpayer,  or  ultimately  to  the 
man  who,  by  conscription  if  necessary,  gives  his  life 
to  assure  that  success.  It  is  all  done  in  the  name  of 
patriotism  and  under  the  guise  of  protecting  citizens 
and  their  enterprises. 

Now,  there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  this 
international  commercialism  and  national  commercial- 
ism. The  latter  operates  within  the  nation  and  accepts 
national  jurisdiction  and  responsibility  along  with 
national  protection.  It  can  hardly  approve  of  extra- 
national  commercialism  which  takes  the  protection 
of  the  nation  and  evades  its  burdens  and  duties.  But 
even  if  capital  condones  it,  the  average  citizen  will  not 
long  remain  devoted  to  a  nationalism  which  means 
profits  for  corporate  interests,  and  taxes,  conscription, 
and  holocausts  like  that  in  Europe  for  him.  He  still 
conceives  of  the  nation  in  traditional  terms,  but  the 
great  war  has  set  everybody  to  thinking  about  national- 


Edward  Krehbiel  189 

ism,  and   already   the   voices   are   numerous   blaming 
nationalism  for  it. 

There  is  also  appearing  a  recognition  of  the  circum- 
stance that  the  belief  or  faith  in  the  existence  of  a 
nation  is  far  from  being  in  agreement  with  the  facts; 
that  in  his  economic  and  cultural  or  intellectual  exist- 
ence man  is  largely  international,  and  that  only  in  his 
political  being  is  he  national.  Nationalism  does  not 
represent  the  actual  conditions  under  which  individuals 
have  to  live.  The  result  is  an  insidious  conflict  within 
the  individual  between  his  national  and  his  non- 
national  being.  To  illustrate — here  is  an  American 
physician;  his  early  training  was  in  his  native  medical 
school  with  texts  and  under  instructors  familiarizing 
him  with  the  best  medical  experience  no  matter  what 
its  source.  He  continued  his  studies  abroad,  in  Vienna 
and  Berlin,  perhaps  Paris  or  London,  to  secure  the 
best,  not  a  national,  professional  education.  In  his 
practice  he  keeps  up  with  knowledge  in  his  special  field. 
To  do  so  he  becomes  a  member  of  medical  societies, 
carries  medical  literature.  Now  if  he  is  an  up-to-date 
physician — the  kind  we  prefer — his  national  existence 
professionally  considered  is  insignificant.  He  belongs 
to  the  medical  world  which  knows  no  boundaries.  He  has 
friends  and  acquaintances  among  so-called  foreigners; 
he  deals  with  them  upon  the  common  ground  of  mutual 
interest  and  understanding,  quite  unconscious  of  the 
accident  that  they  are  in  other  political  units;  he  tests 
the  fitness  of  their  ideas,  not  by  their  nationality,  but 
by  their  efficacy.  In  short,  in  this  medical  world 
there  is  none  of  the  alleged  inability  of  the  individuals 
of  one  nation  to  get  on  with  those  of  another,  none  of 
the  inevitable  and  "irrepressible  conflict"  between 
them.  And  so  it  is  in  the  artistic  world,  the  literary 


Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

world,  the  religious  world,  the  world  of  sport;  in  short, 
in  each  and  every  single  line  of  human  endeavor  the 
individual  understands  the  alien  as  well  as  his  country- 
man and  is  conscious  of  no  fundamental  clash. 

But  when  these  are  grouped  politically  there  is  a 
different  story;  there  are  said  to  be  fundamental 
differences  which  inevitably  lead  the  two  groups  to 
conflict.  The  dilemma  of  the  individual,  though  not 
fully  understood,  is  no  less  real.  He  is  led  by  patriotism 
or  compelled  by  law  to  place  his  allegiance  to  the  politi- 
cal group  to  which  he — often  by  accident — belongs, 
above  the  natural  and  professional  affiliations  through 
which  he  normally  earns  his  livelihood;  he  is  asked  to 
believe — and  apparently  does — that,  though  he  and 
his  fellow-citizens  and  their  professions  taken  severally 
are  in  time  of  peace  in  no  vital  conflict  with  foreigners, 
taken  .jointly  there  is  a  fundamental  conflict  between 
them,  one  which  can  be  resolved  only  by  the  shedding 
of  human  blood. 

There  must  be  something  wrong  in  the  situation. 
To  go  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  matter,  the  difficulty 
is  that  the  concept  of  a  nation — the  nation  of  imagi- 
nation— is  no  longer  in  keeping  with  every-day  facts. 
The  last  century  has  seen  a  steady  and  enormous 
development  of  internationalism,  which  is  a  convenient 
name  for  the  above  described  extension  of  each  nation 
beyond  its  boundaries,  with  a  resultant  interpenetra- 
tion  and  interweaving  of  the  nations;  political  con- 
ceptions, however,  have  stood  about  where  they  were 
and  therefore  represent  conditions  that  are  past  forever. 
Thus  the  conception  that  there  is  a  fundamental 
difference  between  nations  still  lives,  though  the 
conditions  which  gave  it  birth  are  no  more. 

The  old  nationalism  is  then  no  longer  the  true  unit 


Edward  Krehbiel  191 

of  society,  even  if  for  the  moment  it  is  dominant.  The 
true  cohesive  unity  to-day  is  that  represented  by  those 
human  interests  of  every  kind  which  draw  individuals 
of  any  geographical  area  together  into  a  bond  of  com- 
mon understanding.  This  new  unity  is  increasing. 
The  time  will  come  when  it  will  be  so  patent,  and  will 
have  so  influenced  public  thought,  that  nationalism 
will  be  recognized  as  an  old  wine  bottle  not  fit  to  hold 
the  new  wine,  when  some  form  of  international  organi- 
zation and  cooperation  in  harmony  with  life  will  be 
demanded. 

The  bearing  of  all  this  upon  "preparedness,"  which 
is  the  topic  of  the  hour  and  which  is  to  figure  largely 
in  this  Conference,  is  highly  important.  Shall  we 
bolster  up  an  anachronistic  nationalism?  Shall  we, 
by  arming,  stimulate  national  conflicts?  Merely  to 
arm  will  be  regarded  as  a  threat  by  the  rest  of  the 
world,  may  result  in  alliances  abroad  now  deemed 
impossible,  to  counterbalance  the  sudden  show  of 
force  of  the  giant  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Alas, 
if  this  is  all  we  achieve !  Alas  for  the  ideals  we  once 
held!  For  we  were  the  forerunners  in  democracy 
and  the  equality  of  man,  we  are  the  amalgamator  of 
peoples,  we  are  the  world's  greatest  federation.  Should 
these  principles  now  give  way  to  a  nationalism  hostile 
to  all  others  ?  For  nationalism,  militarism,  and  absolut- 
ism, are  a  sort  of  trinity  that  is  ultimately  inseparable. 

We  have  another  choice,  one  more  in  keeping  with 
our  traditions.  We  may  prepare  if  that  be  necessary; 
but  we  must  do  it  with  the  public  announcement  to  the 
world  that  we  do  so  only  because  compelled  to  by 
the  national  spirit  elsewhere,  and  must  declare,  in  a 
binding  way,  that  it  is  not  for  the  sole  sake  of  reinvig- 
orating  our  nationalism.  In  proof  of  our  intention,  we 


192     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

must  accompany  our  preparedness  program  with 
a  standing  offer  to  other  nations  that  we  are  ready  to 
abate  nationalism  just  as  soon  as  others  do,  and  to 
enter  into  any  international  federation  which  has  the 
authority  to  decide  what  is  right  and  the  power  to 
enforce  it.  In  this  way  preparedness  will  be  more 
than  a  mere  menace,  a  mere  resuscitating  of  nationalism. 
We  shall  be  living  up  to  our  traditions  as  believers  in 
democracy  and  federation.  We  shall  have  done  some- 
thing to  advance  the  world  in  the  course  toward  co- 
operative unity  which,  the  foregoing  has  tried  to  show, 
is  already  so  largely  prepared  for. 


FEDERATION    OR    INTER-STATE    ANARCHY: 

THE  WORLD  CRISIS  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF 

AMERICAN  HISTORY,  1783-9 

BY  GEORGE  W.  NASMYTH 

I.      THE  DEEPER   ISSUES  OF  THE  WAR 

TWO  years  ago  the  immense  majority  of  people 
thought  that  foreign  relations  had  no  connection 
with  the  interests  and  intimate  factors  of  their  own 
daily  life.  But  since  August,  1914,  I  will  venture  the 
assertion  that  every  one  of  us  has  been  affected  in  some 
way  by  the  chain  of  events  which  followed  the  assassi- 
nation of  an  Austrian  Crown  Prince  in  an  obscure 
city  of  southeastern  Europe.  Without  our  knowledge 
or  consent,  we  have  all  been  elected  citizens  of  the 
world,  and  each  of  us  finds  that  he  is  being  taxed 
without  representation  to  carry  on  the  great  war  in 
Europe.  We  find  the  man  in  the  street  reading  long 
diplomatic  documents,  dealing  with  technical  problems 
of  international  trade  and  the  rights  of  neutrals.  We 
find  the  great  daily  newspapers  publishing,  in  response 
to  the  newly  awakened  demand,  complete  editions  of 
the  White  Book,  the  Red  Book,  the  Blue  Book,  the  Orange 
Book,  the  Green  Book,  and  all  the  other  whitewash 
books.  In  New  York  City  the  discussions  in  Times 
Square  became  so  heated  that  the  publication  of  war 
bulletins  had  to  be  forbidden  by  the  police.  All  of 
which  witnesses  to  the  fact  that  Americans  are  deeply 

13  193 


194    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

and  intimately  concerned  with  the  problems  of  the 
Great  War  and  its  underlying  issues. 

What  are  the  underlying  issues  of  the  war?  If 
you  read  the  speeches  of  the  statesmen  and  leaders  of 
public  opinion  in  all  the  belligerent  nations,  you  get 
the  same  answer  from  each.  The  object  for  which 
they  are  fighting  is  security  from  the  danger  of  militar- 
ism and  aggression  in  the  future,  and  a  chance  to 
develop  their  civilization  in  peace.  The  same  under- 
lying idea  in  varying  forms  is  expressed  by  Asquith 
and  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Lloyd  George  and  Winston 
Churchill  in  England;  by  the  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  and  the  Kaiser  in  Germany ;  by  Delcasse  and 
Viviani  in  France  and  by  the  Czar  and  the  leaders  of 
the  Duma,  in  Russia.  Various  means  are  proposed 
for  obtaining  this  object,  from  the  crushing  of  the  enemy 
and  the  parcelling  out  of  his  territories  to  the  replacing 
of  the  Balance  of  Power  by  a  concert  of  the  powers. 
But  no  matter  what  the  difference  in  method,  they  are 
all  agreed  that  the  object  for  which  they  are  fighting 
is  security  and  a  more  lasting  peace  for  the  future. 
As  President  Wilson  said  in  his  speech  at  Columbus, 
Ohio,  the  nations  are  determined  that  no  patched-up 
peace  shall  be  the  result  of  the  Great  War. 

In  America  the  interest  created  by  the  issues  of  the 
Great  War  have  been  confused  since  last  summer  in  the 
hysterical  campaign  for  preparedness.  Militarists  and 
anti-militarists  have  both  drawn  a  lesson  from  the 
war  in  Europe  which  fitted  in  with  their  preconceived 
ideas.  A  recent  cartoon  shows  two  men  tugging  at  the 
coat-tails  of  Uncle  Sam,  one  calling  his  attention  to 
Europe,  where  preparedness  and  the  increase  of  arma- 
ments have  led  to  the  breakdown  of  civilization,  and 
the  other  calling  his  attention  to  Asia,  where  the  lack 


George  W.  Nasmyth  195 

of  preparedness  and  of  armaments  threatens  to  break  up 
the  Celestial  Empire.  Each  side  is  greatly  strengthened 
in  its  own  convictions  as  the  result  of  the  experience 
of  the  war.  Failing  to  convince  each  other  by  argu- 
ment they  have  resorted  to  calling  names.  In  a  book 
written  by  the  president  of  one  of  our  large  munitions 
corporations,  called,  felicitously  enough,  Defenseless 
America,  and  of  which  a  professor  of  one  of  the  American 
universities  has  said,  "It  has  a  moral  as  obvious  as 
garlic,"  professional  pacifists  are  called  some  score  of 
names,  and  in  parts  it  seems  as  though  abuse  were 
actually  considered  an  adequate  substitute  for  argu- 
ments. The  anti-militarists,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
not  been  slow  in  laying  the  blame  for  the  war  at  the 
door  of  the  militarists,  even  though  they  have  not 
been  quite  so  unrestrained  in  their  language. 

Now  the  point  I  wish  to  make  is  that  this  whole 
dispute  between  pacifists  and  militarists  has  led  to  a 
misconception  of  the  essential  nature  of  the  underlying 
issues  of  the  war.  The  fundamental  issue  is  not  between 
more  armaments  or  less  armaments.  The  question 
of  militarism  vs.  democracy  in  the  future  is  not  a 
question  which  is  capable  of  solution  within  the  nation. 
It  is  a  world  question.  Lincoln  said  a  half  century 
ago  that  the  United  States  cannot  exist  half-slave  and 
half-free  and  the  issue  that  I  want  to  present  to  you 
is  that  the  world  to-day  cannot  exist  half-militaristic 
and  half-democratic.  Militarism,  in  other  words,  is 
merely  a  symptom  of  a  deep-lying  disease.  That 
disease  is  international  anarchy.  It  is  of  no  avail  to 
try  and  cure  the  disease  by  treating  the  symptoms.  We 
shall  only  find  the  solution  of  the  problem  when  we 
realize  that  the  real  contest  is  not  between  militarists 
and  pacifists,  but  between  world  federalists  and  anti- 


196    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

federalists.  The  fundamental  issue  which  the  human 
race  has  to  solve  at  the  end  of  this  war  is  not  increased 
armament  or  disarmament,  it  is  the  question  of  whether 
we  shall  continue  the  old  system  of  international 
anarchy  or  replace  it  with  a  system  of  world  organiza- 
tion under  justice  and  law. 

One  of  the  events  which  has  made  it  clear  that 
the  underlying  issue  is  that  between  world  organization 
and  international  anarchy  is  the  rising  demand  for  a 
League  of  Peace,  wrhich  has  become  prominent  in  neutral 
as  well  as  belligerent  countries.  Since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  I  have  received  more  than  thirty  programs 
of  constructive  peace  from  important  political  groups  in 
Europe  and  America.  The  remarkable  thing  about 
them  is  that  they  are  in  complete  agreement  upon 
this  principle,  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  war 
is  to  be  found  only  in  some  form  of  world  government, 
with  a  world  court,  a  world  legislature,  and  the  begin- 
ning, at  least,  of  a  world  executive.  For  the  first  time 
in  the  history  of  the  international  movement  we  have 
militarists  and  pacifists,  meeting  together  on  common 
ground,  in  this  demand  for  a  League  of  Peace. 

Now  if  this  is  the  underlying  issue  of  the  war,  if  the 
fundamental  question  is  that  between  federation  and 
international  anarchy,  the  experience  of  the  thirteen 
original  States  in  that  critical  period  of  American 
history  from  1783-9  should  throw  a  great  deal  of  light 
upon  the  problems  of  the  future. 

2.      THE  CRITICAL  PERIOD  OF  AMERICAN  HISTORY 

If  we  go  back  to  the  years  preceding  the  adoption 
of  the  Federal  Constitution,  we  find  a  conditon  of 
inter-State  anarchy,  strikingly  like  that  which  ob- 


George  W.  Nasmyth  197 

tains  in  the  world  to-day.  Up  to  1783  the  colonies 
had  been  held  together  by  the  fear  of  a  common  en- 
emy, but  with  the  treaty  of  peace  that  ended  the  Revo- 
lutionary War  this  external  pressure  ceased  to  hold 
them  together  and  the  internal  forces  of  mutual  interest 
and  common  sympathies  had  not  yet  become  strong 
enough  to  overcome  the  drift  toward  anarchy.  The 
old  ideas  of  absolute  sovereignty  and  independence  were 
still  very  powerful  between  the  States  as  they  are 
between  the  nations  to-day.  The  great  mass  of  the 
people  felt  themselves  to  be  Massachusetts  men  or 
Virginians  before  they  were  Americans.  Each  State 
feared  aggression  on  the  part  of  its  neighbors.  Bound- 
ary disputes  between  the  States  led  to  bloodshed  and 
ever-increasing  bitterness,  while  tariff  wars,  commercial 
boycotts,  and  retaliation  measures  between  the  States 
emphasized  the  weakness  of  the  central  government 
and  the  steady  drift  during  this  period  towards  war 
and  disaster. 

3.      FEAR  OF  AGGRESSION 

It  is  difficult  for  us  to  imagine  the  state  of  mind  in 
which  the  people  of  each  State  looked  upon  those  of 
the  other  States  as  people  of  a  foreign  nation.  Fisher 
Ames  gives  us  an  insight  into  the  popular  feeling  at 
the  time  when  he  wrote  in  1782 : 

Instead  of  feeling  as  a  nation,  a  State  is  our  country. 
We  look  with  indifference,  often  with  hatred,  fear,  and 
aversion,  to  the  other  States.1 

In  1781,  while  Maryland  was  holding  out  for  the  ces- 
sion of  the  Northwest  Territory,  we  find  threats  and 
1  Fisher  Ames,  Works,  vol.  i.,  p.  113. 


198    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

language  curiously  foreshadowing  the  international 
sentiment  in  certain  quarters  at  the  present  day  when 

hotheads  were  even  heard  to  say  that  if  Maryland  should 
persist  any  longer  in  her  refusal  to  join  the  Confederation, 
she  ought  to  be  summarily  divided  up  between  the  neigh- 
boring States  and  her  name  erased  from  the  map. I 

When  Rhode  Island  refused  to  join  the  federation, 
Judge  Dana  even  proposed  to  annihilate  "abominable 
Rhode  Island"  and  divide  her  territory  between 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut.2 

North  Carolina  had  laid  the  foundations  of  a  navy 
during  the  Revolutionary  War,  and  each  State  main- 
tained its  own  military  force,  so  that  suspicions  and 
fears  of  aggression  on  the  part  of  other  States  were 
common.  Some  of  the  speeches  in  the  State  Assemblies 
give  us  an  insight  into  the  atmosphere  of  alarm  and  the 
nightmare  of  fear  which  was  created  by  this  condition 
of  inter-State  anarchy.  For  example,  on  May  12, 1787, 
General  Huntington,  who  had  served  in  the  Continental 
Army,  rose  in  the  Assembly  of  Connecticut  and  ad- 
dressed the  Speaker  as  follows : 

Some  gentlemen  were  of  the  belief  that  the  Confederation 
was  sufficient  unto  itself,  and  others  held  that  the  country 
would  be  better  without  any.  The  Confederation  had  been 
framed  while  America  was  smarting  under  the  hand  of 
wilful  power.  It  seemed  to  have  been  the  leading  object 
of  the  framers  to  set  up  an  authority  without  bestowing 
upon  it  any  power  whatever.  No  penalty  was  fastened 
to  a  breach  of  the  contract  between  the  States.  No  means 
of  enforcing  obedience  existed.  The  observance  of  the 
articles  hung  solely  on  the  goodwill  and  pleasure  of  each 

1  Fiske,  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  p.  195. 
3  Austin,  James  T.,  Life  of  Elbridge  Gerry,  vol.  ii.,  p.  67. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  199 

State.  He  was  no  prophet,  but  his  calculations  must 
indeed  be  wrong  if  diversity  of  sentiment  and  manners, 
if  local  circumstances,  if  the  unjust  distribution  of  the  debt, 
and  the  jealousies  that  sprang  from  trade,  did  not  bring 
forth  heartburnings  and  strife  of  the  most  serious  kind. 
God  only  knew  where  and  when  they  would  end.  Was  it 
wise  to  trust  the  event  to  chance  and  leave  government 
to  arise  out  of  the  distractions  of  the  mob?  Surely  it  was 
far  better,  in  a  cool  and  dispassionate  hour,  to  consult  with 
the  sister  States  on  the  fitness  of  making  needed  changes 
in  the  Confederation.  A  man  removed  from  scenes  of 
danger,  blessed  with  plenty,  and  compassed  by  kind  neigh- 
bors, was  apt  to  hug  himself  in  his  ease,  and  think  the 
independent  State  of  Connecticut  a  host  unto  herself. 
Was  this  so?  Far  from  it.  She  was  open  to  the  insults 
and  the  depredations  of  a  single  ship-of-war.  On  all  sides 
were  treacherous  neighbors.  He  remembered  to  have 
heard  a  gentleman  say,  in  the  debate  upon  another  question, 
that  Poland  was  cut  up  out  of  pity  for  her  people.  Who 
knew  how  long  it  would  be  ere  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island, 
and  New  York  would  join,  and  in  the  excess  of  their  love 
part  out  Connecticut  among  them?  What  security  had 
she  against  the  turbulent  strife  of  the  one,  the  selfishness 
of  the  other,  and  the  righteousness  of  the  third?  How  long 
would  it  be  before  the  rights  of  these  States  began  to  clash? 
In  twenty  years,  nay,  in  ten,  Massachusetts  would  awake 
to  the  fact  that  she  had  the  sole  right  to  the  fisheries  on 
her  coast.  Connecticut  fishermen  would  be  driven  from 
Nantucket  shoals.  Complaints  would  come  in  to  the  As- 
sembly, would  be  sent  on  to  Congress,  and  a  recommenda- 
tion made  by  that  body  to  Massachusetts  to  give  indemnity 
for  the  outrage  and  the  loss.  Did  any  one  for  a  moment 
suppose  that  she  would  do  it?  Alas,  poor  fool!  Massa- 
chusetts would  write  a  long  letter  of  justification  to  Congress 
and  close  it  with  a  reminder  of  the  old  Continental  money 
and  the  renowned  expedition  to  Penobscot  Bay.  Some 
might  say  these  fears  were  visionary,  and  that  his  senti- 


200    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

ments  on  government  came  from  a  military  way  of  thinking, 
or  the  baneful  influence  of  the  Cincinnati.  Yet  he  would 
always  speak  the  dictates  of  duty  and  of  truth,  and  declare 
himself  for  the  convention,  the  impost,  and  an  efficient 
General  Government.  * 

4.      BOUNDARY  DISPUTES 

Still  more  dangerous  than  these  omnipresent  fears  of 
aggression  were  the  boundary  disputes  which  broke  out 
at  intervals  between  the  States  and  led  to  considerable 
bloodshed.  Of  these  the  Wyoming  Valley,  which  lies 
in  the  northern  part  of  what  is  now  Pennsylvania,  and 
on  a  line  drawn  directly  west  from  Connecticut, 
threatened  for  a  time  to  become  the  Alsace-  Lorraine  of 
the  New  World.  The  region  was  populated  by  settlers 
from  Connecticut  but  was  claimed  by  Pennsylvania, 
and  the  chronic  dispute  between  the  two  States  was 
decided  at  last  by  the  award  of  the  prize  to  Pennsyl- 
vania, with  the  government  of  Connecticut  submitting 
as  gracefully  as  possible. 

The  Pennsylvania  Legislature  looked  with  no  friendly 
feeling  upon  the  Connecticut  settlers,  who  were  re- 
garded as  trespassers.  After  the  terrible  winter  of 
1784,  which  left  the  people  starving  from  cold  and 
hunger,  a  scheme  was  devised  for  driving  out  the 
settlers  and  partitioning  their  land  among  a  company 
of  speculators.  Instead  of  answering  the  cry  of  misery 
which  went  up  from  the  valley,  for  measures  of  relief, 
the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  sent  a  force  of  militia 
to  Wyoming,  commanded  by  an  unscrupulous  captain 

1  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  Chapter  on 
"The  Breaking  up  of  the  Confederation,"  vol.  i.,  p.  395.  From  the 
proceedings  of  the  General  Assembly  of  Connecticut,  American  Museum, 
October,  1787. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  201 

named  Patterson.  The  ostensible  purpose  was  to 
assist  in  restoring  order  in  the  valley,  but  the  behavior 
of  the  soldiers  was  such  as  would  have  disgraced  a  horde 
of  barbarians.  They  stole  what  they  could  find,  dealt 
out  blows  to  the  men  and  insults  to  the  women,  until 
their  violence  was  met  with  violence  in  return.  Then 
Patterson  attacked  the  settlement,  turned  some  five- 
hundred  people  out-of-doors,  and  burned  their  houses 
to  the  ground.  The  wretched  victims,  many  of  them 
tender  women,  infirm  old  men,  or  little  children,  were 
driven  into  the  wilderness  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet 
and  told  to  find  their  way  to  Connecticut  without 
further  delay.  Heartrending  scenes  ensued.  Many 
died  of  exhaustion,  or  furnished  food  for  wolves.  All 
the  Connecticut  men  in  the  neighboring  country  flew 
to  arms;  men  were  killed  on  both  sides  and  presently 
Patterson  was  besieged.  A  regiment  of  soldiers  was 
then  sent  from  Philadelphia  under  Colonel  Armstrong, 
who  held  a  parley  with  the  Connecticut  men  and 
persuaded  them  to  lay  down  their  arms,  assuring 
them  on  his  honor  that  they  would  meet  with  no  ill 
treatment  and  that  their  enemy  Patterson  should  be 
disarmed  also.  Having  thus  fallen  into  the  soldiers' 
clutches,  they  were  forthwith  treated  as  prisoners. 
Seventy-six  of  them  were  handcuffed  and  sent  under 
guard,  some  to  Easton  and  some  to  Northumberland, 
where  they  were  thrown  into  jail. 

Great  was  the  indignation  in  New  England  when 
these  deeds  were  heard  of.  The  matter  had  become 
very  serious.  A  war  between  Pennsylvania  and  Con- 
necticut might  easily  have  grown  out  of  it  and  was 
averted  by  the  merest  accident.  The  board  of  censors, 
a  singular  institution  provided  for  in  the  Pennsylvania 
Constitution,  happened  to  meet  just  at  that  time  and 


202     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

condemned  unreservedly  the  conduct  of  Patterson  and 
Armstrong.  A  hot  controversy  ensued  between  the 
Legislature  and  the  censors,  and  public  sympathy  was 
gradually  awakened  for  these  sufferers.  The  wicked- 
ness of  the  affair  began  to  dawn  upon  the  people's 
mind  and  they  were  ashamed  of  what  had  been  done. 
Patterson  and  Armstrong  were  punished,  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Legislature  disavowed  their  acts,  and  it  was 
ordered  that  full  reparation  should  be  made  to  the 
persecuted  settlers  of  Wyoming. x 

Another  critical  territorial  dispute  was  that  which 
raged  about  the  Green  Mountain  district  and  the 
Upper  Connecticut  valley.  This  dispute  had  been 
smouldering  between  the  States  of  New  York  and  New 
Hampshire  for  many  years,  while  the  ' '  Green  Mountain 
boys"  defended  the  claims  of  Vermont.  For  years  the 
peace  of  "new  Connecticut  alias  Vermont"  was  dis- 
turbed by  the  contentions  of  two  parties  among  its  pop- 
ulation, one  called  Yorkers,  and  the  other  Vermonters. 
For  seven  years,  from  1777  to  1784,  the  history  of  this 
region  is  an  almost  unbelievable  record  of  wanton 
attacks  and  reprisals,  of  ambuscades  laid  in  the  dead 
of  night,  of  murder,  arson,  and  bloodshed  between 
these  two  factions  of  the  settlers.2  Believing  that  the 
territory  was  about  to  be  partitioned  between  New- 
York  and  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts  began  to 
go  through  her  old  charters  to  see  if  she  could  not  put 
in  a  claim  for  a  part  of  the  spoils.  Then  Vermont 
became  aggressive,  annexed  towns  east  of  the  Connecti- 
cut River,  and  asserted  sovereignty  over  towns  in 
New  York  as  far  as  the  Hudson.  New  York  sent 

1  Fiske,  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  pp.  147-150.  See  also 
McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i.,  pp.  210-216. 
3  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i.,  p.  347. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  203 

troops  to  the  threatened  frontier.  New  Hampshire 
prepared  to  do  likewise,  and  war  seemed  inevitable. 
Hostilities  were  only  averted  by  the  mediation  of 
Washington,  who  appeared  as  peacemaker  and  pre- 
vailed upon  Governor  Chittenden  of  Vermont  to  use 
his  influence  in  getting  the  dangerous  claims  with- 
drawn. z 

Following  the  example  of  Vermont  in  withdrawing 
from  New  York  in  1777,  several  other  States  made 
organized  attempts  to  set  off  outlying  portions  as 
independent  governments.  In  1782  the  western  colo- 
nies of  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  threatened  to  break 
off  and  form  a  new  state.  In  1785-1786  the  so-called 
state  of  "Franklin,  "  within  the  territory  of  what  is  now 
eastern  Tennessee,  had  a  constitution,  a  legislature,  and 
governor,  and  carried  on  a  border  warfare  with  the 
government  of  North  Carolina,  to  which  its  people 
owed  allegiance.  The  people  of  Kentucky  and  Maine 
held  conventions  looking  towards  separations.  Dis- 
orders in  many  other  States  in  the  year  1786,  culminat- 
ing in  Shays's  Rebellion  in  Massachusetts,  testified 
to  the  condition  of  anarchy  resulting  from  the  lack 
of  a  strong  central  government,  and  it  was  only  by 
going  beyond  its  constitutional  powers  that  Congress 
was  able  to  assist  the  Massachusetts  authorities  in 
restoring  order. 

5.      TARIFF    WARS 

Another  serious  cause  of  dissension  was  the  tariff 
wars  which  raged  between  the  different  States.  Penn- 
sylvania discriminated  against  New  Jersey.  In  1 787  the 
New  York  Assembly  passed  an  act  designed  to  stop 

1  Fiske,  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  pp.  151-152. 


204    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  trade  coming  from  New  Jersey  and  from  Connecti- 
cut, decreeing  that  every  ship  from  these  States  of  more 
than  twelve  tons  burden  should  henceforth  be  entered 
and  cleared  at  the  customs  house  in  the  same  manner 
as  produce  that  came  from  London  or  any  other  foreign 
port.  New  Jersey  retaliated  by  laying  a  tax  of  thirty 
pounds  a  month  upon  a  lighthouse  which  New  York 
had  built  upon  a  plot  of  land  on  Sandy  Hook.  No 
official  action  was  taken  by  the  Connecticut  Assembly, 
but  the  business  men  in  New  London,  whose  trade  had 
been  ruined  by  the  New  York  tariff  law,  formed  a 
league  which  bound  all  who  signed  its  agreement,  under 
a  penalty  of  fifty  pounds  to  be  collected  by  a  civil 
process  in  any  court  of  law,  not  to  send  into  the  State 
of  New  York  any  article  whatever,  or  to  furnish  any 
craft  bound  for  that  State  with  any  kind  of  lading  for 
one  year  from  the  2Oth  of  July,  1787.  The  agreement 
was  faithfully  kept.  Connecticut  opened  her  ports  to 
British  shipping  as  soon  as  the  other  three  New  Eng- 
land States,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  New 
Hampshire,  closed  their  ports.  Then  Connecticut 
followed  this  up  by  laying  duties  upon  imports  from 
Massachusetts.  Discrimination  everywhere  led  to 
retaliation,  and  meetings  were  held,  resolutions  passed, 
which  testified  to  the  growing  spirit  of  bitterness  and 
hostility.  As  Fiske  says: 

these  meetings,  resolves,  and  retaliations  bore  an  ominous 
likeness  to  the  meetings  and  resolves  which  in  the  years 
before  1775  had  heralded  a  state  of  war,  and  but  for  the 
good  work  done  by  the  federal  convention  another  five 
years  would  certainly  not  have  elapsed  before  shots  would 
have  been  fired  and  seeds  of  perennial  hatred  sown  on  the 
shores  that  look  toward  Manhattan  Island.1 
1  Fiske,  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  p.  47. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  205 

6.      WEAKNESS  OF  THE  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT 

The  chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  world  federation 
is  the  doctrine  of  State  sovereignty,  and  this  was  the 
chief  obstacle  which  had  to  be  overcome  in  the  federation 
of  the  Thirteen  States.  This  was  made  clear  by  the 
Articles  of  Confederation  of  1786,  which  said: 

Each  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  inde- 
pendence, and  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  which  is 
not  by  this  Confederation  especially  delegated  to  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 

As  Hayne  said  in  his  famous  debate  with  Webster 
in  1830: 

Before  the  Constitution  each  State  was  an  independent 
sovereignty,  possessing  all  the  rights  and  powers  appertaining 
to  independent  nations.  .  .  .  After  the  Constitution  was 
formed  they  remained  equally  sovereign  and  independent 
as  to  powers  not  expressly  delegated  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment. The  true  nature  of  their  Federal  Constitution, 
therefore,  is  ...  a  compact  to  which  the  States  are  parties. 

The  significant  word  here  is  "compact"  which  is 
equivalent  to  "treaty."  The  Articles  of  Confederation 
had  been  a  compact,  and  it  was  Webster's  contention 
that  the  Constitution  adopted  in  1789  was  not  of  this 
nature. 

It  has  often  been  objected  that  The  Hague  Confer- 
ences are  not  legislative  bodies,  but  a  diplomatic 
assembly  of  sovereign  states.  This  contention  is 
opposed  by  one  of  the  eminent  German  professors  of 
international  law,  Prof.  Walter  Schucking,  of  Marburg 
University,  who  maintains  that  The  Hague  marks  the 


206    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

beginning  of  a  real  union  of  the  nations.1  The  same 
question  was  hotly  debated  in  the  transition  period  of 
American  history,  and  even  John  Adams  said,  "Con- 
gress is  not  a  legislative,  but  a  diplomatic  assembly."2 
McLaughlin  tells  us  that  "Washington  lamented  the 
monster  sovereignty  which  had  taken  fast  hold  on  the 
States,"3  and  unanimity  of  action  was  preserved  only 
by  the  influence  of  a  few  great  men.  And  G.  D. 
Curtis  tells  us  (The  Constitution,  Chapter  IV) : 

The  Confederation  was  formed  on  the  principle  of  a 
league, — a  compact  between  sovereign  states  for  certain 
purposes. 

The  Hague  Conferences  may  be  compared  to  the 
Continental  Congress  in  its  educational  effect  upon 
public  opinion  towards  unity  and  federation.  As  one 
historian  said, 

the  Confederation  had  performed  an  indispensable  service. 
It  had  educated  the  American  people  to  the  point  where 
they  were  willing  to  accept  a  permanent  federal  union. 

As  the  "Federalists"  put  it,  "A  nation  without  a 
national  government  is  an  awful  spectacle."  If  the 
Federalist  could  have  looked  out  upon  the  battlefields 
of  Europe  to-day,  would  he  not  have  a  right  to  say, 
"A  world  without  a  world  government  is  an  awful 
spectacle"? 

Looking  back  from  this  distance  we  are  apt  to  under- 
estimate the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  federation,  as 

1  Schucking,  Das  Werk  vom  Haag. 

'  Defense  of  the  Constitution  of  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  1786  (p.  362). 

»  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United  States, 
vol.  i.,  p.  38. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  207 

compared  with  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  world 
federation  at  the  present  time.  The  diversities  of 
language,  race,  nationality,  religion,  economic  interests, 
and  social  and  political  conditions,  were  infinitely  less 
among  the  Thirteen  Original  States  than  they  are 
among  the  forty-eight  nations  of  the  world,  we  are 
apt  to  think.  But  a  study  of  the  facts  of  the  period 
reveal  deep-lying  differences  between  English-speaking 
Connecticut  and  Dutch  New  York,  between  free 
Massachusetts  and  slave-holding  North  Carolina.  On 
account  of  the  lack  of  means  of  communication,  the 
States  were  widely  separated  in  thought  and  diverse 
in  interests.  The  best  post-road  in  America  was  that 
between  Boston  and  New  York,  yet  it  required  a 
longer  time  to  traverse  the  distance  between  these  two 
cities,  starting  each  morning  at  three  o'clock  and 
traveling  until  far  into  the  night,  than  it  now  requires 
to  go  from  America  to  Europe.  It  would  have  required 
longer  to  go  from  Massachusetts  to  Georgia  than  it 
now  takes  to  travel  around  the  world.  In  1 786  Madison 
wrote  to  Jefferson : 

Of  affairs  in  Georgia  I  know  as  little  as  of  those  in 
Kamskatka. 

Governor  Clinton  in  the  New  York  debates  on  the 
Constitution  repeatedly  emphasized  the  enormous 
distances  and  the  diversity  of  interests  as  an  obstacle 
which  would  make  real  federation  impossible.  In 
one  of  his  speeches  he  said : 

When  we  take  a  view  of  the  United  States,  we  find  them 
embracing  interests  as  various  as  their  territory  is  extensive. 
Their  habits,  their  productions,  their  resources,  and  their 
political  and  commercial  regulations  are  as  different  as 


208    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

those  of  any  nation  upon  earth.  A  general  law,  therefore, 
which  might  be  well  calculated  for  Georgia,  might  operate 
most  disadvantageously  and  cruelly  upon  New  York.1 

7.      THE    PROBLEM  OF  REPRESENTATION 

One  of  the  difficult  problems  which  looms  up  ahead 
in  the  task  of  world  federation  is  that  of  determining 
the  proper  basis  of  representation.  Shall  the  principle 
of  equality  between  states  be  maintained,  or  should 
representation  be  based  upon  the  population,  taking 
into  account  the  factors  of  education,  economic  re- 
sources, and  the  general  standard  of  civilization  ?  This 
is  the  problem  which  almost  wrecked  the  Constitutional 
Convention,  and  its  solution  as  found  in  the  Connecticut 
Compromise,  which  established  the  principle  of  equality 
in  the  Senate  and  of  representation  on  the  basis  of 
population  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  may  help 
in  the  solution  of  the  world  problem.  For  the  solution 
of  the  problem  of  the  representation  of  backward  and 
uneducated  populations,  the  transition  device  adopted 
for  the  slave  States  whereby  three-fifths  of  the  negro 
population  was  added  to  the  white  population  in 
determining  the  total  representation  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  may  suggest  a  possible  compromise 
measure. 

8.      ECONOMIC  PRESSURE  TOWARDS  FEDERATION 

What  are  the  forces  making  for  world  federation? 
Can  they  be  counted  upon  in  the  absence  of  any  common 
enemy,  to  hold  the  nations  together  and  to  overcome 
the  centrifugal  forces  of  disintegration?  Here  again 
the  critical  period  in  American  history  throws  light 

1  Elliott,  Debate  on  the  Adoption  of  the  Constitution,  vol.  ii.,  p.  262. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  209 

upon  the  world  problem.  The  economic  paralysis 
which  followed  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  confusion 
caused  by  embargoes  and  retaliatory  tariff  acts,  and, 
most  important  of  all,  the  issuance  of  paper  money 
and  the  consequent  depreciation  of  the  currency, 
produced  such  disorders  in  the  States  that  conditions 
became  intolerable  and  even  conservative  men  felt 
the  urgent  need  of  inter-State  organization.  In  Rhode 
Island  the  revolutionists  got  control  of  the  government 
and  began  the  issuing  of  the  "Know  Ye"  measures, 
which  soon  made  the  State  long  thereafter  known  as 
Rogue's  Island  and  its  citizens  a  by-word  among  the 
other  states.  In  Massachusetts  Shays's  Rebellion  in 
1786  was  a  significant  warning  of  economic  distress, 
and  armed  mobs  arose  at  Exeter,  New  Hampshire, 
and  at  Windsor  and  Rutland,  Vermont.  With  these 
ominous  warnings,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  more 
sober-minded  people  of  the  States  soon  realized  the 
imperative  need  for  a  strong  central  government 
with  power  to  create  a  stable  currency,  to  regulate 
inter-State  trade,  and  to  save  them  from  the  anarchy 
toward  which  they  were  steadily  drifting. 

Europe  has  been  following  the  direct  road  to  anarchy 
which  the  states  followed  in  that  critical  period.  Eco- 
nomic exhaustion,  the  piling  up  of  an  unbearable  burden 
of  war  debts,  and  the  inflation  of  the  currency  are  going 
on  in  each  of  the  belligerent  countries.  If  in  addition 
to  these  tremendous  burdens  an  attempt  should  be 
made  after  the  war  to  maintain  the  old  conditions  of 
international  anarchy,  with  its  inevitable  renewal  of 
the  armament  competition,  we  shall  have  one  break- 
down after  another,  with  bankruptcy,  attempted 
repudiation  of  debt,  and  revolution,  until  it  is  realized 
that  the  deep-lying  cause  of  all  these  disturbances  is  the 
14 


210     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

system  of  international  anarchy,  and  that  the  only 
cure  is  to  be  found  in  world  organization,  beginning 
with  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

9.      INTER-STATE    CONTROL   OF    UNDEVELOPED    REGIONS 

One  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  establish- 
ment of  a  strong  central  government  was  its  control 
of  the  great  unorganized  Northwest  Territory.  Parts 
of  it  were  claimed  by  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut, 
whose  charters  did  not  specify  any  western  boundary. 
New  York  laid  claim  to  it  because  it  had  belonged  to 
the  five  nations  of  the  Indians  over  whom  New  York 
State  had  assumed  a  protectorate,  and  Virginia  claimed 
it  because  she  was  the  "Old  Dominion"  to  whom  the 
whole  continent  had  originally  belonged,  and  whose 
claim  was  reenforced  by  actual  possession,  which  makes 
nine  points  of  the  law.  Here  seemed  the  seeds  of 
innumerable  conflicts  between  the  States  in  the  future, 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  people  in  all  the  colonies 
were  filled  with  a  vague  dread  of  the  development  of  the 
Northwest  Territory,  somewhat  akin  to  that  which  the 
people  of  Europe  felt  toward  Turkey  and  its  impending 
break-up  on  the  one  hand,  and  China  and  the  Yellow 
Peril  on  the  other.  It  was  the  realization  of  this 
imminent  danger  which  led  the  far-sighted  statesmen 
of  Maryland  to  refuse  to  ratify  the  Constitution  until 
Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New  York,  and  Virginia 
should  surrender  to  the  United  States  their  claims  to 
the  Northwest  Territory,  and  thus  create  a  domain 
which  should  be  owned  by  the  Confederation  in  com- 
mon. This  acquisition  of  common  territory  led  to 
the  exercise  of  eminent  domain,  and  attached  to  the 
central  government  the  interests  of  increasingly 
important  economic  groups. 


George  W.  Nasmyth  211 

Walter  Lippman1  has  pointed  out  that  the  chief 
task  of  world  diplomacy  to-day  is  the  organization  of 
undeveloped  territory  and  backward  peoples.  If  it 
is  true  that  no  government  has  any  chance  of  survival 
unless  it  serves  the  interests  of  powerful  economic 
groups,  one  of  the  plain  teachings  of  the  success  of  the 
federal  government  is  that  the  control  of  backward 
and  undeveloped  territories  of  the  earth  should  be 
made  international.  Territories  like  the  sultanates 
of  northern  Africa,  some  of  the  nations  of  Latin  America, 
Persia,  and  Turkey  should  be  gradually  transferred  to 
the  control  of  a  world  central  government.  The 
necessary  precedents  and  rudimentary  instruments 
can  be  found  in  existing  permanent  international  com- 
missions such  as  the  Pan-American  Union,  the  Interna- 
tional Commission  for  the  Control  of  the  Danube,  and 
the  International  Commission  for  the  Turkish  Debt. 
The  result  of  this  increasing  international  control 
would  be  to  transfer  the  responsibility  for  the  protection 
of,  and  therefore  the  allegiance  of,  concessionaires, 
financiers,  missionaries,  and  merchants  from  their  own 
national  government  to  this  international  government. 

IO.      WORLD     FEDERALISTS    VS.     ANTI-FEDERALISTS 

Those  who  know  intimately  the  complexities  of 
European  international  problems  would  be  the  last 
to  assert  that  the  problem  of  world  federation  is  not 
more  difficult  than  was  the  problem  of  federating  the 
Thirteen  Original  States  of  America.  But  the  point 
I  want  to  make  is  that  federation  is  the  problem,  that 
the  critical  issue  is  not  between  militarists  and  anti- 
militarists,  or  between  more  armaments  or  less  arma- 

1  Lippman,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy. 


212    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

ments.  The  real  division  comes  between  those  who 
stand  for  world  organization  and  those  who  stand  for 
the  present  system  of  international  anarchy. 

Suppose  that  Massachusetts  had  its  own  army  and 
navy  and  retained  its  sovereignty  and  complete  in- 
dependence, and  that  all  the  other  States  of  America 
were  in  the  same  condition.  Would  we  not  have 
boundary  disputes,  tariff  wars,  trade  rivalry  and 
suspicion,  hatred  and  fear?  And  would  not  these 
smouldering  embers  frequently  break  out  into  open 
hostilities?  What  is  the  reason  for  the  contrast 
between  the  peace  that  has  been  maintained,  with 
the  single  exception  of  the  Civil  War,  on  the  North 
American  continent  within  the  territory  bounded  by 
the  United  States,  while  the  countries  of  Latin  America, 
many  of  them  as  like  each  other  as  two  peas,  in  language, 
civilization,  and  race,  bound  together  by  ties  of  mutual 
interest,  have  had  an  almost  continuous  period  of  wars 
during  the  past  century  and  a  quarter?  Does  not  the 
critical  difference  consist  in  this,  that  in  the  forty-eight 
States  of  the  United  States  we  have  built  up  certain 
inter-State  machinery,  a  Supreme  Court,  a  Legislature, 
an  Inter-State  Trade  Commission,  that  we  have  estab- 
lished a  central  government,  to  which  the  interests  of 
powerful  economic  groups  have  been  attached,  and 
most  important  of  all  that  we  have  built  up,  on  the 
basis  of  these  solid  facts  of  political  machinery  and 
economic  interests,  a  common  loyalty  to  a  higher  ideal 
than  that  of  our  State,  the  ideal  of  America,  while  in 
the  dis-united  States  of  Latin  America  this  has  not  been 
done?  And  is  not  the  clear  lesson  of  the  critical  period 
of  American  history  this,  that  if  civilization  is  to  be 
preserved  from  a  similar  breakdown  in  the  future,  if 
democracy  is  to  be  triumphant  over  militarism,  if  we 


George  W.  Nasmyth  213 

are  to  have  an  opportunity  to  carry  out  our  plans  for 
social  reform  and  national  progress,  we  must  place 
ourselves  squarely  on  the  side  of  world  organization? 
Must  we  not  recognize  that  the  most  immediate  interest 
of  each  of  us  individually  is  to  aid  in  the  establishment 
of  a  certain  minimum  of  international  machinery, 
such  as  the  World  Court,  the  International  Council 
of  Investigation  and  Conciliation,  and  the  Conferences 
for  the  development  of  international  law  proposed  by 
the  League  to  Enforce  Peace;  that  we  must  seek  to 
attach  to  this  embryonic  world  government  the  interest 
of  powerful  economic  groups,  by  transferring  to  it  the 
responsibility  for  the  protection  and  the  policing  of 
backward  nations;  and  that  on  the  solid  foundation 
of  these  political  and  economic  measures  we  must 
strive  to  build  up  that  higher  patriotism,  that  inter- 
national mind,  that  loyalty  to  the  ideal  of  the  great 
community  of  all  mankind  which  will  do  for  the  world 
what  the  slow  growth  of  a  larger  American  patriotism 
did  for  the  provincial  patriotism  of  the  States  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century? 

The  pioneer  work  which  has  been  done  by  Washing- 
ton, Franklin,  Jefferson,  and  the  other  founders  of  the 
American  Republic  is  of  invaluable  assistance  in  the 
world  task  which  faces  us,  and  we  world  federalists 
will  gain  new  confidence  from  the  conviction  that  we 
are  engaged  in  the  great  constructive  movement  of 
modern  history. 


THE  LEAGUE  TO  ENFORCE  PEACE 
BY  SAMUEL  J.  ELDER 

I  AM  to  speak  on  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  which 
deals  with  questions  after  this  war  is  over.  It  does 
not  set  for  itself  any  consideration  of  means  for  bring- 
ing this  war  to  a  close.  It  recognizes  the  impossibility 
of  our  people  or  of  organizations  here  having  even  a 
feather's  weight  of  power  to  close  the  terrific  conflict 
on  the  other  side.  But  it  hopes  to  be  instrumental  in 
helping  to  secure  some  safeguards  of  future  peace.  It 
is  the  League  to  ENFORCE  Peace,  and  from  that  title  you 
see  that  it  is  not  a  pacifist  movement ;  it  is  not  a  pallid 
peace  movement;  it  is  not  a  disarmament  movement. 
It  makes  an  appeal  to  force  as  a  means  of  future  peace 
in  the  world.  It  does  not  say  to  you  or  to  the  country 
that  it  has  found  an  absolute  way  to  safeguard  peace 
in  the  future,  but  it  expresses  the  hope  that  the  discus- 
sion which  has  been  brought  about  may  hammer  out 
some  safeguards  against  a  future  cataclysm  of  the  kind 
which  makes  us  numb,  night  and  morning,  as  we  read 
of  it  in  the  papers.  Well,  what  is  it? 

It  was  organized  in  Philadelphia,  not  at  the  mint, 
of  which  Mr.  Roberts  speaks,  but  at  Independence 
Hall,  on  the  1 7th  day  of  June  last,  and  many  have  been 
so  hopeful  as  to  say  that  they  believe  that  the  guaran- 
ties of  peace  between  the  sovereign  States  of  this  country 
which  were  secured  a  century  and  a  quarter  ago  at 

214 


Samuel  J.  Elder  215 

Independence  Hall  may  be  in  some  measure  secured 
by  the  sovereign  states  of  the  world. 

I  want  in  the  first  place  to  call  your  attention  to 
the  names  of  some  of  the  men  now  prominent  in  the 
movement.  William  Howard  Taft  is  the  President  of 
the  League.  A.  Lawrence  Lowell  of  Harvard  is  Chair- 
man of  the  Executive  Committee,  Alton  B.  Parker  of 
the  Committee  on  Home  Organization,  and  Theodore 
Marburg  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Organization. 
Among  the  Vice-Presidents  are:  Lyman  Abbott,  Alex- 
ander Graham  Bell,  Mabel  T.  Boardman,  Ex-Governor 
William  D.  Fort  of  New  Jersey,  Foulke  of  Indiana, 
James  Cardinal  Gibbons  of  Maryland,  Washington 
Gladden,  Judge  George  Gray,  Myron  T.  Herrick, 
President  Hibben  of  Princeton,  President  Wheeler, 
Andrew  D.  White,  Shailer  Mathews,  Governor-Elect 
McCall,  John  Bassett  Moore,  Judge  Prouty,  Harry 
St.  George  Tucker  of  Virginia,  Oscar  S.  Straus,  John 
Hays  Hammond,  and  Frank  S.  Streeter.  The  member- 
ship is  country- wide  and  of  national  distinction. 

So  much  for  the  personnel ;  and  now  for  the  proposals. 
I  think  you  will  agree  that  there  is  great  force  in  their 
simplicity.  Compared  to  the  proposals  of  some  peace 
organizations,  you  will  agree  that  their  brevity  is  the 
soul  of  wit. 

We  believe  it  to  be  desirable  for  the  United  States  to 
join  a  league  of  nations  binding  the  signatories  to  the 
following : 

First:  All  justiciable  questions  arising  between  the 
signatory  powers,  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall,  subject 
to  the  limitations  of  treaties,  be  submitted  to  a  judicial 
tribunal  for  hearing  and  judgment,  both  upon  the  merits 
and  upon  any  issue  as  to  its  jurisdiction  of  the  question. 


216    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Second:  All  other  questions  arising  between  the  signa- 
tories and  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall  be  submitted  to 
a  council  of  conciliation  for  hearing,  consideration,  and 
recommendation . 

Third:  The  signatory  powers  shall  jointly  use  forthwith 
both  their  economic  and  military  forces  against  any  one  of 
their  number  that  goes  to  war,  or  commits  acts  of  hostility 
against  another  of  the  signatories  before  any  question 
arising  shall  be  submitted  as  provided  in  the  foregoing. 

Fourth:  Conferences  between  the  signatory  powers 
shall  be  held  from  time  to  time  to  formulate  and  codify 
rules  of  international  law,  which,  unless  some  signatory 
shall  signify  its  dissent  within  a  stated  period,  shall  there- 
after govern  in  the  decisions  of  the  Judicial  Tribunal  men- 
tioned in  Article  One. 

I  trust  you  will  pardon  me  for  saying  that  I  have 
been  the  President  of  the  Massachusetts  Peace  Society, 
and  am  still  one  of  its  directors.  I  have  the  honor 
to  be  a  director  of  the  American  Peace  Society,  and  I 
am  also  a  trustee  of  the  World  Peace  Foundation.  With 
that  in  mind,  I  shall  be  pardoned  for  saying  that  the 
difficulty  with  the  peace  movement  heretofore  has  been 
that  it  had  no  definite,  no  single,  no  positive  proposal 
to  make  to  the  nations  of  the  world  which  they  were 
likely  to  accept.  The  Peace  Societies  have  long  urged 
the  arbitration  of  international  disputes  and  have 
educated  the  nations  toward  world-wide  observance 
of  the  golden  rule,  but  definite  conventions,  agreements 
that  could  be  put  into  terms  and  adopted,  have  not 
been  in  evidence.  I  should  be  the  last  person  to  raise 
the  slightest  question  as  to  the  great  serviceability  of 
the  peace  movement  during  the  last  wellnigh  one 
hundred  years.  The  work  that  the  Peace  Societies 
here  and  abroad  have  done  is  what  makes  possible  to- 


Samuel  J.  Elder  217 

day  the  proposals  of  the  League  of  Peace.  Nations 
have  been  educated  and  brought  to  the  point  where  we 
hope  they  are  prepared  for  an  agreement  for  compulsory 
arbitration  before  bloodshed. 

During  the  period  from  1820  down  to  1900,  there 
were  one  hundred  and  seventy-two  great  arbitrations 
between  the  nations  of  the  world.  Many  of  them  pre- 
vented war  which  was  imminent.  Others  solved  ques- 
tions between  nations  that  would  have  been  itching  sores 
liable  at  any  time  to  be  torn  open  at  some  new  disagree- 
ment between  the  parties.  Take  a  single  illustration — 
the  Geneva  arbitration.  At  the  end  of  our  Civil  War 
we  had  a  million  and  more  veteran  soldiers.  We 
believed  here  that  our  Civil  War  had  been  protracted 
by  England's  carelessness  in  permitting  blockade  run- 
ning and  the  sending  of  munitions  to  the  Southern 
States,  and  by  permitting  the  escape  of  privateers. 
Our  people  were  insistent  upon  reparation,  and  Great 
Britain,  through  its  Prime  Minister,  replied  that  that 
question  concerned  the  honor  of  Great  Britain,  and 
of  that  honor  Great  Britain  must  be  the  only  judge; 
and  it  seemed  as  if  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  the 
stern  arbitrament  of  war.  But  not  long  afterwards  it 
turned  out  to  be  entirely  possible  to  arbitrate  those 
questions,  and  they  were  arbitrated  at  Geneva,  with  an 
award  of  fifteen  million  dollars  to  the  United  States 
or  its  citizens  for  the  losses  which  they  had  sustained. 
There  was  another  part  of  the  treaty — let  it  not  be 
charged  that  I  speak  only  of  a  case  where  the  United 
States  was  successful — an  arbitration  at  Halifax  with 
regard  to  the  North  Atlantic  fisheries  was  also  provided 
for  in  the  same  treaty,  and  there  the  tribunal  awarded 
five  million  dollars  against  us.  Great  Britain  had 
been  very  indignant  at  the  decision  against  her.  The 


218    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

English  judge  stormed  from  the  bench,  and  went 
back  to  London  and  thundered  through  the  Times 
against  the  award,  and  against  Great  Britain  paying 
it — but  they  paid  it !  Then,  when  the  award  was  made 
against  us  we  stormed.  A  more  outrageous  decision 
had  never  been  perpetrated  against  any  country,  and 
we  would  not  pay  it!  Mr.  Evarts  was  Secretary  of 
State,  and  in  vehement  terms  (I  had  almost  said  un- 
measured terms,  except  that  Mr.  Evarts  always 
measured  his  terms)  he  indicated  to  Great  Britain  that 
it  might  become  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  decline 
to  make  the  payment,  but  almost  on  the  last  day  of  the 
six  months  within  which  the  payment  was  to  be  made, 
it  was  made.  In  short,  nations  are  very  like  individuals . 
They  say  there  is  one  constitutional  right  of  which  no 
litigant  can  be  deprived,  and  that  is  the  right  to  go 
out  back  of  the  court  house  and  swear  at  the  Court! 
We  did  it,  and  Great  Britain  did  it  too. 

And  then,  at  the  end  of  the  last  century,  a  court 
was  established  at  The  Hague.  People  say  to  you,  why 
did  not  the  court  at  The  Hague  prevent  this  war?  I 
do  not  know  why  it  is,  but  there  seem  to  be  some 
people  who  assume  a  kind  of  proprietorship  in  this  war, 
and  gloat  over  it  as  a  triumph  over  the  Peace  Move- 
ment. Why  did  it  not  prevent  this  war?  Why 
doesn't  it  stop  it?  What  has  become  of  the  whole 
thing?  The  answer  is  that  The  Hague  Convention 
was  not  drawn  with  any  idea  that  it  could  certainly 
prevent  such  a  war  as  this.  The  permanent  court 
at  The  Hague  was  a  court  in  name  only.  It  had  no 
power  to  compel  nations  to  come  before  it.  It  consisted 
in  a  list  of  judges,  not  to  exceed  four  judges  from  each 
of  the  signatory  powers — forty-four  countries  in  all— 
from  which  list  the  judges  for  any  particular  arbitration 


Samuel  J.  Elder  219 

were  to  be  selected,  but  whether  there  should  be  an 
arbitration  or  not  depended  upon  the  nations  in  dispute. 
If  they  agreed  upon  an  arbitration,  it  took  place; 
otherwise  not.  When  two  nations  decided  to  arbitrate, 
they  made  a  treaty  with  each  other  fixing  the  exact 
terms  of  the  questions  to  be  discussed,  the  form  of 
procedure,  and  determined  what  judges  were  to  sit. 
That  was  as  far  as  the  nations  of  the  earth  in  1899  and 
1907  were  willing  to  go,  and  the  question  to-day  is 
whether  in  the  light  of  this  calamity  the  nations  will 
be  ready  to  go  further  and  create  at  last  a  court  with 
some  force  back  of  it.  When  you  have  a  disagreement 
with  your  neighbor,  by  your  sheriff  or  marshal  you  can 
compel  him  to  go  to  court  and  try  the  case.  You  can 
compel  a  corporation,  no  matter  how  great,  to  come  to 
court.  Our  American  States  can  bring  each  other 
before  the  courts.  The  point  is  to  reach  at  last  some 
jurisdiction  whereby  a  nation  having  a  grievance  can 
bring  another  nation  before  a  tribunal.  Now,  just 
how  far  does  this  go?  The  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
says 

Hasn't  the  time  come  for  at  least  some  of  the  nations  to 
agree  that  they  will  not  permit  any  of  their  own  number  to 
fight  until  after  their  dispute — whatever  it  is — has  been 
heard  in  open  court? 

Let  us  take  the  proposals  just  as  they  stand.  All 
that  the  League  proposes,  absolutely  the  whole  thing, 
is  that  the  nations  that  sign  the  agreement  shall  not 
go  to  war  with  each  other  or  commit  acts  of  hostility 
against  each  other  until  after  the  submission  which  is 
provided  for;  and  that  if  one  of  them  breaks  its 
agreement  all  the  others  will  use  their  economic  and 
military  force  to  chastise  that  nation.  That  is  all 


220    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

there  is  to  it.  Notice  one  thing:  they  do  not  agree 
that  they  will  enforce  the  decision  either  of  the  court 
or  of  the  council,  and  why  not?  Simply  because  you 
can  not,  even  now,  get  the  nations  of  the  earth  to  agree 
that  they  will  submit  all  questions  to  a  tribunal  and 
abide  by  the  result.  It  is  utterly  useless  to  attempt 
the  impossible.  Stop  and  think  about  it  yourself. 
Will  you  submit  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  a  tribunal 
all  but  one  of  whom  are  foreigners,  aliens,  non-nationals 
of  yours?  You  know  you  would  not.  Will  the  Ameri- 
can people — will  you — submit  our  title  to  the  Panama 
Canal  Zone  to  an  alien  tribunal,  and  agree  to  be  bound 
by  the  decision?  No!  My  friend  here  says:  "We 
ought  to."  Very  likely,  but  we  must  not  waste  time, 
or  effort,  in  attempting  to  accomplish  the  impossible. 
Will  you  submit  the  question  of  the  Philippine  Islands, 
or  Alaska,  or  the  tariff,  to  such  a  tribunal  and  abide 
the  result?  You  know  that  you  cannot  persuade 
the  American  people  or  Congress  to  do  so.  Every 
other  nation  has  questions  of  vital  interest — questions 
that  it  regards  as  questions  of  honor — and  if  we  would 
not  do  it,  if  we  could  not  induce  our  Senate  to  do  it, 
why  should  we  expect  that  we  could  persuade  other 
nations  to  do  it?  No,  the  thing  that  it  is  proposed  to 
agree  upon,  let  me  repeat,  is  that  you  shall  submit 
your  case  to  the  Court  of  the  Nations  before  fighting 
about  it. 

But,  you  say,  what  good  will  it  do  if  you  do  not 
enforce  the  decision?  It  does  this  one  thing:  it  makes 
bloodshed  wait.  It  cuts  off  any  forty-eight-hour 
ultimatum.  You  know  how  long  these  arbitrations 
take.  I  was  concerned  in  one  of  them.  We  were 
a  year  in  getting  ready  and  then  we  talked  for  ten 
mortal  weeks.  I  will  bear  some  of  the  guilt  myself, 


Samuel  J.  Elder  221 

for  I  talked  a  good  deal.  The  opening  for  Great  Britain 
took  two  weeks;  then  there  were  two  weeks  for  the 
United  States  to  open  its  case.  It  was  a  year  and  a 
half  after  the  original  agreement  to  arbitrate  before 
the  matter  was  settled.  The  League  says  you  shall 
try  a  case  before  you  go  to  war.  That  means  a  year 
or  a  year  and  a  half  before  you  can  fight.  The  whole 
purpose  of  it  is  to  interpose  between  the  hot  blood  of 
excited  nations  or  ambitious  chancelleries,  which  may 
be  determined  upon  aggrandizement,  a  long  period 
of  discussion.  After  that  there  will  probably  be  no 
bloodshed.  Men  fight  on  the  instant,  on  the  drop  of  the 
hat.  If  they  have  to  wait,  and  especially  if  they  have 
to  go  to  the  court  house  and  talk  it  over  with  the  judge, 
or  go  around  to  the  professor  and  talk  it  over  with  him, 
they  do  not  fight  at  all. 

Of  course  you  cannot  tell,  humanly  speaking, 
whether  anything  could  have  prevented  this  present 
war  from  coming,  sooner  or  later,  but  it  was  a  forty- 
eight-hour  ultimatum  that  did  bring  it  on.  And 
that  is  the  thing  that  it  is  hoped  may  be  prevented  in 
the  future.  It  has  this  distinctive  advantage:  during 
the  long  hearings  each  nation  is  compelled  to  hear  the 
story  of  the  other,  to  hear  the  arguments  of  the  other. 
The  newspapers  of  all  the  countries  are  printing  the 
proceedings  day  by  day,  showing  where  the  truth  of 
the  matter  lies  and  what  its  real  importance  is.  During 
such  a  time  the  papers  and  the  people,  even  of  the  two 
contending  nations,  may  talk  about  it  and  discuss  it 
freely  and  fully.  When  there  has  been,  or  is  likely  to 
be,  a  forty-eight-hour  ultimatum,  it  is  wellnigh  treason 
for  them  to  do  so.  They  must  know  only  their  own 
side — their  country — right  or  wrong.  But  during  the 
long  period  of  delay,  the  sane  men,  the  sound  men,  the 


222     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

conservative'men^of  each  country  and  of  the  rest  of  the 
world,  may  discuss  the  question  freely  and  reach 
their  own  conclusions. 

My  time  has  wellnigh  expired  and  I  realize  that 
I  have  touched  only  the  outskirts  of  the  subject.  The 
proposal  does  not  include  keeping  the  peace  of  the 
world,  or  the  establishment  of  an  international  police 
by  contributing  America's  quota  to  any  permanent 
force  subject  to  the  direction  of  some  international 
tribunal.  It  does  not  seek  to  fix  the  amount  of  arma- 
ment which  each  nation  shall  maintain,  but  leaves  to 
each  to  maintain  such  armament  as  it  deems  best. 
I  have  not  dealt  at  all  with  the  manner  in  which  the 
economic  forces  of  the  nations  can  be  brought  into 
play  against  a  recalcitrant  power,  and,  in  particular, 
I  have  not  dealt  with  the  question  which  very  likely 
is  present  to  your  minds;  namely,  that  this  is  a  de- 
parture from  the  traditional  policy  of  the  country  to 
avoid  entangling  alliances.  The  League  does  distinctly 
recognize  that  the  period  of  our  weakness  and  isolation 
is  past,  that  we  already  have  world-wide  possessions 
and  engagements  liable  at  any  moment  to  cause  com- 
plications and  war.  In  this  situation  it  presents  to  you, 
to  the  country,  and  to  the  world  the  question  whether 
we  ought  not  to  assist  in  safeguarding  the  world's 
peace  for  our  own  security  as  well  as  for  the  security  of 
all  mankind. 


THE  BRITISH  UNION  OF  DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 

BY  FRANCIS  NEILSON 

WHEN   I  was  asked  if  I  would  come  to  Clark 
University  and  speak  on  the  subject  of  the 
Union   of   Democratic   Control,    I   considered   that  it 
was  a  very  great  honor  and  an  opportunity  that  should 
not,  under  any  circumstances,  be  lost. 

Now,  I  have  to  plead  guilty  to  being  perhaps  re- 
sponsible for  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control.  It 
came  about  in  rather  a  strange  way.  Many  of  the 
leading  members  of  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control 
who  are  members  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  I, 
and  indeed  several  other  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons  who  are  not  allied  with  the  Union  of  Demo- 
cratic Control,  have  for  years  feared  the  foreign  policy 
of  Great  Britain.  Shortly  after  1906,  in  the  House  of 
Commons  was  formed  a  body  which  was  called  the 
"foreign  affairs  group."  Meetings  were  held  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  questions  on  Persia,  Morocco, 
diplomatic  negotiations  and  understandings  were  put 
down  on  the  order  paper  without  drawing  much  infor- 
mation from  the  Foreign  Office.  As  time  passed,  it 
became  clear  to  many  interested  in  foreign  affairs 
that  there  was  a  conspiracy  afoot  to  check  essential 
discussion  on  the  question  and  reduce  the  authority 
of  Parliament  to  the  will  and  permission  of  the  Cabinet. 

223 


224    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  old  policy  of  splendid  isolation  in  European 
affairs  was  gone.  The  Concert  of  European  Powers 
was  supplanted  by  the  older  system  of  the  Balance  of 
Power;  and  Britain  entered  into  the  disastrous  byways 
of  entangling  alliances.  The  reply  to  questions: 
"It  is  not  in  the  public  interest  to  give  the  information 
that  the  Honorable  Member  asks  for, "  became  almost 
stereotyped.  Every  time  I  heard  a  question  and  an- 
swer of  that  nature,  my  mind  went  back  to  the  terrible 
days  of  the  Boer  War.  Shortly  before  the  Boer  War 
began,  one  of  your  great  publishers  came  to  a  very  dear 
friend  of  mine,  the  novelist,  the  late  George  Douglas 
Brown,  who  wrote  The  House  of  the  Green  Shutters, 
and  asked  if  it  were  not  time  to  write  a  life  of  Kruger. 
Brown  came  to  me  and  asked  me  to  collaborate  with 
him.  I  was  very  busy,  but  I  said,  "If  you  will  do  the 
writing,  I  will  get  the  documents."  Had  I  known  the 
difficulty  I  would  have  in  getting  the  documents  of 
British  administration  in  South  Africa,  I  would  never 
have  made  that  promise.  To  get  the  documents 
from  the  different  departments  was  such  a  laborious 
task  that  I  have  never  forgotten  my  difficulties,  and 
I  made  up  my  mind  then  that  if  we  ever  went  into 
another  war,  no  such  difficulties  in  obtaining  documents 
and  information  should  arise  if  in  my  humble  way  I 
could  do  anything  to  avert  them.  One  of  the  reasons 
why  governments  can  so  easily  rush  peoples  into  war 
is  because  the  people  seldom  know  really  what  the  war 
is  about. 

Now,  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  his  speech, 
August  3,  1914,  there  were  about  thirty  members  who 
protested  at  once.  We  had  been  told  for  years  that  it 
was  against  the  public  interest  to  know  what  was  going 
on.  And  when  we  learned  that  the  Foreign  Minister 


Francis  Neilson  225 

had  permitted  conversations  between  the  British  and 
French  naval  and  military  experts  to  take  place,  and 
that  these  conversations  had  been  going  on  over  a  period 
of  eight  years,  that  the  General  Staffs  had  been  exchang- 
ing plans,  we  said,  "That  confession  is  sufficient  for 
us."  We  had  been  told  repeatedly  that  we  were  under 
no  obligation  to  send  troops  to  support  any  Continental 
Power.  We  had  thought  we  were  the  responsible 
representatives  of  our  constituents.  I  read  to-day  a 
sentence  particularly  pertinent  to  this  question,  where 
the  writer  in  one  of  your  reviews  holds  my  friend,  Mr. 
Charles  Trevelyan,  to  a  statement  he  made  in  1913 
to  some  German  functionary,  that  Great  Britain 
would  not  go  to  war.  He  had  a  perfect  right  to  say  it. 
The  Government  always  led  the  House  of  Commons 
to  believe  we  had  no  secret  agreements.  Had  I  been 
asked  by  any  government  functionary  in  1913,  would 
Great  Britain  go  to  war  ?  I  would  have  answered  most 
emphatically,  "No!"  Britain  had  no  entangling 
alliances.  The  Prime  Minister  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
told  us  that  we  were  under  no  obligations  of  war; 
and  not  only  that,  but  in  1913,  over  and  over  again, 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Mr. 
Asquith  stated  that  our  relations  with  all  Powers  were 
peaceful,  and  there  was  not  a  cloud  in  the  sky  to  cause 
us  any  fear  at  all. 

Now,  when  the  members  of  the  House  of  Commons 
protested  against  the  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on 
August  3,  1914,  I  said  to  them,  "Let  us  find  out  what 
it  is  all  about,  and  let  us  keep  a  faithful  record  of  events 
all  through  the  war."  I  was  remembering  the  difficul- 
ties that  I  had  had  at  the  time  of  the  Boer  War.  I 
thought,  how  easy  it  is  for  a  government  to  plunge  a 
nation  into  war,  when  the  people  know  nothing.  That 

IS 


226    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

is  the  way  we  were  plunged  into  the  Boer  War,  the  Cri- 
mean War,  and  all  our  wars  in  Great  Britain.  Mr. 
Warren  Worth  Bailey  said,  a  little  while  ago,  it  is  the 
women  who  suffer  more  than  the  men  who  have  to  give 
their  blood  or  foot  the  bill ;  and  if  you  saw  the  women 
of  Britain  as  I  have  seen  them  for  over  a  year,  now, 
mourning  for  the  loved  ones  who  will  never  come  back, 
and  do  not  even  know  where  their  bones  are  on  the 
western  battlefield,  you  would  think  it  time  for  the 
members  of  Parliament,  and  the  legislatures,  and  the 
people  connected  with  the  national  life  of  the  people, 
to  set  down  those  truths  that  you  can  tell  to  the  people 
as  warnings,  so  that  when  militarists  come  to  you  and 
say,  "Prepare,  "  you  will  think  then — think  harder,  and 
deeper,  than  you  ever  thought  before  in  your  lives. 

The  trouble  with  us  all  is  that  we  do  our  thinking 
when  the  war  is  over.  But  oh,  what  a  task  it  is  to  go 
to  the  men  and  the  women  who  have  suffered,  immedi- 
ately after  the  war,  and  begin  to  recount  the  events 
that  led  up  to  that  war ! 

Oh  [they  say],  have  we  not  had  enough  of  it?  Our 
Jack  is  gone;  and  our  Will  is  gone;  there  is  crippled  Tom 
sitting  by  the  fireside,  and  will  sit  there  as  long  as  he  lives. 
There  is  Harry,  who  has  to  be  carried  upstairs  and  down- 
stairs. Don't  come  to  us  and  talk  of  what  led  up  to  it. 
See;  here  are  the  results. 

You  cannot  get  your  story  of  how  it  began  home 
after  the  event. 

Now,  I  said  to  my  dissentient  friends : 

You  must  form  yourselves  into  a  body.  You  must  go 
back  into  the  records  as  far  as  you  can  and  see  how  this 
thing  has  been  brought  about,  and  you  must  do  it  in  the 
true  patriotic  sense.  Being  loyal  to  the  government :  that 


Francis  Neilson  227 

is  not  patriotism.  Being  loyal  to  a  ruling  class:  that  is  not 
patriotism.  Patriotism  begins  where  John  Bright  said  it 
begins — at  the  lowliest  hearth  in  the  land;  and  if  your  pa- 
triotism does  not  touch  that,  it  is  not  worth  the  price  of  a 
candle. 

So  they  set  to  work.  I  was  taken  very  ill  shortly 
afterwards,  and  sent  away.  I  did  not  see  my  friends 
for  something  like  three  months,  and  in  the  meantime 
the  Union  of  Democratic  Control  had  been  formed  out 
of  the  group.  When  they  started  to  plan  the  creation 
of  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control,  they  called  in  men 
from  the  outside.  Mr.  Ramsey  Macdonald  and  Mr. 
Jowett,  members  of  the  Independent  Labor  Party, 
joined  the  Union;  Mr.  Morel  and  Mr.  Norman  Angell 
and  numbers  of  others,  who  had  been  concerned  with 
peace  and  arbitration  movements  in  Great  Britain. 
You  would  have  thought  at  that  time  by  reading  the 
Liberal  and  Tory  British  papers,  that  England  was 
whole-heartedly  belligerent.  But  that  was  not  so. 
Far  from  it,  indeed.  From  all  parts  of  Britain  came 
letters  of  sympathy,  and  numbers  of  well-known  peo- 
ple saying  they  were  ready  to  join  the  Union  and  work 
for  its  objects.  Many  who  supported  the  Government 
in  striving  to  bring  the  war  to  a  speedy  and  successful 
conclusion  joined  the  Union  because  of  its  objects. 
Branches  were  formed  in  the  provinces.  Interest  in 
the  work  of  the  Union  spread  all  over  the  country. 
Though  the  leading  Liberal  newspapers  seldom  refer- 
red to  its  crusade,  The  Labor  Leader,  the  organ  of  the 
Independent  Labor  Party,  gave  space  regularly  every 
week  to  its  operations.  In  the  London  area  numbers  of 
branches  were  formed.  Meetings  were  held,  in  public 
and  in  private.  Pamphlets  were  published  and  dis- 
tributed broadcast.  And  so  it  went  on.  It  seemed 


228    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

like  that  proverbial  snowball — the  farther  it  went, 
the  more  it  collected  and  the  bigger  it  grew.  For  not 
only  individuals  of  intellectual  England  became  mem- 
bers of  it,  but  people  of  America  and  different  parts 
of  the  world  that  heard  about  its  objects  began  to 
join  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control.  The  women's 
guilds  took  it  up,  and  many  of  them  joined;  then  the 
trade  councils  began  to  discuss  the  matter,  and  a 
great  many  did  join,  and  numerous  other  societies 
affiliated  themselves  with  the  Union  and  entered 
heartily  into  the  spirit  of  the  work.  Spacious  offices 
were  take'n  and  a  large  clerical  force  engaged.  Public 
meetings  were  held.  Don't  forget  that.  I  should  like 
to  emphasize  that  point,  because  during  the  Boer  War 
we  could  not  with  safety  hold  public  meetings.  When 
we  did,  we  were  sometimes  stoned.  As  you  know, 
when  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  himself,  went  to  Birmingham 
to  speak  against  the  conduct  of  the  Boer  War,  the  hall 
was  stormed,  and  he  had  to  escape  in  the  clothes  of  a 
policeman  who,  like  a  good  Samaritan,  dropped  him 
out  of  a  back  window!  Things  have  changed  a  great 
deal.  I,  myself,  really  believe  that  were  it  not  for  the 
agitation  of  three  papers  in  Britain  against  the  Union, 
any  of  its  well-known  members  could  have  held  meet- 
ings at  any  time  in  the  public  parks  without  fear  of 
molestation. 

There  have  been  certain  interruptions  in  the  wrork, 
and  these  I  will  refer  to  briefly  before  I  get  down  to  the 
objects  of  the  work  of  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control. 
I  have  in  my  pocket  here  the  documents  in  connection 
with  the  agitation  of  the  London  Daily  Express,  which 
has,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  an  American  editor,  against 
the  Union  of  Democratic  Control.  It  may  interest 
some  of  you  to  hear  about  this  agitation.  It  might 


Francis  Neilson  229 

prepare  you  for  what  is  coming  here,  if  you  don't  look 
out !  Methods  never  differ.  The  actions  of  militarists 
and  jingoes  are  the  same  in  all  countries.  A  French- 
man will  come  to  us  and  say,  "That  is  the  way  they 
do  those  things  in  France" ;  the  Germans  say,  "That  is 
the  way  they  do  it  in  Germany."  You  see,  within  a  few 
months  before  the  war  we  had  municipal  and  sociological 
deputations  from  Germany,  and  deputations  of  a  like 
nature  went  from  Britain  to  Germany.  The  President 
of  my  association,  one  of  the  heads  of  Unitarianism  in 
England,  Mr.  Enfield  Dowson,  of  Hyde,  came  back 
two  years  before  the  war  from  a  conference  of  Uni- 
tarians in  Germany,  where  he  spoke  from  the  steps  of 
the  Wartburg,  and  he  said  to  me,  "Never  have  I  had 
such  great  hopes  of  European  peace  as  I  have  to-day." 
It  is  a  wonderful  world — the  world  of  armament  and 
diplomacy.  You  never  know  just  where  you  are.  I 
am  going  to  read  you  a  few  lines  which  will  show  you  the 
way  they  break  up  meetings  over  in  England  when  they 
don't  agree  with  you.  Many  of  you  here  may  not 
agree  with  me,  and  as  I  proceed,  you  may  still  less 
agree  with  me,  but  I  think  there  is  no  one  here  who 
looks  as  if  he  would  like  to  throw  a  brick  at  me,  and  I 
surely  do  not  want  to  throw  a  brick  at  the  most  hostile 
person  in  this  audience.  I  will  read  some  extracts  from 
a  letter  which  came  to  me: 

DEAR  SIR: 

I  think  you  should  be  made  acquainted  with  the  under- 
noted  events  which  culminated  in  a  brutal  and  organized 
assault  being  delivered  upon  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby  and  two 
other  speakers  of  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control  in  the 
Kingston  railway  station  on  the  evening  of  Wednesday 
last. 

For  some  time  past,  the  Morning  Post,  the  Globe,  and 


230    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

John  Bull  have  been  publishing  articles  the  general  purpose 
of  which  has  been  to  convey  to  their  readers  that  the 
Union  of  Democratic  Control  (this  is  also  hinted  in  the 
Times  leader  of  to-day)  is  a  traitorous  organization  in 
German  pay.  I  understand,  although  I  have  no  definite 
records  to  produce,  that  very  violent  attacks  have  been 
made  upon  the  U.D.C.  by  civilian  speakers  at  recruiting 
meetings  held  in  London. 

On  July  1 6th,  the  Daily  Express  (whose  editor,  accord- 
ing to  Who's  Who  for  1915,  is  a  Mr.  Ralph  D.  Blumenfeld, 
formerly  editor  of  an  American  newspaper,  and  author  of  a 
work  entitled  Exiled  in  England}  began  to  issue  articles 
and  statements  which  can  only  be  construed  as  an  in- 
citement to  violence  upon  the  persons  of  members  of 
the  U.  D.  C. 

The  letter  then  goes  on  and  gives  extracts  from  the 
papers,  and  comes  to  a  description  of  the  meeting  at 
Kingston,  where  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby  was  assaulted. 
I  will  read  a  part  of  this  to  you. 

The  third  meeting  on  this  list  was  a  public  meeting  to  be 
held  in  the  Friends  Hall,  Kingston,  on  July  2ist.  A 
letter,  signed  with  initials,  published  at  the  bottom  of  an 
item  which  appeared  in  the  Express,  spoke  of  the  "  Disgrace 
to  Kingston  .  .  .  that  loathsome  Body  of  Pro-Germans,  the 
U.  D.  C.  .  .  .  These  people  are  spending  money  like  water 
in  what  is  really  an  attempt  to  get  up  a  traitor  party  in  this 
country." 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  article,  it  tells  the  patriots 
to  look  after  their  interests  and  be  present  and  protest — 
and  they  did! 

The  assault  was  as  follows: 

The  local  Friends  who  had  lent  the  use  of  their  hall  to 
the  Kingston  Group  of  the  London  Branch  of  the  U.  D.  C 


Francis  Neilson  231 

were  informed  on  the  Wednesday  afternoon  by  the  inspector 
of  police  that  disturbances  were  expected  at  the  meeting, 
and  that  the  men  employed  in  the  aviation  firm  of  Sopwith 
had  stated  their  intention  of  preventing  the  meeting  being 
held.  Another  hall  was  secured  at  the  last  moment.  The 
meeting  was  violently  broken  up  almost  immediately  after 
it  commenced.  Mr.  Seymour  Cocks,  the  Secretary  of  the 
London  Branch  of  the  U.  D.  C.,  was  struck  in  the  face  and 
knocked  down,  and  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby  and  Mr.  Langdon 
Davies  were  driven  out.  They  were  followed  to  the  rail- 
way station  by  an  organized  gang  of  about  twenty-five  to 
thirty,  penned  in  the  waiting  room,  and  brutally  assaulted, 
the  odds  being  some  ten  to  one. 

They  were  well  prepared.  They  go  in  for  "prepared- 
ness,"  I  can  tell  you,  when  it  comes  to  the  matter  of 
smashing  up  a  meeting. 

They  had  to  fight  their  way  to  the  railway  carriages  when 
the  train  came  up .  Threats  of  murder  were  freely  proffered. 
Mr.  Ponsonby,  Mr.  Langdon  Davies,  and  Mr.  Seymour 
Cocks  were  badly  bruised  and  battered. 

I  have  also  received  a  copy  of  a  complaint  made  to  the 
Chief  Inspector  of  Police  in  connection  with  the  agita- 
tion to  attempt  to  break  up  the  Union  of  Democratic 
Control.  They  failed  in  their  attempt.  Why  did  they 
fail?  Because  Mr.  Ponsonby,  and  Mr.  Trevelyan,  and 
Mr.  Seymour  Cocks  said,  "They  are  not  going  to 
stop  us,  and  when  the  people  are  willing  to  hear  what 
we  have  to  say,  we  are  willing  to  talk  to  them."  And 
they  are  carrying  on  their  meetings  all  over  the  country, 
and  even  now  they  could  use  many  more  speakers  to 
fill  the  applications  that  come  in  for  meetings  to  be  held. 

There  is  one  other  point  that  I  want  to  deal  with, 
and  it  is  this  one  that  has  been  sedulously  sown  in  the 


232    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

American  press.  When  I  left  England  in  September 
we  thought  we  would  get  facts  over  here,  that  we  would 
be  able  to  get  some  correct  information.  On  arriving 
here,  we  found  that  you  are  not  so  well  informed  on 
the  situation  as  we  are  in  Great  Britain,  where  we  are 
almost  censored  out  of  existence.  This  is  perfectly 
true.  We  have  four  papers  in  Great  Britain  which  do 
defy  the  censor  and  publish  the  truth  when  they  get  it. 
The  censor  has  tried  to  suppress  the  Labour  Leader, 
and  failed,  so  we  can  get  that  paper  when  we  do  want 
to  know  what  is  going  on.  It  is  the  most  astounding 
thing,  how  we  read  in  the  New  York  papers  that 
such  and  such  a  thing  has  happened  in  Europe.  Ten 
days  afterwards,  we  get  the  London  papers,  and  we  read, 
according  to  our  Tory  sheets,  what  has  really  happened 
— usually  something  quite  different.  I  really  think 
you  ought  to  make  a  protest  against  the  British  censor 
for  it  is  a  most  astounding  thing  how  misinformed  the 
people  are  about  this  Union  of  Democratic  Control. 

One  of  my  dear  friends — a  man  I  have  known  thirty 
years,  in  this  land,  came  to  me  shortly  after  I  arrived, 
and  said:  "It  is  something  frightful,  that  organiza- 
tion you  have  in  England,  that  Union  of  Democratic 
Control!  Why  don't  they  suppress  it?  Trying  to 
stop  the  war,  and  throwing  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the 
Government!"  I  said:  "My  dear  fellow,  do  you 
know  we  have  martial  law  in  the  House,  as  well  as  in  the 
country?  How  can  any  Britisher  put  an  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  the  Government,  even  if  he  wished?  Who 
has  tried  to  stop  the  war?"  That  is  what  is  generally 
believed  here.  I  have  seen  several  articles  since 
my  friend  spoke  to  me,  and  I  gather  that  most  of  the 
publications  in  this  country  have  spoken  of  the  Union 
in  the  same  way. 


Francis  Neilson  233 

It  will  be  interesting  to  you  to  know  what  the  objects 
of  the  Union  are: 

1.  No  province  shall  be  transferred  from  one  Govern- 
ment to  another  without  the  consent  by  plebiscite  of  a 
population  of  such  province. 

2.  No   treaty,   arrangement,  or  undertaking  shall  be 
entered  upon  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain  without  the 
sanction  of  Parliament.     Adequate  machinery  for  ensuring 
democratic  control  of  foreign  policy  shall  be  created. 

3.  The  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  shall  not  be  aimed 
at  creating  alliances  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the 
"Balance  of  Power";  but  shall  be  directed  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  Concert  of  Europe,  and  the  setting  up  of  an 
International  Council  whose  deliberations  and  decisions 
shall  be  made  public,  part  of  the  labor  of  such  council  to  be 
the  creation  of  statutes  and  the  establishment  of  courts  for 
their  interpretation  and  enforcement. 

4.  Great  Britain  shall  propose,  as  part  of  the  peace 
settlement,  a  plan  for  the  drastic  reduction,  by  consent, 
of  the  armaments  of  all  the  belligerent  powers,  and  to 
facilitate  that  policy  shall  attempt  to  secure  the  general 
nationalization  of  the  manufacture  of  armaments  and  the 
prohibition  of  the  export  of  armaments  by  one  country  to 
another. 

Those  are  the  objects  of  the  Union  of  Democratic 
Control,  and  they  have  not  changed.  There  is  nothing 
there  about  stopping  the  war.  Now,  to  give  you  an 
idea  of  the  development  of  the  work,  let  me  read  to  you, 
if  you  will  bear  with  me  a  little  more,  some  extracts 
from  speeches  which  have  taken  place  in  the  House  of 
Lords  and  the  House  of  Commons.  First,  I  should  like 
to  deal  with  the  speeches  in  the  House  of  Lords.  You 
will  forgive  me  if  I  describe  some  of  the  men  to  you. 
Earl  Loreburn  was  a  great  Radical  and  peace  leader 


234    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

in  England  for  years.  He  was  a  pro-Boer.  Within 
the  past  few  years  he  has  been  Lord  Chancellor  of 
England.  He  was  the  Lord  Chancellor  that  was 
followed  by  Lord  Haldane.  On  November  8th,  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  he  said : 

The  situation  has  no  parallel  in  the  whole  record  of 
history.  Every  great  nation  in  the  war  has  been  led  to 
believe  that  the  war  was  forced  upon  them — I  am  speaking 
of  the  people  of  the  nations,  not  of  the  rulers  who  have 
beguiled  them.  All  of  them  believe  that  they  are  in  the 
right,  and  that  they  have  only  to  hold  on  in  order  to  win. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that,  if  this  conflict  goes  on 
indefinitely,  revolution  and  anarchy  may  well  follow;  and 
unless  the  collective  common  sense  of  mankind  prevents  it 
before  the  worst  comes,  great  portions  of  the  continent  of 
Europe  will  be  little  better  than  a  wilderness,  peopled  by 
old  men  and  women  and  children.  I  say  that  any  man 
must  be  strangely  constructed  who  does  not  grasp  at  any 
honorable  opportunity  to  prevent  what  would  be  the  most 
frightful  calamity  that  has  ever  befallen  the  human  race. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  a  war  of  attrition.  These  are 
thoughts  from  which  there  is  no  escape,  whatever  may 
be  your  nationality. 

During  the  Boer  War,  it  would  have  been  an  im- 
possibility to  have  made  a  speech  like  that  in  the 
House  of  Lords;  but  there  were  no  interruptions,  so 
my  friends  tell  me  who  were  present  when  this  speech 
was  made. 

Now  I  will  quote  from  the  speech  of  Lord  Courtney, 
of  Penwith,  delivered  on  November  8th.  You  may 
remember  he  was  plain  Mr.  Courtney,  a  Cornish 
member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  then  went  to 
the  House  of  Lords.  I  daresay  that  Lord  Courtney 
has  done  as  much  in  his  time  for  the  world's  peace, 


Francis  Neilson  235 

or  did,  before  the  war,  as  any  man  of  any  nation. 
When  he  spoke  in  the  House  of  Lords,  he  said  some  very 
extraordinary  things.  He  said: 

Whether  we  look  at  home  or  abroad,  our  old  civilization, 
which  we  built  up  through  long  generations  with  much 
effort,  is  not  merely  in  danger,  but  is  undermined  and 
almost  destroyed.  Where  are  our  boasted  guarantees 
of  personal  liberty?  Freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of 
writing,  almost  freedom  of  thought,  have  been  struck  at. 
Instead  of  the  ancient  trial  by  jury  which  we  boasted  was 
the  privilege  of  every  man,  the  gravest  charges  are  ex- 
amined, and  the  weightiest  punishments  inflicted,  by  single 
magistrates  sitting  in  secret,  without  the  advantage  of 
publicity,  and  without  it  being  known  what  is  the  character 
of  the  offense  charged.  Our  municipal  private  law  has 
suffered  these  terrible  inroads ;  and  in  the  domain  of  public 
law,  international  law,  so  slowly  built  up,  in  days  gone  by, 
we  have  witnessed  retrogression. 

It  is  just  as  well  to  consider,  when  you  go  into  a  war, 
what  you  are  likely  to  lose  in  the  conduct  of  the  war. 
We  have  lost  a  great  deal. 

I  do  not  speak  of  what  the  war  has  involved  in  the  way 
of  sacrifice  of  our  young  men .  I  say  nothing  of  the  demands 
it  has  made  on  our  finances.  I  only  wish  to  draw  you  to 
this  conclusion,  that  the  war  has  resulted  in  something 
like  a  deadlock  of  force,  and  has  operated  to  diminish  the 
standard  of  our  civilization,  to  take  away  the  guarantees 
of  liberty,  to  diminish  the  trustworthiness  of  law,  and  to 
endanger  the  situation  amongst  nations,  neutrals,  as  well  as 
combatants.  If  that  is  so,  surely  it  is  not  surprising  that 
one  should  begin  to  ask:  Is  any  escape  possible  from  this 
rake's  progress  upon  which  we  have  entered?  Must  we 
go  on  to  witness  a  continually  extending  panorama  of  war? 


236    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Is  there  no  alternative?  I  believe  there  is.  The  passion 
of  national  independence  is  glorious  and  well  worthy  of  any 
sacrifice.  I  recognize  all  its  claims;  but  the  passion  of 
national  independence  must  in  some  way  be  reconciled,  if 
civilization  is  to  continue  with  the  possibility  of  inter- 
national friendship,  and  unless  you  can  see  out  of  this  war 
something  which  will  lead  to  international  friendship 
coming  into  alliance  with  and  being  supported  by  national 
independence,  you  have  nothing  before  you  but  a  continued 
series  of  wars,  hate  after  hate,  extermination  after  exter- 
mination, from  which,  indeed,  you  may  well  recoil.  Is  it 
not  possible  that  this  reconciliation  should  be  effected; 
that  there  should  be,  so  to  speak,  dovetailed  into  one 
another  the  fact  of  national  independence  and  the  fact  of 
international  friendship ?  The  consummation  of  the  tragedy 
is  that  precisely  what  we  believe  and  say,  is  believed  and  said 
in  Germany,  with  the  same  sincerity  and  the  same  convic- 
tion as  here;  inexcusably,  you  may  say,  and  I  admit  that 
to  us  it  is  very  difficult  to  see  sufficient  reason  on  their  part 
for  that  conviction  and  that  belief.  Some  Germans  find 
it  extraordinarily  difficult  to  realize  what  we  believe  and 
the  possibility  of  the  terror  against  which  we  are  fighting. 
Well,  if  that  is  a  common  error  on  both  sides,  I  am  led 
again  to  the  conclusion  that  there  surely  must  be  some 
way — I  do  not  ask  the  Government  now  to  point  out 
the  way — some  way  out  of  the  impasse  in  which  we  are 
landed,  and  we  ought  at  least  to  show  ourselves  ready  to 
accept  any  suggestion  that  can  be  offered  of  relieving  us 
from  such  an  anxiety. 

At  the  end  of  the  speech,  he  quoted  the  words  of 
Edith  Cavell,  and  then  said: 

I  beseech  your  Lordships  to  entertain  them  with  all 
the  feeling,  with  all  the  fullness  and  simplicity  of  her  mind : 
"Standing  before  God  and  eternity,  I  realize  that  patriotism 
is  not  everything;  I  have  no  bitterness,  no  hate." 


Francis  Neilson  237 

I  will  refer  to  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby's  speech.  Mr. 
Ponsonby  spoke  shortly  after  the  Prime  Minister. 
The  Prime  Minister  had  reviewed  the  whole  progress 
of  the  war,  in  the  longest  speech  that  Mr.  Asquith 
ever  made.  Mr.  Ponsonby  said : 

Are  you  testing  the  powers  of  endurance  of  this  country? 
You  will  find  them  illimitable.  But  woe  betide  the  men 
who  exploit  these  powers  of  endurance  just  for  the  sake  of 
a  passing  triumph!  I  am  tired  of  hearing  the  expression 
about  "winning  the  war,"  "through  terror  to  triumph," 
about  "the  last  man  and  the  last  shilling,  whatever  the 
cost."  Winning  the  war!  There  is  something  more 
important  than  that,  and  it  is  what  you  win  by  the  war 
that  really  matters.  Is  anybody  thinking  about  that? 
Winning  the  war!  We  have  won  wars  in  the  past,  and 
military  victories  have  been  thrown  away  in  the  council 
chamber  by  diplomatists,  simply  because  the  country 
did  not  realize  what -it  went  into  the  war  for. 

Then  he  said : 

Militarism  has  never  been  crushed  by  force  of  arms. 
Force  of  arms  has  only  created  militarism.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  Europe  will  have  learned  a  lesson  from  this 
war,  and  that  militarism  will  be  crushed  everywhere.  In 
Germany,  it  happens  to  be  a  very  pernicious  form  of 
militarism,  but  Germany  is  not  the  only  country  where 
militarism  exists.  We  are  told  that  we  are  fighting  for 
liberty  and  fighting  for  democracy  against  tyranny,  but 
gradually  we  have  seen  the  very  system  we  abominate, 
whose  very  existence  we  detest,  instituted  in  our  midst, 
and  in  setting  out  to  destroy  the  enemy  we  are  creating 
it  at  home.  Criticism  is  silenced,  opinion  is  repressed; 
without  any  sort  of  excuse  or  adequate  explanation,  a 
Liberal  Administration  committed  suicide  before  our  eyes, 
Acts  of  Parliament  have  been  rushed  through  without 
debate,  and  any  criticism  or  opposition  is  condemned  as 


238    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

unpatriotic;  labor  has  been  dragooned,  newspaper  offices 
have  been  raided,  pamphlets  have  been  burned,  speakers 
imprisoned,  protection  instituted  and  conscription  threat- 
ened— and  all  this  in  the  name  of  liberty  and  democracy. 

You  quite  see  Mr.  Ponsonby's  point.  You  might 
go  to  war,  and  you  might  in  the  conduct  and  progress 
of  that  war  have  to  institute  in  your  own  land  the  very 
things  that  you  abominate  in  the  enemy's  land.  War 
is  an  extraordinary  thing.  You  never  know  how  it 
will  turn  out.  The  only  consolation  I  have,  after  talk- 
ing to  belligerents  and  jingoes — and  many  are  jingoes — 
in  New  York,  is  to  turn  back  to  some  great  person  who 
has  been  in  the  thick  of  it  for  years  and  years  and 
read  what  he  has  to  say  of  war.  Read  Lord  Morley. 
Lord  Morley,  after  all  the  wars  that  he  saw  conducted 
by  Britain,  had  to  say,  when  he  was  writing  Glad- 
stone's life,  that  statesmen,  when  they  go  into  war, 
very  soon  forget  the  purpose  of  the  war.  You  do  not 
know  what  the  other  country  will  do.  In  this  war 
they  are  asking  that  the  Government  restate  its  terms. 
Why?  Because  the  events  of  the  war  have  com- 
pletely changed  the  ideas  that  were  in  the  minds  of 
the  statesmen  when  the  war  broke  out.  Furthermore, 
the  speech  which  Mr.  Asquith  made  over  a  year  ago, 
and  which,  according  to  Mr.  Asquith,  placed  Britain 
in  the  position  of  a  power  that  is  fighting  for  a  better 
Europe,  does  not  now  fit  the  military  situation.  Listen 
to  the  words  of  his  speech.  It  was  a  speech  made  at 
Dublin,  in  September  of  last  year,  when  he  said  that 
what  we  ought  to  keep  in  view  in  this  war  was  the 
enthronement  of  the  idea  of  public  right,  which  meant, 

by  a  slow  and  gradual  process,  the  substitution  for  force, 
for  the  clash  of  competing  ambition,  for  groupings  and 


Francis  Neilson  239 

alliances,  and  a  precarious  equipoise,  of  a  real  European 
partnership  based  on  the  recognition  of  equal  rights,  and 
established  and  enforced  by  a  common  will. 

We  all  subscribe  to  that — everybody  does;  but  is 
that  what  we  are  fighting  for  now?  The  position  is 
entirely  changed,  and  the  longer  we  go  on,  the  more 
the  position  will  change,  not  from  the  mere  fact  of  more 
belligerents  entering  the  field,  or  from  the  numbers  of 
powers  that  make  up  the  Entente  or  the  Central  Powers 
— not  that  at  all,  but  from  the  thousand  and  one  viola- 
tions that  are  going  on  in  regard  to  international  law,  and 
will  have  to  go  on  and  multiply  the  longer  the  war  goes 
on.  Indeed,  as  a  great  general  said  the  other  day,  what 
I  would  like  to  know  is  this,  Is  it  going  to  be  muddle  and 
attrition? 

You  can  see  that  the  Union  of  Democratic  Control 
in  the  House  of  Commons  is  really  standing  for  a 
policy  that  means  something  to  humanity.  It  may  not 
be  on  all  fours  with  what  is  required  by  the  Government, 
but  that  is  another  thing.  The  Government  is  not 
humanity;  it  is  not  the  people.  I  have  a  letter  from 
one  of  my  friends,  who  says : 

As  far  as  the  U.  D.  C.  is  concerned,  we  are  going  ahead 
vigorously  and  having  plenty  of  meetings.  Perhaps 
the  most  marked  thing  is  that  Ponsonby  and  I  were  able  to 
speak  our  minds  in  the  House  of  Commons  with  perfect 
toleration.  There  was  a  large  house  when  I  spoke,  and  they 
listened  attentively,  and  to  some  parts  of  my  speech  with  a 
great  deal  of  obvious  agreement.  At  any  rate,  I  am  pretty 
sure  that  the  mass  of  our  fellow  members  already  see  that  a 
"war  of  attrition"  would  be  absolutely  ruinous  to  ourselves 
as  well  as  to  Germany,  and  to  any  clear-sighted  person  it  is 
obvious  that  if  there  is  not  going  to  be  a  war  of  attrition, 
there  must  be  a  statement  of  terms  before  long,  and  before 


240    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

there  is  any  enormous  change  in  the  military  situation. 
I  do  not  feel  as  yet  in  the  least  inclined  to  prophesy.  I  only 
know  that  things  are  not  in  the  least  as  they  would  seem 
to  any  one  merely  reading  the  newspapers. 

Their  work  is  efficacious;  there  is  no  doubt  about  it. 

A  friend  told  me,  some  time  ago,  that  he  had  lost 
his  third  son.  This  father  has  been  one  of  my  greatest 
jingo  opponents  in  England.  He  lived  in  the  first 
constituency  that  I  ever  fought,  where  all  my  father's 
stock  comes  from,  and  so  much  of  a  jingo  was  he,  and 
so  much  opposed  to  my  sentiments,  that  he  would 
follow  me  from  village  to  village,  even  when  I  was 
doing  educational  work,  to  hamper  me  at  question 
time.  After  two  big  political  fights  in  the  division, 
we  became  good  friends.  I  did  not  convince  him. 
He  was  still  a  jingo.  When,  however,  he  wrote  to  tell 
me  that  he  had  lost  his  third  son  in  the  war  (the  fourth 
son  is  a  cripple,  and  will  never  be  able  to  sit  up),  he 
said: 

I  do  not  know  whether  it  is  the  loss  of  my  lads  that  has 
made  me  think,  or  whether  it  has  been  the  awful  position 
of  my  wife  through  it  all,  who  can  speak  to  no  one,  who 
just  goes  about  the  grounds  outside  my  house  from  almost 
early  morning  to  late  at  night,  to  keep  out  of  sight.  I 
said  to  her  one  day  that  I  had  promised  to  read  some  of  the 
literature  that  you  had  suggested  to  me  so  often.  I  took 
up  Tolstoy's  War  and  Peace,  and  it  is  the  first  big  work  I 
ever  read  in  my  life.  I  used  to  consider  that  I  was  doing 
a  great  deal  of  reading  if  I  read  a  novel  of  three  hundred 
and  fifty  pages,  but  to  get  through  the  fifteen  hundred 
pages  of  War  and  Peace  was  a  formidable  task  for  me — but 
it  has  cured  me!  I  see  war  now  as  the  real  soldier  sees  it. 
Tolstoy  was  a  real  soldier.  He  was  not  a  jingo  editor, 
sitting  down  here  out  of  earshot  of  the  guns,  writing  his 


Francis  Neilson  241 

morning  news  in  his  safe,  comfortable  office.  No;  it  is 
another  thing,  when  you  get  the  real  soldier,  the  man  who 
fought  at  Sebastopol  and  on  the  Danube;  the  man  who 
wrote  of  Napoleon's  campaigns  like  Tolstoy. 

My  friend  has  joined  the  Union  of  Democratic 
Control.  So  you  see  there  is  consolation  even  in 
Heaven  for  that  sinner  that  has  been  reclaimed.  It  is 
through  the  experience  of  war  that  these  things  come 
home  to  the  people.  If  you  will  only  let  them  know 
what  they  are  fighting  for,  and  let  them  know  the  full 
cost.  Think  of  the  position  now  of  the  reformer  in 
Great  Britain.  There  was  need  of  reform  in  Great 
Britain.  I  have  helped  the  land  movement  in  Great 
Britain,  the  English  leagues  for  the  taxation  of  land 
values.  It  was  a  long,  bitter  fight.  You  talk  about 
your  fight  against  vested  interests  in  your  country; 
you  do  not  know  what  a  fight  is  until  you  bump  up 
against  British  landlordism.  The  budget  spoken  so 
much  about  in  this  country,  called  the  "people's 
budget,"  the  budget  of  1909,  to  revalue  the  land  of 
Great  Britain,  was  not  a  particularly  revolutionary 
measure,  in  one  sense;  it  was  not  hasty,  for  the  land  of 
Great  Britain,  as  a  whole,  had  not  been  valued  since 
the  time  of  William  and  Mary.  It  was  time  that  some- 
thing was  done.  To-day  some  one  quoted  Richard 
Cobden.  The  quotation  made  me  think  of  reform, 
and  how  slowly  we  move.  In  1843,  Richard  Cobden 
said,  "I  am  in  favor  of  abolishing  the  whole  of  the 
'breakfast-table  duties.'"  The  burden  then  was 
enormous  on  the  wage  earners.  How  did  he  say  he 
would  find  an  alternative  for  the  Treasury,  for  we  could 
not  abolish  those  duties  and  lose  the  money?  If  the 
duties  were  to  be  abolished  and  the  money  lost,  there 

16 


242    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

must  be  another  source  of  income  provided.  So  he 
said,  "Revalue  the  land  of  the  country,  and  place 
taxes  on  it  equal  to  the  amount  that  you  would  lose." 
That  was  in  1843. 

Now  we  will  look  at  the  1914  budget.  What  was  the 
topic?  Just  the  same  old  topic  that  Cobden  referred 
to  in  1843!  The  same  old  topic  that  my  grandfather, 
William  Neilson,  went  to  Dundee  gaol  in  chains  for. 
I  have  a  copy  of  one  of  the  Scottish  chartists'  mani- 
festoes. Some  of  the  topics  mentioned  in  it  were: 
the  repeal  of  the  corn  laws,  freedom  of  speech,  freedom 
of  meeting,  and  the  abolition  of  the  House  of  Lords. 
You  cannot  make  much  progress  and  have  wars.  You 
cannot  do  it.  We  have  tried  to,  and  we  have  failed 
ignominiously.  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  think.  The 
Boer  War  came  at  a  time  when  we  were  making  a  little 
progress.  Then  came  the  burst  of  imperialism  from 
Mr.  Chamberlain.  Look  what  it  cost  us  in  South 
Africa,  not  to  mention  any  other  parts  of  the  globe. 
Can  you  make  progress  with  war?  Think.  Perhaps 
never  in  the  history  of  any  country  was  such  an  attempt 
made  at  progress  with  such  enormous  disabilities  as 
was  made  by  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  and 
Mr.  Asquith.  In  1906,  they  had  this  extra  load  of 
two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  debt.  Taxes  were 
placed  on  sugar,  which  was  not  taxed  before  the  Boer 
War.  There  was  a  tax  of  eight  pence  a  pound  on  tea. 
Taxes  were  increased  on  tobacco,  spirits,  and  beer, 
and  the  tax  was  also  increased  on  dried  fruits.  During 
the  Boer  War  they  put  a  tax  of  two  shillings  on  corn. 
Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman's  Government  set 
to  work  to  carry  out  its  pledges,  to  reform  the  land,  to 
reform  the  House  of  Lords,  to  reform  education,  and 
to  reform  pretty  nearly  everything.  Now,  at  the  end 


Francis  Neilson  243 

of  eight  years,  what  have  they  done?  They  had  paid 
off  one  hundred  millions  of  the  war  debt.  They  had 
reduced  some  of  the  taxes  on  sugar  and  tea.  They 
had,  however,  to  increase  the  taxes,  of  course,  on  beer, 
spirits,  and  tobacco,  to  pay  for  old-age  pensions,  and 
for  the  extra  money  required  for  the  big  sickness 
legislation  introduced  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  insurance 
for  sickness,  maternity,  unemployment,  and  the 
building  of  sanatoria  in  the  country  to  assist  in  wiping 
out  the  "white  scourge."  They  got  extra  taxes  from 
incomes.  And  all  the  time  here  is  this  big  source, 
land  values,  eight  thousand  millions  sterling,  lying 
practically  untouched.  So  we  attempted  in  those 
eight  years  to  do  something,  but  oh,  how  little!  Where 
is  it  now?  Piff !  it  all  went  the  first  day  we  asked  for  a 
war  credit.  When  you  look  back  upon  fifteen  years 
of  your  life  gone  for  nothing,  and  when  you  have 
been  a  Radical  all  your  days  and  have  made  a  study 
of  the  conditions  of  your  country  with  the  idea  of  mak- 
ing as  much  happiness  as  possible,  it  is  a  heartbreaking 
business.  If  there  is  one  thing  that  I  loathe,  it  is 
war.  I  loathe  it,  and  I  shall  always  fight  against  it. 
Now  what  is  there  for  me  to  do  ?  Just  to  work  for  peace, 
to  go  to  those  who  give  me  an  opportunity  to  speak  to 
them,  and  try  to  put  before  you  some  of  the  experiences 
through  which  we  have  passed  in  Great  Britain. 

But,  after  all,  you  must  do  your  own  thinking.  Do 
not  be  dictated  to  by  editors  or  speakers.  Do  not 
accept  what  I  say.  Find  out  the  truth  of  diplomacy, 
preparedness,  and  war  for  yourselves.  The  same 
sources  are  open  to  you  that  are  open  to  me,  so  you  can 
judge  for  yourselves.  Exercise  your  own  mind,  and 
go  in  for  calm,  deliberate  study  and  thought,  and  you 
will  then  have  an  enormous  weapon  against  war. 


"THE  WISCONSIN  PLAN  " :  A  CONFERENCE  OF 
NEUTRALS  FOR  CONTINUOUS  MEDIATION 

BY  EMILY  G.  BALCH 

IN  February,  1915,  the  Legislature  of  Wisconsin 
adopted  a  memorial  to  Congress  endorsing  the  so- 
called  plan  for  continuous  mediation  without  armistice. 
It  may  be  that  the  word  ' '  mediation  "  is  not  well  chosen, 
but  the  proposal  is  quite  clear-cut  and  definite,  and  has 
had  an  interesting  history,  and  its  backers  still  hope 
that  it  may  yet  help  to  make  history  in  a  wider  sense. 

As  often  happens,  the  idea  occurred  independently 
to  more  than  one  person,  and  unfortunately  both  these 
persons  were  women,  and  not  women  with  any  claim 
to  the  authority  of  the  specialist. 

The  idea  has  made  its  way  on  its  merits,  and  has 
been  perhaps  handicapped  by  its  origin.  For  women 
stand  to-day  in  a  peculiar  situation.  Formerly,  when 
a  woman  originated  an  idea,  she  acted  as  an  Egeria. 
However  generously  Mill  or  another  acknowledged 
indebtedness  to  a  woman,  the  ideas  went  forth  with  the 
man's  imprimatur  and  counted  as  his.  Women's  con- 
tributions to  progress  were  all  anonymous.  To-day 
it  is  not  so  natural  to  have  things  take  this  course,  and 
a  woman's  proposal  is  likely  to  carry  her  name.  At  the 
same  time  there  is  a  considerable  and  perfectly  intel- 
ligible prima  facie  prejudice  against  it  as  a  woman's 
proposal,  except  in  certain  fields.  I  considered  there- 

244 


Emily  G.  Balch  245 

fore  whether   or  not    to  describe    the   origin  of   this 
idea,  but  decided  to  do  so. 

Madam  Rosika  Schwimmer,  a  Jewish-Hungarian 
journalist  and  suffragist,  was  in  London  when  hostilities 
broke  out.  A  woman  of  remarkable  intellectual  capa- 
city, of  wide  international  acquaintanceship,  and  of  a 
power  of -high  and  deep  feeling  that  I  have  never  seen 
equaled,  she  was  at  first  almost  prostrated  by  the  war. 
She  decided  to  come  to  the  United  States  to  see  what 
could  be  done  on  behalf  of  reuniting  war-split  Europe, 
and  issued  a  now  rare  circular  outlining  a  plan  for  a  confer- 
ence of  neutral  nations  such  as  is  about  to  be  discussed. 

In  the  autumn  of  the  same  year  Miss  Julia  Grace 
Wales,  a  young  Canadian,  an  instructor  in  English  at 
the  University  of  Wisconsin,  was  working,  and  over- 
working, on  her  doctoral  thesis.  To  her,  as  to  her 
technical  enemy  Rosika  Schwimmer,  the  war  was  an 
intolerable  horror. 

At  Christmas  a  vacation  gave  her  some  free  time,  and 
she  labored  night  and  day  for  several  days  at  a  first 
draft  of  a  plan  that  had  been  working  itself  out  in  her 
mind  for  weeks  past, — a  plan  that  was  in  substance 
the  same  as  that  of  Madam  Schwimmer;  a  plan  to  the 
furtherance  of  which  they  have  finely  cooperated  above 
all  pride  of  authorship,  much  as  they  both  believe  in  it, 
and  much  as  they  both  hope  from  it. 

Miss  Wales  talked  over  her  plan  with  friends,  and 
such  an  excitement  and  enthusiasm  was  aroused  among 
them  that  they  formed  an  informal  committee  to  press 
it.  She  worked  over  her  statement,  profiting  by  criti- 
cism and  suggestions,  and  in  February  it  was  brought 
before  the  State  Legislature,  where,  as  was  said  before, 
it  was  officially  endorsed  and  called  to  the  attention  of 
Congress. 


246    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

It  was  also  introduced  in  Congress  by  Senator  La 
Follette,  on  February  8th,  as  Senate  Joint  Resolution 
234,  but  died  in  committee  after  "highly  significant 
discussions"  attending  its  introduction. 

The  latter  part  of  the  same  month  the  National  Con- 
ference of  the  Emergency  Peace  Federation  met  in 
Chicago  and  adopted  the  proposal  as  its  own. 

At  The  Hague  at  the  end  of  April  and  beginning 
of  May  an  International  Congress  of  Women  came 
together  with  some  1500  delegates  representing  ten 
countries,  including  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Austria, 
Italy,  and  Belgium.  This  body  also  eagerly  accepted 
this  plan.  Not  content  with  this,  it  dispatched  envoys 
to  the  governments  of  Europe  and  of  the  United  States, 
to  lay  before  them  the  Resolutions  of  the  Congress, 
twenty-eight  in  number,  of  which  this  was  one. 

Miss  Jane  Addams  and  Dr.  Aletta  Jacobs  of  Amster- 
dam were  received  by  the  responsible  ministers  of 
Holland,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary, 
Italy  (and  also  by  the  Pope),  Switzerland,  France,  and 
Belgium.  The  second  delegation,  of  which  I  had  the 
honor  to  be  one,  were  received  by  the  King  of  Norway 
and  by  the  responsible  ministers  of  Denmark,  Norway, 
Sweden,  and  Russia.  In  Petrograd  we  talked  for  the 
greater  part  of  an  hour  with  M.  Sazonoff.  Returning 
we  had  occasion  for  further  interviews  in  the  Scandi- 
navian countries,  Holland,  and  Great  Britain,  and  some 
of  our  number  talked  once  more  with  Minister  von 
Jagow,  and  yet  a  third  time  with  the  Scandinavian 
authorities.  All  these  latter  interviews  related  to  the 
subject  of  a  conference  of  neutral  nations  for  purposes 
of  continuous  mediation.  How  would  the  belligerent 
nations  regard  the  calling  of  such  a  conference  ?  Would 
the  neutral  nations  send  delegates  to  such  a  conference, 


Emily  G.  Balch  247 

and  which  nation  or  nations  should  or  would  take  the 
initiative  ? 

In  this  country  interviews  to  talk  over  the  subject 
were  also  held.  President  Wilson  has  received  for 
this  purpose  Miss  Addams,  myself,  Dr.  Jacobs,  Miss 
Macmillan,  and  Madam  Schwimmer. 

In  October  an  International  Peace  Congress  met  at 
San  Francisco,  which  not  only  endorsed  this  plan  but 
sent  President  David  Starr  Jordan,  accompanied  by 
Mr.  Louis  Lochner,  Secretary  of  the  American  Peace 
Federation,  to  urge  it  on  the  attention  of  President 
Wilson ;  this  interview  took  place  early  in  November. 

Besides  the  backing  so  far  spoken  of,  the  plan  has  been 
endorsed  by  the  following  Government  officials: 

The  Governors  of  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Michigan, 
North  Dakota,  Vermont,  Wyoming. 

Members  of  Congress  from  Alabama,  Arkansas, 
California,  Idaho,  Illinois,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Minne- 
sota, Missouri,  New  York,  Ohio,  South  Dakota,  Wash- 
ington, Wisconsin. 

United  States  Senators  from  California,  Wisconsin, 
Wyoming. 

A  former  Secretary  of  War  and  a  former  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War. 

A  former  Secretary  of  State. 

The  United  States  Commissioner  of  Education. 

The  Chairman  of  the  American  Group  of  the  Inter- 
parliamentary Union. 

There  has  been  besides  a  wide-spread  agitation  in  its 
favor  partially  induced  by  the  following  list  of  endorse- 
ments : 

Appeal  of  over  two  hundred  university  and  college 
presidents  and  professors. 

National  Women's  Peace  Party — 200  branches. 


248    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  Board  of  Directors  of  the  American  Peace  Society. 

The  Christian  Endeavor  Society. 

Colorado  State  Federation  of  Women's  Clubs — 
10,400  members. 

Chicago  Commons  (Settlement) — 3000  members. 

Central  Howard  Association,  Chicago,  111. — 2500 
members. 

Woman's  Peace  Party,  Grand  Rapids,  Mich. — 2000 
members;  and  many  others. 

Nor  was  this  agitation,  and  this  interest  and  belief 
in  this  proposal,  confined  to  this  country. 

In  Sweden:  On  June  27th,  nearly  six  hundred  mass 
meetings  throughout  the  kingdom,  with  more  than 
one  hundred  thousand  people  attending,  urged  their 
government  to  cooperate  in  a  neutral  conference. 

In  Holland:  On  August  3d,  the  Anti-Oorlog  Raad 
(Anti-War  Council)  convened  a  national  meeting  at  The 
Hague,  at  which  hundreds  of  Dutch  organizations  were 
represented.  The  convention  went  on  record  in  favor 
of  a  neutral  conference,  and  petitioned  the  Dutch 
government  accordingly. 

In  Switzerland:  Twenty-one  organizations  are  now 
circulating  a  petition  to  encourage  their  government  to 
act  with  other  neutrals. 

In  England,  the  British  Branch  of  the  Women's 
International  Committee  for  Permanent  Peace  (the 
organization  of  which  latter  was  the  outcome  of  The 
Hague  Conference)  not  only  endorsed  the  plan  but  in 
July  were  just  getting  out  a  third  edition  of  Miss 
Wales 's  pamphlet,  bringing  the  total  copies  up  to  8000. 
The  first  two  editions  had  been  sold  out. 

This  is  a  long  introduction.  What  is  this  plan  which 
has  found  such  curiously  wide  and  diverse  encourage- 
ment? Does  it  appeal  merely  to  those  who,  desiring 


Emily  G.  Balch  249 

peace,  are  ready  to  accept  any  program  which  operates 
with  that  magic  password?  What  are  its  merits,  its 
difficulties,  its  outlook? 

First  as  to  its  constitution  and  calling.  What  the 
plan  called  for  was  that  the  neutral  governments  should 
appoint  delegates  to  sit  together  indefinitely  while  the 
war  continued — "Continuous  mediation  without  armi- 
stice. "  The  reasons  why  a  truce  is  impracticable  are 
many  and  obvious. 

I  quote  Miss  Wales  as  to  its  function : 

The  members  of  the  commission  should  have  a  scientific 
but  no  diplomatic  function .  .  .  .  The  commission  should 
explore  the  issues  involved  in  the  present  struggle,  and  in  the 
light  of  this  study  begin  making  propositions  to  the  bel- 
ligerents in  the  spirit  of  constructive  internationalism.  If 
the  first  effort  fail,  they  should  consult  and  deliberate, 
revise  their  original  propositions  or  offer  new  ones,  coming 
back  again  and  again  if  necessary,  in  the  unalterable  con- 
viction that  some  proposal  will  ultimately  be  found  that 
will  afford  a  practical  basis  for  actual  peace  negotiation. 
The  commission  should  be  established  without  delay,  on 
neutral  initiative. 

I  quote  further  from  a  statement  sent  out  last  month 
by  the  National  Peace  Federation,  of  which  Mr.  Hamil- 
ton Holt  is  President : 

The  work  of  the  conference  should  be  to  formulate  con- 
certed proposals  of  possible  terms  of  peace  as  a  basis  for 
suggestions  and  objections  on  the  part  of  the  belligerent 
governments  and  for  public  discussion.  In  other  words, 
it  should  frame  the  outline  of  a  possible  treaty  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  belligerent  governments  and  to  be  publicly 
discussed  in  the  different  countries. 

Further,  on  the  basis  of  the  suggestions  and  objections 


250    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

received  from  the  belligerent  governments,  the  conference 
should  modify  the  original  proposals  and  submit  them  again 
to  the  belligerents  in  the  modified  form.  It  should  in  this 
way  continuously  develop  the  original  proposals  in  the 
line  of  further  suggestions  and  objections  made  by  the 
belligerent  governments,  or  arising  out  of  the  public  dis- 
cussion of  the  successive  proposals  in  the  different  countries. 
It  should  continue  in  this  way  until  the  proposals  have 
reached  a  point  when  the  belligerents  of  both  sides  find  in 
them  sufficient  common  ground  themselves  to  meet  for  the 
final  settlement  of  the  peace  treaty. 

The  type  of  persons  appointed  should  be  of  broad  inter- 
national outlook.  They  .  .  .  should  act  on  their  own 
responsibility,  as  do  the  Judges  of  The  Hague  Court  of 
Arbitration,  who  are  appointed  by  their  governments,  but 
who,  once  appointed,  act  on  their  own  responsibility. 
The  work  of  the  conference,  however,  would  be  different 
from  that  of  The  Hague  Court  of  Arbitration,  which  deals 
only  with  justiciable  questions.  The  proposed  conference 
would  more  resemble  an  International  Court  of  Conciliation, 
and  its  work  would  be  analogous  to  that  of  a  Board  of 
Conciliation  mediating  between  employers  and  employed. 

Those  with  special  information  regarding  the  problems 
involved,  whether  from  neutral  or  belligerent  countries, 
would  be  willing  to  give  it  to  such  a  conference  of  neutral 
governments. 

Two  important  points  are  to  be  observed. 

(1)  The  delegates,  though  officially  appointed,  should 
have  no  power  to  commit  their  own  governments  to 
anything.     The  government's  responsibility  is  limited 
to  the  mere  fact  that  it  invites  or  is  invited  to  designate 
members  of  the  conference,  and  that  it  does  designate 
and  accredit  such. 

(2)  The  members  of  the  conference  should  be  free  to  act 
without  referring  back  to  their  respective  governments. 


Emily  G.  Balch  251 

Some  writers  have  proposed  a  conference  not  alone 
for  purposes  of  mediation,  but  one  in  which  at  the  same 
time  the  rights  of  non-belligerents  in  time  of  war  should 
be  defined,  and  the  interests  of  non-belligerents  be 
represented.  This  seems  to  most  of  those  who  advocate 
the  continuous  mediation  idea  a  fatal  policy,  and  for 
several  reasons. 

In  the  first  place,  too  much  time  has  already  been 
spent,  at  Hague  congresses  and  elsewhere,  in  arranging 
the  ways  in  which  war  shall  be  carried  on.  The  time 
that  has  been  spent  in  haggling  over  dumdum  bullets, 
and  legislating  that  bombs  solely  for  the  dispersion  of 
asphyxiating  gases  should  be  illegitimate,  but  that 
bombs  for  the  diffusion  of  asphyxiating  gases  plus 
missiles  should  be  legitimate,  might  have  been  better 
employed.  One  of  the  shocks  of  the  present  experience 
has  been  to  find  how  easily  we  adjust  our  plastic  human 
nature  and  plastic  human  institutions,  even  our  highly 
artificial  and  sensitive  credit  systems,  to  the  new  con- 
ditions imposed  by  warfare,  as  a  man  with  one  lung  or  a 
leaky  heart  learns  to  get  on  in  that  way.  Let  us  not 
call  together  a  new  conference  to  arrange  how  to  make 
war  tolerable  and  to  adjust  our  institutions  further 
to  its  continuance.  Let  us  get  rid  of  the  idea  that  if 
war  is  only  properly  regulated  and  politely  conducted 
it  is  all  right. 

In  the  second  place,  a  conference  of  neutrals  laying 
down  and  insisting  on  their  own  grievances  and  claims 
would  be  by  that  very  fact  spoiled  for  mediatory  func- 
tions or  for  conciliation.  If  a  man  is  trying  to  get  two 
angry  neighbors  to  listen  to  reason  and  see  if  it  might  not 
be  possible  to  find  some  fair  and  reasonable  plan  on 
which  they  can  agree,  he  does  not  begin  by  pointing  out 
how,  in  their  fighting,  they  have  trampled  on  his  own 


252    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

garden,  and  by  insisting  that  they  shall  quarrel  without 
interfering  with  his  business. 

The  two  functions  of  a  neutral  conference  are  mu- 
tually incompatible  and  should  be  undertaken  by 
separate  bodies  differently  constituted. 

We  have  seen  how  far  the  conference,  once  consti- 
tuted, would  be  dissociated  from  the  countries  consti- 
tuting it.  Its  relation  to  the  belligerent  governments 
would  be  in  a  sense  still  less.  The  belligerent  govern- 
ments would  not  need  to  take  any  official  cognizance 
of  the  conference,  and  therefore  not  only  need  not 
ask  to  have  it  called,  but  need  not  be  consulted  as  to 
whether  it  should  be  called. 

The  Hague  Convention  provides  that  it  cannot  be 
considered  an  unfriendly  act  to  offer  mediation.  Never- 
theless, in  the  actual  world  neutral  governments  will 
not  take  even  so  innocent  a  step  as  naming  members  of 
such  a  conference  without  assuring  themselves  through 
diplomatic  channels  that  such  a  conference  would  not 
be  resented. 

Information  on  this  point  is  at  hand  in  the  signed 
statement  issued  on  October  15,  1915,  by  five  of  the 
women  who  enjoyed  the  interviews  already  described : 

Jane  Addams  (United  States). 

Emily  G.  Balch  (United  States). 

Aletta  Jacobs  (Holland). 

Chrystal  Macmillan  (Great  Britain). 

Rosika  Schwimmer  (Austria-Hungary). 

This  says: 

We  heard  much  the  same  words  spoken  in  Downing  Street 
as  those  spoken  in  Wilhelmstrasse,  in  Vienna  as  in  Petro- 
grad,  in  Budapest  as  in  Havre,  where  the  Belgians  have 
their  temporary  government. 


Emily  G.  Balch  253 

Our  visits  to  the  war  capitals  convinced  us  that  the  bellig- 
erent governments  would  not  be  opposed  to  a  conference  of 
neutral  nations;  that  while  the  belligerents  have  rejected 
offers  of  mediation  by  single  neutral  nations,  and  while  no 
belligerent  could  ask  for  mediation,  the  creation  of  a  con- 
tinuous conference  of  neutral  nations  might  provide  the 
machinery  which  would  lead  to  peace.  We  found  that  the 
neutrals  on  the  other  hand  were  concerned  lest  calling  such 
a  conference  might  be  considered  inopportune  by  one  or 
other  of  the  belligerents.  Here  our  information  from  the 
belligerents  themselves  gave  assurance  that  such  initiative 
would  not  be  resented.  "  My  country  would  not  find  any- 
thing unfriendly  in  such  action  by  the  neutrals,"  was  the 
assurance  given  us  by  the  foreign  Minister  of  one  of  the 
great  belligerents.  "My  government  would  place  no 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  its  institution,"  said  the  Minister 
of  an  opposing  nation.  "What  are  the  neutrals  waiting 
for?"  said  a  third,  whose  name  ranks  high  not  only  in  his 
own  country  but  all  over  the  world.  "Yours  is  the  sanest 
proposal  that  has  been  brought  to  this  office  in  the  last  six 
months, "  said  the  Prime  Minister  of  one  of  the  belligerent 
countries. 

As  to  the  functioning  of  the  proposed  conference, 
it  would,  among  other  things,  do  a  great  service  in 
merely  bringing  concrete  proposals  forward  for  dis- 
cussion. These  would  at  once  give  a  starting  point  to 
the  moderate  element  in  each  country,  and  help  them  in 
their  stand  against  their  respective  jingo  opponents  at 
home.  The  English  Independent  Labor  Party  says  in 
a  manifesto : 

Each  country  believes  itself  to  be  fighting  for  "Liberty, " 
"Freedom, "  and  other  terms  which,  used  in  this  connection, 
are  vague  and  insubstantial.  In  no  case  has  a  government 
stated  in  a  practical  and  concrete  way  the  terms  on  which 


254    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

it  would  be  willing  to  negotiate  peace.  .  .  .  The  Labor 
and  Socialist  forces  in  all  the  belligerent  countries  should 
press  their  governments  to  disclose,  not  in  vague,  meaning- 
less generalities,  but  in  clear  and  specific  terms,  what  they 
are  fighting  for,  and  on  this  information  it  would  be  possible 
to  take  national  and  international  action,  with  a  view  to 
reaching  a  settlement  with  the  largest  possible  measure  of 
equity,  and  the  least  possible  loss  of  life.  There  are  obliga- 
tions to  be  met,  not  least  in  regard  to  Belgium,  but  the  aim 
and  purpose  of  the  governments,  the  point  at  which  they 
would  be  satisfied,  should  be  frankly  stated,  for  an  open 
declaration  might  help  to  remove  error  and  fear,  and  save 
hundreds  and  thousands  of  lives  that  otherwise  would  be 
needlessly  slaughtered. 

The  case  for  such  a  conference  is  very  well  stated  in 
the  closing  paragraph  of  an  article  in  the  October  23d 
number  of  The  New  Republic: 

No  one  doubts  that  the  nations  of  Europe  are  already 
weary  of  war.  Nine  tenths  of  the  population  of  each  of  the 
belligerent  states  would  gladly  accept  any  peace  terms 
consistent  with  national  honor.  Less  and  less  is  the  na- 
tional honor  of  the  one  party  conceived  of  as  implying  the 
subjugation  and  humiliation  of  the  other.  The  time  will 
come — perhaps  it  is  at  hand — when  each  of  the  belligerents 
will  realize  that  further  fighting  cannot  possibly  produce 
gains  commensurate  with  its  costs.  Yet  neither  party 
will  dare  to  make  overtures  for  peace,  lest  it  weaken  its 
moral  position  and  still  be  forced  to  fight  on.  The  initia- 
tive must  come  from  the  neutrals,  pressing  their  claims  upon 
both  parties  with  equal  force.  And  if,  when  the  time  of 
compromise  has  come,  the  neutrals  have  not  formed  an 
organization  appropriate  to  the  work,  the  guilt  for  further 
bloodshed  will  at  least  partly  rest  upon  them — most  of  all 
upon  the  United  States,  designated  by  its  geographical 
position,  its  ethnical  composition,  its  wealth,  and  its  power 
for  leadership  in  the  enterprise. 


Emily  G.  Balch  255 

There  is  danger,  however,  of  the  United  States  play- 
ing a  dog  in  the  manger  part  in  this.  In  talking  the 
project  over,  as  I  and  my  colleagues  had  the  opportun- 
ity to  do,  with  the  responsible  ministers  of  various 
countries  and  with  other  well-informed  and  states- 
manlike persons  interested,  the  plan  took  more  and 
more  definite  shape.  The  six  European  countries  that 
have  any  valid  neutrality  are  Sweden,  Norway,  and 
Denmark,  Holland,  Switzerland,  and  Spain.  Spain, 
for  reasons  merely  of  distance  and  time,  we  did  not 
visit.  In  all  the  others  there  was  conference,  and  gen- 
erally reiterated  conference.  Our  conclusions  are 
stated  in  the  manifesto  already  quoted,  as  follows : 

We  have  been  convinced  that  the  governments  of  the 
belligerent  nations  would  not  be  hostile  to  the  institution 
of  such  a  common  channel  for  good  offices ;  and  that  the 
governments  of  the  European  neutrals  we  visited  stand 
ready  to  cooperate  with  others  in  mediation.  Reviewing 
the  situation,  we  believe  that  of  the  five  European  neutral 
nations  visited,  three  are  ready  to  join  in  such  a  conference, 
and  that  two  are  deliberating  the  calling  of  such  a  confer- 
ence. Of  the  intention  of  the  United  States  we  have  as  yet 
no  evidence. 

We  are  but  the  conveyors  of  evidence  which  is  a  challenge 
to  action  by  the  neutral  governments  visited — by  Denmark, 
Holland,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  the  United 
States. 

We  .  .  .  bear  evidence  of  a  rising  desire  and  intention 
of  vast  companies  of  people  in  the  neutral  countries  to  turn 
a  barren  disinterestedness  into  an  active  good- will.  In 
Sweden,  for  example,  more  than  four  hundred  meetings  were 
held  in  one  day  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  calling  on 
the  government  to  act. 

The  excruciating  burden  of  responsibility  for  the  hopeless 
continuance  of  this  war  no  longer  rests  on  the  will  of  the 


256    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

belligerent  nations  alone.  It  rests  also  on  the  will  of  those 
neutral  governments  and  people  who  have  been  spared  its 
shock  but  cannot,  if  they  would,  absolve  themselves  from 
their  full  share  of  responsibility  for  the  continuance  of  war. 

The  statement  on  this,  issued  in  November  by  the 
National  Peace  Federation,  is  as  follows: 

In  order  to  make  a  start  in  forming  such  a  conference 
some  neutral  state  must  issue  the  invitation  to  other 
neutral  states  to  the  conference.  Certain  European 
neutrals  have  already  intimated  a  readiness  to  help  and  a 
wish  to  cooperate  when  effective  action  should  be  taken. 
Moreover,  the  governments  of  the  Netherlands  and  of 
Sweden  are  seriously  considering  the  question  of  taking  the 
initiative.  Our  information  leads  to  the  belief  that  the 
conference  could  be  more  efficiently  and  quickly  got  to- 
gether if  one  of  the  European  neutrals  were  to  convene  a 
conference  of  the  governments  of  Norway,  Sweden,  Den- 
mark, Holland,  Switzerland,  Spain,  and  the  United  States 
of  America. 

The  United  States  would  probably  find  it  difficult,  if  it 
took  the  initiative,  to  discriminate  between  the  European 
neutrals  and  the  South  American  republics,  with  which  it 
has  so  many  close  ties.  The  United  States,  however,  would 
not  be  in  the  same  difficult  position  in  accepting  the  invita- 
tion of  one  of  the  European  neutrals  to  join  in  a  conference 
with  the  European  neutrals. 

Were  these  European  neutrals  informed,  officially  or 
unofficially,  that  the  United  States  would  accept  such  an 
invitation,  it  would  be  possible  to  set  up  the  conference  in 
the  near  future.  These  smaller  European  neutrals  would 
in  this  way  be  given  the  support  which  would  make  it 
possible  for  them  to  act. 

In  case  it  seems  to  our  statesmen  unwise  for  us  to 
so  far  depart  from  our  precedent  of  abstention  from 


Emily  G.  Balch  257 

European  quarrels  as  to  ourselves  take  the  lead,  can  we 
not  at  least  give  our  hearty  moral  support  and  good 
wishes  to  Spain,  Sweden,  Holland,  the  Pope,  or  any 
other  neutral  that  will  take  the  initiative  in  calling 
together  such  a  conference?  Since  without  such  as- 
surance from  us  the  small  neutrals,  all  in  very  difficult 
positions,  are  afraid  to  act,  are  we  not  indeed  a  dog  in 
the  manger,  neither  moving  nor  making  it  possible  for 
others  to  do  so? 

I  do  not  wish  to  imply  that  there  are  no  difficulties. 
Naturally  doubts  and  criticisms  regarding  this  plan 
are  plentiful. 

The  most  common  objections  seem  to  be  that  such 
a  conference  would  be  completely  ineffective  and  that 
it  would  force  a  premature  peace.  The  two  arguments 
are  obviously  inconsistent.  But  supposing  that  such 
a  conference  were  not  ineffective,  but  that,  on  the 
contrary,  the  governments  found  it  an  acceptable  instru- 
ment, how  could  it  force  any  one  of  them  to  a  "pre- 
mature peace,"  "an  inconclusive  peace,"  or  any  kind 
of  peace  but  that  which  the  nation  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances desired?  The  president  of  a  great  Peace 
Society  told  me  he  opposed  the  plan  because  he  feared 
it  would  end  the  war  too  soon.  I  have  puzzled  much 
over  how  he  supposed  it  could  do  it. 

A  second  objection  is  that  it  is  too  early  to  begin  any 
move  for  such  a  conference.  As  the  manifesto  already 
quoted  says : 

It  has  been  argued  that  it  is  not  the  time  at  present  to 
start  such  a  process  of  negotiation,  and  that  no  step  should  be 
taken  until  one  or  the  other  party  has  a  victory,  or  at  least 
until  some  new  military  balance  is  struck.  The  answer  we 
bring  is  that  every  delay  makes  more  difficult  the  begin- 

17 


258    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

ning  of  negotiations,  more  nations  become  involved,  and  the 
situation  becomes  more  complicated ;  that  when  at  times  in 
the  course  of  the  war  such  a  balance  was  struck,  the  neu- 
trals were  unprepared  to  act.  The  opportunity  passed.  For 
the  forces  of  peace  to  be  unprepared  when  the  hour  comes 
is  as  irretrievable  as  for  a  military  leader  to  be  unready. 

As  the  statement  of  the  National  Peace  Federation 
remarks  : 

Those  who  advocate  the  postponement  of  any  action  to- 
ward the  application  of  those  principles  till  the  end  of  the 
war  fail  to  realize  that  the  terms  of  peace  are  being  decided 
now  in  the  secret  bargains  being  made  between  one  or  the 
other  belligerent  side  and  the  neutrals  who  are  being  urged 
to  enter  the  conflict. 

To  suggest  the  postponing  of  action  till  after  a  problem- 
atic decisive  victory,  whether  on  one  side  or  the  other,  is  to 
go  back  to  the  exploded  idea  that  peace  must  be  dictated 
by  the  victor  to  the  defeated. 

Moreover  great  bodies  move  slowly  and  if  there  is  a 
chance  that  proposals  of  such  a  conference  might  find 
people  ready  to  discuss  them  months  from  now,  then 
it  is  none  too  early  for  governments  to  take  the  first 
steps  looking  to  the  calling  of  such  a  conference. 

Thirdly,  it  has  been  objected  that  for  such  a  confer- 
ence to  be  called  at  a  time  when  one  side  has  the  mili- 
tary advantage  would  be  to  favor  that  side.  The 
manifesto  says: 

The  answer  we  bring  is  that  the  proposed  conference 
would  start  mediation  at  a  higher  level  than  that  of  military 
advantage.  As  to  the  actual  military  situation,  however,  we 
quote  a  remark  made  to  us  by  a  foreign  Minister  of  one 
of  the  belligerent  powers:  "Neither  side  is  to-day  strong 


Emily  G.^Balch  259 

enough  to  dictate  terms,  and  neither  side  is  so  weakened 
that  it  has  to  accept  humiliating  terms."  Such  a  confer- 
ence would  consist  of  the  ablest  persons  of  the  neutral 
countries,  assigned  not  to  problems  of  their  own  govern- 
ments, but  to  the  common  service  of  a  supreme  crisis.  The 
situation  calls  for  a  conference  cast  in  a  new  and  larger 
mold  than  those  of  conventional  diplomacy,  the  govern- 
ments sending  to  it  persons  drawn  from  social,  economic, 
and  scientific  fields  who  have  genuine  international  ex- 
perience. 

Their  aim  would  be  to  find  common  ground  of  agree- 
ment, chosen  with  as  little  regard  as  practicable  to 
temporary  advantages,  and  as  much  as  practicable  to 
reasonable  permanent  adjustments  making  for  inter- 
national stability.  Terms  practically  dictated  by  men 
flushed  with  military  success  and  dominated  by  the 
shortsighted  statesmanship  of  the  soldier  are  not  the 
most  hopeful  terms. 

A  fourth  objection  is  that  the  whole  neutral  argu- 
ment in  general,  and  the  propaganda  for  continuous 
mediation  in  particular,  "assumes  that  both  sides  are 
equally  in  the  wrong — an  assumption  contrary  to  truth 
and  hence  fundamentally  immoral."  Miss  Wales  in  a 
recently  published  statement,  issued  one  may  suppose 
especially  with  her  fellow  British  subjects  in  mind, 
argues  as  follows : 

In  reply  to  this  charge  we  emphatically  assert  that  the 
neutral  propaganda  for  Continuous  Mediation  without 
Armistice  makes  no  such  assumption.  What  it  does  as- 
sume is  that  in  any  case  there  are  some  right-thinking 
people  on  both  sides.  In  an  appeal  for  cooperation  to  right- 
thinking  people  in  all  countries  neutral  and  belligerent, 
whatever  their  national  prejudices  in  connection  with  the 
present  war,  we  believe  that  it  would  be  out  of  place  to 


260    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

dogmatize  as  to  which  side,  if  either,  represents  the  cause 
of  international  righteousness  for  which  we  desire  to  contend 
in  working  for  the  establishment  of  an  international  com- 
mission. We  believe  that  any  nation  sincerely  righting 
for  the  right  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  plan  and  much  to 
gain,  that  the  plan  is  on  the  side  of  any  country  that  is  on 
the  side  of  international  righteousness.  We  believe  that 
the  plan  of  Continuous  Mediation  without  Armistice  will 
tend  to  assist  and  reward  right  motives  in  every  country 
and  to  thwart  wrong  motives.  We  believe  that  the  citizen 
of  any  country  understanding  our  plan  and  believing  that 
his  own  country  is  righting  for  the  right  will  feel  that  the 
plan  is  favorable  to  his  own  national  cause.  We  believe 
that  the  plan,  if  carried  out,  would,  while  thwarting  short- 
sighted national  selfishness,  tend  to  bring  ultimate  good  to 
all  lands — the  genuine  and  permanent  benefit  which  de- 
pends on  the  welfare  of  the  family  of  nations  as  a  whole. 
Among  those  working  for  the  establishment  of  the  in- 
ternational commission  are  people  of  various  national 
sympathies.  Probably  there  is  no  one  working  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  international  commission  who  has  not  a 
personal  opinion  as  to  which  side  en  the  whole  represents  the 
cause  of  right.  We  feel,  however,  that  difference  of  opinion 
as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  belligerents,  the  responsibility  of 
the  war,  and  the  attitude  which  the  various  nations  will 
take  in  the  settlement  need  not  prevent  us  from  working 
together  provided  that  we  are  agreed  in  our  desire  for  the 
establishment  of  a  permanent  peace  based  on  principles  of 
international  righteousness. 

A  fifth  objection  is  that  such  a  conference  is  officious 
and  unnecessary  since  the  belligerent  governments  will 
ask  for  terms  when  they  are  ready,  and  that  till 
they  are  ready,  nothing  can  be  done.  The  statement 
issued  by  the  National  Peace  Federation  in  November 
says: 


Emily  G.  Balch  261 

It  is  useless  to  wait  until  one  belligerent  side  asks  for 
mediation,  because  however  sick  both  sides  may  be  of  the 
war,  they  are  too  proud  to  accept  mediation  as  commonly 
understood.  None  of  the  governments  can  afford  as  yet 
to  go  before  its  people  with  a  virtual  confession  of  defeat, 
such  as  would  be  implied  in  its  official  acceptance  of  medi- 
ation. The  censored  press  in  each  of  the  belligerent 
countries  leads  each  people  to  believe  that  victory  is  certain. 
Imagine,  then,  the  popular  outcry  against  any  government 
that  suddenly  announced  that  it  had  told  Uncle  Sam  or  any 
other  neutral  that  it  was  ready  for  a  settlement ! 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  first  steps  looking  toward  an 
approach  to  a  settlement  must  come  from  some  neutral 
agency.  Every  day's  delay  means  loss,  irreparable  loss, 
not  only  to  the  belligerents  but  to  the  whole  world.  This 
method  provides  the  machinery  for  taking  the  first  step 
towards  a  settlement.  It  is  for  the  neutrals  to  put  it  into 
motion. 

To  quote  once  more  the  National  Peace  Federation 
statement : 

This  war  is  in  every  way  unparalleled,  so  that  none  of 
the  methods  applied  to  the  settlement  of  previous  wars  are 
practicable.  It  is,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
the  future  peace  of  the  whole  world  that  the  method  of 
bringing  about  the  settlement  of  the  present  war  should 
be  adapted  to  its  peculiar  circumstances.  Such  a  method 
is  this  impartial  neutral  conference,  which  would  work 
towards  a  settlement  without  waiting  to  be  officially  asked 
by  the  belligerents. 

A  sixth  objection  is  that  a  conference  of  neutrals 
would  be  a  clumsy  and  slow  moving  body,  and  that  a 
single  neutral  might  better  undertake  the  work  of  con- 
ciliation. 


262     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  necessity  of  mediation  by  a  group  of  governments, 
instead  of  by  an  individual  government,  is  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  group  acting  jointly  would  give  confidence  to  the 
belligerents  of  both  sides,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
help  to  safeguard  the  neutrality  of  the  individual  govern- 
ments cooperating. 

This  is  necessary  because  the  sensitiveness  of  the  bellig- 
erents might  lead  them  to  suppose  that  some  of  the  neutrals 
might  lean  to  one  side  and  some  to  the  other,  so  that  the 
cooperation  of  a  group  would  assure  the  belligerents  of  the 
disinterestedness  of  all  the  parties. 

A  final  objection  is  that  the  war  must  be  ' '  fought  to  a 
finish, "  and  decided  solely  by  force  of  arms.  In  some 
mysterious  way  it  is  considered  more  honorable  and 
more  effective  to  drive  the  Germans  out  of  Belgium, 
for  instance,  than  to  secure  her  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, without  which  any  permanent  peace  is  unthink- 
able, by  negotiation.  At  least  everyone  may  be  sure 
that  this  is  not  the  view  of  the  Belgians  themselves. 
To  them  the  utmost  and  final  horror  would  be  the  re- 
treat of  angry  and  defeated  hordes,  blowing  up  and 
burning  as  they  went  whatever  remains  of  bridges, 
railroads,  cathedrals,  cities,  homesteads,  and  followed 
by  a  rush  of  victorious  soldiery.  Talk  this  over  with  any 
Belgian  you  can  get  at  and  never  more  will  you  consider 
such  a  driving  out  of  the  enemy  a  tolerable  proposition. 

David  Starr  Jordan  says : 

No  probability  exists  that  military  operations  in  any  quar- 
ter, on  land  or  sea,  can  of  themselves  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

A  sweeping  victory  on  either  side,  even  if  attainable, 
would  not  contribute  to  the  solution  of  the  problems  of 
Europe,  being  sure  to  leave  an  increasing  legacy  of  hate  with 
the  seeds  of  future  wars. 


Emily  G.  Balch  263 

No  possible  gain,  economic  or  political  (the  integrity  of 
invaded  territory  being  assured),  can  compensate  any  na- 
tion for  the  loss,  distress,  and  misery  involved  in  this  war 
and  aggravated  by  every  day  of  its  continuance. 

This  is  in  line  with  what  one  of  the  great  European 
ministers  said  to  our  envoys:  "You  are  right  that  it 
should  be  of  the  greatest  importance  to  finish  the  fight 
by  early  negotiation  rather  than  by  further  military 
efforts,  which  would  result  in  more  and  more  destruction 
and  irreparable  loss. " 

In  conclusion,  I  will  give  the  latest  and  most  con- 
densed restatement  by  Miss  Wales : 

Our  argument  for  Continuous  Mediation  without  Armis- 
tice rests  on  the  following  convictions: 

(1)  That  humanity  should  be  able  to  find  some  method 
of  avoiding  prolonged  wholesale  destruction ; 

(2)  That  on  both  sides  there  are  people  who  believe 
themselves  to  be  fighting  in  self-defense,  who  desire  a  right 
settlement,  and  who  ought  not  to  have  to  fight  against 
each  other ;  that  it  is  an  ultimate  outrage  against  humanity 
that  they  have  to  do  so; 

(3)  That  the  only  way  to  straighten  the  tangle  is  to  adopt 
and  persistently  employ  the  device  of  placing  simultaneous 
conditional  proposals  ("Will  you   ...   if  the  rest  will?") 
before  the  belligerents ;  that  neither  side  can  think  correctly 
or  effectively  unless  it  has  among  the  data  of  its  thinking 
exact  knowledge  as  to  how  the  enemy  (not  merely  the 
government  but  the  various  elements  of  the  people)  would 
react  to  every  possible  proposal  for  settlement; 

(4)  That  truth  tends  to  work  on  the  mind,  and  that  to 
place  sane  standing  proposals  before  the  nations  would  tend 
to  ripen  the  time  for  peace ; 

(5)  That  delay  is  dangerous  because  bitterness  and  the 
desire  for  revenge  are  growing  stronger,  and  the  civil  power 


264    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

in  all  warring  countries  is  daily  growing  weaker  in  propor- 
tion to  the  military; 

(6)  That  there  ought  to  be  a  commission  of  experts 
sitting  throughout  the  war  and  in  some  way  holding  the 
possibilities  of  settlement  before  the  belligerents ;  that  world 
consciousness  is  trying  to  break  through;  that  a  world 
thinking  organ  should  be  created  and  that  the  creation  of 
such  an  organ  at  this  juncture  would  concentrate  and  render 
effective  the  idealism  of  all  nations  and  open  the  possibility 
of  establishing,  upon  a  deposed  militarism,  the  beginnings 
of  World  Federation. 


WAR'S  TEST  OF  THE  GERMAN  THEORY  OF 
MILITARISM 

BY  MORTON  PRINCE 

term  "militarism"  has  different  meanings  for 
A  different  people.  With  some  its  signification 
relates  merely  to  the  size  of  the  army  and  navy  main- 
tained by  a  nation ;  with  others  to  the  motives,  attitude 
of  mind,  and  political  policies  which  are  behind  the 
military  establishments,  and  the  purposes  for  which 
they  are  to  be  employed.  So  that  in  this  view  one 
nation  might  maintain  a  very  small  military  force  and 
yet  its  government  rest  upon  and  be  actuated  by 
"militarism";  while  another,  the  United  States,  for 
example,  or  Great  Britain,  might  maintain  a  very  great 
military  or  naval  establishment  without  exhibiting 
militarism.  We  must  not  confuse  militarism,  under- 
stood in  this  sense,  with  the  American  idea  of  "pre- 
paredness" against  war — a  policy  of  national  defense 
which  is  now  in  the  public  mind  in  this  country.  The 
two  have  nothing  in  common  excepting  that  they  make 
use  of  military  organization  as  a  means  to  an  end.  It 
is  the  difference  in  the  ends  sought  that  distinguishes 
the  two. 

However  militarism  in  general  be  defined,  our  thesis 
requires  only  that  we  deal  with  the  German  theory  of 
militarism.  There  is  a  very  general  consensus  of  opin- 
ion throughout  the  world,  outside,  of  course,  of  the 

265 


266    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

German  Empire,  as  to  the  character  of  German  mili- 
tarism and  the  purposes  which  it  has  been  meant  to 
subserve.  I  believe  I  am  right  in  saying  that  it  is 
commonly  agreed  that  the  fundamental  principle  of 
German  militarism  is  that  the  stability,  power,  and  will 
of  the  nation  rest  on  armed  force ;  and  therefore  that  it  is 
to  such  armed  force  that  the  Imperial  Government 
looks  both  to  maintain  itself  within  the  Empire  and  to 
enforce  its  will  and  its  policies  upon  other  nations  with- 
out the  Empire. 

More  concretely,  German  militarism  in  its  external 
relations  may  be  defined  as  the  idea  of  extending  the 
nation's  trade  and  system  of  government  by  force. 
It  would  be  easy  to  cite  from  numerous  authorities  to 
support  this  interpretation  of  German  militarism. 

Militarism  thus  becomes  something  much  more  than 
a  system  of  defense  against  encroachments  from  within 
and  without — it  is  a  mode  of,  and  organization  for,  attack 
in  the  enforcement  of  progressive  policies,  of  national 
growth,  and  of  the  will  of  the  state,  whatever  direction 
these  may  take.  It  has  been  even  the  boast,  not  only 
of  the  German  Emperor  but  of  a  host  of  German  pub- 
licists, that  by  the  potential  power  of  its  army  Germany 
has  itself  maintained  peace  between  the  great  powers  of 
Europe  during  the  past  twenty-five  years. 

With  the  questionable  validity  of  this  claim  I  am  not 
here  concerned,  any  more  than  with  the  prophecy  of  the 
Emperor  in  1902,  when  he  said,  "The  powerful  German 
army  guarantees  the  peace  of  Europe."  The  irony 
of  Aug.  i,  1914,  makes  such  claims  tragic.  My  only 
motive  in  citing  them  is  to  summarize  the  functions 
which  militarism  has  undertaken  to  perform  so  that 
when  we  come  to  weigh  its  claims  with  its  achievements 
we  may  indite  it. 


Morton  Prince  267 

With  militarism  as  a  principle  of  government  within 
the  German  Empire  I  have  nothing  to  do.  Though 
it  may  be  a  system  for  the  enforcement  of  the  will  of  the 
state  against  the  will  of  the  people,  if  the  German 
people  are  satisfied  with  government  resting  on  the 
principle  of  armed  force,  it  is  their  own  affair  and  con- 
cerns them  alone.  I  will  content  myself  with  pointing 
out  that  that  principle  necessarily  means  autocracy 
based  on  armed  force,  and  is  utterly  antagonistic  and 
hostile  to  that  other  principle  of  government  which 
rests  upon  the  moral  force  of  public  opinion  controlled 
and  checked  by  constitutional  guarantees  to  the  in- 
dividual of  "natural"  and  "inherent"  and  "inalien- 
able rights."  And  yet,  if  time  permitted,  the  thesis 
would  be  an  interesting  one  to  defend  that  even  within 
the  German  body  politic,  militarism  like  all  other  hu- 
man forces  acting  upon  human  beings,  is  bound  eventu- 
ally to  excite  and  bring  into  activity  other  forces 
antagonistic  to  itself  and  with  which  it  sooner  or  later 
must  come  into  conflict.  And  this  has  happened.  The 
extraordinary  growth  of  the  German  democracy,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  numerous  political  parties  that  have 
sprung  up  in  opposition  to  the  government,  must  be 
looked  upon  as  the  necessary  reaction  of  human  wills  to 
an  autocratic  will  attempting  to  impose  itself  by  force. 
However  that  may  be,  it  is  of  the  theory  of  militarism 
applied  to  international  relations  that  the  present  war 
can  alone  be  regarded  as  a  test,  and  it  is  this  aspect  of 
the  theory  that  I  propose  to  consider. 

We  need  not  concern  ourselves  with  the  origin  and 
historical  evolution  of  German  militarism.  It  is  suffi- 
cient to  accept  it  as  it  is  found  in  its  final  form  and 
as  it  has  manifested  itself  during  the  last,  say,  twenty 
years — since  1899,  the  date  of  the  Boer  War. 


268    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

The  best  exposition  of  German  militarism  is  to  be 
found  in  concrete  applications  of  its  principles,  and  no 
more  excellent  example  of  applied  militarism  is  to  be 
found  than  in  the  attitude  of  Germany  in  the  Serbian 
crisis  in  July,  1914.  I  trust  I  may  be  permitted  to  cite 
that  incident  in  spite  of  the  danger  of  introducing  into 
this  discussion  controversial  matters  outside  the  main 
thesis. 

Serbia  had  been  guilty,  or  had  been  charged  with 
being  guilty,  of  offenses  against  Austria.  Germany  ac- 
cordingly gave  Austria  assurances,  secretly,  that  the 
latter  should  have  a  "free  hand"  in  dealing  with  Serbia 
as  she  saw  fit,  regardless  of  the  interests  of  Russia  or 
the  sovereign  rights  of  Serbia,  and  that  Germany  would 
back  her  up  with  her  army,  if  necessary.  To  all  expostu- 
lation on  the  part  both  of  Serbia  and  the  other  powers 
Germany  and  Austria  turned  a  deaf  ear.  A  settlement 
of  Austria's  demands — all  of  which  were  yielded  but 
two  and  Serbia  offered  to  refer  these  to  The  Hague — by 
mediation,  by  conference  of  the  powers,  by  conversa- 
tions was  refused.  Militarism  had  the  power,  so  it 
felt,  to  enforce  its  demands  against  Serbia,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  against  any  outside  interference  by  any  power 
or  combination  of  powers,  on  the  other.  Militarism 
desired,  of  course,  to  "localize"  the  conflict,  for  in  that 
case  its  task  would  be  easy;  but  if  the  conflict  could  not 
be  localized,  militarism  had  the  power  anyway,  so  it 
believed,  and  was  going  to  gain  its  ends  by  force  and 
would  accept  no  other  methods,  no  matter  what  the 
consequences.  Its  ulterior  object,  it  is  generally  con- 
ceded, was  to  extend  German  trade  as  an  appanage  of 
empire  through  the  Balkans  to  the  ^Egean  Sea,  Con- 
stantinople, and  the  Persian  Gulf  by  force. 

Militarism  refused  to  take  into  consideration  the 


Morton  Prince  269 

rights  of  a  sovereign  nation,  the  "natural"  and  "in- 
herent rights"  of  mankind,  the  political  interests  of 
other  European  powers,  racial  sympathies  and  pre- 
judices, the  traits,  instincts,  passions,  and  aspirations 
of  other  peoples,  and,  above  all,  mutual  international 
moral  obligations  by  which  one  nation  should  respect 
the  rights  and  interest  of  every  other.  Its  sole  function 
was  to  gain  the  ends  of  its  own  nation  by  force,  and, 
relying  upon  a  supposed  fear  of  its  own  armed  power, 
it  refused  until  it  was  too  late  every  other  mode 
of  settlement.  That  was  the  method  of  militarism. 
Necessarily  militarism,  to  be  efficient,  requires  a  highly 
developed  condition  of  preparedness  for  war.  And 
this  the  German  state  has  provided,  first,  in  a  scheme  of 
offensive  and  defensive  alliances ;  and,  second,  in  a  more 
efficiently  organized  military  machine  than  the  world 
has  ever  before  seen  and,  for  that  matter,  than  the 
world  ever  dreamed  of  or  thought  possible.  So  that  if 
militarism  when  tested  shall  be  found  not  to  have  been 
a  success,  its  failure  cannot  be  laid  to  inefficiency  of 
preparedness. 

At  this  point  the  difference  between  the  American 
idea  of  preparedness  and  the  German  idea  becomes 
apparent.  The  American  idea  is  preparedness  for 
defense  against  attack. 

The  German  idea  includes  this,  but  adds  to  it  pre- 
paredness for  defense  of  imperial  intentions  to  extend 
German  trade,  German  thought,  and  a  system  of 
government  throughout  the  world  by  force — world 
empire  or  downfall,  it  has  been  called. 

The  underlying  theory  of  militarism  of  course  has 
been  that,  if  all  the  resources  of  a  nation  are  organized 
into  a  military  system  and  that  system  is  developed  to 
its  very  highest  efficiency  in  every  one  of  its  multiplicity 


270    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  parts,  it  will  be  so  powerful  as  to  be  irresistible 
against  any  combination  of  powers  likely  within  human 
foresight  to  be  brought  against  it;  and  that  therefore 
no  state  or  likely  combination  of  states  will  dare  to 
attack  it  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  it  can 
enforce  its  will  on  the  world. 

As  opposed  to  this  we  have  the  rival  theory  that  under 
modern  conditions  of  civilization,  whatever  may  have 
been  the  case  in  the  ancient  Roman  world,  no  one  or 
two  or  three  states  can  dominate  the  whole  world  by 
force;  that  any  state  that  disregards  the  natural  and 
inherent  rights  of  sovereign  states  and  fails  to  show 
"a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind"  is 
bound  to  awaken  into  activity  the  latent  moral  and 
physical  forces  of  the  world;  that  aggressive  actions 
threatening  to  obtain  unjust  advantage  by  force  stimu- 
late resistance,  and  that  sooner  or  later,  under  the 
influence  of  public  opinion,  combinations  of  forces  come 
into  being  which  are  too  powerful  to  be  overcome  by 
any  single  power  or  possible  alliance  of  powers. 

A  perfect  analogy  may  be  found  in  the  great  political 
conflict  which  of  recent  years  agitated  this  country— 
the  conflict  between  organized  industries  and  organized 
capital  on  the  one  hand  and  public  opinion  on  the  other. 
Great  aggregations  of  capital  and  industrial  corpora- 
tions, grown  arrogant  with  power,  undertook  to  extend 
their  systems  in  disregard  of  the  laws  that  protected 
the  natural  and  inherent  rights  of  individuals  and 
lesser  organizations,  and  to  take  what  they  wanted  by 
the  power  which  they  wielded  through  their  mighty 
militant  organizations.  In  the  pursuance  of  this  policy 
there  failed  to  be  shown  "a  decent  respect  to  the  opin- 
ions of  mankind."  It  was  the  principle  of  militarism 
adopted  by  industrialism  and  applied  by  industrial 


Morton  Prince  271 

force.  Such  overriding  of  the  rights  of  others  neces- 
sarily created  an  uprising  of  public  opinion  which 
gathered  to  itself  the  political  powers  of  the  nation  and 
the  States.  These  were  more  mighty  than  any  that 
industrialism  could  mobilize.  The  result  was  such  as 
might  have  been  expected,  and  industrial  militarism 
was  overthrown. 

As  tested  by  the  results  of  the  conflict,  industrial 
militarism  proved  itself  a  failure.  Let  us  see  how  far 
German  state  militarism  has  proved  successful  as 
tested  by  this  war.  We  are  not  concerned,  of  course, 
with  the  moral  aspects  of  the  question — with  such  ques- 
tions as  right  and  justice — but  only  with  the  pragmatic 
question  of  success  or  failure.  If  militarism  can  point 
to  success,  it  can  at  least  find  one  defense  on  the  ground 
of  necessity  and  expediency. 

Has  German  state  militarism  been  successful? 

When  one  thinks  of  the  great  military  successes 
achieved  by  the  German  armies  thus  far  in  this  war,  of 
the  large  regions  of  conquered  territory  in  Belgium, 
France,  Russia,  and  Serbia,  one  is  prompted  offhand 
to  answer  in  the  affirmative.  But  deeper  consideration, 
I  think,  shows  this  view  to  be  a  superficial  one.  None 
of  the  armies  of  the  great  belligerents  on  either  side 
has  been  destroyed.  They  all  remain  intact,  and  until 
the  armies  have  been  eliminated  as  effective  forces,  or 
their  governments  rendered  incapable  by  exhaustion 
of  using  them  for  further  effective  offense  or  resistance, 
it  is  idle  to  talk  of  victory  for  one  side  or  the  other. 
Against  the  occupation  of  territory  by  the  armies  of  the 
Central  Empires  may  be  set  off: 

I.  The  complete  failure  of  their  plan  of  campaign, 
designed  years  in  advance,  and  to  carry  out  which  the 
German  military  organization  had  been  perfected.  So 


272     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

far  from  France  being  crushed  and  "bled  white"  by 
German  preparedness,  the  German  armies,  after  an 
early  retreat,  are  held  in  their  trenches,  unable  to  move 
on  the  west,  and  on  the  east  apparently  are  incapable  of 
further  advance. 

2.  The  complete  impotence  of  the  German  navy, 
the  bottling  up  of  her  merchant  marine,  the  destruction 
of  her  commerce  and  consequent  impairment  of  her 
industries. 

3.  The  loss  of  all  Germany's  colonies. 

4.  The  encircling  of  Germany  by  an  iron  naval  and 
military  ring  from  which  she  cannot  break  out. 

5.  The  indefinite  isolation  of  Germany  from  com- 
merce with  oversea  nations  and  the  paralyzing  of  her 
industries  by  England's  navy  until  England  is  satisfied 
with  the  terms  of  peace;  thus  probably  enabling  Eng- 
land to  dictate  terms. 

6.  The  possible  restriction,  after  the  war,  of  Ger- 
many's commerce  by  preferential  tariffs,   mercantile 
port  restrictions,  and  other  measures  on  the  part  of 
England  and  her  colonies,  France,  and  Russia,  against 
Germany  and  Austria. 

These  are  offsets  to  the  territories  conquered  by 
Germany  and  Austria.  In  view  of  them  the  final 
possession  of  the  territories  now  held  will  be  determined 
by  considerations  governing  the  urgency  of  necessities 
for  peace  and  not  by  the  fact  of  temporary  occupancy 
by  force.  But  however  that  may  be,  after  giving  the 
very  maximum  of  weight  to  the  initial  territorial  gains 
justly  to  be  credited  to  militarism,  including  those  in 
Serbia,  let  us  look  at  the  other  side  of  the  ledger  and  see 
what  material  and  moral  forces  its  very  successes  have 
called  into  being  to  threaten  its  supremacy. 

By  its  own  very  example,  the  object  lesson  it  has 


Morton  Prince  273 

given,  it  has  not  only  taught  other  nations  the  possi- 
bilities of  military  efficiency  but,  as  a  necessary  reaction, 
has  directly  excited  them  to  imitate  the  methods  which 
German  militarism  invented  and  to  rival  its  standards. 
The  results  have  been : 

1.  That  France,  at  first  half  prepared,  has  in  self- 
preservation  developed  and  organized  a  military  ma- 
chine which,  in  proportion  to  its  size,  is  the  equal  of 
Germany's.     For  this,  time  was  the  sole  requisite  and 
this  was  gained  when  the  German  war  machine  was 
checked  and  held  immobile  after  the  first  six  weeks  of 
war. 

2.  That   the   English  nation,  hitherto   pursuing  a 
policy  opposed  to  the  maintenance  of  large  military  land 
forces,  has  been  stimulated  to  create  for  the  purposes 
of  this  war  a  great  military,  industrial,  and  fighting 
machine  which  soon   will   be  equal  in  efficiency,  and 
approximate  in  numbers  of  men,  to  that  of  Germany. 
But,  more  important  of  all  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
validity  of  the  theory  of  militarism,  there  have  been 
evoked,  as  a  reaction  to  the  threatening  oppression  of 
militarism,   a  solidified  British  public  opinion  and  a 
national  consciousness  that  not  only  accept  military 
preparedness  on  land  as  a  requisite  for  national  security 
against  force,  but  are  inspired  by  a  national  will  to 
destroy  the  militarism  of  German  autocracy. 

3.  We  are  too  far  removed  from  Russia  to  judge 
the  conditions  there  existing,  but  it  is  probably  safe  to 
assume  that  Russia,  with  her  armies  still  intact,  and 
taught  by  reverses,  is  reacting  as  England  and  France 
have  done. 

4.  Even  the  United  States  has  not  remained  quies- 
cent.    The  thought  of  the  nation  has  reacted  to  the 
object  lesson  of  this  war,  and  public  opinion,  as  a  coun- 

18 


274    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

terforce,  is  fast  being  mobilized  into  a  national  will  to 
oppose  the  threatening  aggressions  of  militarism  by  a 
preparedness  to  meet  the  attacks  of  organized  force 
with  organized  force. 

5.  But  beyond  these  reactions,  resulting  in  the 
mobilization  of  moral  and  physical  forces  against 
militarism,  there  have  been  other  moral  reactions  of 
great  portent.  Without  undertaking  to  pass  judgment 
in  a  discussion  of  this  kind  on  the  rights  and  wrongs  of 
the  cause  for  which  the  belligerents  of  each  side  are 
contending,  the  lamentable  fact  still  remains  that  the 
hatred  and  animosities  that  have  been  created  in  one 
people  for  another  will  prove  to  be  both  moral  and 
industrial  losses  comparable  to  the  loss  of  provinces. 

There  is  another  world  condition  which  can  be  justly 
attributed  to  German  militarism  and  which  should  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  the  test  of  its  success  or 
failure  as  a  policy  of  government.  I  refer  to  the  world- 
wide hostility  to  and  dislike  of  Germany  and  her  system 
of  government  which  now,  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
permeates  almost  all  nations.  Here,  again,  I  wish  to 
emphasize  that  I  am  not  concerned  with  the  Tightness  or 
wrongness,  the  justice  or  injustice  of  this  attitude  of 
mind.  I  am  dealing  only  with  the  psychological  fact 
as  determined  by  observation  and  of  common  accept- 
ance. 

Although  this  world  attitude  of  mind  has  been 
brought  to  a  culmination  by  the  war  and  by  contempo- 
rary studies  of  the  German  state  forced  into  the  focus 
of  interest  by  the  problems  raised  by  the  war,  its  origin 
can  be  traced  to  a  succession  of  events,  or  better  termed, 
perhaps,  "crises, "  beginning  at  least  twenty  years  ago. 
It  has  therefore  been  of  gradual  growth.  Let  me  briefly 
sketch  its  history.  We  need  not  go  further  back  than 


Morton  Prince  275 

1896,  although  it  would  be  a  serious  omission  to  over- 
look the  formation  of  the  Dual  Alliance  in  1879,  made 
into  a  Triple  Alliance  in  1883  by  the  union  of  Italy. 
For  this  alliance  created  a  fear  of  Germany,  and  as  a 
necessary  reaction  called  forth  the  dual  Franco-Russian 
alliance  in  1891,  to  become  the  Triple  Entente  in  1904 
and  1907  by  "understandings"  between  England, 
France,  and  Russia.  Potential  force  awakens  distrust 
and  creates  preparations  to  use  counterforce. 

In  1896  the  celebrated  so-called  Kruger  telegram  of 
the  Kaiser  stirred  the  resentment  of  the  English  nation, 
even  to  the  mobilization  of  her  fleet,  and  set  the  people 
thinking.  Suspicions  of  Germany's  intentions  became 
rife,  and  were  kept  alive  during  the  next  ten  years  by 
Germany's  ambitions  to  wrest  the  supremacy  of  the 
seas  from  England;  so  that  in  1908  the  Emperor  felt 
constrained  to  give  out  his  famous  London  Telegraph 
interview  in  the  hope  to  appease  them.  But  the  fear 
of  German  militarism  had  taken  deep  root  in  the  na- 
tional consciousness  of  England  and  haunted  her  states- 
men. Thus  the  germs  of  hostility  to  Germany  were 
planted  in  the  English  mind. 

In  1897  the  act  of  German  militarism  that  seized 
Kiao-Chau  by  force,  in  disregard  of  the  sovereignty  of 
China,  shocked  the  public  opinion  of  the  world. 

In  1898,  in  Manila  Bay,  the  German  Admiral  Died- 
erichs  brought  Germany  to  the  brink  of  war  with  the 
United  States,  and  the  German  government  attempted 
to  form  a  European  coalition  against  the  United  States 
for  the  purpose  of  intervening  in  our  war  with  Spain. 
Though  Dewey,  supported  by  British  ships  under  Cap- 
tain Chichester,  thwarted  the  scheme  of  the  German 
Admiral,  and  the  British  Cabinet  blocked  the  designs 
of  the  German  government,  the  seeds  of  a  public  opinion 


276    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

hostile  to  Germany  were  sown  in  the  United  States  by 
these  episodes,  to  germinate  later  in  widespread  sus- 
picions of  a  German  design  to  test  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

In  1905  a  diplomatic  controversy  with  Germany 
over  Morocco  left  France  humiliated  after  the  capture 
of  Algeciras  with  the  resignation  of  Delcasse  forced 
under  the  threat  of  war  by  Germany :  Germany  gained 
a  point  by  militarism,  but  strengthened  the  entente  of 
France  with  England  against  a  common  foe.  Thus  in 
France  new  seeds  of  hostility  were  sown  by  militarism. 

In  1908  it  was  Russia's  turn,  when  Germany,  in 
disregard  of  both  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  and  the  Treaty 
of  London  in  1871,  compelled  Russia  by  the  threat  of  the 
sword  to  back  down  and  assent  to  the  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria.  And  Russia 
announced,  "  Never  again !" 

Then  in  1911  came  the  crisis  of  Agadir,  when  Ger- 
many sent  the  Panther  to  that  port  and  threatened  to 
interfere  for  the  second  time  by  force  with  France  in 
Morocco,  and  nearly  brought  on  a  European  war. 
Though  German  militarism  backed  down  before  the 
power  of  the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  England,  it 
left  increased  feelings  of  hostility  to  Germany  behind. 

And  so,  whatever  be  the  rights  and  the  wrongs  of 
the  successive  controversies  in  these  crises,  there  has 
gradually  been  incubating  for  years  in  the  world-con- 
sciousness an  attitude  of  mind  hostile  to  German 
militarism,  and  this  has  burst  into  full  ripeness  under 
the  heat  of  resentment  for  wrongs  committed  against 
humanity  and  civilization  during  the  present  war. 
I  have  passed  over,  of  course,  a  large  number  of  co- 
operating happenings,  such  as  the  German  Emperor's 
appeal  to  Mohammedanism  in  1898  and  1905,  the  mili- 
tant naval  program  of  1897,  the  Casablanca  affair  in 


Morton  Prince  277 

1908,  etc.  I  have  selected  only  the  more  criticial 
energizing  causes  of  world  hostility. 

In  view  of  these  critical  events,  so  far  from  Germany 
having  kept  the  peace  of  Europe  by  the  power  of  its 
army  during  the  past  twenty-five  years,  as  has  so  often 
been  proclaimed,  she  has,  besides  robbing  China  of  a 
province  in  1897,  nearly  precipitated  war  by  the  aggres- 
sive actions  of  her  militarism  on  five  different  occasions : 
once  in  1896  with  England,  once  in  1898  with  the 
United  States,  twice  with  France,  in  1905  and  in  1911, 
and  once  with  Russia  in  1908.  And  finally,  by  common 
consent,  German  militarism  incited  the  world  cataclysm 
of  1914. 

It  is  not  given  to  anyone  to  prophesy  the  final  out- 
come of  this  war,  but  we  can  at  least  say  this,  that, 
whatever  it  may  be,  it  is  not  conceivable  that  the  suc- 
cesses of  German  militarism  can  be  a  recompense  for 
its  moral  and  material  losses,  and  that  it  will  not  be  left 
in  a  relatively  far  weaker  condition  for  offense  than 
before  the  war.  Whatever  may  be  the  final  result  as 
determined  by  the  terms  of  peace,  German  militarism 
at  the  end  of  the  war  will  not  only  not  have  succeeded 
in  gaining  its  long  planned  for  end  of  achieving  its 
ambitions  by  force,  but  will  have  called  into  being  a 
combination  of  opposing  forces  far  more  powerful  than 
its  own. 

The  Central  Powers  will  find  themselves  surrounded 
by  hostile  powers  not  one  of  which  will  be  more  ex- 
hausted than  Germany  herself. 

There  will  have  been  created  in  each  of  the  greater 
allied  nations — France,  England,  Russia,  and  Italy — a 
military  organization,  modeled  after  the  German  pat- 
tern, fully  equipped  and  prepared  and  commanding 
all  the  mobilized  industrial  resources  of  the  nation. 


278    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

German  militarism  will  have  awakened  in  every 
nation,  including  the  United  States,  a  complete  under- 
standing of  the  forces  with  which  it  will  have  to  deal 
in  the  future — an  understanding  that  was  previously 
lacking — and  will  have  created  a  preparedness  by  the 
great  powers  against  attack  which  will  guarantee  that 
none  can  be  taken  unawares ;  will  make  another  invasion 
impossible,  and  military  threats  impotent. 

In  other  words,  it  will  have  created  a  world  condition, 
probably  with  groups  of  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ances, in  view  of  which  no  nation,  and  no  alliance  of 
nations,  can  hope  to  aggressively  enforce  its  policies 
against  a  great  power  by  military  force. 

In  other  words,  German  militarism,  by  its  potential 
power  and  aggressive  tactics,  has  called  into  being,  as 
it  was  bound  in  time  to  do,  forces  more  powerful  than 
itself. 

By  the  test  of  this  war,  then,  as  I  view  the  case, 
German  militarism  has  failed  as  a  theory  of  empire. 
In  this  failure  have  we  not  the  most  powerful  motive 
for  an  international  court  to  enforce  peace? 


THE  WAR— A  TEST  OF  THE  GERMAN  THEORY 
OF   STATE 

BY  KUNO  FRANCKE 

IN  the  present  war  Germany  is  undergoing  the  greatest 
test  of  national  stamina  to  which  any  nation  ever 
has  been  put.  For  more  than  a  year  all  Germany  has 
been  one  vast  beleaguered  fortress.  For  more  than  a 
year  she  has  been  cut  off  from  nearly  the  whole  world. 
Her  merchant  marine  has  been  swept  off  the  ocean. 
Her  export  trade  has  been  completely  stopped  and  her 
import  trade  nearly  so.  For  more  than  a  year  she  has 
had  to  rely  upon  her  own  resources,  in  men,  in  food,  in 
equipment,  in  armament;  while  nearly  all  the  great 
military  powers  of  the  earth  have  been  together  pressing 
against  her  and  the  greatest  of  the  neutral  nations — the 
republics  of  North  and  South  America — have  been 
furnishing  her  foes  with  vast  quantities  of  war  material, 
money,  foodstuffs,  and  other  supplies. 

In  the  face  of  all  this,  Germany  has  not  only  freed 
her  own  soil  from  hostile  invasion.  She  has  transferred 
the  war  into  the  enemy's  country.  East  and  west  of 
her  own  frontiers  she  holds  large  territories  in  firm  grip. 
And  now,  together  with  her  Austrian  ally,  she  is  gather- 
ing her  forces  for  a  great  thrust  in  the  south,  which, 
if  successful,  will  burst  the  iron  ring  forged  by  her 
enemies  around  her. 

What  accounts  for  this  extraordinary  manifestation 

279 


280    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  national  will  power?  To  put  it  briefly:  the  impetus 
given  to  the  whole  of  German  life  by  the  German  theory 
of  state. 

The  German  theory  of  government  rests  upon  the 
fundamental  conviction  that  the  state  is  not  only  a 
protector  of  vested  rights,  not  only  a  guardian  of  public 
safety  and  of  social  conditions  that  make  for  individual 
happiness,  but  that  it  is  preeminently  a  moral  agency 
superior  to  society,  and  that  its  principal  mission  is  to 
raise  the  individuals  that  make  up  society  to  a  higher 
level  of  public  consciousness  and  energy. 

No  doubt  there  never  was  a  conception  of  the  state 
among  any  people  from  which  this  moral  and  disci- 
plinary view  was  entirely  absent.  But  not  since  Plato's 
time  has  this  view  anywhere  been  a  national  force  as 
truly  vital  and  all-embracing  as  it  has  come  to  be 
in  modern  Prussia  and  Germany.  It  has  imbued  the 
whole  German  people,  as  no  other  people  is  imbued,  with 
the  spirit  of  national  service  and  national  achievement. 
The  modern  German  mind  instinctively  refuses  to 
accept  any  of  the  thousand  and  one  private  activities 
that  constitute  the  daily  life  of  a  people  as  something 
really  private  and  isolated.  The  farmer  and  the  miner, 
the  factory  hand  and  the  sailor,  the  business  man  and 
the  preacher,  the  scholar  and  the  artist — they  are  all 
soldiers,  soldiers  for  German  greatness  and  progress; 
and  their  spheres  of  activity,  far  apart  as  they  seem  from 
each  other,  are  in  reality  on  one  and  the  same  level,  the 
level  of  the  fight  for  making  Germany  in  every  way — 
politically,  economically,  intellectually,  and  morally — 
a  self-supporting,  self-relying,  conspicuously  healthy 
and  conspicuously  productive  national  organism. 

To  call  such  views  of  the  state  a  disguise  of  despotism 
is  doing  violence  to  the  English  language.  For  how  can 


Kuno  Francke  281 

there  be  despotism  in  a  state  where  all  classes  acknowl- 
edge public  service  as  the  highest  law?  Besides,  it  is 
a  well-known  fact  that,  owing  to  the  multiplicity  of 
sovereign  German  states  within  the  Empire,  each  one 
with  its  own  executive  and  legislature,  and  owing  to 
the  exceptionally  high  development  of  municipal  self- 
government  in  Germany,  there  is  more  of  habitual, 
organized  popular  scrutiny  of  governmental  acts  in 
Germany  than  in  either  England,  France,  or  Italy — 
quite  apart  from  the  Reichstag's  being  based  upon  an 
absolutely  universal  manhood  suffrage.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  clear  that  a  state  concentrating  all  the 
energies  of  the  people  upon  the  one  aim  of  national 
achievement  is  bound  to  make  continuity  of  adminis- 
trative policy  the  very  corner-stone  of  its  governmental 
system.  Hence  the  importance  attached  in  the  Ger- 
man theory  of  state  to  an  executive  standing  above 
parties,  an  executive  body  consisting  of  the  most  highly 
trained  experts  in  their  several  departments,  represent- 
ing the  most  enlightened  and  most  objective  opinion 
upon  public  conditions  and  needs,  working  now  with 
this,  now  with  that  combination  of  parliamentary 
groups,  but  not  pledged  to  any  one  of  them,  and  sub- 
ject in  its  tenure  of  office  only  to  the  crown,  and  not  to 
changing  parliamentary  majorities. 

This,  in  brief,  is  the  German  conception  of  the  state. 
How  has  it  stood  the  tremendous  test  of  the  present 
war?  How  has  it  succeeded  during  this  supreme  crisis 
in  lifting  the  whole  nation  to  that  higher  level  of  public 
consciousness  and  zeal  which  is  its  foremost  aim  ? 

In  the  first  place,  the  executive  has  maintained  un- 
broken the  continuity  of  administration.  The  war  has 
brought  Germany  no  parliamentary  sensations  and  no 
ministerial  crises.  While  dissensions  in  the  English 


282     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Cabinet  have  been  carried  almost  to  the  point  of  rupture, 
while  the  Russian  Duma  has  openly  attributed  the 
Russian  defeats  to  governmental  corruption,  while  the 
two  foremost  anti-German  leaders  on  the  Continent, 
Delcasse  in  France  and  Sazanoff  in  Russia,  have  been 
forced  to  resign,  the  German  policy  is  to-day  in  the 
same  hands  in  which  it  was  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war;  and  although  there  has  been  open  criticism  of 
the  expediency  or  effectiveness  of  some  governmental 
measures,  no  distrust  in  the  ability  of  the  present 
government  to  carry  through  the  war  to  a  successful 
issue  has  been  uttered  in  the  German  Parliament. 
What  the  Emperor  said  on  Aug.  4,  1914,  in  the  Reich- 
stag: "From  to-day  on,  I  know  no  parties,  I  know  only 
Germans, "  has  in  the  main  become  true  of  the  people 
also,  and  is  now  a  reality  throughout  the  length  and 
the  breadth  of  the  land. 

In  the  next  place,  the  economic  and  industrial  adapta- 
tion of  Germany  to  the  needs  of  the  war  has  been  some- 
thing marvelous,  by  far  exceeding  even  the  boldest 
expectations. 

The  most  trenchant  and  far-reaching  economic 
measures — such  as  the  sequestration  by  the  government 
of  the  whole  wheat  crop,  the  regulation  of  the  bread 
consumption  of  the  whole  population  by  an  elaborate 
card  system,  the  limitation  of  meat  consumption  and 
even  of  the  use  of  fats  for  cooking  purposes  to  certain 
days  of  the  week,  the  establishment  of  maximum  prices 
for  a  variety  of  foodstuffs — all  these  measures,  affecting 
deeply  the  daily  life  and  the  fundamental  needs  of 
sixty-eight  million  people,  have  been  carried  out  with 
an  ease  and  a  lack  of  friction  as  though  they  concerned 
only  the  superfluities  and  luxuries  of  a  handful  of  privi- 
leged individuals.  And  with  equal  readiness  and  un- 


Kuno  Francke  283 

hesitating  decision  have  the  majority  of  German 
industries  placed  themselves  at  the  service  of  the  one 
great  national  demand,  the  upkeep  of  the  army.  It  is 
fanciful  and  false  to  see  in  the  abundance  of  munitions 
and  all  the  other  army  equipments  in  Germany,  even 
after  a  year  of  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  a 
proof  of  Germany's  having  stored  up  before  the  war  a 
fabulous  amount  of  war  material.  Indeed,  in  September, 
1914,  and  again  in  February,  1915,  Germany  had  a 
decided  shortage  of  munitions.  Their  present  abund- 
ance is  a  proof  of  the  extraordinary  ability  and  willing- 
ness of  the  German  people  to  adjust  itself  to  the  supreme 
need  of  the  hour.  Steam-engine  factories  now  turn 
out  shells,  pianoforte  factories  furnish  cartridge  cases, 
leather  chair  factories  make  knapsacks,  boiler  factories 
make  field  kitchens,  hat  factories  make  helmets,  roller 
coaster  firms  build  field  hospitals,  chemical  concerns 
produce  coffee  and  beef-tea  tablets,  and  so  forth  ad 
infinitum.  The  dearth  of  raw  materials  has  largely 
been  taken  care  of  through  the  use  of  substitutes,  of 
potato  flour  for  wheat  flour,  of  tin  for  aluminum,  of  steel 
for  brass,  of  iron  electric  wires  for  copper  electric  wires, 
and  so  on ;  or  through  the  production  of  artificial  mate- 
rials, such  as  the  production  of  rubber  from  oxidized 
linseed  oil  or  the  production  of  saltpeter — so  necessary 
both  as  an  explosive  and  as  fertilizer — from  the  nitrogen 
of  the  air.  And  in  addition  to  all  this,  the  German 
sense  of  economy,  ingrained  in  the  people,  generation 
after  generation,  by  a  long  tradition  of  domestic  and 
public  schooling,  has  in  this  war  revealed  itself  more 
impressively  and  finely  than  ever  before.  There  is  not 
a  household  now  in  all  Germany  where  retrenchment 
in  eating  and  drinking  is  not  the  unalterable  law  of  daily 
conduct,  where  every  waste  in  cooking  and  baking  is 


284    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

not  scrupulously  avoided,  where  every  crumb  and  every 
refuse  is  not  carefully  preserved,  and  from  where  every 
particle  of  food  and  clothing  that  can  possibly  be  spared 
does  not  go  out  week  after  week  to  the  men  who  are 
fighting  for  the  Fatherland  in  France,  in  Flanders,  in 
Russia,  in  the  Balkans,  in  the  North  Sea  or  the  Baltic. 
And  while  this  constant  stream  of  loving  gifts  is  going 
out  to  the  front  the  men  at  the  front  send  back  to  their 
families  at  home  what  they  can  spare  of  their  pay. 
The  fact  that  the  German  field  postal  service  is  handling 
upwards  of  ten  million  private  pieces  of  mail  and  pack- 
ages every  day  is  sufficient  illustration  of  what  results 
this  systematic  and  considerate  economy  is  bringing 
both  to  the  men  in  the  field  and  their  kindred  at  home. 
It  also  shows  that  the  soul  of  Germany  is  in  this  fight, 
and  that  it  is  the  people  and  not  the  militarist  class 
that  is  waging  it. 

And  how  has  the  money,  needed  for  this  gigantic 
war,  been  raised?  Let  me  quote  some  figures.  The 
total  of  the  third  German  war  loan,  raised  two  months 
ago,  was  12,000,000,000  mark.  It  was  subscribed  by 
3,551,746  persons  or  institutions.  Of  these  545  persons 
or  institutions  subscribed  over  1,000,000  mark  each;  849 
persons  or  institutions  subscribed  from  500,000  to  1 ,000,  - 
ooo  mark  each;  7274  persons  or  institutions  subscribed 
from  100,000  to  500,000  mark  each;  10,512  persons 
or  institutions  subscribed  from  50,000  to  100,000  mark 
each — and  so  on  until  at  the  end  of  the  list  we  reach  the 
following  figures:  881,923  persons  (for  here  the  institu- 
tions hardly  count  any  longer)  contributed  from  600  to 
i ooo  mark  each;  812,011  contributed  between  300  and 
500  mark  each;  and  686,289  persons  contributed  less 
than  200  mark  each.  In  other  words,  the  3,551,746 
contributors  to  this  war  loan  represent  indeed  the  whole 


Kuno  Francke  285 

German  people  from  top  to  bottom,  all  degrees  of  in- 
come, all  strata  of  society.  The  German  people  gave 
this  money  joyfully,  unreservedly,  and  trustingly;  and 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  they  will  continue 
to  do  so  when  other  loans  are  called  for. 

The  spirit  of  national  service,  of  unconditional  sur- 
render to  the  needs  of  the  state,  has  enabled  Germany 
to  mobilize  and  to  sustain  her  economic  forces  in  this 
war  as  none  of  her  antagonists  have  been  able  to.  It 
has  also  mobilized  her  emotional  and  moral  forces  in  a 
manner  unheard  of  before.  With  the  exception  of  a 
few  Socialist  theorizers,  not  a  German  has  lifted  his 
voice  during  the  last  twelvemonth  but  to  declare  that 
this  war  is  the  decisive  test  of  German  nationality,  of 
everything  for  which  Germans  have  lived  and  died  in 
the  past.  American  observers  have  frequently  ex- 
pressed surprise  that  the  intellectual  and  spiritual 
leaders  of  the  Germany  of  to-day,  scientists  like  Haeckel 
and  Ostwald,  philosophers  like  Eucken  and  Wundt, 
philologists  like  Wilmanowitz  and  Diels,  historians  like 
Eduard  Meyer  and  Erich  Marcks,  economists  like 
Schmoller  and  Wagner,  theologians  like  Harnack  and 
Troeltzsch,  musicians  like  Humperdinck  and  Strauss, 
poets  like  Dehmel  and  Gerhardt  Hauptman — are  all  of 
one  mind  in  this  crisis,  and  that  in  their  individual  or 
collective  utterances  they  lay  much  more  stress  upon 
conviction  than  argument.  The  reason,  I  think,  is  that 
these  men,  and  with  them  the  masses  of  the  German 
people,  feel  that  the  German  cause  in  this  war  needs 
no  logical  defense,  that  it  is  impossible  to  think  that 
the  most  orderly,  industrious,  intelligent,  law-abiding, 
sober,  and  spiritually  minded  of  nations  should  sud- 
denly have  become  insane,  and  from  sheer  madness  of 
passion  and  lust  of  conquest  have  plunged  into  a  war 


286    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

of  aggression  against  the  majority  of  the  world's  military 
powers,  in  other  words  into  what  to  all  outward  appear- 
ances would  seem  certain  self-destruction.  They  be- 
lieve that  Germany  has  been  the  victim  of  a  world-wide 
coalition  to  rob  her  of  the  legitimate  fruits  of  her  unre- 
mitting toil  for  national  organization  and  to  crush  the 
spirit  of  national  solidarity  that  has  led  to  German 
ascendency  in  nearly  every  field  of  higher  activity. 
Whatever  may  be  one's  viewr  as  to  the  historical  basis 
for  this  belief,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  is  this  belief 
more  than  anything  else  which  is  giving  Germany  in 
this  war  an  extraordinary  heroic  strength. 

Some  months  ago,  there  took  place  at  Namur,  the 
Belgian  fortress  occupied  by  German  troops  since  the 
autumn  of  last  year,  a  memorable  open-air  performance. 
Goethe's  Iphigenie  was  produced  by  German  actors 
in  the  public  square  of  that  town,  and  the  audience 
consisted  of  the  rank  and  file  of  German  regiments, 
with  their  officers.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know 
what  was  going  on  in  the  minds  of  these  German 
soldiers  listening  in  the  enemy's  country  and  within 
sound  of  cannon  thunder  to  the  most  delicate  and 
sublimated  creation  of  German  dramatic  poetry,  the 
triumphal  song  of  the  inner  life  and  of  purity  of  soul. 
Undoubtedly,  there  were  many  gradations  of  feeling, 
from  sleepiness  and  ennui  to  aesthetic  delight  and  pa- 
triotic rapture.  But  consciously  or  unconsciously,  all 
these  men  must  have  felt  with  particular  force  that 
day  what  kind  of  a  country  and  what  kind  of  a  state 
had  sent  them  forth  into  war — a  state  assiduously 
cultivating  every  higher  tendency,  every  refining  influ- 
ence; maintaining  in  its  schools  and  universities  the 
noble  message  of  intellectual  striving  and  moral  freedom 
bequeathed  by  the  classic  epoch  of  German  literature; 


Kuno  Francke  287 

a  state  demanding  much  from  every  citizen,  in  taxes, 
in  military  service,  in  submission  to  all  sorts  of  regula- 
tions and  ordinances;  but  giving  as  much  to  every 
citizen,  in  unimpeachable  cleanliness  of  administration, 
in  the  schooling  of  all  classes  for  the  true  democracy 
of  public  obligations,  in  securing  general  respectability 
and  comeliness  of  the  outward  conditions  of  life;  a 
state  conserving  every  one  of  its  physical  and  intel- 
lectual resources,  protecting  the  streams  and  the  for- 
ests, safeguarding  the  workmen  against  the  excesses  of 
capitalism,  and  at  the  same  time  stimulating  every 
activity,  enterprise,  and  invention,  and  inspiring  every 
one  of  its  members  with  a  feeling  of  pride  of  belonging 
to  it.  Is  it  a  wonder  that  such  a  state  has  rallied  the 
whole  of  Germany  around  itself,  and  that  the  German 
people  is  determined  to  uphold  this  state,  at  any  sacri- 
fice and  against  any  assault? 

Let  me  close  with  a  brief  answer  to  two  questions 
which  suggest  themselves  in  connection  with  this  whole 
subject. 

First.  The  German  system  of  government  has  often 
been  compared  to  a  huge  soulless  machine.  Can  a 
rational  system  such  as  I  have  been  trying  to  describe 
be  called  a  soulless  machine?  I  think  the  war  has 
proved  that  it  cannot.  Rather  should  it  be  called  a 
living  national  body,  every  limb  and  every  fiber  full  of 
alertness,  teeming  with  health,  quick  in  thought  and 
quick  in  action,  of  infinite  resourcefulness  and  adapta- 
bility to  varying  conditions;  an  embodied  spirit;  free 
energy  controlled  by  a  common  aim.  No  unprejudiced 
observer  of  contemporary  European  affairs  can  get 
away  from  the  fact  that  Germany  during  the  last  fifty 
years  has  excelled  all  other  countries  in  eagerness  and 
momentum  of  private  initiative.  The  German  school- 


288    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

boy  is  more  eager  to  learn,  the  German  university 
student  is  more  firmly  set  upon  independent  research, 
the  German  workman  has  a  higher  level  of  average 
intelligence,  the  German  farmer  is  more  scientific  in  the 
cultivation  of  his  soil,  the  German  manufacturer  is  more 
ready  to  introduce  new  methods  of  production,  the 
German  business  man  is  more  active  in  finding  new 
outlets  for  his  goods,  the  German  city  administrator  is 
more  keenly  alive  to  civic  improvements,  the  German 
army  and  navy  officer  is  more  fully  abreast  with  every 
new  experiment  or  device  of  military  tactics,  all  Ger- 
mans are  keyed  up  to  a  more  intense,  a  more  swiftly 
pulsating  manner  of  life  than  is  the  case  in  any  one  of 
the  nations  with  which  Germany  is  now  at  war.  All 
this  intensity  of  private  initiative,  I  believe,  is  largely 
due  to  the  impelling  force  exerted  upon  the  individual 
by  the  exalted  views  instinctively  held  by  all  Germans 
regarding  the  mission  and  the  functions  of  the  state. 

Secondly.  The  German  system  of  government  has 
often  been  called  a  danger  to  other  less  well  organized 
nations.  Does  this  danger  really  exist? 

The  history  of  all  the  leading  nations  of  the  past 
shows  only  too  clearly  that  there  is  a  real  temptation  for 
a  people  to  use  highly  organized  national  power  for  ag- 
gressive purposes.  During  the  last  few  centuries,  France 
used  her  higher  national  organization  for  wars  of  ag- 
grandizement under  Louis  XIV.  and  again  under  Na- 
poleon. England  used  her  higher  national  organization 
for  wars  of  conquest  on  a  colossal  scale  under  Walpole 
and  Pitt  and  Palmerston  and  Disraeli  and  Gladstone 
and  Salisbury.  Prussia  used  her  higher  national  or- 
ganization for  wars  of  aggression  under  Frederick  the 
Great  and  again  under  Bismarck.  It  can  be  said,  I 
think,  with  good  reason  that  Germany,  since  the  founda- 


Kuno  Francke  289 

tion  of  the  new  Empire  in  1871,  has  been  less  aggressive 
and  less  territorially  expansive  than  any  one  of  the 
great  European  powers  during  the  same  period.  Ger- 
many has  acquired  some  colonies  in  Africa  and  in  the 
Far  East.  But  what  are  Kamerun  and  Dar-es-Salaam 
and  Kiao-Chau  compared  with  the  British  hold  upon 
Egypt,  the  British  subjugation  of  the  South  African 
republics,  the  Italian  conquest  of  Tripoli,  and  the 
French  colonial  empire  in  Madagascar,  Cochin  China, 
Algiers,  Tunis,  and  Morocco?  Wherever  Germany 
has  made  her  influence  felt  on  the  globe,  wherever 
she  has  engaged  in  colonial  enterprises,  she  has 
been  willing  to  make  compromises  with  other  nations 
and  to  accept  their  cooperation,  notably  so  in  the  Bag- 
dad railway  undertaking.  Over  and  over  again,  she 
has  been  blocked  in  these  enterprises  by  the  ill  will  of 
her  more  grasping  rivals,  and  it  is  hard  to  resist  the 
conclusion  that  the  present  war  was  entered  upon  by 
her  enemies  with  the  hope  of  shutting  her  out  once  for 
all  from  the  great  stakes  of  colonial  expansion. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  undeniable  that  the  present 
war  itself,  with  its  enormous  sacrifices  in  men  and 
money,  has  led  in  Germany  to  a  strong  and  widely  spread 
popular  propaganda  for  territorial  compensations,  both 
on  the  western  and  the  eastern  frontier,  to  be  exacted 
at  the  end  of  the  war  as  presumable  "guarantees  of 
durable  peace." 

It  is  hard  to  understand  how  judicious  people  can 
believe  that  the  forcible  annexation  of  territories  with 
hostile  and  racially  unassimilated  populations  could 
possibly  form  guarantees  of  durable  peace.  It  is  hard 
to  understand  how  people  can  fail  to  see  that  these 
annexed  provinces  would  form  a  constant  source  of 
international  irritation  and  domestic  dissension,  that 


290    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  necessity  of  holding  them  by  force  would  inevitably 
tend  to  degrade  and  debase  the  whole  tenor  of  German 
public  life.  Fortunately,  the  Socialists  are  not  alone 
in  resisting  this  martial  annexation  propaganda.  Men 
of  such  weight  and  influence  as  Brentano,  Delbruck, 
Dernburg,  Harnack,  Mendelsohn,  Schmoller,  Siemens, 
have  openly  attacked  it.  The  German  government,  I 
trust,  will  find  some  way,  at  the  coming  peace  conference, 
of  restoring  the  independence  both  of  Poland  and  of 
Belgium,  while  at  the  same  time  attaching  these  coun- 
tries to  the  economic  interests  of  the  new  Austro- 
German  federation.  The  annexation  of  Poland  and 
Belgium  would  be  at  variance  with  the  German  con- 
ception of  the  state  as  a  moral  agency  whose  mission  it 
is  to  raise  every  one  of  its  members  to  a  higher  level  of 
public  consciousness  and  activity.  The  German  people, 
it  seems  to  me,  has  a  rare  opportunity  before  it  to 
demonstrate  to  the  world  in  a  striking  manner  that  its 
highly  developed  national  organization  is  not  a  danger 
to  other  less  well  organized  nations,  that  its  remarkable 
display  of  national  will-power  is  backed  up  by  an  equally 
remarkable  power  of  national  self-restraint,  and  that 
Germany  indeed  took  up  arms  for  no  other  purpose  than 
to  uphold  national  achievements  made  possible  by  her 
superior  sense  of  public  obligation  and  solidarity.  The 
only  conquest  which  will  add  to  Germany's  greatness 
as  a  result  of  this  war,  is  the  recognition  by  the  rest 
of  the  world  of  the  moral  strength  imparted  to  a  whole 
people  by  an  exalted  view  of  the  mission  of  the  state. 
Of  this  conquest  Germany  is  assured,  no  matter  what 
the  final  decision  of  the  battlefield  may  be. 


SOME  OF  THE  RIGHTS  AND  THE  OBLIGATIONS 
OF  AMERICAN  CITIZENSHIP 

BY  GEORGE  W.  ANDERSON 

I  COME  to  preach  platitudes,  or  what  ought  to  be 
platitudes.  My  first  platitude  is  that  rights  and 
obligations  are  correlative, — the  enjoyment  of  the  one 
connotes  the  recognition  of  the  other.  Recent  events 
indicate  that  this  platitude  ought  to  be  pressed  home  to 
a  considerable  part  of  our  citizen  population.  We  must 
never  raise  the  cry  "America  for  Americans"!  but 
there  is  much  to  indicate  that  it  is  high  time  to  raise 
the  cry  "Americanism  for  Americans"!  It  is  time  to 
assert  anew  our  faith  in  the  fundamentals  of  our 
American  institutions ;  to  renew  and  to  voice  our  belief 
in,  and  love  for  "government  of  the  people,  for  the 
people,  by  the  people. " 

For  some  years  the  Fourth  of  July  oration  and  its 
spirit  have  been  out  of  fashion.  We  have  been  analyz- 
ing and  criticizing,  not  without  cause,  some  of  our 
achievements  and  failures  to  achieve,  and  thereby  have 
been  constrained  to  be  less  boastful  as  to  the  accomplish- 
ments of  American  democracy.  This  is  well.  Self- 
examination  and  self-criticism  are  good.  But  nations  as 
well  as  persons  must  retain  and  assert  a  wholesome  self- 
respect.  Let  there  be  no  cringing  spirit  in  our  Ameri- 
canism. It  is  time  for  American  citizenship  to  reassert 
its  rights  to  self-respect ;  and  also  its  right  to  command 

291 


292     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  loyalty  and  the  regard  of  all  those  who  would  share 
its  benefits,  whether  born  citizens,  naturalized  citizens, 
or  strangers  within  our  gates. 

My  second  platitude  is  that  in  these  times  of  Euro- 
pean war  there  is  both  a  right  and  an  obligation  of 
neutrality.  By  this  I  do  not  mean  merely  the  right 
of  the  American  people  to  keep  out  of  the  European 
war;  I  mean  the  right  and  the  corresponding  obligation 
of  both  citizens  and  residents  to  keep  the  European 
war  out  of  our  political  campaigns  and  elections.  I  do 
not  say  that  the  best  of  American  citizens  may  not  have 
and  express  the  deepest  sympathies  with  some  of  the 
warring  nations.  He  would  be  poor  stuff  to  make 
American  or  any  other  sort  of  citizen  out  of,  who  did 
not,  in  these  frightful  times  of  storm  and  stress,  feel  the 
ties  of  blood  and  kin.  We  all  ought  to  think  as  well  as 
we  can  of  our  ancestors.  This  is  not  merely  a  privilege, 
but  at  times  it  becomes  a  duty.  For  instance,  when  I 
reflect  on  some  of  the  performances  of  my  Scotch  for- 
bears in  Scotland  at  the  time  of  John  Knox  and  the 
domination  of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  it  is  only  a 
strong  sense  of  duty  that  makes  me  disposed  to  boast 
of  the  politico-religious  achievements  of  my  ancestry. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  have  a  sympathetic  and  tolerant 
regard  for  the  sentiment  growing  out  of  blood  and  km, 
and  quite  another  thing  for  us  to  tolerate  the  attempted 
injection  of  European  issues  into  American  political 
campaigns  and  American  elections.  We  must  have  it 
fully  and  plainly  understood  that  American  political 
campaigns  and  American  elections  exist  solely  for  the 
discussion  and  determination  of  American  issues,  and 
only  of  American  issues. 

We  have  always  suffered  in  this  country  from  the 
presence  of  a  considerable  number  of  individuals,  some 


George  W.  Anderson  293 

of  them  citizens  born,  some  of  them  citizens  natural- 
ized, some  bad-mannered  guests,  who  have  not  yet 
conceived  the  dignity  and  worth  of  our  American 
citizenship.  They  still  labor  under  the  delusion  that 
the  United  States  is  nothing  but  a  place — a  piece  of 
land. — an  arena  in  which  they  may  exploit  European 
quarrels  and  intrigues. 

The  time  is  ripe  to  have  it  distinctly  understood  by 
all  of  our  citizens  and  by  all  of  our  residents  that  the 
United  States  is  not  merely  a  place — a  piece  of  land. 
There  must  be  adequate  and  respectful  realization  of 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  a  body  of  institutions, 
a  human  organism, — of  which  all  good  citizens  are  a 
wholesome,  vital,  and  vitalizing  part.  If,  perchance, 
we  have  in  our  citizenship  some  who  are  not  vital  and 
cannot  be  vitalized,  it  may  be  necessary  to  find  some 
method  of  freeing  ourselves  from  the  danger  of  gangrene. 

It  is  another  platitude  to  say  that  America  has 
always  welcomed  to  her  citizenship  men  of  all  the 
European  strains  of  blood.  We  expect  that  in  the  veins 
of  American  citizens  will  flow  German,  English,  Irish, 
French,  Italian,  Swedish,  and  all  the  other  European 
strains  of  blood.  But  one  thing  we  may  and  do  demand : 
and  that  is  that  all  these  strains  shall  run  red  Ameri- 
can blood,  else  they  are  not  entitled  to  receive  and  to 
retain  the  rights,  the  privileges,  and  the  honors  of 
American  citizenship.  If,  after  experiment,  any  amongst 
us  find  their  blood  not  running  red  American,  it 
would  be  well  for  them  to  return  to  the  country 
whose  loss  by  the  emigration  of  themselves  or  of  their 
progenitors  is  not  our  gain.  We  shall  dote  on  their 
absence.  We  care  not  whether  they  came  to  us  in  1700 
or  in  1900;  if  they  find  themselves  not  of  us,  they  belong 
not  with  us. 


294     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

When  I  state  that  the  injection  of  European  issues 
into  American  political  campaigns  and  elections  should 
"not  be  tolerated, "  I  am  far  from  meaning  that  I  would 
restrain  by  law  and  the  strong  hand  of  the  govern- 
ment such  impudent  disloyalty.  I  had  rather  lash  the 
hyphenate  with  an  American  tongue  and  punish 
him  by  political  oblivion,  than  prosecute  him  in  an 
American  court  and  confine  him  in  an  American  prison. 
We  do  not  need  a  law  to  crush  out  this  sort  of  offensive 
impertinence.  We  do  need — and  in  Massachusetts — 
men  in  politics  who  have  the  courage  of  utterance  and 
profound  belief  in  the  Americanism  of  the  American 
people.  We  must  make  political  success  impossi- 
ble to  all  who  lack  such  belief  and  the  courage  to 
utter  it. 

I  would  have  no  Alien  and  Sedition  laws  placed  on  our 
Statute  books.  I  have  recently  read,  not  with  pride, 
the  history  of  some  of  the  prosecutions  instituted  by  the 
Federal  government  against  blackguarding  slanderers 
of  their  government  and  nation  under  the  Alien  and 
Sedition  laws  of  1797. 

America  stands  to-day,  as  always,  in  an  attitude 
of  welcome  toward  home-seeking  aliens  showing  any  fair 
potentiality  of  fitness  for  American  citizenship.  I  note 
with  satisfaction  that  both  Republican  President  Taft 
and  Democratic  President  Wilson  have  vetoed  legis- 
lation applying  the  literacy  test  to  restrictive  immi- 
gration legislation.  Both  of  these  great  American 
citizens  thus  recognized  and  asserted,  as  the  real 
American  policy,  that  home-seeking  aliens  must  not  be 
kept  from  us  and  from  those  of  their  own  blood  and  kin 
who  have  already  joined  us,  by  such  unfair  and  arti- 
ficial discrimination  as  the  literacy  test  involved. 
There  is  no  widespread  or  well-grounded  feeling  in 


George  W.  Anderson  295 

America  against  aliens  as  such,  but  there  is  an  increas- 
ing and  well-grounded  feeling  against  the  alien  spirit. 

Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  In  my  judgment,  at 
least  95  per  cent,  of  our  citizens  who,  or  whose  parents, 
were  born  on  foreign  soil  cherish  the  American  ideals  as 
resolutely  and  strongly  as  those  of  us  whose  ancestors 
came  over  hundreds  of  years  ago.  Indeed,  I  have  often 
been  struck  by  the  fact  that  some  of  those  who  have 
recently  felt  the  smart  of  European  oppression  appre- 
ciate the  free  atmosphere  and  opportunity  of  America 
far  better  than  those  whose  remote  ancestors  only  knew 
what  the  lack  of  liberty  is. 

One  danger  is  that  the  very  noise  and  clangor  of 
the  small  minority  of  those  who  really  have  the  alien 
spirit  will  create  an  unjust,  ill-grounded,  but  wide- 
spread prejudice  against  a  great  mass  of  loyal  citizens 
and  thus  tend  to  divide  and  to  disintegrate  our  body 
civic  and  politic. 

We  must  conserve,  construct,  concentrate.  Divisive 
councils  should  be  given  no  patient  hearing.  We  must 
have  accord,  unity,  solidarity  in  Americanism.  We  in 
America  are  all  immigrants.  No  distinction  should  be 
made  or  tolerated,  based  merely  upon  the  time  of  our 
immigration.  The  distinction  should  be  whether  hav- 
ing immigrated,  we  have  adopted  and  made  our  own 
American  institutions  and  American  ideals.  If  "Yes, " 
— we  are  American.  If  "No, "  we  are  alien. 

Unless  threatening  signs  of  disloyalty  shall  greatly 
multiply,  my  own  hope  and  belief  are  that  we  shall 
never  need  to  bar  out  any  aliens  because  of  their  insist- 
ence on  their  retaining  their  alien  spirit.  But  there 
must  be  no  paltering  with  that  issue.  America  must  be 
and  remain  American  in  institution  and  spirit.  We 
admit  aliens  to  our  American  citizenship  in  order  that 


296    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

they  may  be  Americanized,  and  not  that  American 
citizenship  may  be  alienized. 

Nor  would  I  have  any  revival  of  the  sedition  law  or 
the  sedition  spirit.  The  history  of  the  attempt  in  1797 
so  to  deal  with  this  sort  of  disloyalty  shows  that  it  is 
far  more  important  that  we  should  have  freedom  of 
speech  and  of  the  press,  than  that  we  should  have  only 
truthful  and  loyal  speech  and  printing. 

It  would  be  a  grave  error  for  our  citizens  to  say 
that  it  is  for  the  government  to  deal  with  offensive 
attempted  alien  interference  in  American  elections. 
The  main  reliance  should  rather  be  upon  an  enlightened 
and  loyal  public  sentiment,  upon  creating  and  main- 
taining such  a  moral,  social,  and  political  atmosphere 
as  to  make  un-American  breathing  impossible.  If  we 
are  to  continue  a  melting-pot,  we  must  furnish  heat 
enough  to  melt  anything  worth  melting,  and  throw 
all  insolubles  into  effectual  discard. 

No,  the  resort  should  not  be  to  the  law  or  to  the 
courts.  But  political  oblivion, — immediate,  perma- 
nent, should  be  the  fate  of  any  candidate  for  office  who 
toys  for  a  moment  with  the  question  of  permitting  the 
injection  of  European  issues  into  an  American  political 
campaign. 

It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  the  suppression 
of  the  preaching  of  false  doctrines  has  always  been 
infinitely  more  harmful  to  the  cause  of  free  government 
than  the  preaching  of  the  doctrines  themselves.  Our  just 
exasperation  at  the  disloyal  utterances  of  some  of  our 
citizens  must  never  lead  us  to  encroach  to  the  slightest 
degree  upon  the  great  principle  of  freedom  of  speech  and 
of  the  press.  Indeed,  there  was  never  a  time  when  we 
ought  more  carefully  to  cherish,  conserve,  and  protect 
the  fundamental  principles  of  American  liberty  than 


George  W.  Anderson  297 

now.  We  must  not  talk  loosely  about  "treason," 
"sedition,"  and  "restraining  disloyal  utterances." 

"Treason  against  the  United  States  shall  consist  only 
in  levying  war  against  them  or  in  adhering  to  their 
enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort. "  (Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  Art.  Ill,  sec.  3.)  "Congress  shall 
make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the 
press."  (First  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.)  "The  liberty  of  the  press  is  essential 
to  the  security  of  freedom  in  a  state;  it  ought  not, 
therefore,  to  be  restrained  in  this  Commonwealth." 
(Art.  VI  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  the  Inhabitants 
of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.) 

Few  recognize  after  what  struggles  and  how  recently 
real  liberty  of  speech  and  of  the  press  was  secured. 
Not  only  the  present  appalling  situation  in  Europe,  with 
the  censorship  of  the  press,  perhaps  a  necessity  of  the 
war,  but  much  in  our  own  recent  history  points  to  the 
necessity  of  guarding  jealously  all  our  muniments  of 
freedom.  It  is  enough  to  note  that  in  Essex  County, 
Massachusetts,  in  New  Jersey,  in  West  Virginia,  in 
Colorado,  and  perhaps  in  other  states,  conflicts  have 
within  the  past  few  years  taken  place,  indicating  the 
vital  importance  of  preserving  all  the  great  guaranties 
of  our  liberty.  The  history  of  the  struggle  for  liberty 
of  speech  and  of  the  press  as  set  forth  in  such  books  as 
Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations,  should  be  more 
commonly  taught  and  understood. 

The  tendency  of  those  who  are  armed  with  govern- 
mental powers  to  abuse  them  in  order  to  restrain  even 
fair  and  just  criticism  of  their  own  conduct,  has  in 
experience  been  found  almost  irresistible.  Even  Parlia- 
ment was  formerly  supposed  to  sit  with  closed  doors  and 
no  official  publication  of  its  papers  was  provided  for  and 


298     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

no  other  was  allowed.  In  1641  Sir  Edward  Deering 
was  expelled  and  imprisoned  for  publishing  a  collection 
of  his  own  speeches,  and  the  book  was  ordered  to  be 
burned  by  the  hangman.  Nor  does  it  appear,  as  a  read- 
ing of  parts  of  the  Congressional  Record  might  lead  one 
to  suspect,  that  the  speeches  were  burned  because  they 
were  bad.  Even  our  own  Constitutional  Convention 
of  1787  sat  with  closed  doors  and  debated  in  secret,  to 
the  great  loss  of  future  students  of  the  Constitution. 
Under  the  common  law  which  we  inherited  from 
England  liberty  of  the  press  was  neither  well  protected 
nor  well  defined.  It  was  mentioned  neither  in  the 
English  Petition  of  Rights  nor  in  the  Bill  of  Rights. 
Yet  nothing  is  plainer  than  that  liberty  of  speech  and 
of  the  press  is  fundamental  to  the  continuance  and 
development  of  democratic  institutions.  Nothing 
could  be  more  utterly  destructive,  both  of  the  efficiency 
of  democratic  government  and  of  the  rights  of  citizens 
under  democratic  government,  than  to  give  to  those 
who  for  the  time  being  exercise  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment, legal  machinery  to  suppress  discussion  and 
criticism.  Our  constitutional  restraints  upon  govern- 
ment must  be  jealously  guarded.  It  is  not  merely  the 
constitutional  guaranty  of  liberty  of  speech  and  of  the 
press  that  we  should  more  fully  understand  and  cherish, 
—it  is  the  whole  body  of  American  liberties  expressed  in 
our  Bill  of  Rights.  Our  whole  citizenship  should  be 
educated  to  a  fuller  knowledge  and  a  keener  realiza- 
tion of  what  these  guarantees  mean  in  the  daily  life 
of  the  citizen.  The  Bill  of  Rights,  if  not  the  whole 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  Lincoln's  Gettys- 
burg address,  and  the  essence  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  ought  to  be  a  part  of  the  mental  furni- 
ture of  every  intelligent  and  decently  educated 


George  W.  Anderson  299 

American  citizen,  either  born  or  naturalized.  We 
must  take  more  seriously  and  soberly  our  civic  duties 
and  our  civic  rights.  It  must  be  held  no  light  and 
trifling  thing  to  be  an  American  citizen. 

It  is,  I  think,  no  mere  casual  coincidence  that  I  have 
just  run  across  in  the  last  book  of  the  scholarly  Senior 
Senator  from  Massachusetts  an  eloquent  address  on 
"The  Constitution  and  the  Bill  of  Rights,  "  delivered  in 
Boston  not  long  ago;  and  that  at  least  twice  within  the 
last  few  weeks  the  scholarly  historian,  now  President  of 
the  United  States,  has  in  addresses  referred  to  and 
quoted  from  the  Bill  of  Rights. 

Thoughtful  citizens  everywhere  are  re-examining  the 
foundations  and  muniments  of  our  American  liberty. 
We  must  teach  the  rising  generation  that  while  both 
they  and  we,  like  Saul  of  Tarsus,  were  "born  free, "  our 
fathers,  like  Agrippa,  "with  a  great  price  obtained  this 
freedom, "  enunciated  and  secured  to  us  by  the  Bill  of 
Rights. 

The  substance  of  what  I  have  said  concerning  the 
importance  of  guarding  jealously  freedom  of  speech 
and  of  the  press  is  equally  applicable  to  most  of  the 
other  fundamental  rights  secured  by  our  Bill  of  Rights. 
We  assume  freedom  of  religion,  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury,  the  inviolability  of  our  homes,  and  forget  that  a 
large  part  of  the  world  is  yet  a  stranger  to  this  sort  of 
freedom.  Indeed  the  entire  thirty  articles  of  the 
Massachusetts  Bill  of  Rights,  their  historic  foundation, 
and  their  profound  significance  in  the  daily  life  of  our 
people  ought  to  be  as  well  known  and  understood  as  the 
elementary  rules  of  arithmetic.  I  cannot  forbear  quot- 
ing three  of  these  articles,  for  in  these  days  when  the 
"subjects"  of  European  monarchies  are  fighting  each 
other  to  the  death  for  they  know  not  what,  it  is  well  to 


300     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

contrast  the  foundation  upon  which  our  government 
rests  and  to  remember  that  with  us  the  State  exists  for 
the  citizen,  not  the  citizen  for  the  State.  Articles  I, 
XVIII  and  XXVIII  of  our  Massachusetts  Bill  of 
Rights  are  as  follows: 

All  men  are  born  free  and  equal  and  have  certain  natural, 
essential  and  inalienable  rights;  among  which  may  be  reck- 
oned the  right  of  enjoying  and  defending  their  lives  and 
liberties;  that  of  acquiring,  possessing  and  protecting 
property. 

A  frequent  recurrence  to  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  Constitution  and  a  constant  adherence  to  those  of 
piety,  justice,  moderation,  temperance,  industry  and 
frugality,  are  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  the  advan- 
tages of  liberty,  and  to  maintain  a  free  government.  The 
people  ought,  consequently,  to  have  a  particular  attention 
to  all  those  principles,  in  the  choice  of  their  officers  and 
representatives:  and  they  have  a  right  to  require  of  their 
law-givers  and  magistrates  an  exact  and  constant  obser- 
vance of  them,  in  the  formation  and  execution  of  the  laws 
necessary  for  the  good  administration  of  the  Common- 
wealth. 

No  person  can  in  any  case  be  subject  to  law-martial,  or 
to  any  penalties  or  pains,  by  virtue  of  that  law,  except  those 
employed  in  the  army  or  navy,  and  except  the  militia  in 
actual  service,  but  by  authority  of  the  legislature. 

The  obligation  of  thoroughbred  American  citizens  to 
deal  with  the  foreign  policy  of  their  country  in  a  fair, 
intelligent,  and  non-partisan  spirit  is  not  limited  to  the 
complications  which  grow  out  of  the  European  war. 
It  is  equally  applicable  to  conditions  which  arise  on  this 
continent,  and  particularly  with  relation  to  Mexico. 
I  am  unable  to  think  of  the  attitude  of  certain  editorial 


George  W.  Anderson  301 

writers  on  some  of  our  leading  New  England  news- 
papers concerning  what  this  country  has  done  and 
has  not  done  in  Mexico,  without  intense  indignation. 
The  partisan  bitterness  of  the  hyphenate  is  arguably 
excusable,  although  not  justifiable.  Insistent  as  we 
all  must  be  upon  the  paramount  duty  of  loyalty  to 
American  institutions  and  ideals,  we  may  yet  sym- 
pathize with  those  who  still  feel  too  strongly  the  old  ties 
of  blood  and  kin  tugging  at  their  heartstrings.  But  the 
attacks  upon  the  present  Administration  and  its  policy 
(and  really  upon  that  of  the  last  administration) 
because  disorder  has  not  been  suppressed  in  Mexico, 
has  been  of  such  a  mean,  carping,  apparently  mercenary 
character,  as  to  call  for  the  just  indignation  of  every 
red-blooded  American.  The  time  may  come  when, 
in  the  cause  of  humanity  or  of  human  liberty,  such  as 
we  thought  we  felt  in  1898  when  we  went  to  war  with 
Spain  to  free  Cuba,  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  United 
States  to  send  its  citizen  soldiery  into  Mexico  or  some 
other  Central  or  South  American  country.  Conceiv- 
ably the  time  may  come  when  the  7000  picked  Massa- 
chusetts youths  who  marched  in  our  Massachusetts 
Militia  in  August  may  have  to  be  sent,  as  European 
boys  by  the  millions  have  been  recently  sent,  to  fight 
and  to  die  "at  their  country's  call"  in  a  foreign  land. 

But  so  long  as  American  ideals  dominate  in  American 
politics  and  in  our  foreign  policy,  no  such  sacrifice  will  be 
made  at  the  behest  of  newspapers  representing  specu- 
lative exploitations  in  foreign  lands. 

It  is  one  thing  to  insist  that  the  American  flag  shall 
protect  American  citizens.  It  is  quite  another  thing 
to  insist  that  the  American  flag,  backed  up  by  the 
American  soldiery,  should  be  unfurled  in  a  foreign 
country  to  protect  the  roaming,  speculative,  exploiting 


302    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

American  dollar  that  is  unable  to  find  sufficiently  re- 
munerative opportunities  within  our  own  domain. 

Perhaps  it  will  be  thought  that  the  implication  of  my 
subject  involves  some  discussion  of  preparedness.  I 
query  whether  preparedness  is  not  being  over-dis- 
cussed. It  is  enough  for  me  to  say  that  I  think  the 
great  weight  of  non-partisan,  sound-thinking  American 
sentiment  is  in  favor  of  a  military  and  naval  prepared- 
ness substantially  such  as  has  been  recommended  by 
the  National  Administration.  Force,  as  the  sanction 
of  law,  national  or  international,  cannot  be  ignored. 
Undoubtedly  to-day  there  is  much  less  just  ground  to 
rely  upon  an  enlightened  and  justice-regarding  public 
opinion  as  a  guaranty  of  international  rights  and  for  the 
protection  of  treaties,  than  eighteen  months  ago. 

But  our  "preparedness"  must  be  for  real  and  not  for 
imaginary  dangers.  Nor  may  we  overlook  that  mili- 
tary and  naval  preparedness  is,  as  the  European  war 
has  bitterly  demonstrated,  itself  not  infrequently  a 
danger.  The  preparedness  that  is  being  preached  by 
certain  profit-seekers  should  be  viewed  with  just 
suspicion.  I  do  not  share  the  nervous  hysteria  of 
those  people  who  expect  that  within  the  next  five  or 
ten  years  we  shall  have  an  invasion  from  the  East  or  the 
West,  or  from  both  at  the  same  time.  I  suspect  the 
motives  and  the  patriotism  of  the  most  vociferous  of 
these  preachers  of  preparedness  for  profit. 

But  I  do  share  the  solicitude  of  those  who  think  that 
the  present  standards  of  American  citizenship  are 
too  low  and  not  growing  visibly  higher.  I  do  venture 
to  say  that  we  need  economic,  political,  civic,  and  moral 
preparedness.  It  is  the  unarmed,  not  the  armed,  for- 
eign invader  that  we  have  most  cause  to  fear.  Indeed, 


George  W.  Anderson  303 

some  recent  events  lead  us  to  question  whether  we  have 
not  already  been  successfully  invaded  and  whether 
our  present  task  is  not  the  expulsion  of  invaders. 
At  any  rate,  if  we  are  not  called  upon  to  go  to  the 
extreme  of  expelling  un- Americanized  persons,  we  may 
and  ought,  by  the  moral  and  political  methods  I 
have  discussed,  forthwith  to  expel  un-American  ideas 
and  ideals. 

What  I  have  said  may  well  be  thought  to  be  some- 
what heated  and  polemic.  I  concede  it.  These  are 
war  times.  Calm,  peaceful  thought  and  measured 
expression,  however  desirable,  seem  almost  inappropri- 
ate. I  envy  the  assured  confidence  in  his  own  mental 
processes  of  him  who  has  not,  during  the  last  sixteen 
months,  found  many  of  his  most  cherished  notions  as 
to  the  course  of  history  and  the  foundations  of  civili- 
zation shaken  or  utterly  destroyed. 

But  there  is  a  present  obligation  of  American  citizen- 
ship of  which  one  may  speak  with  more  calmness:  The 
obligation  of  studying  world  conditions  and  forming 
sane  and  intelligent  views  about  world  politics  and  the 
future  relations  of  America  to  world  organization. 

However  compelling  the  reasons  for  cherishing  and 
valuing  the  past  achievements  of  American  democracy, 
we  must  as  never  before,  recognize  that  no  nation 
"liveth  unto  itself."  The  "policy  of  splendid  iso- 
lation" taught  by  Washington  and  Hamilton  in  the 
Farewell  Address  is  no  longer  possible.  We  must 
realize  that  to-day  the  world  is  smaller  and  more  in- 
timately associated  than  were  the  thirteen  American  Col- 
onies one  hundred  and  forty  years  ago.  Our  economic 
relations  with  nearly  every  people  of  the  world  are  to- 
day more  intimate  and  important  than  were  the  econo- 
mic relations  between  Massachusetts  and  Georgia  at 


304     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  time  of  the  Revolutionary  War.  What  our  part  in 
world  politics  will  be,  we  know  not.  That  we  must 
take  some  part,  we  do  know. 

Even  if  otherwise  we  might  persist  in  our  detached 
and  isolated  policy,  the  control  of  the  Philippines  and 
the  ownership  of  the  Panama  Canal  are  enough  to  make 
such  a  policy  impossible. 

Like  it  or  not,  we  must  become  students  of  inter- 
national law;  we  must  take  part  in  the  future  develop- 
ment of  international  law.  Politics  were  never  before 
so  important  a  part  of  human  life. 

The  great  outstanding  fact  in  the  development  of 
modern  human  society  is  nationalism.  What  the 
ultimate  significance  of  this  fact  will  be,  no  one  can  tell. 
That  nationalism  alone,  unrestrained  and  uncoordin- 
ated by  internationalism,  is  little  better  than  a  failure, 
present  European  conditions  demonstrate.  Yet  we 
cannot  overlook  the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  to- 
day in  a  broad  sense  an  Americanized  Europe,  and 
that  this  furnishes  a  just  ground  for  the  hope,  if  not  the 
belief,  that  in  some  way  the  essence  of  American  princi- 
ples may  yet  be  extended  until  there  is  in  truth  "A 
Parliament  of  man — a  Federation  of  the  world. "  This 
at  least  we  know,  un-Americanized  Europe  is  to-day 
submerged  in  chaos  and  misery,  a  veritable  slaughter- 
house. Americanized  Europe  is  peaceful,  orderly,  pro- 
gressive, and  more  prosperous  than  ever  before  in  its 
history. 

It  is  but  another  platitude  to  say  that  human  capa- 
city for  organization  has  fallen  behind  the  human  need 
of  organization.  Economically  the  world  is  a  unit,  or 
nearly  so.  Politically,  it  is  little  better  than  chaos. 
The  present  world  organization  is  painfully  like  the 


George  W.  Anderson  305 

feudal  system  as  described  in  Cooley's  Constitutional 
Limitations,  p.  50: 

i 

A  feudal  kingdom  was  a  confederacy  of  a  numerous  body, 
who  lived  in  a  state  of  war  against  each  other,  and  of  rapine 
towards  all  mankind;  in  which  the  king  according  to  his 
ability  and  vigor,  was  either  a  cipher  or  a  tyrant,  and  a 
great  portion  of  the  people  were  reduced  to  personal 
slavery. 

Men's  incapacity  so  to  organize  as  to  be  able  to  live 
together  on  terms  of  toleration,  amity,  and  cooperation, 
—the  leading  characteristic  of  the  feudal  system,  is  the 
leading  characteristic  of  the  nationalistic  system  of 
to-day. 

From  Plato  to  Franklin  there  were  but  three  inven- 
tions changing  radically  men's  relations  to  each  other 
and  to  nature.  These  three  were  the  mariner's  com- 
pass, without  which  America  would  never  have  been 
discovered;  gunpowder,  which  destroyed  the  feudal 
system  and  drove  mankind  into  larger  units  for  the 
business  of  quarreling;  and  printing,  obviously  the 
foundation  of  general  intelligence  and  information,  and 
so  the  basis  of  modern  democracy. 

From  Franklin  to  our  own  time  have  come  all  the 
inventions  and  discoveries  that  make  modern  industry, 
—the  spinning  jenny,  the  steam  engine,  the  steamboat, 
the  railway,  the  telegraph,  the  telephone,  the  gasolene 
engine  and  its  resultant  automobile,  wireless  telegraphy, 
telephony,  and  the  conquest  of  the  air.  In  this  period 
of  one  hundred  and  forty  years  have  come  more  changes, 
affecting,  on  the  physical  side,  the  relations  of  human 
beings  to  each  other  and  to  the  forces  of  nature,  than  in 
all  anterior  human  history.  The  law, — the  rules  of  the 
game  of  life, — politics,  the  struggle  for  law, — these  are 


3o6    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

nearly  as  crude  and  as  imperfect  as  they  were  one 
hundred  and  forty  years  ago.  Never  were  lawyers, 
truly  great,  so  needed  as  to-day. 

We  hope  and  believe  that  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
of  individualism  on  which  our  American  institutions  are 
grounded,  the  federative  principle  under  which  local 
self-government  is  left  all  possible  control,  will  yet  prove 
the  principles  upon  which  shall  be  founded  a  world 
order.  Whether  or  not  this  hope  will  prove  well- 
grounded, — yet  for  our  own  America  we  say : 

Our  hearts,  our  hopes,  our  prayers,  our  tears, 
Our  faith  triumphant  o'er  our  fears, 
Are  all  with  Thee,  are  all  with  Thee. 


TO  WHAT  EXTENT  WOULD  AMERICA  PROFIT 
BY  SUPPRESSING  THE  NATIONAL  TRADI- 
TIONS OF  ITS  HYPHENATED  CITIZENS 

BY  CAMILLO  VON  KLENZE 

'T'HE  early  settlers  of  those  parts  of  America  which 
1  later  became  the  Thirteen  Colonies  brought  with 
them  and  established  here  the  English  view  of  life,  art, 
and  morals,  and  in  that  fashion  from  the  very  outset 
gave  to  this  country  a  powerful  English  bias. 

The  American  Revolution  brought  about  political  sev- 
erance between  the  Thirteen  Colonies  and  the  mother 
country,  but  in  every  respect  the  spirit  of  the  new 
commonwealth  remained  essentially  English.  Through- 
out the  nineteenth  century,  nearly  to  its  close,  and 
in  large  measure  even  to-day,  the  United  States  may 
well  be  called  a  culture-colony  of  Great  Britain. 

Any  foreign  traveler  in  this  country  is  struck  by  the 
close  resemblance  between  America  and  England,  not 
only  in  regard  to  the  prevalent  definition  of  political 
liberty,  but  even — at  least  in  all  essentials — in  regard 
to  art,  literature,  breeding,  and  conduct.  Our  agree- 
ment with  British  ideals  appears  most  clearly  perhaps 
in  American  literary  criticism.  The  perusal  of  the 
critical  works  of  Lowell,  of  the  letters  of  Charles  Eliot 
Norton,  of  the  essays  of  Mr.  Paul  Elmer  Moore,  brings 
home  the  fact  that  in  all  important  matters  our  evalu- 
ation of  foreign  literatures  is  essentially  the  English 

307 


3o8    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

evaluation.  To  take  a  concrete  instance:  of  the  whole 
wealth  of  German  letters,  English  criticism  has  virtu- 
ally deleted  everything  but  the  Nibelungenlied,  Lessing, 
Goethe,  Schiller,  and  Heine,  and  of  late  Hauptmann  and 
Sudermann.  Similarly,  American  criticism  has  entirely 
overlooked  the  importance  of  the  German  drama  be- 
tween Schiller  and  Hauptmann ;  and  its  attitude  toward 
German  narrative  prose  has  gone  not  one  step  beyond 
Carlyle.  It  would  be  easy  to  adduce  other  instances  of 
agreement  between  English  and  American  criticism  of 
the  art  and  literatures  of  foreign  countries. 

If  English  culture  has  been  the  cynosure  of  American 
thought  and  taste  for  many  generations,  it  is  of  the  last 
importance  for  us  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
intellectual  achievements  of  Great  Britain.  English 
culture,  as  we  all  agree,  has  preeminent  qualities.  It 
combines,  as  perhaps  no  other  does,  virility  and  mellow- 
ness. And  since  the  Puritan  Revolution  it  has  been 
generally  characterized  by  great  sobriety  and  ethical 
seriousness.  But  like  all  other  national  cultures,  it  has 
its  decided  limitations.  It  has  produced  no  philosophy 
of  the  first  order,  no  great  art,  and  virtually  no  music 
whatever.  Even  in  letters,  supreme  at  the  time  of 
Shakespeare,  the  very  sobriety  and  self-control,  for 
which  we  rightly  have  so  much  admiration,  have  some- 
what clipped  the  wings  of  English  daring  and  power.  It 
is  an  open  question  whether,  since  the  days  of  Milton, 
we  must  not — in  spite  of  the  great  wealth  of  English 
prose  and  poetry — look  to  other  countries  than  Eng- 
land for  the  very  highest  inspiration  and  originality. 
Rousseau,  Voltaire,  Goethe,  Balzac,  Zola,  Ibsen, 
Nietzsche,  and  Tolstoi,  have  none  of  them  been 
Englishmen. 

Viewing  this  culture  as  a  whole,  with  all  its  advan- 


Camillo  von  Klenze  309 

tages  and  natural  limitations,  we  cannot  but  feel  that 
America — that  land  of  unlimited  possibilities — should 
aim  at  something  even  deeper  and  broader. 

Least  of  all  should  modern  America — increasingly 
complex  as  it  is  growing  to  be — be  satisfied  with  that 
reflex  of  English  culture  that  has  been  handed  down  to 
it  by  Puritanism.  For  Puritanism  and  its  exaggerated 
tendencies  to  suppress  imagination  and  emotion  is  still 
a  more  potent  force  in  the  higher  life  of  America  than 
may  appear  at  first  blush.  Our  culture — as  yet  com- 
paratively meager  and  unoriginal — is  primarily  in  need 
of  expression  and  emotional  expansion. 

Whence  can  these  qualities  be  derived  for  the  America 
of  the  future?  Throughout  the  nineteenth  century, 
millions  of  foreigners  from  all  parts  of  the  world  have 
landed  on  these  shores  and  have  contributed — especially 
in  the  Middle  West — towards  the  creation  of  a  new 
national  temperament.  In  the  Mississippi  Valley,  a  na- 
tional psyche  is  rapidly  evolving  which,  though  power- 
fully influenced  by  Anglo-Saxon  ideals,  is  something 
essentially  new.  The  millions  of  Slavs,  Celts,  Teutons, 
Latins  are  beginning  to  color  the  national  woof.  Nor 
need  we  believe  that  such  is  the  case  merely  in  states 
like  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  Indiana,  or  Kansas.  Even  in 
New  England  the  strong  influx  of  Italians,  Poles, 
Portuguese  is  bound  in  course  of  time  to  modify  the 
existing  temperament.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  symptoms 
such  as  the  rapid  waning  of  the  Puritan  conception  of 
Sunday,  our  increasing  delight  in  color,  etc.,  indicate 
that  this  change  of  temperament  is  already  becoming 
manifest. 

The  question  may  pertinently  be  asked :  have  these 
foreigners  so  far  contributed  to  the  enrichment  of 
American  culture?  The  answer  must,  unfortunately, 


310    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

be :  they  have  done  very  little  indeed.  They  have  done 
so  little,  partly  because  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  them  came  from  classes  which  had  neither  the  leisure 
nor  the  means  to  devote  themselves  to  intellectual 
pursuits.  But  may  we  say  that  America  has  done 
anything  to  tap  that  subconscious  wealth  which  every 
member  of  an  old  race — however  lowly  he  may  be 
— brings  with  him  as  a  deposit  of  centuries  of  race 
experience?  So  far  from  encouraging  the  preservation 
of  national  acquirements,  so  far  from  absorbing  them 
into  our  American  life,  we  have  by  a  subtle,  indefinable 
and  exceedingly  effective  process  managed  to  make 
every  foreigner  feel  that  he  is  truly  patriotic  only  by 
eliminating  in  himself,  as  quickly  as  possible,  every 
point  of  divergence  from  the  prevalent  norm.  And 
this  norm,  which  we  call  "American,"  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  corresponds  in  all  essentials  as  we  saw,  to  the  New 
England  reflex  of  Anglo-Saxon  ideals  of  life,  and  hardly 
any  longer  to  the  temperament  of  our  nation  as  a  whole. 
This  process  of  leveling  out  is  the  outcome  of  a 
thoroughly  healthy  instinct :  the  instinct  to  form  out  of 
our  heterogeneous  elements  a  closely  knit  nation.  It 
would  be  most  unfortunate  for  this  country — and  every 
American  of  foreign  descent  would  heartily  agree  to 
this  statement — to  permit  anything  like  anarchy  or 
disintegration.  This  danger,  if  it  ever  existed  in  the 
early  stages  of  our  history,  has  long  since  ceased  to  be  a 
reality.  The  definite  Anglo-Saxon  stamp  has  been  pro- 
foundly impressed  upon  the  national  life.  Perhaps  no 
one  who  has  not  passed  through  the  process  of  amalga- 
mation can  form  any  conception  of  the  overwhelming 
force  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  influence  upon  the  foreigner — 
especially  the  young  foreigner.  To  begin  with,  English 
is  the  language  of  the  public  school.  And  a  language, 


Camillo  von  Klenze  311 

as  we  are  all  aware,  reflects  a  world-view.  By  adopting 
a  language  as  your  mother-tongue,  you  subconsciously 
adopt  a  vast  number  of  ideas  and  traditions  imbedded 
within  it.  Our  conception  of  political  life  is  essentially 
English  and  is  daily  impressed  upon  us  through  the 
newspapers,  in  the  class  room,  and  from  the  political 
platform.  Moreover,  the  rise  in  the  social  scale,  which 
consciously  or  unconsciously  forms  the  goal  of  nearly 
every  energetic  man's  ambition,  implies  an  adaptation 
to  the  ideals  prevalent  in  the  ruling  class.  And  these — 
it  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention — are  Anglo-Saxon. 
Thus  in  various  ways  and  without  any  coercion,  such 
as  has  often  been  used  in  Europe,  we  manage  in  a 
remarkably  short  time  to  sandpaper  our  foreigner  into 
almost  absolute  conformity.  Politically  speaking,  this 
conformity  may,  to  a  large  extent,  be  desirable.  At 
least  it  simplifies  the  working  of  the  machinery  of 
government.  But  outside  of  politics  certainly,  diver- 
gence has  again  and  again  led  to  the  creation  of  a  rich 
and  many-sided  culture.  Have  English  letters,  for 
instance,  not  gained  by  the  fact  that  not  only  the 
Anglo-Saxon  but  the  Celtic  temperament  as  well  has 
found  expression  there?  Who  would  care  to  eliminate 
Tom  Moore,  Robert  Burns,  or  Keats — to  name  but  a  few 
out  of  many?  Our  own  Edgar  Allen  Poe  and  our  Mac- 
Dowell — a  greater  musician  than  all  of  England  has  ever 
produced — have  enriched  our  higher  life  precisely  be- 
cause they  contributed  essentially  a  non-Anglo-Saxon 
note.  Yet  are  we  not  subconsciously  pursuing  a 
policy,  which  if  consistently  carried  through,  would 
tend  to  militate  against  such  enrichment?  Is  it  wise 
for  us  to  influence  our  German  boys,  for  instance,  in 
such  fashion  as  subtly  to  induce  them  to  give  up  the 
songs  which  they  learned^at  their  mother's  knee?  It  is 


312     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

a  well-known  fact  that  while  our  German  immigrants 
continue  in  their  "Gesang-Vereine"  to  cultivate  some 
of  the  best  German  music,  their  children,  during 
the  process  of  amalgamation,  let  this  inestimable  herit- 
age slip  through  their  fingers.  Under  the  delusion  that 
they  thus  grow  more  truly  American,  they  become 
unmusical.  In  consequence,  although  we  find  in  our 
colleges,  especially  in  the  Middle  West,  a  large  number 
of  students  of  German  descent,  our  American  college 
music  has  not  been  improved  during  the  last  fifty  years. 
We  continue  cheerfully  to  sing  and  enjoy  songs  of  the 
caliber  of  My  Bonnie  lies  over  the  Ocean.  Would  not 
our  young  Latins  contribute  to  the  grace  and  charm  of 
American  life  more  effectively  than  they  do,  if  in  the 
process  of  Americanization  they  did  not  feel  induced 
to  repress  all  too  rigidly  their  natural  vivacity?  And 
would  American  life  be  injured  by  an  injection  of 
Slavic  emotional  spontaneity  and  force? 

No  nation  ever  had  a  more  wonderful  opportunity 
than  we  have  of  becoming  rich  and  varied  in  the  mani- 
festations of  its  higher  life.  First  of  all  we  are,  among 
the  great  nations,  the  last  comer  in  history.  We  thus 
have  fallen  heir  to  the  cultural  experiences  of  the  whole 
world.  Further,  we  have  ampng  us  millions  of  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  great  nations  of  Europe;  and  lastly, 
our  American  temperament  is  rapidly  growing  more 
plastic  to  new  suggestions. 

As  the  Anglo-Saxon  ideal,  so  powerfully  working 
through  the  school,  the  pulpit,  the  press,  and  our  politi- 
cal institutions,  is  sure  always  to  furnish  the  necessary 
element  of  stability  and  cohesion,  we  can  fully  afford 
to  be  hospitable  to  many  varieties  of  traditions  and 
temperaments.  An  opposite  course,  so  far  from 
building  up  a  better  America,  might  easily  lead  to  com- 


Camillo  von  Klenze  313 

parative  impoverishment.  Every  American  of  foreign 
descent  feels  that  his  own  interests  and  those  of  his 
children  lie  in  America.  His  gaze  is  directed  forward  to 
the  America  of  his  future,  not  backward  to  the  Europe 
of  his  past. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  mistrust  him,  to  suppress  him. 
He  is  sufficiently  repressed  by  the  forces  of  the  life 
about  him.  Our  duty  towards  America  directs  us  rather 
to  use  him,  to  cultivate  what  gifts  he  brings,  and  to 
utilize  them  for  the  good  of  the  America  that  is  to  be. 

If  the  American  people  as  a  whole  were  to  become 
musical  as  the  Teutons  or  Slavs,  sensitive  to  color  and 
line  as  the  Italians,  if  they  were  to  develop  a  deference 
for  language  like  that  of  the  French,  without  losing 
the  Anglo-Saxon  straightforwardness,  political  sense 
and  self-control,  then  the  America  of  the  future  would 
correspond  to  that  picture  which  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously, even  the  severest  Anglo-Saxon  New  Englander 
is  cherishing  in  his  heart. 


THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  WAR  UPON  EUROPE 
BY  STANTON  COIT 

BEFORE  submitting  what  seem  to  me  the  significant 
effects  of  the  world-crisis,  I  wish  to  remove 
certain  false  preconceptions  concerning  the  European 
war,  which  appear  to  be  prevalent  among  the  idealists 
of  America. 

First,  its  horrors  do  not  constitute  its  essence, 
and  we  gain  nothing  by  dwelling  upon  them.  It  is  by 
concentrating  attention  upon  them,  that  many  Ameri- 
cans have  come  to  look  upon  the  European  conflict 
as  mere  butchery.  But  when  your  Civil  War  was  on, 
you  did  not  so  name  the  conflict  into  which  Abraham 
Lincoln  had  precipitated  this  nation  by  the  stand  he 
took.  Because  he  would  not  allow  the  Southern 
States  to  secede,  he  caused  the  shedding  of  the  blood 
of  a  million  men.  You  are  right,  however,  in  maintain- 
ing that  their  slaughter  was  not  butchery;  it  was  need- 
ful sacrifice,  if  the  God  of  Righteousness  was  to  reign  in 
America.  Now,  in  the  present  conflict,  all  Englishmen 
think  that  England  is  fighting  to  suppress  an  institution 
as  hateful  in  its  inhumanity  as  was  Negro  slavery.  We 
mean  to  cut  out  the  cancer  of  militarism  from  the 
heart  of  Europe  or  die  in  the  attempt.  What  we  are 
doing  is  surgery,  not  butchery. 

Another  false  notion  prevalent  among  American 
idealists  is  that  the  claim  of  the  English  is  to  be  dis- 

314 


Stanton  Coit  315 

counted  by  the  fact  that  a  similar  and  equally  sincere 
claim  is  put  forward  by  the  Prussians.  But  in  all  great 
struggles  each  side  thinks  itself  right  and  the  other 
wrong;  that  fact,  however,  does  not  excuse  a  third  party 
from  the  responsibility  of  investigating  the  case  and 
coming  to  an  independent  judgment  as  to  which  side 
is  the  more  right  and  which  of  the  two  the  more  wrong. 
Why  should  Americans  in  this  particular  case  be  so 
impressed  by  the  fact  that  each  side  thinks  itself  in  the 
right?  From  this  circumstance  they  seem  to  draw  the 
conclusion  that  there  is  no  more  right  on  one  side  than 
on  the  other;  or  that  a  really  gentle  person  would  not 
presume  to  side  against  a  nation  which  is  convinced  of 
the  righteousness  of  its  cause.  But  a  similar  clashing 
of  moral  judgment  occurred  in  the  Civil  War.  The 
slaveholders  thought  they  were  justified ;  yet  this  circum- 
stance did  not  tempt  the  North  to  abate  by  one  jot  or 
tittle  its  conviction  that  the  Union  should  not  be  broken 
in  two  nor  slavery  be  allowed  to  spread.  The  sincerity 
of  the  South  did  not  stay  Mr.  Lincoln's  hands  nor  cause 
his  divine  intent  to  waver.  Likewise,  the  other  day,  in 
Boston,  the  voters  were  deciding  between  license  and 
no-license.  Both  sides  believed  they  were  in  the  right 
on  this  issue;  nevertheless,  this  circumstance  did  not 
weaken  the  conviction  of  either  side.  And  why  should 
it  have  done  so?  Indeed  it  is  precisely  when  both 
sides  think  their  cause  is  just  that  no  man  who  respects 
himself  will  suspend  judgment  and  remain  a  neuter. 
It  must  not  be  imagined  that  either  side  in  any 
significant  struggle  asks  that  its  own  testimony  or  its 
sincerity  of  conviction  should  be  taken  as  proof  of  its 
righteousness,  but  only  that  they  should  be  respected, 
as  an  imperative  call  to  outsiders  to  investigate  and 
judge  for  themselves.  Never  until  this  war  have  I, 


316    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

in  a  long  lifetime,  known  educated  persons  who  were 
not  cynics  to  throw  into  the  face  of  either  party  to  a 
terrible  massacre  the  fact  that  the  other  also  believes 
that  it  is  right.  Of  course  it  does !  That  is  an  essential 
element  of  tragedy  in  real  life  as  it  is  upon  the  stage. 
The  question  is  not  concerning  any  one's  goodness  of 
motive.  The  problem  before  the  tribunal  of  the  world 
to-day  is  to  decide  which  of  the  two  parties  in  the 
struggle  is  right  independently  of  what  each  thinks  of 
himself  or  the  other.  In  your  Civil  War — for  I  can 
find  no  better  instance — the  problem  was  not :  does  the 
North  think  it  is  right?  But  is  it  right?  Is  its  moral 
judgment  of  itself  true  or  erroneous?  So  with  the 
European  war,  as  between  Alliance  and  Entente,  the 
motives  are  equally  high;  but  that  fact  has  no  bearing 
on  the  issue  which  confronts  humanity.  It  is  wholly 
a  question  of  the  objective  lightness  of  conduct. 
America  therefore  should  not  allow  herself  to  be  stag- 
gered because  Prussian  and  Briton  are  equally  sincere, 
nor  should  she  halt  at  that;  as  if  she  could  be  ex- 
empted from  deciding  between  nations  who  are  both 
well-meaning. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that,  in  order  to  sketch 
in  outline  the  terms  of  a  just  and  enduring  peace,  it  will 
not  be  necessary  to  settle  who  started  the  war,  or  who 
was  the  more  to  blame  in  precipitating  it.  To  find 
out  who  started  the  war  will  throw  no  light  upon  how 
it  can  or  ought  to  be  ended.  Nor  is  the  starting  of  it 
the  same  as  the  being  to  blame  for  it.  The  blame  often 
rests  upon  the  side  which  wishes  to  preserve  the  status 
quo  and  which  therefore  does  its  utmost  to  maintain 
peace — a  peace  which  may  be  a  whitened  sepulcher. 
But  in  any  case  it  makes  little  difference  who  is  to 
blame,  for  the  settlement  cannot  be  allowed  to  be 


Stanton  Coit  317 

of  the  nature  of  a  punishment.  The  arrangement 
to  be  made  must  be  guided  by  the  principle  of  social 
utility,  which  is  wholly  forward-looking  and  which 
cannot  aim  at  reforming  the  culprit;  it  must  only 
attempt  to  remove  the  outward  occasion  of  any  moral 
obliquity  that  may  have  been  at  work.  And  to  do  this 
it  must  be  a  constructive  readjustment  of  all  the  in- 
terests. It  can  afford  to  ignore  the  guilt  of  every 
one,  because  it  will  remove  the  existing  mal-adjustment 
which  incited  to  evil  designs. 

The  notion  has  also  been  widely  published  through- 
out America  that  it  would  be  a  misfortune  to  humanity 
if  a  decisive  victory  should  be  won  by  either  side. 
The  ground  upon  which  this  judgment  is  based  is  that 
the  victor,  if  his  triumph  were  absolute,  would  be 
so  inflated  with  ambition  and  revenge  that  he  would 
refuse  to  consider  the  just  claims  of  the  vanquished. 
Now  I  cannot  speak  as  to  the  mental  effects  which 
unqualified  victory  would  have  upon  Prussia,  al- 
though we  do  know  how  she  treated  France  in  1871; 
but  on  behalf  of  the  rulers  of  the  British  Empire  it  is 
only  fair  to  cite  the  use  they  made  of  the  unconditional 
surrender  of  the  Boers.  Absolute  victory  in  no  wise 
made  Great  Britain  oblivious  of  the  human  and  even 
the  political  claims  of  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa. 
One  may  also  cite  the  conquests  of  the  Soudan.  With 
these  two  recent  cases  before  us  as  proof  of  the  non- 
demoralizing  effects  of  complete  triumph  upon  the 
character  of  the  British  Government,  how  can  any 
impartial  witness  hope  for  a  "draw"  between  the 
Entente  and  the  Alliance,  on  the  score  of  fear  lest 
England,  as  the  dominant  factor,  would  abuse  the 
power  which  an  overwhelming  success  would  place  in 
her  hands?  And — again  concerning  the  Civil  War,— 


318    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

I  would  ask  whether  the  complete  surrender  of  the 
South  would  have  tempted  the  North,  had  Abraham 
Lincoln  lived,  to  cruel  or  brutal  retaliation?  The 
Southerners  themselves  do  not  so  think. 

There  is,  however,  a  still  stronger  ground  for  protest- 
ing against  the  notion  of  a  "draw"  as  between  Prussia 
and  England.  Such  an  outcome  could  be  desired  only 
on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  moral  issue  at  stake 
and  that  the  right  was  just  as  much  on  one  side  as  on 
the  other.  Against  such  an  assumption,  I  would 
affirm  that  the  burden  of  proving  that  there  is  no  moral 
issue  at  stake  rests  with  those  who  say  so,  inasmuch  as 
all  the  belligerents  interpret  the  case  otherwise.  Grant- 
ing that  there  is  now  a  contest  between  right  and 
wrong,  I  ask :  would  it  have  been  an  advantage  if  after 
two  years  of  war  between  the  North  and  the  South, 
the  struggle  had  been  closed  with  a  "draw"?  Indeed, 
it  was  only  after  that  period  of  time  that  the  deeper 
social  issues  of  the  struggle  rose  clearly  into  the  self- 
consciousness,  both  of  North  and  of  South,  and  became 
the  dominant  motives.  At  least  the  North  did  not 
realize  the  deeper  human  meaning  of  the  situation  until 
after  that  length  of  time.  Now,  whether  rightly  or 
wrongly,  throughout  the  British  Empire  in  the  last 
seventeen  months,  there  has  been  a  similar  deepening 
of  insight  and  elevation  of  purpose.  The  strife  may 
have  begun  with  no  clear  intelligence  on  the  part 
of  any  one  in  England  outside  of  an  exclusive  circle 
of  international  diplomatists.  The  motives,  likewise, 
which  first  incited  the  enthusiasm  of  the  populace  may 
have  well  been  superficial  and  sentimental.  But  now 
the  British  public  knows  what  it  is  fighting  for.  Nor 
can  there  be  any  difference  between  what  it  thinks 
is  its  purpose  and  what  its  purpose  really  is.  In  its 


Stanton  Coit  319 

judgment  the  cause  of  personal  liberty  and  equality 
and  of  government  responsible  to  the  will  of  the  people 
is  bound  up  with  the  existence  of  the  British  Empire. 
The  struggle  is  between  military  despotism  and  govern- 
ment throughout  the  world  by  the  peoples  thereof 
and  for  the  peoples. 

Nor  in  the  minds  of  the  British  public  is  there  any 
confusion  as  to  what  enemy  they  are  fighting — that 
enemy  is  the  Prussian  Government  as  the  incarnation 
of  military  despotism,  and  not  the  German  people. 
No  one  in  England  wishes  to  wipe  Germany  off  the 
map  or  to  crush  Germany.  But  unhappily  Americans 
do  not  make  this  discrimination  between  Prussia  and 
Germany.  And  when  we  speak  bitterly  against  the 
former,  they  imagine  that  we  wish  to  annihilate  the 
latter,  but  our  purpose  is  the  opposite  of  this.  More 
and  more  in  the  minds  of  the  British  the  war  assumes 
the  nature  of  a  crusade  to  free  the  politically  oppressed 
people  of  Germany.  England  is  as  much  opposed  to 
Prussian  autocracy  as  were  the  4,250,000  Social  Demo- 
crats who  cast  their  votes  against  military  despotism  in 
1912. 

What  the  British  fear  is  not  military  conquest  by 
Prussia,  but  the  kind  of  peace  government  which 
would  follow  in  its  wake.  It  is  Prussia's  domestic 
political  system,  with  a  Prime  Minister  responsible  only 
to  his  autocratic  master,  that  the  English  dread  to  see 
spread  over  the  territory  either  of  South  America  or 
South  Africa,  either  of  Egypt  or  India.  Nobody  can 
gainsay  the  statement  that  wherever  England  spreads 
she  establishes,  as  rapidly  as  the  self-conscious  spirit 
of  her  subjects  demands  it  and  as  their  education  and 
experience  permit,  individual  liberty  and  equality, 
and  government  responsible  to  the  common  will. 


320    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Hence  this  seems  to  the  people  of  England  a  moral 
issue.  She  is  fighting  now  for  the  same  end  which  has 
made  her  look  askance  at  the  aggression  of  Russia. 
She  wishes  to  secure  the  foothold  throughout  the  world 
which  government-by-the-people  has  at  last  attained. 
She  knows,  it  is  true  of  the  whole  world  that  a  house 
divided  against  itself  cannot  stand.  As  Lincoln  said 
of  the  United  States,  it  must  become  either  all  slave  or 
all  free,  so  the  British  Empire  sees  that  the  whole  world 
must  become  either  all  military  despotism  or  all  govern- 
ment-by-the-people. 

There  still  remain  a  number  of  false  preconceptions  in 
the  minds  of  many  Americans  which  must  be  removed 
before  it  is  possible  for  them  to  understand  and  appre- 
ciate the  effects  of  the  European  conflict.  In  the  first 
place  the  question  "Who  will  win?"  need  not  be 
answered  before  deciding  what  the  real  outcome  of  the 
struggle  will  be.  We  may  be  certain  that  the  ultimate 
issue  will  be  victory  for  the  cause  of  liberty,  equality, 
and  democratic  government  throughout  Europe, 
although  we  know  that  the  way  towards  that  goal  will 
be  different,  if  Germany  wins,  from  what  it  would  be  if 
the  triumph  were  with  the  Allies.  If  Prussia  conquers, 
popular  government  cannot  be  established  in  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Turkey  except  by  way  of  social  revolution. 
If  the  Allies  overcome  their  enemy,  the  road  to  the 
triumph  of  democracy  will  be  straight  and  immediate, 
not  only  in  Central  Europe  but  in  Russia. 

We  must  remember  the  striking  historic  fact  that  the 
vanquished  country  often  is  victor,  and  vice  versa.  In 
1 806  Prussia  was  bowed  down  to  the  dust,  and  the  hoof 
of  Napoleon  the  Great  was  placed  upon  her  neck,  but 
out  of  this  humiliation  the  spirit  of  the  Fatherland  rose 
to  a  dignity,  insight,  and  energy  heretofore  unparalleled. 


Stanton  Coit  321 

Fichte  in  1810  issued  his  Speeches  to  the  German 
Nation  in  which  he  urged  the  people  to  concentrate 
all  their  powers  upon  their  physical  culture  and  upon 
the  discipline  and  equipment  of  their  intelligence. 
They  were  poor;  they  were  without  political  unity;  as 
an  army  they  were  disgraced;  they  had  no  navy. 
In  this  predicament  the  only  line  of  deliverance  was 
that  of  intellectual  and  physical  culture.  Thus  out  of 
the  ashes  of  national  grief  rose  like  a  sphinx  the  spirit 
of  the  New  Germany,  which  was  destined  in  the 
sixties  of  the  last  century  to  conquer  Schleswig-Holstein 
and  Austria,  and  in  1870  France.  If  one,  then,  has  an 
eye  to  the  real  issues,  1806  was  the  beginning  of  real 
victory  for  Germany.  So  with  France  was  the  defeat 
of  1871.  In  the  same  way  we  are  justified  in  believing 
that  the  cause  of  democratic  government  will  triumph 
even  though  the  immediate  terms  of  peace  may  not 
be  all  that  England,  France,  and  Italy  might  desire. 

In  the  second  place,  American  idealists  are  far  too 
prone  to  contrast  peace  and  war.  They  think  of 
peace  as  a  heavenly  thing,  pure  and  innocent,  come 
down  straight  from  God,  and  of  war  as  something  alien 
and  monstrous,  which  has  been  belched  up  from  some 
region  lower  than  humanity.  Now  of  ideal  peace,  such 
as  never  was  on  land  or  sea,  this  contrast  may  hold 
good;  but  of  the  actual  peace  which  had  prevailed  for 
forty-four  years  in  Europe,  it  is  utterly  untrue.  No 
two  things  in  the  world's  history  are  more  alike  than 
the  peace  which  prevailed  from  1871  to  1914  and  the 
war  which  has  continued  since  then.  That  peace  was 
big  with  all  the  potencies  and  purposes  which  have 
brought  forth  this  war.  That  peace  was  a  hatching 
season  for  this  war.  And  you  cannot  say  that  a  peace 
which  is  big  with  the  ends  that  require  the  prepara- 


322    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

tion  for  war  is  innocent  of  the  bloodshed  which  en- 
sues. One  may  contrast  in  the  same  way  sobriety 
with  drunkenness  and  maintain  that  temperance  is  an 
angelic  virtue,  while  inebriety  is  a  loathsome  vice. 
But  if  a  man  while  perfectly  sober,  deliberately  drinks 
glass  after  glass  of  whiskey  in  order  to  make  himself 
drunk,  how  can  one  laud  such  soberness  as  any  nobler 
than  the  bestiality  it  fosters  ?  If  the  present  European 
war  is  inhuman,  still  more  so  was  the  precedent  Euro- 
pean peace ;  for  the  intellectual  instigator  to  a  crime  is 
worse  than  the  accessory  who  executes  it. 

If  any  one  challenges  my  description  of  the 
forty-four  years  of  peace,  it  can  only  be  because  he  is 
less  acquainted  than  I  am  with  international  diplomacy 
during  that  period.  Possibly  one  reason  why  so  many 
pacificists  desire  a  "draw"  in  the  present  conflict  is 
because  they  imagine  that  a  return  to  the  status  quo 
would  be  a  reestablishment  of  seraphic  harmony 
among  the  States  of  Europe;  but,  if  such  is  the  basis 
of  their  desire,  it  is  a  proof  that  their  idealism  is  not 
supplemented  by  a  realistic  and  conscientious  grip 
of  the  historic  forces  which  have  brought  about  this 
war. 

Another  illusion  of  visionary  idealists  in  America  is 
the  identification  of  trade  with  peace  and  the  belief 
that  war  is  not  the  offspring  of  foreign  commerce  and 
international  finance.  This  present  world-conflict  can 
never  be  understood  unless  it  is  realized  that  inter- 
national finance  in  the  hands  of  private  capitalists  and 
foreign  commerce  controlled  by  individual  traders 
with  an  eye  to  personal  gain  have  brought  it  about,  as 
they  have  all  the  great  wars  between  foreign  countries 
during  the  last  three  hundred  years.  When  to  keep 
peace  favors  international  financiers  and  traders, 


Stanton  Coit  323 

they  see  that  it  is  kept;  but  whenever  it  has  been 
broken,  the  reason  has  been  that  war  would  serve  their 
purpose  better.  Whether  it  is  a  case  of  hypocrisy  or  of 
the  unconscious  self-blinding  of  the  mind  to  its  own 
depravity  we  need  not  say;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Sir  John  Seeley  in  his  Expansion  of  England  is 
true  to  historic  fact  when  he  declares  that  during  the  last 
three  centuries  trade  and  war  have  been  one  and  the 
same  thing.  The  present  world-conflict  reveals  to  the 
eyes  of  all  what  some  students  of  social  dynamics  already 
knew,  that  international  finance  in  the  hands  of  private 
capitalists  has  had  and  will  always  have  the  very 
opposite  effect  from  that  which  Mr.  Norman  Angell 
has  declared  must  be  its  result.  When  I  said  that 
the  peace  of  the  preceding  decades  caused  the  war,  it 
was  only  another  way  of  declaring  that  international 
finance  and  trade  were  pushing  the  ends  which  they 
meant  to  attain  without  bloodshed,  if  possible,  but 
with  it,  if  necessary.  To  return  to  the  kind  of  peace, 
therefore,  which  prevailed  before  August,  1914,  would 
simply  be  a  going  back  to  a  pursuit  of  the  same  ends, 
but  with  intensified  preparation  of  still  more  terrific 
means. 

I  now  ask  you  to  consider  several  unforeseen  and 
unintended  effects  of  the  war  upon  Europe,  for  these 
seem  to  me  to  be  the  permanent  and  vital  outcome,  and 
they  all  in  my  judgment  are  fraught  with  blessings 
to  the  world.  From  my  praise  of  them,  however,  it 
must  not  be  inferred  that  I  approve  the  conflict. 
Towards  it  I  assume  the  attitude  taken  by  the  gentle 
American  Quakeress,  Lucretia  Mott,  when  some  one 
pointed  out  to  her  certain  instances  of  the  law  that  good 
comes  out  of  evil.  She  assented  that  God  used  in- 
strumentalities which  she,  Lucretia  Mott,  would  not 


324    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

touch  with  a  ten -foot  pole !  We  may  regard  the  present 
European  war  as  we  must  the  Great  Plague  of  the 
fourteenth  century  or  the  fire  of  London  in  the  seven- 
teenth or  the  earthquake  at  San  Francisco  in  the 
twentieth;  these  were  things  which  no  human  being 
would  voluntarily  have  set  going  and  yet  they  were 
things  which  in  their  total  result  were  undoubtedly 
great  gains  to  the  populations  which  survived. 

In  order  to  know  the  most  significant  effects  of  the 
war  upon  Europe  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  be  endowed 
with  any  special  gift  of  prophecy.  An  acquaintance 
with  the  causes  which  induced  the  war  made  it  possible 
for  Professor  Usher  and  Mr.  Price  Collier  in  America, 
and  in  England,  Earl  Roberts,  Mr.  Robert  Blackfoot, 
and  a  score  of  others,  to  anticipate  with  startling 
foresight  many  terrible  events  which  have  since  occurred. 
But  I  invite  you  to-day  rather  to  attempt  what  might 
be  called  creative  prophecy,  prophecy  in  kind  like  that 
which  Professor  von  Treitschke,  Prince  von  Buelow  and 
General  Bernhardi  practised  in  Germany  but  in  another 
spirit  and  with  another  motive.  These  said : ' '  Let  there 
be  war!"  and  there  was  war — because  they  had  said  so. 
Likewise  it  is  possible  for  us  to  say : ' '  Let  there  be  justice 
that  removes  the  causes  of  war!"  and  we  shall  have 
instituted  peace  everlasting.  And  yet,  creative  pro- 
phecy cannot  create  something  out  of  nothing ;  it  must 
seize  upon  certain  factors,  bye-products  which  the  war 
has  brought  forth,  and  use  them  as  a  basis  for  peace. 

I  have  asked  you  to  prophesy;  but  now  that  the 
war  has  been  producing  effects  for  the  last  seventeen 
months,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  that  we  should  fore- 
cast the  future.  We  need  not  so  much  foretell  what 
will  be,  as  tell  what  has  already  been  the  effect  upon 
Europe.  It  is  not  so  much  prevision  of  what  will 


Stanton  Coit  325 

happen  as  vision  of  what  is  taking  place  before  our  very 
eyes,  that  we  must  exercise. 

For  Americans  to  understand  what  the  supreme 
effect  of  the  war  upon  Europe  is  and  will  be,  it  is  only 
necessary  for  them  to  note  what  it  is  and  will  be  within 
America  herself  upon  the  mind  of  all  Americans.  For 
the  very  same  effect  has  taken  place  throughout  the 
British  Empire,  Belgium,  Germany,  and  every  other 
country  involved  in  the  conflict.  This  present  Euro- 
pean war  has  already  done  spiritually  for  the  United 
States  of  America  what  the  Civil  War  after  four  years 
did  for  it  politically.  In  July,  1914,  America  was  dead 
to  patriotism;  her  idealists,  whether  socialists  or 
pacificists  or  feminists,  were  preaching  that  moral 
preference  for  one's  own  country  was  a  provincialism 
and  a  vice,  and  that  the  broad  spirit  of  American 
humanitarianism  required  the  setting  up  in  its  place  of 
the  love  of  all  individual  men  irrespective  of  nationality, 
and  a  moral  regard  and  solicitude  for  other  countries  as 
great  as  that  for  one's  own.  A  divided  loyalty  on 
the  part  of  many  immigrants  was  noticed  without 
alarm  and  accepted  as  only  natural.  It  seemed  to  go 
without  saying  that  a  recent  comer  to  the  United  States 
should  give  legal  and  economic  adherence  to  the  life  of 
America,  while  reserving  inner  loyalty  to  some  govern- 
ment of  Europe.  But  the  European  War  has  changed 
all  that  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye.  It  has  ended  for- 
ever the  divided  allegiance  of  hyphenated  hearts.  The 
European  war  has  brought  it  about  that,  now,  through- 
out America,  patriotism  is  a  virtue  instead  of  a  vice. 
It  has  re-defined  patriotism  so  that  it  begins  to  mean  and 
will  henceforth  forever  signify  loyalty  to  the  country 
which  one  intends  to  die  in,  instead  of  loyalty  to  the 
country  in  which  one  had  never  intended  to  be  born. 


326    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

American  capitalists  had  supposed  that  they  were 
importing  by  the  million  or  the  million-and-a-half  a 
year  merely  mechanical  labor  units ;  by  the  glare  of  the 
war-flames  of  Europe  they  have  discovered  that  they 
had  been  importing  human  souls  which  had  come 
bearing  clouds  of  glorious  memory  from  Servia,  or 
Italy,  or  Prussia,  or  where-not,  which  had  been 
their  home.  Or,  if  this  were  not  the  case,  at  least  the 
immigrants  were  mentally  sensitive  to  the  suggestions  of 
political  agents  from  the  lands  of  their  birth.  In  any 
case  America  is  now  spiritually  the  most  united  people 
on  the  face  of  the  earth.  "America  first"  is  the 
master-purpose  of  every  foreign-born  resident  in  the 
States,  naturalized  or  not  yet  naturalized,  as  well  as 
of  the  native-born.  This  spiritual  bye-product  of  the 
war,  manifest  in  America,  is  an  incontrovertible  fact  of 
supreme  importance  and  of  abiding  and  vital  power. 
But  the  same  thing  has  happened  in  every  nation 
that  is  participating  in  the  conflict. 

The  British  Empire  has  always  been  politically  as 
compared  with  the  United  States  after  1865  a  mere  rope 
of  sand.  Until  two  decades  ago  almost  every  one  of 
her  statesmen  believed  that  each  one  of  the  self-govern- 
ing Dominions  in  the  Empire  would  in  the  fullness  of 
time  drop  away  as  had  the  thirteen  original  colonies. 
Strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  certain  leaders  like 
Mr.  Chamberlain  to  offset  the  spiritual  disintegration 
of  the  Empire  by  means  of  economic  devices  in  the 
form  of  preferential  tariffs  between  the  mother-country 
and  the  colonies.  But  within  a  month  after  its  begin- 
ning, the  war  had  bound  all  the  constituent  parts 
of  the  Empire  from  within  in  such  a  manner  and 
by  manifestation  of  such  deeds  of  heroic  loyalty,  that 
no  foreign  power  on  earth  and  no  insidious  domestic 


Stanton  Coit  327 

vice  can  ever  disrupt  or  disintegrate  it.  It  had  seemed 
to  some  lovers  of  the  British  Empire  as  if  it  would  take 
five  centuries  of  education  and  systematic  propaganda 
to  bring  about  so  glorious  a  result.  It  is  not  a  result 
which  the  Kaiser  intended  nor  the  Czar  foresaw  nor 
which  furnished  an  added  motive  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
It  has,  as  it  were,  come  down  out  of  heaven,  and  has 
come  to  stay. 

The  like  effect  has  been  manifest  in  Belgium.  She 
was  the  most  mechanical  and  uninteresting  state 
of  Europe.  She  was  a  political  device,  a  mere  state, 
the  body  of  a  nation  without  the  mind  rather  than  a 
social  group  which  had  grown  spontaneously  into  an 
independent  selfhood.  Belgium  had  been  manu- 
factured by  Germany,  France,  and  England,  in  1839. 
But  in  1914  she  became  not  only  a  living  soul  within 
her  own  border,  but  a  quickening  spirit  breathing  re- 
demptive courage  into  the  heart  of  every  other  nation 
on  earth. 

I  have  no  time  in  which  to  particularize  the  results  of 
the  war  in  awakening  the  spirit  of  nationality  in  France, 
Italy,  and  Greece,  the  Balkan  States,  Turkey,  and 
Russia;  but  in  each  one  of  these  nations,  the  historic 
genius  of  the  people  has  been  heightened  and  quickened 
into  self-consciousness  and  into  a  strenuousness  of  self- 
sacrifice  and  a  far-reaching  purpose,  such  as  has  never 
been  attained  before.  Some  believers  in  peace  at  any 
price,  who  are  unwilling  to  see  benefits  even  in  the  bye- 
products  of  war,  affirm  that  this  magnificent  heighten- 
ing of  the  spirit  of  solidarity  in  each  nation  is  due  only 
to  the  spasm  of  suffering.  These  wholesale  and  unsee- 
ing depreciators  of  international  war  declare  that  the 
heightening  of  national  consciousness  which  swallows 
up  petty  and  sordid  self-interests  is  pathological,  tran- 


328    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

sient,  and  certain  to  be  followed  by  a  reaction  in  the 
opposite  direction.  But  a  moment's  reflection  will  show 
that  it  is  not  a  common  grief,  nor  hysterical  fear  which 
has  drawn,  for  instance,  the  self-governing  Dominions 
and  the  dependencies  of  the  British  Empire  into 
unity  of  purpose  and  consciousness  of  identity.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  the  far-sighted  and  cool  anticipation 
of  danger  and  the  determination  to  stand  together 
which  has  caused  nine-tenths  of  the  anguish  and  all 
the  bitterness  of  grief,  resentment,  and  hate.  What 
was  before  real  but  unconscious — the  spiritual  unity  of 
the  British  Empire — now  has  risen  above  the  threshold 
of  blind  psychic  life.  That  is  all.  The  truth  is  that 
increasingly  during  the  last  forty  years  the  affections, 
the  memories,  the  personal  pride,  the  commercial 
interests,  and  the  sense  of  honor  with  its  standards  of 
manhood  and  duty  have,  in  the  breasts  of  all  the  subjects 
of  the  British  Crown,  been  more  and  more  closely  knit- 
ting themselves  about  that  great  historic  Being  called 
the  British  Empire.  The  shock  of  the  war  only  woke 
up  these  sleeping  energies  and  attachments.  But,  by 
being  awakened  into  self-directing  principles,  they 
have  become  a  hundred-fold  more  potent  than  they 
ever  could  have  been,  had  they  remained  unaware 
of  themselves.  The  same  is  the  case  with  Belgium  and 
the  other  nations  which  I  have  mentioned. 

As  regards  Austria-Hungary,  there  has  been  no  evi- 
dence of  any  spiritual  unification.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Austria-Hungary  is  not  one  nation,  and  never 
has  been.  It  is  only  an  enforced  political  union  of 
some  eight  social  groups,  two  of  which  exercise  brutal 
compulsion  over  the  others.  Such  being  the  case, 
it  is  probable  that  the  war  has  on  the  contrary  stim- 
ulated the  antagonisms  between  the  various  potential 


Stanton  Coit  329 

nationalities  of  the  country.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  under  the  melting-pot  process,  to  which  Europe 
is  now  subjected,  the  things  which  lose  their  shape  and 
are  dissolved  are  the  artificial  and  forced,  the  mechani- 
cal unions;  while  those  spiritual  realities  which  we  call 
nations — those  groups  of  human  beings  who  find  them- 
selves spontaneously  one  in  sympathy,  reciprocal  under- 
standing, and  moral  interest,  become  only  refined  and 
solidified  by  the  dangers  and  necessities  of  war.  As 
regards  nationality  the  result  will  probably  be  that  one 
part  of  Austria  will  become  merged  into  the  German 
Empire,  while  several  other  constituent  factors  will 
find  the  fulfillment  of  that  innate  destiny  in  a  self- 
governing  federation  with  the  Balkan  States. 

A  notion  is  prevalent  among  the  Allies  and  through- 
out the  United  Stntes  that  before  the  war  began  Ger- 
many was  already  a  nation  unified  in  mind,  purpose, 
and  sentiment.  But  no  statement  could  be  further 
from  the  truth,  as  every  one  will  testify  who  has  been 
acquainted  during  the  last  twenty  years  with  the 
domestic  life,  economic  and  political,  of  the  German 
people.  If  there  ever  was  a  house  divided  against  itself, 
that  house  was  Germany,  until  the  first  of  August,  1914. 
Let  any  one  read  the  second  part  of  Prince  von  Buelow's 
book,  Imperial  Germany,  which  treats  of  her  domestic 
policy,  and  he  will  see  to  what  an  alarming  degree  had 
spread  not  only  the  class-war  between  the  Social-Demo- 
crats and  the  rulers  of  Germany,  but  the  feud  between 
the  Prussian  government  and  such  outlying  parts  as 
German  Poland.  I  have  time  to  instance  only  one  fact 
— the  social  democratic  vote  of  Germany  had  risen 
steadily  from  the  middle  of  the  eighties  in  the  last 
century,  when  it  was  some  800,000,  to  the  colossal 
number  of  4,250,000  in  the  year  1912.  Let  it  be 


33°    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

recalled  to  mind  that  the  social  democratic  party  stands 
enthusiastically  and  avowedly  for  a  republican  form  of 
government  and  that  its  members  have  for  twenty- 
five  years  hated  the  Kaiser,  the  Crown  Prince's  set,  and 
all  the  works  of  Prussian  military  despotism,  as  much 
as  the  French  and  the  British  soldiers  in  the  trenches 
have  begun  to  do  only  since  August,  1914.  Then  it 
will  not  be  denied  that  Germany  was  far  advanced 
towards  civil  strife  and  social  disruption.  The  con- 
tention of  some  that  the  ultimate  object  of  the  Prussian 
government  was  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  German 
people  from  the  political  and  economic  revolution 
which  they  had  organized  themselves  to  bring  about, 
is  not  without  foundation.  But  whether  the  govern- 
ment foresaw  the  unifying  effect  which  a  war  would 
have,  as  Bismarck  had  anticipated  it  in  1870,  is  of  no 
importance.  It  cannot  be  questioned  in  face  of  the 
enduring  effect  of  the  Franco-German  conflict  in  ce- 
menting the  German  Empire,  that  the  present  war  has 
abolished  forever  what  is  called  the  class-war  in  Ger- 
many. In  the  breasts  of  the  4,250,000  Social-Democrats, 
loyalty  to  the  Fatherland  has  overborne  loyalty  to  the 
proletariat.  No  one,  moreover,  who  has  known  the 
inner  life  of  the  social  democratic  party  believes  for  a 
moment  that  the  working  classes  of  Germany  who  have 
been  disciplined  by  Lassalle  and  Marx  identify  the 
Fatherland  with  the  Kaiser.  It  is  in  spite  of  him  that 
they  have  been  moved  to  fight  for  their  country.  The 
history  of  no  nation  furnishes  a  more  striking  and 
dramatic  proof  of  the  irresistible  force  of  patriotism. 
This  war  demonstrates  in  the  case  of  every  nation  of 
Europe  that  in  the  minds  of  men  patriotism,  although 
a  purely  spiritual  passion,  is  more  powerful  than  the 
elementary  cravings,  such  as  hunger,  thirst,  and  the 


Stanton  Coit  331 

reproductive  instinct.  Patriotism  is  proved  to  be  so 
deep  in  root  and  so  vital,  that  no  intellectual  theory 
and  no  dogma  and  no  force  of  public  opinion  created  by 
any  one  class  can  damp  its  ardor  or  weaken  its  energy. 

I  count  this  conscious  renaissance  of  patriotism 
throughout  the  Western  world  to  be  the  supreme  effect 
of  the  war.  It  is  as  startling  in  its  dramatic  surprise 
as  it  is  ennobling  in  its  redemptive  efficacy!  for  the 
whole  world  seemed  to  have  come  to  the  conclusion,  not 
only  that  patriotism  was  a  petty  provincialism  of  which 
one  ought  to  be  ashamed,  but  that  it  was  in  very  fact 
practically  dead.  Now,  nothing  else  is  so  alive  and 
mighty.  Nor  in  my  judgment  is  any  other  factor  in  the 
moral  universe  of  man  so  beneficent.  The  universality 
of  patriotism,  which  the  war  has  demonstrated,  shows 
to  the  members  of  each  nation  that  the  supreme  force 
upon  which  he  must  reckon  and  which  he  must  respect 
in  every  other  nation  is  the  corresponding  loyalty  of  its 
members  to  their  own  beloved  community.  Hence- 
forth, to  be  a  patriot,  the  first  requirement  will  be  that 
a  man  shall  reverence  and  dread  the  patriotism  in  the 
hearts  of  foreign  nations.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  men 
will  ever  again  enter  so  ruthlessly  into  aggressive  war- 
fare, now  that  they  have  known  what  manner  of  devour- 
ing and  passionate  resentment  their  insult  will  arouse. 
It  appears  to  men  of  all  countries  that  the  loyalty  of 
Belgians  to  their  nation  and  their  state  has  been  alto- 
gether right  and  reasonable. 

The  war  has  thus  demonstrated  for  all  time  the 
compatibility  of  a  man's  moral  preference  for  his  own 
country  with  supreme  respect  for  other  men's  preference 
for  their  countries.  It  has  shown  that  a  man's  love 
for  his  country  is  analogous  to  his  preference  for  his  own 
mother.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  mother  of  each 


332    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

man  and  woman  present  in  my  audience  to-night  is 
just  as  good  and  noble  as  my  mother  was;  and  yet  I  am 
sure  that  no  sane  person  present  will  take  offense 
if  I  presume  to  say  that  I  love  my  own  mother,  whom  I 
have  known,  better  than  the  mothers  of  my  auditors 
whom  I  have  not  seen.  You  would  suspect  me,  I  have 
no  doubt,  of  intentional  falsehood,  or  else  of  emotional 
insanity,  if  I  attempted  to  make  you  believe  that  I 
entertained  as  great  affection  for  the  women  who 
brought  you  into  the  world  and  nurtured  you  as  for 
the  one  who  mothered  me.  I  accordingly  maintain 
that  a  man  would  either  be  a  criminal  lunatic  or  a 
deceitful  knave  who  professed  that  he  cared  just  as 
much  for  a  foreign  nation  and  a  foreign  government 
under  which  he  had  never  lived  as  for  the  one  which 
was  bound  up  with  all  the  memories  of  his  childhood, 
youth,  and  immediate  present.  In  the  same  way, 
I  confess  my  preference  for  my  own  children  for  whom 
I  am  responsible;  but  I  am  not  for  a  moment  deceived 
into  thinking  that  my  children  are  any  more  beautiful 
or  graceful  or  intelligent  than  yours.  I  cite  the  relation 
of  a  man  to  his  own  mother  and  his  own  children  because 
when  the  citizens  of  any  nation  look  backward,  they  are 
filled  with  a  sense  that  their  nation  stands  to  them  in 
the  benign  intimacy  of  a  mother,  and  the  next  instant 
when  they  look  to  its  future,  their  country  appears  to  be 
their  own  child.  The  war  has  taught  us  to  have  con- 
tempt for  any  man  who  does  not  feel  thus  towards  his 
own  country;  and  thus  we  have  learned  that  the 
future  Brotherhood  of  Man  is  not  to  be  a  cosmopolitan 
union  of  individuals  without  sentiment  of  nationality, 
but  a  Brotherhood  of  Nations.  In  other  words,  two 
practical  corollaries  are  felt  to  be  involved  in  the  uni- 
versal awakening  of  patriotism.  One  is  the  inviola- 


Stanton  Coit  333 

bility  of  every  nation  on  earth,  as  regards  its  territory 
and  the  inherent  law  of  its  moral  genius.  The  other 
is  the  spiritual  independence  of  nations,  according 
to  which  no  people  has  a  right  to  remain  absolutely  in 
exclusive  isolation  while  on  the  other  hand  foreign 
peoples  have  not  the  right  to  deprive  it  of  local  self-gov- 
ernment, in  so  far  as  it  does  not  violate  other  nations. 

The  second  great  effect  of  the  war  is  to  have  revealed 
the  necessity  for  the  federal  principle  of  government  to 
various  groups  of  nations  throughout  the  world.  We 
see  now  that  the  inevitable  destiny  of  Central  Europe 
is  to  become  a  United  States  with  no  one  state  among 
them  in  ascendency  over  the  others.  The  German 
Empire  has  known  nothing,  and  was  not  willing  to  know 
anything,  about  the  American  principle  illustrated  in  its 
coordination  of  forty-eight  states,  each  a  self-govern- 
ing dominion  under  a  central  sovereignty  in  which 
each  has  equal  power  with  every  other.  In  Germany, 
Prussia  has  expanded  her  own  territory  within  the 
German  Empire  by  incorporating  other  states  into 
herself;  and  in  1871  she,  using  her  greater  power,  seized 
the  lion's  share  of  political  authority  in  the  newly 
founded  empire.  Many  believe  that  Prussia  would  cease 
forever  to  be  a  menace  to  other  German  states  and  to 
the  rest  of  the  world,  were  the  Empire  to  be  recon- 
structed on  the  American  principle  of  federal  govern- 
ment. Certain  pro-German  Americans  have  maintained 
that  the  domestic  organization  of  the  German  Empire  is 
purely  Germany's  own  affair  and  is  no  business  what- 
ever of  the  Allies  and  of  neutral  nations  like  the  United 
States.  But,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out,  the  su- 
preme concern  of  neutral  republics  and  of  the  Allies  is 
this  very  method  of  domestic  political  organization  which 
the  present  constitution  of  the  German  Empire  illus- 


334     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

trates.  For,  whatever  territory  is  conquered  by 
Prussia,  or  is  ceded  to  her  in  the  terms  of  peace,  it  is 
inevitable  that  she  will  extend  to  it  her  home  principle 
of  hegemony,  whereby  Prussia  dominates  the  other 
principalities  of  the  Empire.  If,  however,  Germany 
becomes  a  United  States  with  no  one  state  in  ascendency 
over  others,  it  will  be  very  easy  to  incorporate  into  her 
domain  all  the  neighboring  peoples  who  are  kindred 
in  temper  and  speech. 

The  war  has  heightened  the  self-consciousness  of 
Norway,  Sweden,  and  Denmark,  but  at  the  same  time 
and  even  to  a  greater  degree,  it  has  reawakened  a  sense 
of  the  solidarity  of  all  the  Scandinavian  peoples.  The 
pointing  of  the  Spirit  which  broods  over  the  face  of  the 
European  chaos  is  to  a  United  States  of  Scandinavia — 
into  which  Finland  might  wish  to  enter.  There  is  no 
occasion  for  me  to  outline  an  exact  and  mechanical 
regrouping  of  the  peoples  of  Europe  under  several 
federal  governments.  More  important  is  it  to  call 
attention  to  the  way  in  which  the  war  has  forced  the 
idea  of  federal  government  upon  English  statesmen  as 
a  necessity  for  the  British  Empire.  If  the  war  lasts  for 
several  years  more,  we  should  be  quite  safe  in  prophesy- 
ing that  before  its  end  the  British  Empire  would  already 
be  a  United  States  with  not  only  local  government  for 
all  her  great  constituent  parts,  but  also  with  the  impe- 
rial sovereignty  itself  diffused  throughout  the  Empire. 
It  is  now  seen  that  a  Conference  of  the  Prime  Ministers 
of  the  self-governing  Dominions  every  four  years  cannot 
be  adequate.  Nor  is  it  possible  that  the  King  or  the 
Prime  Minister,  acting  in  the  name  of  the  King,  can  be 
the  executive  and  unifying  head  of  the  British  Empire. 
Either  the  present  House  of  Commons  must  be  so 
reconstructed  that  the  oversea's  Dominions  and  even 


Stanton  Coit  335 

India  and  Egypt  send  their  fair  share  of  representatives 
to  it,  or  a  new  imperial  parliament  must  be  founded 
and  the  old  House  of  Commons  be  restricted  to  the 
home  affairs  of  Little  England  or  of  England,  Ireland, 
and  Wales.     I  have  no  time  in   which   to   give  my 
grounds  for  asserting  that  the  present  war  has  turned 
British   statesmanship   in    the    direction    of    imperial 
federation,  but  Americans  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
political  thought  of  England  during  the  last  forty  years 
are  aware  that  this  idea  has  long  been  growing.     You 
may  be  sure  that  when  Lord  Bryce  published  and  re- 
edited  his  book  on  The  American  Commonwealth,  he 
did  so  not  to  flatter  Americans  nor  with  an  eye  to  his 
appointment  as  Ambassador  at  Washington,  but  be- 
cause he  wished  to  prepare  the  minds  of  British  voters 
for  the  ultimate  adoption  throughout  the  Empire  of  the 
American  federal  principle.     Readers  also  of  Sir  John 
Seeley's  book,  The  Expansion  of  England  (which  more 
than  any  other  volume  published  during  the  last  thirty 
years  has  molded  imperial  statesmanship)  know  well 
that   Seeley's   chief   motive  is   to  urge  the   adoption 
by  the  British  Empire  of  the  American  idea  of  federa- 
tion.    In  his  judgment  the  notion  of  many  coordinate 
states,  each  locally  self -ruled  but  all  equally  sharing 
in  the  central  sovereignty  of  the  whole  group,  seems  to 
be   the   greatest   political  invention  upon  which   the 
mind  of  man  has  ever  hit.     The  present  European  war 
has  brought  home  its  universal  applicability  to  the 
liberals  in  almost  every  country  of  Europe.      They  see 
that  federation  is  one  of  the  chief  ways  of  putting  an 
end  to  war. 

But  before  passing  to  the  third  great  effect  of  the 
European  conflict,  I  should  like  to  call  the  attention  of 
Americans  to  the  incontrovertible  and  yet  altogether 


336    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

overlooked  fact  that  England  is  not  a  part  of  Europe 
and  has  not  been  since  the  sinking  of  the  Spanish 
Armada.  England  belongs  to  the  New  World  and  the 
East.  She  is  every  bit  as  much  in  the  New  World  and 
of  it  as  is  the  United  States  of  America.  England  is 
in  Canada,  New  Zealand,  Australia,  and  in  all  these 
parts  is  in  character  as  typically  a  New  World  product 
as  this  great  republic  itself.  I  cannot  here  argue  this 
point,  but  it  is  most  important,  if  America  is  to  par- 
ticipate in  determining  the  world  peace,  that  she  should 
not  think  of  England  as  a  part  of  Europe  and  imagine 
that  the  British  Isles  might  become  one  state  in  a 
federation  with  France  and  other  European  countries. 
It  must  be  remembered  that,  politically  and  historically, 
in  sentiment  and  tradition,  the  remotest  parts  of  the 
British  Empire  are  nearer  to  one  another  than  is 
Calais  to  Dover.  If  we  take  the  point  of  view  of  kin- 
ship and  solidarity  of  mind  of  the  inhabitants,  it  is  only 
twenty  miles  from  Liverpool  in  England  to  Sidney  in 
Australia  but  is  twelve  thousand  miles  from  Dover  to 
Calais.  No  entente  cordiale  between  France  and  the 
British  Empire,  forced  upon  each  by  the  menace  of  a 
common  enemy,  can  deceive  the  people  of  either 
nation  as  to  the  fact  that  France  belongs  and  must  be- 
long to  Europe,  while  the  British  Islands  are  morally 
contiguous  with  Canada,  New  Zealand,  Australia,  and 
South  Africa. 

The  third  conspicuous  effect  of  the  war  is  its  demon- 
stration to  the  common  people  of  every  nation  of  the 
beneficent  power  of  the  State  as  an  economic  agent 
of  the  whole  people  of  each  nation.  Since  the  war 
began  the  government  in  every  nation  has  assumed 
the  r61e  as  it  were  of  Divine  Providence,  feeding 
the  people,  keeping  down  the  price  of  all  necessities, 


Stanton  Coit  337 

and  organizing  the  industrial  as  well  as  the  mili- 
tary forces.  Each  state  involved  in  the  conflict 
has  either  taken  over  industrial  functions  that  had 
hitherto  been  in  the  hands  of  private  capitalists,  or 
has  regulated  in  the  interest  of  the  community  the 
enterprises  of  individual  employers.  The  State  has 
claimed  war  profits  and  dictated  the  conditions  of 
labor.  In  this  way  the  people  of  England — to  instance 
them  only — have  learned  more  concerning  the  power 
and  the  possible  beneficence  of  the  State  as  an  industrial 
agent  than  it  seemed  likely  that  they  would  learn  in 
five  hundred  years  of  private  enterprise  such  as  pre- 
vailed throughout  the  British  Empire  until  August, 
1914.  Nor  can  previous  wars  be  cited  as  instances  in 
which  during  war  times  states  similarly  assumed  extra- 
ordinary industrial  functions  and  then  relinquished 
them  as  soon  as  the  war  was  over.  For  this  is  the  first 
great  war  in  which  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  of  the 
British  Empire  have  participated,  since  they  have  had 
general  elementary  education  and  have  been  subjected 
to  socialistic  propaganda.  The  war  has  demonstrated 
the  feasibility  of  national  collectivism.  The  people 
reason :  if  the  State  can  be  so  effectual  in  war  times,  what 
might  it  not  achieve  in  times  of  peace?  The  State  is 
now  seen  by  the  masses  of  every  country  to  be  the  one 
power  that  can  step  in  between  them  and  two  sorts 
of  enemies — profit-mongers  at  home  and  profit-mongers 
abroad.  The  war  in  this  way  has  educated  two  dis- 
tinct and  opposing  classes.  The  socialists  despite  their 
talk  about  the  nationalization  of  land  and  capital  have 
never  looked  to  their  own  nation  as  an  industrial  unit 
of  collectivism,  but,  following  Karl  Marx,  have  been 
cosmopolitan.  Even  in  England  the  labor-leaders 
have  not  been  freed  from  the  strange  aberration  of 


338     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

internationalism.  As  a  result  of  the  war,  however, 
socialists  will  henceforth  be  patriots.  Their  patriotism 
will  be  not  only  a  thing  of  sentiment,  but  the  an- 
imating spirit  of  industrial  reconstruction.  The  second 
class  whom  the  war  has  educated  consists  of  the  private 
capitalist  and  the  academic  sociologists  who  have 
believed  hitherto  that  the  State  should  not  itself  enter 
into  commerce  and  industry  except  upon  occasion  for 
the  benefit  of  private  capitalists.  Now  even  economic 
individualists  have  been  so  benefited  by  state  inter- 
vention that  they  are  almost  persuaded  that  this  war 
has  ended  the  era  of  private  enterprise  and  inaugu- 
rated an  epoch  of  national  collectivism.  Unless  the 
lessons  of  the  war  are  to  be  lost,  the  various  nation- 
states  of  the  world  are  now  entering  upon  a  new  career. 
States  themselves  will  become  the  importers  and 
exporters  of  commodities,  superseding  private  com- 
panies of  individual  traders.  International  firance  will 
be  handled  more  and  more  by  governments,  one  nation 
as  a  whole  dealing  with  another  nation  as  a  whole 
through  their  respective  governments  and  thus  elim- 
inating private  profits  both  from  international 
finance  and  from  foreign  trade.  In  this  way  the 
war  is  introducing  an  era  in  which  patriots  will  for 
the  first  time  be  socialistic  and  socialists  will  become 
patriotic. 

The  last  great  effect  which  I  have  time  to  mention  is 
the  awakening  of  democracy  throughout  Europe  and 
the  British  Empire — not  individualistic  but  collectiv- 
istic  democracy.  Each  nation  might  have  become 
intensified  in  its  selfhood  and  the  states  might  have 
assumed  the  r61e  of  industrial  agent ;  and,  still,  pater- 
nal government  in  each  country  might  have  thereby 
intrenched  itself  the  more  securely.  But  the  war  in 


Stanton  Coit  339 

every  nation  has  lifted  the  masses  up  to  the  level  of  the 
ruling  classes  by  heightening  self-respect  and  bringing 
home  to  each  individual  the  sense  of  his  own  importance 
as  a  factor  in  his  nation's  destiny.  It  is  not  easy  for  one 
who  has  not  lived  in  Germany  since  the  war  began  to 
cite  proofs  that  the  German  people  will  assert  them- 
selves as  soon  as  peace  is  declared,  whether  the  Father- 
land is  defeated  or  not.  But  anyone  who  had  known 
the  Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany  during  the 
twenty  years  preceding  the  war  will  have  no  doubt  that 
the  war  discipline  instead  of  increasing  obedience  and 
subserviency  is  generating  an  irresistible  determina- 
tion and  will-to-power  in  the  heart  of  the  common 
people.  In  England  already  labor  is  on  top  and  knows 
that  it  is.  It  has  dictated  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
recruiting.  It  will  not  oppose  conscription  provided 
the  trades  unions  are  consulted  and  heeded. 

In  closing,  a  word  about  America!  This  war,  as  I 
have  said,  has  unified  America  spiritually.  Her  ideal 
is  that  of  personal  liberty  and  equality,  of  government 
by  the  whole  people  of  a  nation  and  of  federal  union 
among  coordinate  states.  She  also  believes  in  the 
inviolability  and  the  spiritual  independence  of  all 
nations. 

Thus  far  in  her  career  she  has  remained  aloof  and 
practically  in  isolation.  Now,  however,  the  European 
War  is  forcing  her  both  from  humane  and  patriotic 
motives  as  well  as  from  industrial  interests  and  respon- 
sibilities to  become  a  world-power.  As  a  world-power, 
what  will  be  her  policy?  If  she  is  to  remain  true  to  the 
law  of  her  own  being,  she  will  use  her  prestige,  her 
organized  intelligence,  her  wealth,  and,  if  need  be,  her 
increasing  military  and  naval  force,  to  spread  among 
the  common  people  of  all  the  other  nation-states  in  the 


34°    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

world  the  principles  she  herself  has  found  to  be  so 
beneficent  within  her  own  borders.  If  her  working 
hypotheses  have  been  of  benefit  to  all  the  immigrants 
who  have  come  to  her  shores,  from  some  fifty-one 
different  nations,  she  will  reason  that  they  will  be 
equally  beneficial  to  the  kinsfolk  whom  these  relatives 
have  left  behind  in  Russia,  Prussia,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey.  America  herself  will  begin  to  do  something 
for  the  oppressed  in  every  country  in  the  world  analo- 
gous to  that  which  the  Irish  Americans  have  done  for 
Ireland.  They  subsidized  the  Home  Rule  Movement; 
they  strengthened  the  hand  of  the  Liberal  government 
in  its  effort  to  bring  political  justice  to  Ireland.  They 
thus  backed  the  first  great  enterprise  towards  federal 
government  within  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the 
same  way  America  as  a  nation-State  can  carry  liberty 
and  justice  in  a  corresponding  manner  to  the  Jews  and 
native  peasants  of  Russia.  She  can  back  the  crusade 
for  ridding  Germany  of  despotic  militarism  by  strength- 
ening the  hands  of  the  4,250,000  Republican  voters  of 
Germany — one-third  of  all  the  electors  of  the  Empire. 
If  America  means  to  flood  the  world  with  liberty, 
equality,  government-by-the-will-of-the-people  and  the 
federal-idea,  she  will  proclaim  this  as  her  policy  and 
will  forewarn  all  the  other  governments  of  the  world 
that  when  the  next  war  is  declared,  she  will  throw  her 
whole  prestige  and  power  to  the  side  of  that  party  in 
the  conflict  which  is  battling  for  liberty,  equality, 
popular  government,  and  the  federation  of  states.  To 
that  side  only  will  she  then  furnish  munitions;  but  on 
that  occasion  she  will  furnish  them  not  by  accident,  but 
on  principle.  Not  only  munitions  will  she  supply,  but 
all  the  other  necessities  of  life  which  she  can  spare. 
These  she  will  furnish,  not  from  a  motive  of  private  gain 


Stanton  Coit  341 

on  the  part  of  her  manufactures,  nor  from  the  motive  of 
increasing  the  government's  revenue,  but  because  the 
fight  for  liberty,  equality,  popular  government,  and  the 
federal  principle  is  her  fight. 

When  the  United  States  built  the  Panama  Canal,  she 
committed  herself  to  the  responsibilities  of  a  world- 
power,  but  a  world-power  of  a  new  order.  She  repudi- 
ated the  example  of  previous  empires  whose  motive  had 
been  to  serve  private  traders  and  financiers.  She 
claimed  to  be  protectress  of  the  whole  of  the  New  World 
in  the  interest  of  New  World  ideas.  It  is  an  interesting 
coincidence  that  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  World  War 
opened  almost  at  the  same  time.  They  are  enterprises 
which  confront  each  other.  Perhaps  I  cannot,  therefore, 
more  fittingly  bring  my  address  to  a  close  than  with 
a  few  lines,  expressive  of  the  spirit  and  destiny  of 
America  as  a  world-power,  taken  from  an  ode  on  the 
Panama  Canal  written  by  a  great  American  poet : 

O  lazy  laughing  Panama ! 
O  flutter  of  ribbon  'twixt  the  seas ! 
Pirate  and  king  your  colors  were 
And  stained  with  blood  your  golden  keys. 
Now  what  strange  guest,  on  what  mad  quest, 
Lifts  up  your  trophy  to  the  breeze ! 
O  Panama,  O  ribbon-twist, 
That  ties  the  continents  together, 
Now  East  and  West  shall  slip  your  tether 
And  keep  their  ancient  tryst. 


Our  ships  shall  sail 
West  to  the  ancient  East. 
Once  more  the  quest  of  the  Grail, 
And  the  greatest  shall  be  the  least. 


342    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

We  shall  circle  the  earth  around 
With  peace  like  a  garland  fine ; 
The  warring  world  shall  be  bound 
With  a  girdle  of  love  divine. 
What  build  we  from  coast  to  coast? 
It's  a  path  for  the  Holy  Ghost. 


WHAT  A  GERMAN  VICTORY  WOULD  MEAN  TO 
THE  WORLD 

BY  JOHN  A.  WALZ 

THE  present  anti-German  feeling  in  our  country  is  to 
a  considerable  extent  due  to  the  fear  of  a  German 
victory.  The  Germans,  we  are  told,  are  aiming  at 
world  dominion  and  a  German  victory  will  establish  a 
German  overlordship  in  the  world  threatening  the  inde- 
pendence of  all  other  nations,  great  and  small.  Is 
there  any  basis  in  fact  for  such  a  view?  There  are  at 
the  present  time  two  world  empires,  the  Russian 
Empire  and  the  British  Empire.  The  Russian  Empire 
developed  along  its  Eastern  boundary  because  it  had 
as  neighbors  only  inferior  Asiatic  tribes,  in  the  West 
it  grew  chiefly  on  account  of  the  political  disorgani- 
zation of  Central  Europe.  But  the  Russian  Empire 
has  a  physical  basis  of  power  such  as  only  the  Asiatic 
empires  of  the  past  have  had,  the  vast  territory  of  Cen- 
tral and  Northern  Russia,  an  inexhaustible  reservoir  of 
soldiers.  The  expansion  of  Russia  has  been  by  massive 
force,  through  quantity,  not  through  quality.  In  the 
eighteenth  century,  moreover,  when  Russia  acquired 
most  of  her  western  non-Russian  territory,  the  principle 
of  nationality  was  dormant  and  the  Russian  government 
itself  did  not  seriously  interfere  with  the  national  life  of 
the  annexed  provinces.  It  is  only  during  the  nineteenth 
century  that  Russia  has  systematically  attempted  to 

343 


344    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

force  upon  her  foreign  nationalities  Russian  institutions, 
language,  and  religion.  The  British  Empire  rests  upon 
the  command  of  the  sea.  Its  physical  basis  is  repre- 
sented by  the  geographical  position  of  England  in  the 
midst  of  the  ocean.  Command  of  the  sea  has  enabled 
the  English  to  conquer  India,  Egypt,  and  South  Africa. 

The  German  Empire  has  no  large  physical  basis. 
Its  area  covers  only  209,000  square  miles,  not  quite 
four-fifths  of  the  single  state  of  Texas.  Its  population 
is  67,000,000,  as  against  330,000,000  in  the  rest  of 
Europe,  160,000,000  in  the  Russian  Empire,  1 10,000,000 
on  the  North  American  continent,  nearly  400,000,000 
in  the  British  Empire.  How  is  it  conceivable  in  our 
age  of  democracy  and  nationality  that  a  nation  of 
67,000,000  should  lord  it  over  330,000,000  of  other 
Europeans,  not  to  speak  of  the  peoples  of  other  conti- 
nents? And  though  there  are  great  differences  in  the 
culture  and  civilization  of  the  countries  of  Europe, 
they  belong  in  general  to  the  same  race  and  the  same 
sphere  of  civilization  as  the  Germans.  They  are  not 
like  the  nomads  of  Siberia  and  the  mountaineers  of  the 
Caucasus  greatly  inferior  in  civilization. 

Can  a  victorious  Germany  ever  hope  to  become 
mistress  of  the  sea?  Here,  too,  every  physical  and 
geographical  basis  is  lacking.  The  German  coast  line 
is  not  made  for  sea  monopoly,  and  even  if  a  victorious 
Germany  were  to  control  the  coast  of  Flanders,  condi- 
tions would  not  be  essentially  changed.  We  are  told 
that  sea  power  is  indivisible,  and  that  one  country  must 
always  dominate  the  sea,  that  if  England  is  defeated, 
Germany  will  take  her  place  as  mistress  of  the  sea.  The 
teaching  of  history  is  very  different.  England  acquired 
her  absolute  control  of  the  sea  during  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  through  her  surprise  attack  on  the  Danish 


John  A.  Walz  345 

fleet  and  through  the  battle  of  Trafalgar.  Before  that 
time  she  was  the  first  naval  power  but  she  had  no 
absolute  control.  A  victorious  Germany  will  break 
the  British  monopoly  of  sea  power  but  she  cannot 
replace  it  by  a  monopoly  of  her  own.  Germany  cannot 
change  her  coast  line  and  she  cannot  alter  the  work  of 
history.  Germany  lacks  the  physical,  material,  and 
geographical  basis  for  world  dominion  on  land  or  on 
sea.  The  Germans  with  their  clear  sense  of  realities 
know  that  perfectly  well.  No  German  statesman  and 
no  reputable  German  publicist  has  ever  spoken  or 
thought  of  world  dominion  as  the  goal  of  German 
ambition.  When  they  speak  of  the  German  idea  in  the 
world  or  of  a  place  in  the  sun,  they  mean  something 
very  different.  The  charge  that  the  Germans  are  aim- 
ing at  world  dominion  is  a  part  of  that  great  campaign 
of  slander  against  everything  German  which  was 
launched  in  the  press  of  their  enemies  sixteen  months 
ago. 

Do  the  neutral  nations  of  Europe  fear  the  conse- 
quences of  a  German  victory?  Five  little  nations  are 
the  next-door  neighbors  of  the  German  Empire ;  Switzer- 
land, Holland,  Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden.  They 
are  divided  in  their  sympathies,  but  all  five  nations, 
whatever  their  sympathies,  are  determined  to  the  last 
man  to  preserve  their  nationality  and  independence. 
For  sixteen  months  they  have  maintained  strict  neu- 
trality at  great  cost  to  themselves,  though  joining  the 
Allies  would  mean  to  all  of  them  considerable  temporary 
advantages  in  trade  and  commerce.  If  they  really 
feared  that  a  German  victory  would  threaten  their 
independence,  they  would  have  joined  the  Allies  long 
ago  to  make  an  end  of  the  German  danger.  But  these 
nations  do  not  fear  a  German  victory  any  more  than 


346     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

a  victory  of  the  Allies,  and  they  do  not  propose  to 
sacrifice  blood  and  treasure  in  a  cause  which  is  not  their 
own.  They  know  the  German  government  and  the 
German  people.  Next-door  neighbors  know  each 
other  better  than  people  living  three  thousand  miles 
apart. 

If  any  further  proof  were  needed  to  show  that  a  Ger- 
man victory  will  not  endanger  the  small  nations,  it  is 
the  action  of  the  Balkan  states.  Bulgaria  joined  the 
Central  Powers  not  because  her  sympathies  were  pro- 
German  or  pro-Austrian  but  because  she  saw  that  her 
future  as  a  nation  depended  upon  the  victory  of  the 
Central  Powers.  Greece  is  maintaining  her  neutrality 
under  the  greatest  difficulties,  but  that  means  that 
Greece  does  not  believe  that  a  German-Austrian 
victory  will  endanger  her  independence.  The  same  is 
substantially  true  of  Rumania.  What  counts  in  the 
present  crisis  is  the  attitude  of  responsible  governments 
and  not  the  reports  of  a  biased  press. 

Is  the  character  of  Germany's  ally,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, such  as  to  make  a  German  victory  a  danger  to  the 
world  ?  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  her  enemies  called 
her  a  ramshackle  empire  and  were  confident  that  she 
would  fall  apart  at  the  first  rude  shock.  To-day  she 
stands  before  us  a  state  organized  and  united,  full  of 
power  and  determination.  Austria-Hungary  devel- 
oped at  a  time  when  the  principle  of  nationality  was 
unknown,  when  democracy  was  little  potent,  when 
the  dynasty  represented  the  interests  of  a  country. 
When  the  principle  of  nationality  became  established 
in  Europe,  during  the  nineteenth  century,  it  seemed 
as  though  that  monarchy  were  bound  to  disappear. 
But  in  1867  Austria  gave  full  recognition  to  the  principle 
of  nationality.  In  Austria  to-day  all  nationalities 


John  A.  Walz  347 

enjoy  the  free  use  of  their  language  which  is  guaranteed 
to  them  by  the  constitution  and  Austria  guarantees 
to  all  her  citizens  freedom  of  religion.  Austria  has  in 
principle  solved  the  most  difficult  problem  of  statecraft, 
to  unite  on  a  just  basis  the  interests  of  many  nationali- 
ties differing  in  language  and  religion,  to  enable  each  one 
to  follow  the  bent  of  its  national  genius  and  to  make 
them  all  loyal  to  the  common  political  organism.  In 
practice,  it  is  true,  there  will  always  be  difficulties  to 
overcome,  but  great  principles  are  bound  to  suffer  when 
applied  in  practice. 

Russia  is  not  a  national  state,  it  embraces  even 
more  nationalities  than  Austria-Hungary,  but  the 
Great  Russians,  the  real  bearers  of  the  Empire,  have 
adopted  a  policy  the  reverse  of  the  Austrian.  They 
have  made  the  Orthodox  Faith  the  only  recognized 
religion,  membership  in  which  alone  confers  full  citizen- 
ship; other  religions  are  merely  tolerated.  And  the 
Great  Russians  are  trying  hard  to  destroy  the  nation- 
ality of  the  non-Russian  peoples  within  the  Empire. 

Austria  has  proven  herself  the  protector  of  the  small 
nationalities  and  of  religious  freedom.  That  has 
given  to  the  Dual  Monarchy  its  unexpected  marvelous 
strength. 

Does  any  sane  man  believe  that  the  Poles,  the  Czecks, 
the  Magyars,  the  Croatians  are  sacrificing  the  flower  of 
their  manhood  in  order  to  pass  under  German  dominion 
in  case  of  victory?  No.  These  nationalities  realize 
that  their  whole  future  as  separate  entities  depends 
upon  a  German  victory  and  that  their  common  political 
organism,  the  Dual  Monarchy,  will  cease  to  exist  if 
Germany  is  defeated.  They  know  that  a  victory  of  the 
Allies  will  make  Russia  supreme  upon  the  Continent 
and  England  and  France  will  count  for  little  in  Central 


348    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

and  Eastern  Europe.  It  is  to  prevent  national  extinc- 
tion that  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  are  fighting 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  armies  of  Germany. 

Austria-Hungary  points  the  way  to  the  future 
formation  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  a  union  or 
confederacy  of  nations  large  and  small,  which  will 
insure  safety  and  freedom  to  all,  with  a  sufficient 
guarantee  that  the  rights  of  each  one  will  be  respected. 
In  reading  the  numerous  articles  in  German  and 
Austrian  periodicals  dealing  with  the  future  condition 
of  Central  Europe  you  find  invariably  the  idea  of  a 
union  of  some  kind  between  the  German  Empire  and 
Austria-Hungary  based  upon  common  defense  and 
common  economic  interests,  a  union  which  might  in- 
clude Bulgaria  and  Turkey  and  other  states  willing 
to  join  it  and  which  would  leave  to  all  partners  the 
utmost  freedom  in  internal  affairs.  It  is  the  first  sign, 
indistinct  as  yet,  of  a  new  Europe,  of  a  confederacy  of 
European  states  based  not  upon  common  nationality 
but  upon  common  interests  and  mutual  justice.  It 
will  be  the  federal  principle  of  the  German  Empire 
applied  very  loosely  combined  with  the  principle  of 
nationality  of  Austria.  It  will  mean  that  war-ridden 
Europe  will  become  the  permanent  home  of  peace. 

Turkey  does  not  sacrifice  her  men  to  help  Germany  or 
Austria.  But  Turkey,  like  Bulgaria,  knows  that  her 
existence  as  a  nation  depends  upon  a  German  victory. 
We  may  not  like  the  Turks,  but  we  cannot  deny  to  that 
virile  people  the  right  of  self-government  which  we  are 
ready  to  grant  to  all  other  nations.  For  over  fifty 
years  England  was  the  protector  of  Turkey,  not  because 
she  loved  the  Turks  but  because  she  feared  Russia. 
Some  ten  years  ago  Great  Britain  made  peace  with 
Russia  at  the  expense  of  Persia.  Turkey  saw  what  was 


John  A.  Walz  349 

in  store  for  her.  But  the  Turks  are  not  Persians  and 
they  preferred  fighting  to  the  fate  of  Persia. 

When  Great  Britain  lost  her  interest  in  Turkey 
Germany  stepped  in.  It  was  the  German  policy  to 
strengthen  Turkey  from  within  by  military  reorgan- 
ization and  by  the  development  of  the  country's  econo- 
mic resources.  A  strong  Turkey  was  in  the  interest  of 
Germany,  a  weak  Turkey  in  the  interest  of  Russia 
and  Great  Britain.  The  Young  Turks  saw  that  as 
clearly  as  the  old  Sultan.  A  German  victory  will  mean 
the  regeneration  and  modernization  of  Turkey,  not  as  a 
vassal  state  of  Germany  but  as  an  independent  country 
which  may  in  some  form  be  linked  to  Central  Europe. 
The  Young  Turks  have  shown  that  their  race  is  capable 
of  assimilating  modern  ideas. 

Japan  has  shown  to  the  world  that  an  Asiatic  nation 
is  able  to  govern  and  to  defend  itself.  If  Turkey,  with 
the  aid  of  Germany,  can  maintain  her  independence 
against  the  armies  of  the  Allies,  why  should  not  Persia 
aspire  to  independence,  why  not  the  nations  of  Central 
Asia,  why  not  India  with  her  ancient  civilization? 
Germany  can  never  hope  to  rule  Persia  or  India,  but 
she  may  be  able  to  help  both  countries  to  gain  freedom 
and  independence,  and  her  organizing  genius  may  assist 
both  countries  in  establishing  stable  government.  The 
longer  the  war  lasts  the  more  likely  it  is  that  the  nations 
of  Asia  will  achieve  independence.  It  will  mean  a  new 
era  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

And  here  we  come  to  the  true  significance  of  a  Ger- 
man victory.  Germany  from  necessity  stands  for  the 
independence  of  nations  and  a  German  victory  will 
mark  the  end  of  the  great  world  empires  based  upon 
conquest.  It  will  replace  conquest  by  cooperation  and 
will  establish  the  democracy  of  nations. 


350     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

In  this  Germany  is  not  guided  by  altruistic  motives 
but  by  enlightened  self-interest.  It  is  to  the  interest  of 
Germany  that  the  Balkan  States  enjoy  peace  and  stable 
government,  that  Turkey  develop  her  resources,  that 
Persia  be  independent,  that  Egypt  determine  her  own 
economic  policy,  that  the  door  remain  open  in  China, 
that  the  laws  of  the  sea  be  made  by  all  sea-faring  nations 
in  common.  But  all  these  things  are  also  in  the  interest 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  is  the  reason  why  we 
German-Americans  and  a  few  other  Americans  have 
always  maintained  that  the  foreign  interests  of  this 
country  and  of  Germany  are  in  all  essentials  identical. 
The  time  will  come  when  this  will  be  recognized. 

The  political  effects  of  a  German  victory  will  affect 
Europe  and  Asia  but  hardly  our  own  country.  Other 
effects  will  be  felt  here.  We  are  told,  to  be  sure,  that  a 
victorious  Germany  will  challenge  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  even  contemplate  an  invasion  of  the  United  States. 
A  tyro  in  naval  matters  may  see  that  no  modern  fleet 
is  able  to  engage  in  serious  hostile  operations  4000 
miles  from  its  base.  We  deny  the  good  faith  or  the 
good  sense  of  the  men  who  are  trying  to  arouse  the 
American  people  by  the  bogy  of  a  German  invasion  of 
North  or  South  America.  We  have  shown  the  impossi- 
bility of  a  German  political  world  empire  and  a  layman 
in  military  matters  has  seen  that  none  of  the  belligerents 
has  attempted  to  land  an  army  on  enemy  shore  with  the 
exception  of  the  Dardanelles.  The  Germans  have  not 
even  attempted  to  land  troops  in  England  or  north  of 
Riga,  the  British  have  not  attempted  to  land  troops 
in  Belgium  to  attack  the  Germans  from  the  rear.  The 
landing  at  the  Dardanelles  was  attempted  only  after  the 
Allies  had  seized  a  few  neutral  and  undefended  islands 
to  serve  as  base. 


John  A.  Walz  351 

The  effects  of  a  German  victory  upon  our  country 
will  be  quite  different.  We  see  to-day  the  armies  of 
Germany  on  enemy  soil  though  they  have  always  been 
greatly  outnumbered  by  their  opponents.  It  looks 
very  much  like  a  victory  of  quality  over  quantity. 
It  is  no  longer  possible  to  speak  of  an  autocracy  or  a 
military  caste  forcing  an  unwilling  people  into  a  war  of 
aggression. 

No  despotic  government  and  no  caste  government 
in  history  have  ever  accomplished  what  the  Germans 
have  accomplished  during  the  last  eighteen  months. 
Democracy  alone  is  capable  of  such  efforts.  But  what 
is  German  democracy  and  how  does  it  work  ?  The  pro- 
gressive movement  in  this  country  is  the  attempt  to 
apply  German  methods  and  principles  of  government 
to  American  conditions,  to  Germanize  or,  if  you  please, 
to  Prussianize  American  institutions.  Two  thirds  of 
the  progressive  platform  of  1912  represent  an  Ameri- 
can transliteration  of  German  governmental  principles 
and  practices.  There  is  a  most  interesting  political 
document  that  contains  the  answer,  the  platform  of  the 
progressive  party  of  1912.  The  progressive  platform 
demands  the  conservation  of  human  resources  through 
an  enlightened  measure  of  social  and  industrial  justice, 
protection  for  the  workingman  through  a  system  of  social 
insurance,  the  lifting  of  the  last  load  of  illiteracy  from 
American  youth,  national  regulation  of  corporations 
and  industrial  organizations,  a  non-partisan  tariff 
commission,  conservation  of  natural  resources,  protec- 
tion of  agriculture,  economy  and  efficiency  of  the 
government  service.  But  all  these  things  have  been 
recognized  in  principle  by  the  German  government  and 
people  for  the  last  thirty  years  and  most  of  them  have 
been  fully  carried  out  in  practice. 


352     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

A  German  victory  will  mean  the  victory  of  pro- 
gressive legislation  in  this  country  whatever  may 
become  of  the  progressive  party.  Old  age  pensions, 
compulsory  insurance,  and  other  social  measures  may 
not  be  Anglo-Saxon,  but  we  are  Americans  and  our 
workmen  will  insist,  as  they  have  done,  on  obtaining 
the  same  rights  and  the  same  protection  that  German 
workingmen  enjoy,  and  our  business  men  will  demand  of 
the  government  the  same  intelligent  impartial  interest 
in  the  business  of  the  whole  country  and  the  same 
protection  against  the  exploitation  of  the  few  that  Ger- 
man business  men  enjoy  at  the  hands  of  their  govern- 
ment. The  common  people  in  all  industrial  countries 
will  be  benefited  by  a  German  victory,  for  all  these 
countries  will  be  compelled  to  adopt  progressive  legis- 
lation, that  is,  German  principles  of  government.  In 
this  sense  it  may  truly  be  said  that  a  German  vic- 
tory will  benefit  victors,  vanquished,  and  neutrals. 
The  German  state  has  serious  faults  but  Ger- 
many has  been  winning  not  through  her  faults 
but  through  her  greater  virtues,  and  England,  France, 
and  Russia  have  been  losing,  not  through  their 
virtues  which  are  great,  but  through  their  faults, 
which  are  greater.  Let  me  quote  from  a  recent 
book,  Socialized  Germany,  by  the  distinguished  com- 
missioner of  immigration,  Mr.  Frederic  C.  Howe, 
p.  324: 

Germany  differs  from  other  leading  countries  in  the  thought 
that  has  been  given  to  the  distribution  as  well  as  the  pro- 
duction of  wealth.  And  no  other  country  has  so  greatly 
improved  the  well-being  of  so  large  a  portion  of  the  people. 
This  is  the  real  explanation  of  her  power;  this  lies  back  of 
her  military  achievements;  this  explains  her  advance  in 
trade  and  oversea  commerce. 


John  A.  Walz  353 

P.  321 :  "This  emphasis  on  human  welfare  is  one  of 
the  remarkable  things  about  the  German  idea  of  the 
state. "  As  to  German  city  government  Mr.  Howe  says, 
p.  85:  "There  is  far  less  exploitation  by  privileged 
interests  than  in  America,  far  less  than  in  England. " 
As  to  education : 

Undoubtedly  Germany  is  the  most  highly  educated  nation 
in  the  world.  There  is  no  illiteracy  in  Germany  or  practi- 
cally none.  Education  is  prized  by  all  classes.  It  is 
looked  upon  as  the  one  avenue  of  advancement.  .  .  .  The 
German  educational  system  is,  if  not  a  model  that  can  be 
copied  by  other  countries,  at  least  a  suggestion  of  the 
commanding  position  which  education  will  probably  enjoy 
in  the  civilization  of  the  future. 

It  is  clear  that  a  German  victory  must  hasten  the  time 
when  education  will  occupy  the  commanding  position 
in  the  life  of  the  civilized  world  of  which  at  the  present 
time  Germany  alone  gives  a  suggestion. 

The  progressive  platform  contains  the  solemn  pledge 
of  the  party  to  maintain  the  government  of  the  people, 
by  the  people  and  for  the  people.  Millions  of  citizens 
voted  the  progressive  ticket  because  they  believed  that 
there  was  not  enough  government  by  the  people  and 
for  the  people.  They  wished  to  do  away  with  the  invis- 
ible and  irresponsible  government  sitting  enthroned 
behind  the  ostensible  government.  The  German 
government  is  not  a  government  of  the  people,  its 
historical  development  has  been  quite  different,  but 
it  has  become  more  and  more  a  government  by  the 
people  and  especially  for  the  people.  In  many  and 
important  phases  of  public  life  the  Germans  have  the 
substance  of  democracy  while  we  have  the  shadow. 
Mr.  Duncan-Clark  has  summed  up  the  ideas  under- 
23 


354    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

lying  the  progressive  movement  as  follows:  Human 
rights  are  superior  to  property  rights,  justice  is  a  bigger 
word  than  charity,  honesty  is  a  bigger  word  than  success, 
cooperation  is  more  potent  for  human  welfare  and  pro- 
gress than  competition,  and  the  highest  ideal  of  citizen- 
ship is  service.  But  these  are  the  principles  underlying 
the  German  government  in  theory  and  in  practice  and 
these  principles  will  become  triumphant  in  the  world 
through  a  German  victory.  There  will  be  more  govern- 
ment by  the  people  and  a  great  deal  more  for  the  people. 

And  here  we  come  to  the  heart  of  the  anti-German 
sentiment  in  our  country.  Capitalism  throughout  the 
world  has  an  instinctive  aversion  to  the  German  govern- 
ment, but  the  seat  of  capitalism  is  the  city  of  London 
and  its  most  important  branch  is  Wall  Street.  Capital- 
ism in  England  has  succeded,  under  the  guise  of  parlia- 
mentary forms,  in  making  itself  supreme  at  the  expense 
of  the  English  masses.  Capitalism  means  the  govern- 
ment by  the  few  and  for  the  few.  But  German  prin- 
ciples of  government  are  inexorably  opposed  to  the 
rule  of  capitalism  at  the  expense  of  the  common  people. 
The  Germans  were  the  first  to  recognize  that  unre- 
strained capitalism  means  the  subjection  and  exploi- 
tation of  the  masses  whether  the  form  of  government 
be  monarchical  or  republican. 

A  German  victory  will  mean  the  curbing  of  the  power 
of  capitalism  throughout  the  world  and  that  means 
the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  social  and  economic 
life  of  the  nations.  It  is  perfectly  logical  for  the  cham- 
pions of  capitalism  to  tell  us  that  a  German  victory 
will  mean  the  suppression  of  the  individual  in  favor 
of  the  state.  They  scent  the  danger  and  they  are 
trying  to  avert  it  by  painting  the  results  of  a  German 
victory  in  the  most  lurid  colors.  Capitalism  is  individ- 


John  A.  Walz  355 

ualism  raised  to  its  highest  power.  It  is  for  the  benefit 
of  the  individual  and  its  good  or  bad  use  depends 
solely  upon  the  character  of  the  individual.  But  hu- 
man nature  is  weak  and  the  temptations  are  strong. 
In  restraining  capitalism  in  the  interest  of  the  whole 
people  and  in  compelling  the  strong  individual  to 
respect  the  rights  of  his  weaker  fellow  individual, 
Germany  does  not  crush  individuality  but  makes  it 
serve  the  common  good.  To  the  charge  that  German 
principles  of  government  suppress  individuality  we 
reply  with  the  question :  Which  one  of  the  belligerent 
nations  seems  to  have  brought  forward  the  largest 
number  of  individuals  able  to  meet  the  crisis?  Which 
nation  has  had  the  most  competent  leaders  in  military, 
financial,  economic,  and  social  matters?  But  leadership 
means  strong  individuality. 

Cooperation  is  the  basis  of  the  German  idea  of  the 
state.  As  a  principle  it  had  been  accepted  by  the 
German  people  long  before  the  war,  during  the  war 
it  has  penetrated  all  phases  of  national  life.  Coopera- 
tion as  an  applied  principle  of  government  is  without 
question  a  form  of  socialism,  a  collectivistic  form  of 
society.  All  the  belligerent  countries  have  been  forced 
to  adopt  the  principle  of  cooperation  and  they  have  in- 
troduced many  measures  which  before  the  war  would 
have  been  inconceivable  in  a  capitalistic  form  of  society, 
but  nowhere  have  these  measures  been  so  successfully 
carried  out  as  in  Germany,  for  the  whole  trend  of 
German  development  before  the  war  was  towards  co- 
operation. England,  too,  in  spite  of  her  boasted 
individualism  has  adopted  the  German  system  of  co- 
operation, but  fundamental  changes  in  governmental 
principles  and  practices  cannot  be  carried  out  success- 
fully upon  short  notice.  England's  failure  in  the 


356    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

present  crisis  is  due  to  her  antiquated  principles  of 
government  which  are  based  upon  the  unrestrained 
individualism  of  former  generations,  upon  competition. 
But  Germany  has  shown  that  her  government  is  based 
upon  modern  principles  and  she  has  demonstrated  to  the 
world  that  cooperation  is  more  potent  than  competition. 

A  German  victory  will  mean  that  the  principle  of 
cooperation  will  find  a  place  in  the  national  organi- 
zation of  all  the  countries  that  do  not  wish  to  lag  be- 
hind in  their  internal  development.  It  will  mean  the 
curbing  of  capitalism  and  the  uplifting  of  the  common 
people.  It  will  in  no  way  interfere  with  the  develop- 
ment of  strong  individualities,  but  it  will  replace  the 
English  idea  of  citizenship  which  is  individual  liberty 
by  the  German  ideal  of  citizenship  which  is  service. 

One  word  about  German  efficiency.  Less  than  two 
years  ago  efficiency  was  the  watchword  of  our  states- 
men, publicists,  and  educators.  It  was  held  up  as  the 
one  thing  needful  for  the  American  people.  But  when 
we  suddenly  saw  the  rising  of  a  nation  that  was  truly 
efficient,  the  word  lost  all  its  magic  charm  for  our  edu- 
cators and  moralists.  It  acquired  a  bad  connotation 
and  many  hesitate  to  use  it  to-day.  But  in  spite  of 
that  there  has  never  been  a  man  efficient  in  anything 
who  did  not  possess  certain  valuable  moral  qualities, 
and  no  nation  has  ever  been  efficient  without  great 
moral  strength.  Efficiency  presupposes  honesty,  love 
of  work,  and  a  strong  sense  of  duty.  These  are  the 
moral  qualities  at  the  bottom  of  German  efficiency. 
A  German  victory  will  give  to  these  qualities  a  higher 
value  throughout  the  world  than  they  have  ever  had 
before.  And  if  the  neutral  nations  have  anything  to 
fear  from  a  German  victory,  they  must  fear  German 
efficiency  but  not  the  German  armies  or  men  of  war. 


THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  UPON  PAN-AMERI- 
CAN COOPERATION 

BY  SENHOR  MANGEL  DE  OLIVEIRA  LIMA 

EUROPE,  whose  age  ought  to  have  rendered  her 
wiser,  has  foolishly  made  of  America  a  true 
"continent  of  peace"  amidst  the  universal  delirium  of 
the  moment.  The  name  had  often  been  given  to  her  in 
conference  addresses  and  post-prandial  speeches,  but  it 
was  rather  a  usurped  reputation.  We  have  paid  our 
contribution  to  warfare.  History  shows  that  in  the  last 
century,  besides  the  innumerable  civil  wars — and  in  this 
field  the  primacy  also  belongs  to  the  United  States — 
your  country  fought  against  England,  against  Mexico, 
and  against  Spain;  my  country  fought  against  Argen- 
tina, against  Uruguay,  and  against  Paraguay;  Chile 
fought  against  Peru  and  against  Bolivia;  Peru  fought 
against  all  her  neighbors,  and  so  forth,  until  we  reach 
the  toy  battles  of  Central  America. 

Now  we  really  deserve  the  title,  although  we  have 
done  nothing  else  for  it  than  to  keep  quiet ;  but  to  keep 
quiet  in  these  times  of  crazy  activity  and  contagious 
folly,  is  indeed  something,  is  even  a  great  deal,  and  we 
must  claim  the  credit  that  belongs  to  us  for  good  behav- 
ior. The  United  States  especially  have  several  times 
seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  being  drawn  into  the 
whirlpool,  yet  they  have  managed  so  far  to  keep  safely 

away. 

357 


358    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

I  am  certainly  not  going  to  discuss  the  question  of 
responsibility,  whether  this  war  was  begun  by  one  party 
or  the  other.  The  subject  is  fortunately  and  wisely  left 
out  of  our  program.  Its  discussion  would,  moreover, 
lead  to  no  practical  result.  Arguments,  reasons,  facts, 
coincidences  would  be  brought  in  by  each  side  with- 
out convincing  the  other.  Neutrality  is  the  easiest 
thing  on  earth  to  profess  and  the  most  difficult  to 
apply:  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  impart  to  others 
the  conviction  that  it  is  being  applied.  Every  neu- 
trality is  benevolent  towards  one  of  the  sides  in  a 
larger  or  smaller  degree,  and  to  have  such  a  feature 
suppressed,  it  would  be  necessary  to  abide  by  some- 
thing called  impartiality,  in  which  I  do  not  believe, 
although  I  claim  to  be  impartial. 

On  Latin  America  the  war  has  had  generally  detri- 
mental effects,  so  far  as  the  economic  situation  is  con- 
cerned, but  morally  it  has  had  a  wholesome  effect. 
It  has  drawn  the  Latin-American  countries — the 
South-American  countries  at  least — more  closely  to- 
gether than  anything  else,  for  the  very  same  and  simple 
reason  that  the  people  of  a  far-away  village  would  flock 
together,  like  sheep,  if  they  saw  at  a  distance  a  group 
of  highwaymen  righting  to  decide  who  was  the  strongest 
and  the  richest  in  that  region.  They  would  justly 
dread  to  fall  under  the  sway  of  the  victor  and  have 
to  pay  him  tribute,  unless  the  fighters  should  all  of  them 
become  so  exhausted,  that  they  would  have  no  strength 
left  for  the  task  of  exacting  such  tribute.  But  even  so 
it  would  be  but  a  matter  of  time,  as  one  of  the  highway- 
men would  surely  recover  more  quickly  than  the  rest, 
and  distance  does  not  count  nowadays.  Everything 
goes  fast  in  the  air  or  under  the  water. 

Cooperation  may  be  thus  considered  the  legitimate 


Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima     359 

child  of  fear, — and  may  be  regarded  as  more  natural 
and  certain  when  there  already  exists  an  embryo  of 
association — one  of  the  famous  pan  in  which  the  world 
is  divided — for  the  benefit  of  races  and  the  fostering 
of  progress,  so  people  say,  but  in  fact,  in  most  cases, 
to  keep  up  their  rivalry  and  their  hatred.  Pan- 
Americanism,  I  must  say,  is  the  most  harmless  of  them 
so  far,  particularly  when  compared  with  pan-Slavism, 
pan-Germanism,  pan-Islamism  and  a  few  others  of  the 
lot.  It  has  not  yet  grown  sufficiently  to  become  ag- 
gressive :  it  just  begins  to  show  itself  defiant,  like  a  lion 
cub  reared  in  the  house  and  which  all  of  a  sudden  makes 
use  of  its  claws  and  its  teeth. 

With  our  pan  in  mind,  many  persons  are  persuaded 
that,  should  any  attack  occur  with  a  view  to  sub- 
jugation of  a  Latin-American  country  by  a  European 
power,  the  sister-republics  would  stand  united  and 
protect  the  country  so  threatened.  If,  for  instance, 
Germany  ever  attempted  to  establish  a  protectorate 
over  South  Brazil,  or  more  accurately,  the  States  of  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul  and  Santa  Catharina,  then  Argentina 
and  Chile  would  hasten  to  help  us.  If  Chile  happened 
to  be  the  intended  victim  of  a  Japanese  raid,  Argentina 
and  Brazil  would  surely  turn  out  to  be  her  chief  sup- 
porters in  the  struggle  against  the  Asiatic  enemy 
which  is  developing  into  the  nightmare  of  the  Pacific 
coast  of  America. 

I  am  not  so  sure  of  that  assistance.  I  firmly  believe 
in  American  solidarity,  but  I  believe  still  more  in  human 
selfishness.  The  war  which  is  raging  in  Europe  is  of  a 
nature  to  render  anyone  extremely  pessimistic.  Just 
look  at  the  Balkans.  Are  they  not  all  of  the  same 
race  or  very  nearly  so — Jugoslavs  or  simply  Slavs, 
but  anyhow  Slavs — and  those  of  a  different  race,  do 


360    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

they  not  profess  the  same  creed  and  are  they  not  sup- 
posed to  be  bound  by  the  same  ideals  ?  Is  not  Bulgaria, 
however,  anxious  to  suppress  Serbia ;  Greece  indifferent 
to  the  fate  of  her  ally  of  yesterday;  Roumania  closely 
watching  the  game  and  its  profits?  Is  there  anything 
on  the  American  continent  so  different  from  Europe, 
that  all  political  wickedness  should  be  magically 
changed  into  social  altruism?  It  may  be  so,  but  per- 
sonally I  am  not  conscious  of  the  fact. 

Peru  was  deprived  of  two  of  her  provinces — much 
more  Peruvian,  for  instance,  than  Alsace  is  French — 
and  Chile  has  not  been  compelled  to  give  up  her  con- 
quest, or  even  to  fulfill  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
which  provided  for  a  plebiscite  after  ten  years'  occu- 
pation. Peru,  by  the  way,  has  been  trying  to  find  a 
territorial  compensation  at  the  expense  of  Ecuador. 
A  few  years  ago,  Chile  would  have  gladly  welcomed 
any  curtailment  of  Argentine  power,  and  vice  versa. 
The  Christ  of  the  Andes  has  perhaps  worked  the 
miracle  of  suppressing  any  uncharitable  thoughts. 
Brazil  and  Argentina  are  very  good  friends  now,  but 
they  have  not  yet  settled  to  whom  belongs  the  hege- 
mony on  the  eastern  coast  of  South  America — because 
in  our  America,  just  as  in  wicked  Europe,  the  word 
hegemony  belongs  to  the  international  vocabulary  and 
supremacy  is  equally  found  in  such  a  lexicon. 

Of  one  thing  though  I  am  pretty  sure:  that  the 
United  States  would  lose  no  time  in  assisting  the  victim 
instead  of  assisting  the  aggressor.  The  French  Ambas- 
sador in  London,  Mr.  Paul  Cambon,  an  old,  shrewd 
diplomat,  sarcastically  remarked  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  that  it  was  rather  useless  to  try  arguments  in  order 
to  bring  new  partners  to  the  Allies.  Blows  were  all 
that  were  wanted,  as  not  a  few  countries  would  gladly 


Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima     361 

fly  to  the  victor.  The  United  States  know  too  well 
that  they  could  not  afford  to  have  victors  over  here, 
other  than  themselves.  It  is  the  one  question  of  hege- 
mony and  supremacy  in  the  New  World. 

So  there  is  hardly  any  chance  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  will  disappear;  it  will  continue  either  in  its 
former  unilateral  feature,  or  in  the  multiple  combined 
aspect  that  some  (and  I  belong  to  the  number)  have 
been  suggesting  it  should  assume,  not  so  much  through 
fear  of  an  external  aggression,  as  for  the  sake  of 
domestic  cooperation  favorable  to  a  common  devel- 
opment. This  is  one  of  the  rare  cases  in  which  egoism 
serves  altruism  and  exclusiveness  aids  association. 

Certainly  Latin-American  countries  have  also  a  deep 
interest,  all  of  them,  in  their  eventual  union  against  a 
common  possible  foe,  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  com- 
mon foe  to  America;  but  it  is  quite  natural  that  they 
should  rely  for  the  emergency  on  the  proved  strength 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  democracy  of  America.  Sister 
republics  as  they  are,  what  is  the  use  of  having  a  big 
brother,  athletic  and  fearless?  Some  of  them  are  of  a 
more  affectionate  nature  than  the  others  and  sincerely 
love  the  big  brother.  A  few  may  have  a  grudge  against 
him  for  some  past  quarrel  and  would  not  dislike  to  see 
him  a  trifle  snubbed.  Such  a  state  of  mind  in  a  large 
sisterhood  is  very  complicated  and  I  will  not  venture 
into  this  psychology. 

I  should  like  to  repeat  to  you  the  good  saying  of  the 
Chief  Executive  of  a  tiny  republic  created  under  your 
auspices.  He  boasted  one  day  before  a  high  American 
official — who  related  the  story  to  me— that  his  country 
was  the  third  naval  power  in  the  world,  and  as  this 
seemed  to  surprise  the  gentleman  I  am  quoting,  he 
added:  "Why,  we  launched  to-day  the  battleship 


362    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Texas;  isn't  the  fleet  of  the  United  States  by  chance 
intended  to  protect  our  independence,  which  has  been 
guaranteed  by  your  country?" 

The  war  has  had  a  remarkable  influence  in  every 
department  of  the  human  realm.  There  is  not  one 
that  has  been  unaffected  by  it.  I  can  hardly  conceive, 
for  instance,  priests  of  my  Catholic  faith  fighting 
in  soldiers'  uniforms,  pointing  their  rifles  against 
human  creatures,  and  shooting  them  dead  without 
shuddering.  I  had  been  taught  that  priests  only 
assisted  the  dying,  that  they  never  killed  anybody 
unless  they  had  repudiated  their  sacerdotal  character. 
Am  I  to  kneel  at  the  feet  of  a  man  who  has  his  hands 
tinged  with  blood,  I,  who  never  destroyed  a  bird?  I 
cannot  forget  the  humanitarian  traditions  of  my 
country  nor  that  our  most  glorious  soldier,  the  Duke 
de  Caxias,  when  invited  by  the  bishop  and  chapter  of 
Marianna  to  attend  a  service  to  commemorate  his 
victory  over  the  political  rebels  of  1842,  replied  that 
the  duty  of  the  clergy  was  to  pray  for  the  dead  and  not 
to  celebrate  fratricidal  fights  which  only  grieved  the 
national  soul.  This  subject  is,  however,  alien  to  us. 
Let  us  consider  the  subject  of  the  day,  which  is  fortu- 
nately less  painful  in  its  gravity. 

Latin-American  business  is  suffering  seriously 
through  the  obstacles  put  in  the  path  of  its  commerce, 
and  the  losses  sustained  are  already  very  important. 
Since  the  United  States  and  the  Argentine  Republic  do 
not  suffer  as  much  as  do  other  countries,  they  cannot 
realize  the  situation  to  its  whole  extent.  If  you  cannot 
export  cotton  to  Germany,  you  may  export,  on  an 
enormous  scale,  guns  and  ammunition  to  the  Allies. 
Argentina  feeds  the  Allies'  troops  with  frozen  beef,  and 
sends  horses  and  mules  to  the  battle  fields,  and  wheat 


Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima     363 

and  corn  to  the  belligerent  populations  which  are  unable 
to  pursue  the  bucolic  work  of  the  land  and  are  not 
allowed  to  starve.  But  poor  Chile,  that  chiefly  exported 
her  nitrate  to  fertilize  the  German  plains,  and  poor 
Brazil,  that  counted  the  Central  Empires  as  her  best 
customers  for  coffee  and  now  is  not  allowed  to  ship 
more  than  a  certain  restricted  quantity  to  Holland  and 
to  Scandinavia,  so  that  it  may  not  reach  the  German 
trenches  and  stimulate  the  nerves  of  the  German 
soldiers!  If  the  war  is  to  last  much  longer  and  the 
crops  are  to  be  heaped  in  Brazilian  warehouses,  Brazil, 
which  exports  226  million  dollars'  worth  of  coffee 
out  of  a  total  of  362  million  dollars'  worth  produced,  will 
be  as  ruined  as  England  will  be  bankrupt,  which  is  no 
consolation  to  us,  who  are  not  in  the  war  and  have  kept 
a  strict  neutrality. 

Meanwhile,  Brazilian  ships  bound  from  Santos  to 
Dutch  ports,  that  is,  neutral  ships,  bound  from  a 
neutral  port  to  another  neutral  port,  employed  in  the 
most  legitimate  commerce — since  coffee  is  no  article 
of  war,  not  even  of  food — have  been  detained  on  the 
high  seas  and  ordered  to  proceed  to  English  harbors, 
to  have  their  cargoes  examined  and  their  status  defined 
by  a  British  prize  court,  which  means  by  the  authorities 
of  one  of  the  belligerents.  So  the  belligerents  dictate 
to  the  neutrals  the  articles  in  which  they  may  trade 
amongst  themselves  and  to  what  extent,  instead  of  the 
neutrals  imposing  on  the  belligerents  rules  and  proced- 
ures of  war  that  will  not  hurt  their  own  interests. 

In  fact,  this  war  as  regards  commerce  has  been  as 
much  waged  against  the  neutrals  as  between  the  belli- 
gerents, and  there  has  been  none,  I  believe,  in  which 
neutrals  have  been  exposed  to  so  many  prohibitions 
and  subjected  to  so  many  vexations  in  their  traffic. 


364    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

It  is  not  only  in  Germany  that  everything  is  verboten: 
England,  as  the  power  now  predominant  at  sea,  has 
practically  done  the  same,  although  she  is  justly  con- 
sidered to  be  the  nursery  of  liberal  ideas.  It  is  true 
that  no  government  is  so  near  despotism  as  democracy : 
monarchies  belong  to  the  autocratic  family  and  they 
have  learned  by  experience  that  the  secret  of  success 
does  not  consist  in  suppressing  freedom.  It  rather 
consists  in  organizing  it. 

I  really  think  that  cooperation  among  the  neutrals 
would  bring  about  a  better  state  of  things  for  all  of 
them  in  time  of  war,  and  it  would  even  result  in  the 
cessation  of  war,  if  such  cooperation  was  what  it  should 
and  ought  to  be — absolutely  neutral  as  regards  the 
belligerents,  and  decidedly  opposed  to  war  as  a  bar- 
baric method  unworthy  of  our  civilization.  I  hear, 
however,  people  speaking  of  benevolent  neutralities, 
which  suppose  malevolent  neutralities:  what  distin- 
guishes the  first  from  alliances  and  the  latter  from 
hostility  ? 

The  concept  of  neutrality  is  the  first  thing  to  be 
settled  and  defined  before  neutrals  start  cooperating. 
Are  the  shipping  of  ammunition  and  the  lending  of  the 
money  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  to  be  considered 
compatible  with  neutrality,  or  do  such  acts  contradict 
neutrality  ?  Why  should  it  be  a  crime  for  the  nationals 
of  a  belligerent  country  living  in  a  foreign  country  to 
furnish  coal  to  the  men-of-war  of  their  own  nationality 
raiding  on  the  ocean,  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  no 
crime  for  the  nationals  of  that  foreign  neutral  country 
to  gorge  themselves  with  the  product  of  the  lavishly 
paid  engines  of  destruction  manufactured  and  sold  by 
them?  I  abstain  from  giving  my  personal  opinion:  I 
only  suggest  the  queries. 


Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima      365 

What  kind  of  moral  authority  can  be  claimed  by  a 
neutral  who  wants  to  mediate  between  belligerents  and 
who  appears  before  them  charged  with  those  breaches  of 
neutrality,  if  they  are  to  be  so  considered  ?  Is  prepared- 
ness, when  it  is  avowedly  undertaken  against  one  side, 
to  be  reconciled  with  friendship  towards  both  sides? 
All  these  questions  are  to  be  answered  before  any  serious 
trial  of  cooperation  can  be  made. 

In  his  very  recent  lectures  at  the  Lowell  Institute, 
Professor  Wilson,  of  Harvard  College,  a  recognized 
authority  on  international  law,  when  referring  to 
unneutral  service,  illustrated  his  case  with  two  instances. 
It  would  be  an  unneutral  service,  he  said,  for  the 
Fore  River  Shipyard  to  build  and  equip  a  submarine 
and  send  it  to  sea  under  its  own  power  to  join  the 
Allied  fleet.  But  it  would  not  be  an  unneutral  service 
to  manufacture  the  pieces  for  such  a  submarine  and  to 
send  them  to  Canada  to  be  put  together  and  completed. 
Similarly,  a  completely  equipped  expedition  could  not 
be  sent  out  from  America  to  join  the  Allies  or  the 
Germans.  But  a  number  of  friends  might  join  together, 
sail  informally  on  a  ship,  and  have  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion in  the  hold:  they  would  not  constitute  an  armed 
expedition. 

The  line  is  narrow,  as  the  eminent  professor  explained, 
but  it  has  to  be  drawn  somewhere.  Why  not  simply 
draw  it  where  no  mistake,  no  confusion  is  possible,  at 
the  point  where  pure  common  sense  indicates  that 
neutrality  and  unneutrality  part  company?  The  line 
has  to  be  drawn  somewhere,  certainly;  but  I  venture 
to  say,  not  ad  libitum,  according  to  every  neutral 
preference  or  convenience.  It  must  be  drawn  by 
justice,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  justice  would  rather 
dictate  that  all  those  conflicting  examples  are  of  an 


366    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

invariably  unneutral  character :  it  matters  little  whether 
the  submarine  is  completed  in  the  States  or  in  Canada, 
whether  the  expeditions  carry  the  guns  on  deck  or  in 
the  hold.  The  contrary  would  savor  too  much  of  a 
comedy. 

We,  in  South  America,  have  been  really  and  truly 
neutral  throughout  this  war:  I  don't  mean  individuals, 
as  it  would  be  obviously  impossible  to  regulate  in  the 
same  way  both  the  official  attitude  and  the  expression 
of  the  personal  feelings  of  the  officials  themselves.  No 
encouragement  of  any  kind  has  been  given  to  any 
partiality,  and  strict  policing  has  been  employed. 
In  Brazil,  a  league  was  immediately  formed  for  the 
Allies,  comprising  many  intellectuals,  fed  on  French 
culture,  but  another  league  was  formed  for  the  Central 
Powers,  equally  made  up  of  intellectuals,  fond  of  Ger- 
man scholarship.  At  charity  festivals,  on  the  same 
stage,  although  on  different  days  and  before  different 
assemblies,  the  busts  of  King  Albert  and  Emperor 
William  were  to  be  seen,  the  first  praised  as  an 
heroic  knight  and  the  second  exalted  as  a  great 
sovereign. 

Let  me  add  that  our  German-Brazilians  have  not 
been  considered  foreigners  by  us,  nothing  indeed  on  their 
side  justifying  such  treatment,  so  that  we  are  all  asking 
ourselves  what  has  become  of  that  famous  German 
peril,  which  has  been  so  strenuously  pointed  out  by 
others?  If  not  for  other  reasons,  then  just  through 
our  behavior,  we  Latin  Americans  are  consequently 
entitled  to  help  peace  in  an  effective  way;  to  ask  for  a 
lasting  peace  and,  anyhow,  to  protect  ourselves  against 
the  bad  effects  of  future  wars ;  contributing  to  define  the 
rights  of  the  neutrals,  together  with  the  responsibilities 
of  the  belligerents.  That  is  the  way  in  which  we  may 


Senhor  Manoel  de  Oliveira  Lima     367 

better  cooperate  for  the  harmony  of  the  political  world 
and  the  welfare  of  human  society. 

I  think  that  nothing  would  better  help  the  cause  of 
the  neutrals  than  the  abolition  of  the  right  of  seizure 
of  private  property  on  sea  as  on  land  in  time  of  war. 
The  freedom  of  the  oceans  would  in  this  way  be  per- 
fectly assured,  and  armaments,  naval  armaments  at 
least,  could  surely  be  reduced.  Is  it  not  an  American 
doctrine  ?  Was  it  not  presented  as  such  by  Secretary  of 
State  Marcy  when  the  Congress  of  Paris  established  in 
1856  the  two  famous  rules  of  maritime  commerce  that 
the  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  contraband  of  war,  and  that  neutral  goods, 
with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war,  are  not 
liable  to  capture  under  the  enemy's  flag?  These  rules 
though  are  not  to  be  avoided  by  making  of  everything 
contraband  of  war. 

They  were  contemptuously  repudiated  in  the  present 
war,  together  with  many  others  framed  in  the  con- 
ferences of  peace.  Sir  Edward  Carson  said  in  a  speech 
delivered  but  a  few  weeks  ago  on  the  "Duty  of  Neu- 
trals," that  conventions  adopted  in  times  of  peace 
could  be  upheld  only  by  neutrals,  and  he  added  that 
international  law,  the  product  of  all  the  peace  instincts 
of  all  nations  with  a  view  to  preventing  interruption  to 
civilization,  even  in  time  of  hostilities,  had  been  entirely 
abolished  or,  at  any  rate,  greatly  encroached  upon  by 
the  ineptitude  and  powerlessness  shown  by  neutrals. 

If  it  is  so,  and  I  am  afraid  it  is;  if  war  has  gone  back 
to  its  most  brutal  ways,  to  its  most  inhuman  aspects — 
non-combatants  immolated  by  airships'  bombs  and  sub- 
marine torpedoes,  populations  threatened  with  starva- 
tion, etc. — only,  as  the  ex-attorney  general  of  Great 
Britain  says,  because  of  the  impotence  of  the  neutrals 


368    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

themselves,  their  responsibility  is  great.  In  fact  they 
have  in  their  hands — specially  a  powerful  neutral  of 
prestige  like  the  United  States — the  ability  to  stop 
any  war.  Pan-American  cooperation  will  not  fail  to 
back  the  leader  of  such  a  union,  if  it  chooses  to  exer- 
cise its  authority  in  the  sense  of  conciliation.  Neutrals 
indeed,  which  are  supposed  to  be  free  from  passion 
in  the  struggle,  can  and  must  begin  by  enforcing 
the  respect  for  the  rules  of  international  jurisprudence 
through  some  kind  of  international  injunction.  Peace 
is  to  be  organized  as  war  has  been  organized. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  RED  CROSS  FOR 

PEACE 

BY  MABEL  T.  BOARDMAN 

IT  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  moral  code  of  man,  the 
individual,  in  his  relations  to  his  fellow  men  is  far 
superior  to  the  code  that  governs  nations  in  their  rela- 
tionship to  their  fellow  nations.  Man,  the  individual, 
centuries  ago  left  the  Stone  Age  far  behind  him,  but 
nations  still  cling  to  the  primitive  ethics  of  this  early 
period.  International  law  fails  as  yet  to  embody  the 
principles  of  the  ancient  Decalogue  in  its  provisions. 
"Thou  shalt  not  steal, "  makes  the  man  who  breaks  the 
law  a  criminal,  but  nations  plunder  each  other  without 
a  seeming  blot  upon  the  escutcheon  of  their  national 
honor.  "Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  makes  the  man  who 
slays  his  fellow  man  a  murderer,  yet  nations  destroy 
their  tens  of  thousands,  chanting  after  every  victory 
their  triumphant  te  deums  to  the  author  of  the  old 
Mosaic  law. 

To  speak  of  the  present  titanic  conflict  as  a  lapse 
into  barbarism  is  hardly  just.  Within  the  last  fifty 
years  every  one  of  the  chief  nations  involved  has  been 
engaged  in  other  wars.  Three  times  during  the  life  of 
the  man  not  yet  threescore  years  and  ten  our  own 
nation  has  resorted  to  arms  to  settle  foreign  or  domestic 
difficulties.  .  Wars  are  not  a  return  to  barbarism,  but 
a  perpetuation  of  barbarism. 
24  369 


370     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

Amidst  the  horrors  of  death,  desolation,  and  inde- 
scribable suffering  are  there  no  signs  of  better  things? 
Must  we  stand  helplessly  appalled  before  the  triumph 
of  man's  brutal  nature,  hopeless  as  to  the  ability  of 
nations  to  rise  above  this  bestial  plane? 

All  evolution  is  so  slow  that  at  close  range  it  becomes 
hardly  visible,  and  only  by  the  long  perspective  of 
history  can  any  progress  be  discerned.  I  doubt  myself 
if  on  the  active  field  of  battle  any  real  advancement 
can  be  found.  Warfare,  like  everything  else  with 
which  man  has  to  do,  has  reaped  the  benefits  of  scientific 
skill.  The  scope  and  the  power  of  modern  inventions 
for  the  destruction  of  human  life  have  so  increased 
within  a  few  decades  that  a  single  battle  of  to-day  would 
have  wiped  out  of  existence  entire  armies  of  a  century 
ago.  Man  himself  under  the  horrible  excitement  of 
strife  becomes  mad  with  blood  lust  and  hardly  a  more 
responsible  being  than  his  ancestors  of  the  caves. 
Picture  a  single  scene  of  this  modern  warfare.  An 
onslaught  is  to  be  made  upon  the  enemy's  lines.  With 
the  earliest  dawn  above  the  waiting  men,  begins  the 
deafening  roar  of  the  huge  guns  of  the  artillery  in  the 
rear,  pounding  the  enemy's  trenches  with  a  hail  of  shot 
and  shell.  Clutching  their  guns,  the  men  lie  side  by  side, 
with  faces  white  and  tense  in  the  early  dawn.  One 
strokes  another's  arm.  One  turns  to  kiss  his  comrade's 
cheek.  The  sergeant  clutches  the  foot  of  his  command- 
ing officer,  who,  bending  towards  him,  hears  the  hoarse 
whisper, ' '  With  you,  my  Captain,  with  you. ' '  Not  a  man 
but  knows  that  death  may  claim  him  as  its  own  before 
the  sun  now  rising  sinks  into  the  west.  Not  a  man  but 
knows  if  he  falls,  and  his  comrades  retreat,  he  must  be 
left  to  die  without  aid  or  succor  where  he  lies.  On  the 
signal,  out  of  their  earth  burrows  dash  the  long  lines  of 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  371 

nerve-strained  and  wildly  excited  men.  Leaping  into 
the  enemy's  trenches,  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  ensues. 
No  quarter  is  given  or  taken.  Above  ground  there  is 
no  protection  for  prisoners'  convoys,  and  if  the  second 
trench  is  to  be  attacked  no  living  man  can  be  left  behind 
to  endanger  those  who  must  advance.  Hand  grenades 
put  an  end  to  any  who  may  have  hidden  in  the  shelter 
of  the  caves  they  have  constructed,  and  finally,  as  the 
forces  spring  forward  to  the  next  attack,  a  few  detailed 
for  trench-cleaning  duty  make  an  end  of  any  wounded 
men  who  may  prove  dangerous.  A  thousand  years 
ago  men  fought  with  no  greater  fury  or  barbarity. 
Prisoners  are  taken  only  when  armies  are  cut  off,  or 
some  of  their  detachments  surrounded,  or  fortified 
places  captured.  For  my  part,  I  do  not  find  any 
particular  virtue  or  advancement  in  the  efforts  to  make 
war  humane  by  treaty  prohibition  of  certain  kinds  of 
ammunition  like  dumdum  bullets.  War  cannot  and 
never  will  be  a  humane  institution,  and  shrapnel  wounds 
are  quite  as  horrible  as  those  caused  by  the  prohibited 
missiles.  It  is  well,  however,  that  public  opinion  takes 
cognizance  of  the  atrocities  of  war  and  burns  with 
indignation  over  these  horrors,  for  atrocities  are  a  part 
and  parcel  of  all  wars,  past  and  present,  and  will  be  such 
as  long  as  wars  occur.  These  minor  atrocities  go  to 
make  up  the  great  sum  of  atrocity,  WAR  ITSELF. 

Hopeful  signs  for  humane  progress  are,  therefore,  not 
to  be  found  in  the  midst  of  shot  and  shell,  of  bullet  and 
bayonet,  of  aeroplane  and  submarine,  but  in  the  still, 
small  voice  of  the  people's  conscience. 

The  fact  that  the  nations  involved  in  to-day's  mighty 
conflict  seek  in  books  and  pamphlets  as  many-hued  as 
the  rainbow  to  justify  to  the  world  their  action  for 
entering  into  the  war,  gives  a  note  of  promise  that  the 


372 

awful  deluge  of  blood  now  flooding  the  battle  fields  of 
Europe  will  not  occur  again.  The  people  of  the  world 
are  becoming  ashamed  of  war  and,  conscious  of  their 
shame,  strive  most  diligently  to  find  its  justification. 

There  is  to-day  another  sign  of  moral  growth  that  not 
only  stands  as  a  milestone  on  the  road  of  national  pro- 
gress towards  a  higher  ethical  plane,  but  which  I  believe 
possesses  possibilities  as  yet  undreamed  of. 

As  a  witness  of  the  awful  sufferings  after  the  battle 
of  Solferino,  in  1859,  a  Swiss,  Henri  Dunant,  issued  a 
pamphlet  graphically  depicting  the  conditions  and 
experiences  of  the  wounded.  This  little  pamphlet 
marked  an  era  in  history  and  led  to  the  Treaty  of  Gen- 
eva, which  provided  for  the  mitigation  of  the  sufferings 
of  war.  This  is  probably  the  only  treaty  in  the  world 
devoted  wholly  to  humanitarian  provisions.  The 
Treaty  of  The  Hague,  which  extends  its  obligations  to 
naval  warfare  and  embraces  the  question  of  the  treat- 
ment of  prisoners  of  war,  embodies  also  other  matters. 

In  opening  the  first  Conference  of  Geneva,  previous 
to  the  drafting  of  the  Treaty,  Monsieur  Moynier,  the 
presiding  officer,  said : 

It  has  been  stated  that  instead  of  seeking  expedients  to 
render  war  less  murderous  we  should  do  better  to  attack  the 
evil  at  its  root  and  to  work  toward  universal  and  perpetual 
pacification  of  the  world.  To  hear  our  critics  it  would 
really  seem  that  we  are  attempting  to  do  nothing  less  than 
take  part  in  legitimate  warfare  by  regarding  it  as  a  neces- 
sary evil. 

Is  this  criticism  serious?  I  cannot  believe  so.  We  cer- 
tainly desire  as  much  as,  and  more  than,  anyone,  that  men 
shall  jease  to  butcher  one  another  and  that  they  shall  repu- 
diate this  remnant  of  barbarism  which  they  have  inherited 
from  their  forefathers.  With  the  aid  of  Christianity,  they  will 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  373 

succeed  in  doing  this  sooner  or  later,  and  we  applaud  the 
efforts  of  those  who  work  to  bring  about  better  relations. 
However,  we  are  convinced  that  it  will  be  necessary  for  a 
long  time  yet  to  reckon  with  human  passions  and  endure 
their  baleful  consequences.  Why,  then,  if  we  cannot 
absolutely  and  immediately  do  away  with  them,  should 
we  not  seek  to  lessen  them?  Charity  commends  this 
course,  and  it  is  because  we  have  listened  to  the  voice  of 
charity  that  we  are  here.  I  cannot  understand  wherein 
our  attempts  would  seem  to  be  calculated  to  retard  the 
dawn  of  the  era  of  peace  of  which  we  see  a  glimpse.  More- 
over, I  am  convinced  that  in  organizing  assistance  for 
the  wounded,  in  addressing  earnest  appeals  to  the  inhab- 
itants in  behalf  oc  their  misery,  and  in  describing,  for  the 
needs  of  our  cause,  the  lamentable  spectacle  of  a  battle- 
field, unveiling  the  terrible  realities  of  war  and  proclaiming 
them  in  the  name  of  charity,  a  thing  which  it  is  too  often 
the  interest  o:  politics  to  keep  hidden,'  we  shall  do  more 
for  the  disarmament  of  peoples  than  those  who  resort 
to  the  economy  arguments  or  declarations  of  sterile  senti- 
mentality. 

There  is  an  interesting  fact  connected  with  the 
adoption  of  the  Treaty  of  Geneva  not  generally  known. 
A  large  majority  of  the  conferees  were  military  men 
and  humane  men,  but  fearing  from  the  professional 
point  of  view  the  privileges  it  sought  to  grant.  Mr. 
Charles  Bowles,  one  of  the  American  delegates,  when 
the  Treaty's  fate  hung  in  the  balance,  arose  in  the  Con- 
vention and  explained  the  similar  orders  issued  during 
our  Civil  War  to  the  armies,  their  success,  and  the  work 
of  the  Sanitary  Commission .  This  practical  illustration 
of  the  treaty  provisions  undoubtedly  was  a  potent 
factor  in  bringing  about  its  adoption.  It  was  not 
ratified,  however,  by  the  United  States  Government 
until  1882. 


374    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

By  means  of  the  Treaty  not  only  are  the  sick  and 
wounded  to  be  respected,  and  cared  for,  without 
distinction  of  nationality,  by  the  belligerents  in  whose 
power  they  are;  but  another  humanitarian  measure 
worked  for  the  alleviation  of  the  mental  suffering  of 
the  families  of  the  sick  and  wounded  prisoners  by  the 
provision  that  the  belligerents  shall  keep  each  other 
mutually  informed  of  the  conditions  of  these  men, 
for  transmission  to  their  families  and  friends. 

Such  provisions  as  these,  together  with  the  require- 
ments for  the  humane  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war 
embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  The  Hague,  led  to  influences 
for  peace  little  realized.  Consider  for  a  moment  the 
long  resentment  felt  in  the  North  after  the  Civil  War, 
because  of  the  treatment  of  the  Federal  prisoners  at 
Anderson ville.  Watch  to-day  the  bitterness  of  repri- 
sals when  reports  of  the  ill-treatment  of  wounded  or 
prisoners  arise.  Look  on  the  other  side  of  the  picture. 
During  the  Russo-Japanese  war  the  devoted  care  given 
both  by  the  Government  and  the  Red  Cross  of  Japan 
to  the  sick  and  wounded  Russian  prisoners,  sent  back 
to  Russia,  when  the  war  was  over,  thousands  of  little 
centers  that  could  not  fail  to  radiate  a  subtle  influence 
for  peace  and  the  reestablishment  of  friendly  relationship 
between  the  two  countries. 

At  the  Eighth  International  Conference  of  the  Red 
Cross,  held  in  London  in  1907,  a  well-known  authority 
on  international  law,  Professor  Martens,  head  of  the 
Russian  Red  Cross  Prisoners'  Bureau,  reported: 

As  under  the  Red  Cross  flag  there  can  be  no  bitterness, 
and  that  justice  should  be  rendered  to  all,  I  feel  it  my  duty 
to  inform  this  conference  that  the  states  at  war  gave  all 
necessary  aid  in  furnishing  the  desired  information;  and 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  375 

a  fact  extraordinary  in  the  annals  of  international  relations, 
in  spite  of  the  conflict  the  relations  between  the  Red  Cross 
of  the  two  countries  at  enmity  never  ceased  to  be  most 
correct  and  amiable  during  the  entire  war. 


This  work  of  mercy  had  alone  made  such  relation- 
ship possible.  War  had  broken  every  bond — that 
of  diplomacy,  of  commerce,  and  of  the  postal  service; 
but  stronger  than  the  force  of  war  was  the  bond  of  the 
Red  Cross.  As  the  occupation  in  the  destruction  of 
human  life  drags  man  downward  towards  the  brute, 
that  of  the  merciful  work  of  the  Red  Cross  in  the  con- 
servation of  human  life  has  its  elevating  influence. 
It  lifts  man  above  the  condition  of  the  savage  onto  the 
higher  plane  of  human  brotherhood. 

That  the  spirit  of  the  Red  Cross  is  twice  blessed 
is  well  known  to  those  who  have  had  much  to  do  with 
our  own  share  in  the  present  European  war.  Where- 
ever  groups  of  persons  have  banded  themselves  together 
to  aid  one  belligerent  or  one  group  of  belligerents,  their 
marked  and  intense  sympathy  with  that  particular 
side  in  the  controversy  becomes  very  evident,  and 
they  but  reflect  the  spirit  that  makes  war  possible. 
Realizing  that  it  is  far  wiser  to  recognize  human  nature 
as  it  is,  the  Red  Cross  has  welcomed  all  within  its  sphere 
of  helpfulness  and  opened  wide  its  medium  of  useful- 
ness to  any  who  may  desire  to  send  their  aid  to  the 
Allies  only,  or  to  the  Central  Powers;  and  by  such 
recognition  brings  those  whose  hearts  are  really  warm 
for  human  suffering  into  close  contact  with  the  broader 
spirit  of  universal  humanity. 

Turning  back  to  the  position  of  governments  in  war, 
we  cannot  fail  to  recognize  the  difficult  position  of  the 
neutral  state  in  maintaining  its  neutrality.  The 


376    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

present  conflict  is  so  vast,  embracing  eight  powers  on 
the  one  side  and  four  on  the  other,  and  including,  save 
the  United  States  and  China,  the  most  important 
nations  of  the  world, — that  each  of  the  countries 
involved  dares  not  lose  any  advantage.  As  a  conse- 
quence, the  rights  of  neutral  nations  are  frequently 
disregarded.  Ever  since  the  war  began  we,  as  a  neutral 
nation,  have  been  forced  diplomatically  to  fight  for  our 
rights.  Each  time  that  these  rights  have  been  disre- 
garded there  has  arisen  a  feeling  of  resentment  among 
our  own  people ;  and  each  demand  made  upon  a  foreign 
power  for  the  recognition  of  such  abuse,  its  discontinu- 
ance, and  reparation  for  the  wrong  committed,  arouses 
resentment  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  the  nation 
concerned.  On  the  other  hand,  the  neutrality  of  the 
Red  Cross  is  of  an  entirely  different  nature,  and  pro- 
duces an  entirely  different  attitude.  It  is,  if  I  may  use 
the  term,  a  positive  neutrality.  It  makes  no  attacks,  it 
demands  no  rights;  it  asks  simply  that  it  may  give  to 
those  who  suffer,  and  give  its  aid  to  all.  It  sits  in 
judgment  upon  no  cause,  and  by  no  criticism  closes 
the  open  doors  of  opportunity  before  it.  More  blind 
than  justice,  it  questions  not  the  suffering  that  it  aids, 
and  finds  a  welcome  everywhere. 

Nearly  four  hundred  of  our  Red  Cross  surgeons, 
nurses,  and  sanitary  experts  have  cared  for  the  sick  and 
wounded  in  Europe.  Hospital  supplies  and  garments 
by  millions  of  pounds  have  been  sent.  Hundreds  of 
thousands  of  dollars  have  gone  for  the  maintenance 
of  hospitals,  the  health  of  refugees,  the  aid  of  pris- 
oners, and  many  other  humanitarian  institutions — all 
pitiful  needs  the  war  has  produced.  Not  a  nation 
but  has  poured  out  its  gratitude  for  our  sympathy 
and  our  help  for  their  suffering  people. 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  377 

As  a  group  of  our  surgeons  and  nurses  were  leaving 
Vienna,  one  of  the  officers  of  the  Austrian  Red  Cross, 
in  his  words  of  farewell,  said  to  them : 

Enormous  material  losses  have  befallen  us.  Towns 
have  been  destroyed  and  countries  have  been  devastated. 
Precious  human  life  has  been  slaughtered.  But  far  greater 
than  any  material  losses,  those  ideals— carefully  guarded— 
of  humanity,  the  fruit  of  centuries  of  civilization  have 
been  destroyed.  In  these  terrible  events  we  can  see  one 
ray  of  sunshine  in  the  truly  neutral  love  you  bestowed 
upon  your  fellow  creatures  ,  not  inquiring  whether  friend 
or  enemy.  The  farmer,  looking  over  his  ravaged  field  after 
a  terrible  tempest,  sees  in  the  midst  of  the  destruction  a 
single  flower,  which  means  to  him  a  happy  outlook,  and 
hope  for  the  future.  This  flower  is  the  true  Samaritan 
whose  apostolic  messenger  came  to  us  in  you.  This  true 
Samaritan  work  gives  consolation  and  hope  for  a  better 
future.  Not  only  for  this  do  we  thank  you — that  you  came 
over  here  to  heal  our  wounded — but  much  more  do  we  thank 
you  that  through  your  work  of  true  Samaritan  love,  uncon- 
cerned whether  friend  or  foe,  you  have  kept  alive  the  convic- 
tion that  those  ideals  of  neighborly  love  have  not  died  out. 

It  is  in  such  deeds  of  mercy  that  the  Red  Cross 
sows  the  seeds  of  brotherly  sympathy  that  make  for 
peace.  When  the  day  dawns  wherein  the  nations  shall 
learn,  as  men  have  learned,  that  there  exists  something 
more  than  international  treaties  of  rights,  and  that  that 
something  is  a  positive  command,  "Thou  shalt  love  thy 
neighbor,"  the  foundations  of  lasting  peace  will  have 
been  laid. 

In  the  meantime,  we  must  deal  with  the  results 
of  hatred  and  strife  and,  unnecessary  as  it  should  be, 
must  continue  to  occupy  ourselves  in  mitigating  the 
sufferings  caused  by  "man's  inhumanity  to  man." 


378    Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

May  I  turn  now,  for  a  moment,  to  another  field  of 
Red  Cross  service,  its  labors  for  the  relief  of  suffering 
after  a  disaster  in  foreign  lands,  and  mention  only 
one  of  the  many  cases  that  I  might  cite. 

The  central  part  of  China,  the  Huai  River  basin, 
sometimes  called  the  "granary  of  the  Empire,"  from 
times  before  recorded  history  begins  has  suffered  from 
great  floods  and  their  resulting  famines  whereby  mil- 
lions of  people  have  been  brought  to  greater  misery 
than  any  other  calamity  can  cause  except  that  of  war 
alone.  For  the  relief  of  the  starving  people  of  this 
valley  the  American  Red  Cross  has  expended  nearly 
$600,000.  Among  the  people  of  China  some  ten 
years  ago,  angered  by  the  exclusion  law,  there  had 
arisen  a  deep  feeling  of  resentment  against  America. 
The  help  given  to  the  starving  population,  together 
with  the  remission  of  the  indemnity,  Mr.  Root,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  believed  changed  completely  the 
attitude  both  of  the  Chinese  Government  and  the 
people  towards  our  country,  from  that  of  antagonism 
to  one  of  friendly  relations.  To-day  China  looks  to  us 
as  her  best  and  most  unselfish  friend. 

Not  content  with  rendering  relief  after  the  famines 
had  begun,  our  Red  Cross,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  sent  a  board  of  eminent  engineers 
to  study  flood  and  famine  prevention  in  the  Huai 
valley.  The  report  of  this  board  of  engineers  shows 
that  by  modern  and  scientific  drainage,  at  a  reasonable 
cost,  flood  prevention  is  feasible,  the  land  reclaimed 
and  improved  fully  repaying  the  expense  of  the  work. 
China  turned  to  the  American  Red  Cross  to  aid  her 
in  obtaining  the  necessary  loan  and  to  secure  the  engin- 
eer to  be  placed  in  charge  of  the  construction  by  her 
Government.  When  a  tentative  draft  for  the  loan  was 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  379 

submitted  to  the  Chinese  Minister  in  Washington,  with 
the  provision  that  in  case  of  the  disability  of  this 
engineer  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  contractors 
should  select  his  successor,  the  Minister  declared 
his  Government  would  not  be  satisfied  unless  in  such 
a  case  the  successor  was  selected  by  the  American 
Red  Cross. 

The  Red  Cross  had  represented  to  the  people  of  China 
the  disinterested,  helpful  friendship  of  the  people  of 
America,  above  suspicion  and  above  reproach.  Back 
of  it  lay  no  ulterior  motive  that  threatened  the  integrity 
of  their  Empire,  and  no  selfish  purpose  that  endangered 
their  welfare.  Unfortunately,  the  financial  world  had 
been  so  seriously  affected  by  the  European  war  that 
the  bankers  were  not  willing  to  take  up  this  loan  at  that 
time.  I  am  glad  to  say  that  at  present  serious  considera- 
tion is  being  given  to  the  matter  by  our  most  important 
financiers. 

Dr.  Reinsch,  the  American  Minister  at  Peking, 
writes  of  the  proposed  work : 

I  may  state  to  you,  as  I  have  said  to  the  Department  of 
State  and  to  the  President,  that  there  is  no  undertaking  at 
present  proposed  in  China  which  equals  in  importance  and 
significance  the  Huai  River  improvement.  It  is  not  only 
that  millions  of  acres  of  the  most  fertile  agricultural  land 
of  China  will  be  reclaimed  to  usefulness,  affording  assured 
means  of  livelihood  to  twenty  million  human  beings  but 
the  character  of  the  work  itself  is  of  such  a  nature  that 
its  execution  would  have  a  profound  influence  on  the  future 
of  China.  The  work  would  be  a  model  for  scientific  method 
and  organization  as  applied  throughout  Chinese  life. 
More  especially,  however,  it  would  be  the  beginning  of 
reclaiming  the  waste  lands  of  China  and  utilizing  the  forces 
of  nature,  as  represented  in  the  rain-swollen  streams,  with 


380     Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War 

the  result  that,  according  to  the  computations  of  competent 
experts,  the  agricultural  productivity  of  China  could  be 
increased  by  nearly  one  hundred  per  cent.  This  is  the 
starting  point  of  all  reform,  leading  to  the  betterment  of 
conditions  of  life  in  this  country.  That  these  opportunities 
exist  is  recognized  by  the  leading  representatives  of  all 
nations:  the  American  project  has  therefore  been  given 
generous  commendation  and  support  in  the  press  through- 
out the  world,  such  as  has  never  fallen  to  any  other  foreign 
enterprise  in  China,  without  exception. 

I  have  written  so  fully  to  you  about  this  matter  because 
I  realize  that  in  this  enterprise  lies  the  finest  opportunity 
which  America  has  ever  had  of  bringing  a  great  liberating 
influence  to  bear  in  China — liberating  millions  of  people, 
and  eventually  the  entire  population,  from  the  dominance 
of  unfavorable  natural  conditions.  All  Americans  in  China 
realize  the  importance  of  this  work.  Having  put  our  hands 
to  the  improvement  of  famine  conditions  in  central  China,  it 
has  become  a  matter  of  justifiable  national  pride  that  this 
great  work  should  be  carried  to  the  successful  issue  which  is 
now  in  sight. 

The  Red  Cross  is  new  to  China,  but  is  there  some- 
thing of  a  vision  in  the  powers  some  of  her  people 
attribute  to  it  ? 

During  the  revolutionary  wars  men  sought  its 
protection,  or  brought  their  treasures  to  the  hospi- 
tals to  place  them  under  the  safety  of  its  folds.  In  a 
certain  inland  city,  where  the  fighting  was  severe,  a 
teacher  moved  a  little  group  of  scholars  from  the 
school  to  the  station  to  take  them  to  a  safer  place, 
marching  them  forth  under  a  Red  Cross  flag,  both 
the  fighting  factions  respecting  the  emblem  which 
safeguarded  the  children. 

The  observance  of  its  sanctity,  the  prevention  of 
its  abuse,  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized.  The 


Mabel  T.  Boardman  381 

nation,  the  physician,  or  the  nurse  that  utilizes  its 
sacred  privileges  for  any  purpose  whatsoever  save  that 
.for  which  it  was  created,  commits  a  crime  against 
humanity.  It  has  proven  to  the  world  that  one  flag 
may  command  the  respect  and  the  protection  of  all 
nations.  This  is  not  possible  for  any  other  emblem 
the  world  has  ever  known.  No  symbol  of  religion,  no 
insignia  of  peace — even  the  flag  of  truth — ever  pos- 
sessed this  world-wide  recognition.  What  then  is  the 
secret  of  this  Red  Cross  power?  I  believe  it  is  because 
in  its  mission  is  found  the  best  there  is  in  man's  nature. 
There  is  no  room  in  its  true  service  of  humanity  for  self- 
ishness, for  hatred,  or  for  strife.  It  disarms  suspicion, 
and  builds  up  confidence.  I  believe  through  the 
medium  of  the  Red  Cross  a  new  era  may  dawn  upon  this 
war-weary  world— an  era  not  of  national  rights,  but  an 
era  of  international  duties  and  international  service. 
Leagues  of  peace  and  courts  of  arbitration  will  never  do 
away  with  the  arbitrament  of  arms  until  the  founda- 
tions of  international  relationships  are  built  upon  the 
rock  of  international  friendship  and  good  will. 


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